




Titel der Dissertation 
Full Protection and Security in International Law 
Verfasser 
Finnur Magnússon 
angestrebter akademischer Grad 
Doktor der Rechtswissenschaften (Dr. iur) 
Wien, 2012  
Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt: A >783 101< 
Dissertationsgebiet  lt. Studienblatt: Rechtswissenschaften 
Betreuer: Univ.-Prof. Mmag. Dr. August Reinisch LL.M. (NYU) 
 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................ 7 
 
PREFACE ................................................................................................................................ 9 
 
PART I 
The Full Protection and Security Standard and its historical evolution 
1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 17 
1.1 Subject of the study and methodology ........................................................................ 17 
1.2 A summary of the substance and structure of the study........................................... 18 
1.3 The use of categories ...................................................................................................... 20 
 
2. THE HISTORY OF THE STANDARD OF FULL PROTECTION AND  
    SECURITY........................................................................................................................ 21 
2.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 21 
2.2 Protection of nationals abroad – the breakdown of consensus ............................... 22 
2.3 Codification of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaties ............................. 27 
2.4 The emergence of bilateral investment treaties .......................................................... 31 
2.5 The success and failure of multilateral instruments ................................................... 33 
2.6 Regional instruments ...................................................................................................... 36 
2.7 Non-governmental initiatives ........................................................................................ 39 
2.8 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 40 
 
PART II 
The sources and content of the Full Protection and Security Standard  
3. SOURCES OF THE FULL PROTECTION AND SECURITY STANDARD .. 45 
3.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 45 
3.2 Sources of international law .......................................................................................... 46 
3.3 Sources of international investment law ...................................................................... 48 
3.3.1 General .................................................................................................................. 48 
3.3.2 International investment treaties ....................................................................... 48 
3.3.2.1 Structure of investment treaties and its implications .......................... 48 
3.3.2.2 Bilateral investment treaties .................................................................... 49 
3.3.2.2.1 The meaning of different parts and their structure ............... 49 
3.3.2.2.2 Overview of different formulations ......................................... 53 
3.3.2.3 Regional treaties ........................................................................................ 62 
3.3.2.3.1 The meaning of different parts and their structure ............... 62 
3.3.2.3.2 Overview of different formulations ......................................... 63 
3.3.2.4 Multilateral treaties ................................................................................... 69 
3.3.2.4.1 The meaning of different parts and their structure ............... 69 
3.3.2.4.2 Overview of different formulations ......................................... 70 
3.3.2.5 The effect of different formulations ...................................................... 74 
3.3.3 Customary international law .............................................................................. 75 
3.3.3.1 Customary international law and foreign investment ......................... 75 
3.3.3.2 Customary international law as a minimum standard ......................... 75 
3.3.3.3 The relationship between the treaty-based standard and   
            the minimum standard of customary international law ..................... 78 
3.3.3.4 Can a clear conclusion be drawn? .......................................................... 84 
3.3.4 General principles of law recognized by civilized nations ............................. 86 
3.3.5 Arbitral awards ..................................................................................................... 91 
3.3.6 Writings of highly qualified publicists .............................................................. 96 
3.4 The status of international investment law within the sphere of   
      public international law and municipal law ................................................................. 97 
3.5 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 100 
 
4. INTERPRETATION OF THE STANDARD OF FULL PROTECTION  
    AND SECURITY ......................................................................................................... 103 
4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 103 
4.2 General considerations as regard interpretation ...................................................... 104 
4.2.1 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ................................................. 104 
4.2.2 The meaning of “protection”.......................................................................... 107 
4.2.3 The meaning of “security” .............................................................................. 110 
4.3 Interpretation in practice ............................................................................................ 114 
4.3.1 Textual interpretation – ordinary meaning ................................................... 114 
4.3.2 Object and purpose .......................................................................................... 117 
4.3.3 Contextual interpretation ................................................................................. 118 
4.3.4 Can the intention of the parties be ascertained? .......................................... 123 
4.4 Treaty interpretation and customary international law........................................... 127 
4.5 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 131 
5. THE CONTENT OF THE STANDARD OF FULL PROTECTION       
    AND SECURITY ......................................................................................................... 135 
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 135 
5.2 Conceptual issues – substantive elements of the standard .................................... 136 
5.2.1 The concepts of protection and security prior to   
         the evolution of the BIT ................................................................................. 136 
5.2.2 The concept of a standard ............................................................................... 139 
5.2.2.1 Standards as non-sources of law ......................................................... 139 
5.2.2.2 The usage of standards in national and international law ................ 141 
5.2.2.3 Does past doctrine apply to present problems? ................................ 146 
5.2.3 The standard’s substantive elements and due diligence .............................. 147 
5.3 The meaning of state actors and private actors ....................................................... 151 
5.4 The due diligence principle and obligations of the host state ............................... 155 
5.4.1 General ............................................................................................................... 155 
5.4.2 Negative and positive obligations of the host state ..................................... 156 
5.4.3 Elements important for discharging due diligence ...................................... 163 
5.4.3.1 The state of state responsibility in general ......................................... 163 
5.4.3.2 Elements of due diligence .................................................................... 164 
5.4.4 Different levels of due diligence depending   
         on the nature of disturbances ......................................................................... 170 
5.4.5 Does the standard entail an obligation of conduct   
         or obligation of result? .................................................................................... 171 
5.5 The application of the standard ................................................................................. 175 
5.5.1 Introduction....................................................................................................... 175 
5.5.2 Procedural and substantive requirements for protection ........................... 175 
5.5.3 Protection of physical safety ........................................................................... 179 
5.5.4 Protection beyond physical safety .................................................................. 183 
5.5.5 Conclusion concerning application ................................................................ 192 
5.6 Does the host state’s level of development affect application? ............................ 194 
5.6.1 Investors in less developed countries ............................................................ 194 
5.6.2 Protection reasonable under the circumstances ........................................... 195 
5.6.3 How could development affect adjudication of investment disputes? ..... 199 
5.7 Does the standard overlap with other investment standards? .............................. 202 
5.7.1 Fair and equitable treatment ........................................................................... 203 
5.7.2 Expropriation .................................................................................................... 207 
5.7.3 Denial of justice ................................................................................................ 213 
5.7.4 National treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment .......................... 219 
5.8 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 230 
 
PART III 
Violations of the Full Protection and Security Standard  
and their manifestations 
 
6. VIOLATIONS OF THE STANDARD AND THEIR MANIFESTATIONS . 235 
6.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 235 
6.2 Disparate behaviour constituting a violation of the standard ............................... 236 
6.3 Violations of the standard .......................................................................................... 238 
6.3.1 Taking of investment or destruction of investment .................................... 238 
6.3.1.1 Taking or destruction caused by state organs ................................... 238 
6.3.1.2 Taking or destruction caused by private parties................................ 241 
6.3.2 Coercion and harassment of the investor and his personnel ..................... 243 
6.3.2.1 Coercion and harassment caused by state organs ............................. 243 
6.3.2.2 Coercion and harassment caused by private parties ......................... 245 
6.3.3 Changes to the regulatory framework after an investment is made .......... 248 
6.3.3.1 Post-investment obligations of the host state not implemented .... 250 
6.3.3.2 Operating licenses revoked or restrictions   
            imposed on the investment ................................................................. 253 
6.3.3.3 Demands for the renegotiations of concession agreements ........... 254 
6.3.4 Failure to provide for legal system ................................................................. 255 
6.4 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 258 
 
7. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONARY REMARKS ............. 261 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................. 265 
 
ARBITRAL CASES AND OTHER DECISIONS ..................................................... 279 
 
ANNEXES ......................................................................................................................... 287 
     ANNEX I: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES ....................................... 289 
     ANNEX II: REGIONAL TREATIES .................................................................... 331 
     ANNEX III: MULTILATERAL TREATIES ........................................................ 339 







AJIL    American Journal of International Law 
ASEAN   Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
BIT    Bilateral Investment Treaty 
BYIL    British Yearbook of International Law 
CUP    Cambridge University Press 
ECJ    European Court of Justice 
ECT    Energy Charter Treaty 
EFTA    European Free Trade Association 
EJIL    European Journal of International Law 
EU    European Union 
FCN    Friendship, Commerce and Navigation  
FDI    Foreign Direct Investment 
FET    Fair and Equitable Treatment 
FTA Free Trade Agreement 
FTC    Free Trade Commission 
ICC    International Chamber of Commerce 
ICJ    International Court of Justice 
ICLQ    International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
ICSID International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes 
IIA    International Investment Agreement 
ILC    International Law Commission 
ILM    International Legal Materials 
ILR     International Law Reports 
ITO    International Trade Organization 
LCIA    London Court of International Arbitration 
7
MAI    Multilateral Agreement for Investment 
MERCOSUR Mercado Común del Sur (Common Market of 
the Southern Cone) 
MFN    Most-Favoured-Nation 
MIGA    Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
NAFTA   North American Free Trade Agreement 
NYIL  Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and  
Development 
 OUP    Oxford University Press 
PCIJ    Permanent Court of International Justice 
RCADI Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de droit 
international (Collected Courses of the Hague 
Academy of International Law) 
RIAA    Reports of International Arbitral Awards 
SCC    Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
UNCITRAL United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development 
UNCTC United Nations Code of Conduct for 
Transnational Corporations 
UNGA   United Nations General Assembly 
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development 
Organisation 
UNTS    United Nations Treaty Series 
US    United States 
WTO    World Trade Organization 






This thesis is submitted to the Law Faculty of the University of Vienna as a thesis 
obtaining the degree of doctor iuris. The thesis deals with, as its title entails, one of 
the fundamental standards of international investment law: Full Protection and 
Security in International Law. 
The idea of writing a thesis on the full protection and security standard came to 
me when I concluded a postgraduate program, LL.M. in International Legal Studies, 
at the University of Vienna in October 2008. Despite the temptation, I decided to 
focus my master’s thesis on issues relating to the accountability of the United 
Nations’ Security Council. Nevertheless, I did not forget the topic which covers one 
of the fundamental principles of international investment law. This principle, which 
has a long history, was considered dormant until recently. In the early 1990s, Ibrahim 
Shihata, then General Counsel and Senior Vice President of the World Bank, and 
Antonio Parra, ICSID Legal Advisor at the time, pointed out that there “was hardly 
any case law” on the full protection and security standard. It is safe to say that the 
standard is currently in the process of resurging as one of the most important 
standards of international investment law. Not only did the first investment treaty 
award rendered by an ICSID tribunal, namely Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. (AAPL) 
v Republic of Sri Lanka, adjudicate a dispute concerning the standard twenty years ago, 
but around thirty awards dealing with the standard have been adjudicated during the 
last five years. Hence, the decision to write about the full protection and security 
standard was not difficult to make. 
The idea of writing a doctoral thesis is an older one. In 2004, I assisted Dr. Pall 
Hreinsson, a judge at the EFTA Court, to prepare his doctoral thesis for publication 
in Iceland. During that time I witnessed, in part, the process of writing a doctoral 
thesis. That experience did not deter me from attempting to write a doctoral thesis 
myself, in a way, that experience resulted in the thesis that now follows. 
However, this doctoral thesis could not have been written without the assistance 
and encouragement of Professor Dr. August Reinisch at the University of Vienna. I 
would like to thank Professor Reinisch for his support throughout this project. He 
has been a source of academic advice and provided support with his deep 
understanding of international law. I am not only thankful for the time he took in 
supervising this thesis, but also indebted to him for his guidance, questions and 
insightful comments, including constructive criticism, which enabled me to pursue a 




During my research I talked with numerous individuals and scholars concerning 
the subject at hand. I am indebted to Professor Christoph Schreuer, who, during the 
initial phase of my research, provided me with valuable information concerning the 
topic and further research, in particular concerning arbitral awards. In addition, I 
would like to thank Professor Jan Wouters at the University of Leuven for assisting 
me in my research at Leuven during the latter half of my research.  
While working on the thesis I received the Research Grant of the University of 
Vienna of 2011 (Forschungsstipendium 2011). I am thankful to the University of 
Vienna for providing financial assistance that enabled me to focus on various issues 
in a way that would not have been possible otherwise. 
I would like to extend my thanks to Mag. Jur. Róbert Spanó (Oxford) and Dr. 
Aðalheiður Jóhannsdóttir (Uppsala), professors at the law faculty of the University of 
Iceland, for providing me with excellent facilities at the University of Iceland. Their 
help and generous support during the last phase of my studies provided me with a 
stimulating research environment.  
This thesis was partly researched during two visits to institutions with excellent 
academic facilities. First, during winter 2009, I visited the Peace Palace Library in The 
Hague which enabled me to do in-depth analysis on various issues. The staff at the 
Peace Palace Library was most helpful with regard to my requests. Second, during 
autumn 2011, I was privileged to conduct my research as a Visiting Fellow at the 
Lauterpacht Centre for International Law at the University of Cambridge. While 
living there, I met an extraordinary group of individuals, many of whom assisted me 
in my research. I would like to thank, in particular, Professor James Crawford and 
Dr. Michael Waibel for their support and helpful comments during my stay in 
Cambridge. I also extend my thanks to a fellow scholar at the Lauterpacht Centre for 
International Law, Ms. Kathleen Claussen, Assistant Legal Counsel at the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration, for providing me with advice on the usage of the English 
language. 
I would also like to extend my thanks to my colleagues in private practice. I am 
indebted, in particular, to my friend and colleague, Mr. Sigurbjörn Magnússon, 
Supreme Court Attorney, for his advice and support throughout this project and for 
welcoming me to law practice again following a three year period spent in Vienna, 
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not take long for a lawyer, who has been given the opportunity to pursue his studies, 
to realize that such a position should never be taken for granted. Hence, the need to 
thank my parents, Magnus and Bryndis, especially for their support. Last but by no 
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and in-depth discussions about the thesis’s topic. I would also like to thank her 
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mentioned, this thesis is submitted in my name. Any errors or discrepancies are the 
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1.1 Subject of the study and methodology 
International investment law is in constant development. That situation is one of the 
defining characters of this specific field of international law. One of the many 
international investment standards, namely the standard of full protection and 
security in international law, is the subject of this thesis.  
The standard is in principle based upon a rather simple idea. In theory, a state is 
obliged to take active measures to protect a foreign investor and his property and 
other interests, including his investments, from adverse effects which may stem from 
activities of the host state itself or from third parties. However, in practice this 
obligation turns out to be a complex matter hedged in by limitations and caveats. As 
a standard with a long history, it has not only expanded in scope in line with the 
ever-growing fragmentation of international law, but its sources have also changed 
and affected its application. Furthermore, even though the standard has been applied 
for some time, its content is far from undisputed, particularly with respect to the 
degree of protection it affords to investors.1  
The main purpose of this study is to collect relevant legal sources and analyse 
and define the standard of full protection and security. The study will be based on a 
legal methodology to determine the substantive content of the standard and the 
protection it provides. The legal methodology will incorporate the main sources of 
international investment law – customary international law, bilateral investment 
treaties and arbitral awards – which greatly affect the application of the standard in 
practice. The analysis with regard to arbitral awards will not be limited to whether a 
consistent practice can be found, but will also seek to determine how arbitral 
tribunals approach legal disputes arising out of alleged breaches of the standard. The 
study will not differentiate between judgments and arbitral awards depending on 
which jurisdiction they stem from as long as they shed light on the substantive 
content of the standard. Hence, the study is not to be understood as a comparative 
study, even though it is based on judgments from the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, the International Court of Justice, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal 
and tribunals established under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States. These judgments and awards 
will, as other sources of law, be assessed to further understand the nature of the full 
                                                     
1 UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes Arising from Investment Treaties: A Review, UNCTAD Series on 
International Investment Policies for Development, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/4, p. 47. 
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protection and security standard and its content. Moreover, the importance of treaty 
practice cannot be underestimated as this standard has a longer history than other 
standards, such as the standard of fair and equitable treatment, as it was incorporated 
in many FCN treaties which predate bilateral investment treaties that today provide 
for the modern treaty framework used in applying the standard. It is also important 
to mention that, although the thesis will focus in particular on these sources of law, 
other sources will also be analyzed. Thus, scholarly writings will play a major role in 
analyzing the nature of the standard and its application in particular cases.  
The overriding purpose when determining the scope of this study and the 
methodology to be applied is to establish not only an academic thesis, but also a 
thesis that can be used in a practical manner when assessing particular issues within 
the context of the full protection and security standard. To achieve this goal, the 
main judgments and arbitral awards of importance for this study are described either 
in individual chapters or in footnotes.  
 
1.2 A summary of the substance and structure of the study 
This study is divided into three parts and seven chapters.  
In Part I, the study is introduced in terms of structure and substance. Chapter 1 
provides a description of the scope of the research topic and a definition of its terms 
and structure. Chapter 2 covers the historical development of the full protection and 
security standard. A discussion about the reasons why the consensus, which had been 
reached amongst nations during the colonial expansion of Western Powers, came to 
an end; the codification of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaties; the 
emergence of bilateral investment treaties and the failure of multilateral attempts to 
codify an instrument providing for investment protection will be undertaken. The 
historical perspective is of considerable importance due to the fact that one of the 
defining differences between the standard of full protection and security vis-à-vis 
other standards, e.g. the standard of fair and equitable treatment, is their different 
historical origin. This issue is important as it could affect the substantive 
interpretation of the full protection and security standard.  
Part II deals with three fundamental issues concerning the standard: sources, 
interpretation and content. Chapter 3 contains a discussion dealing with the various 
sources of the standard, such as international investment treaties, customary 
international law, general international law and arbitral awards. Each source will be 
studied independently. Various examples of different formulations of the standard in 
bilateral investment treaties, regional and multilateral treaties will be examined and 
discussed. In addition, state practice relevant within the context of customary 
18
international law and various arbitral awards will be discussed and issues concerning 
the nature of each source addressed. Questions relating to the relationship between 
these sources of law and to what extent these sources have on the substantive 
content of the standard will be asked and answered. Chapter 4 will discuss general 
issues with regard to interpretation, such as to what extent the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties influences the process of interpretation. The chapter will 
address the substantive meaning of “protection” and “security”, not least because of 
the important role which the objective meaning of these concepts play when 
interpreted through the prism of “ordinary meaning” as prescribed by Article 31(1) 
of the Vienna Convention. In addition, the chapter will address the most relevant 
tools of interpretation, most notably textual interpretation, object and purpose, 
contextual interpretation and whether the intention of the parties can be ascertained. 
Finally, questions concerning the ever-present role and influence of customary 
international law during the process of interpretation will be discussed and issues 
dealing with the important role of customary international law despite the ever-
growing number of BIT and other instruments addressed. Chapter 5 deals with the 
content of the standard of full protection and security, including conceptual issues 
relating to the substantive elements of which the standard consists. Moreover, the 
chapter will ask questions as to which underlying issues are needed to explore when a 
due diligence assessment is made in order to determine whether a state has fulfilled 
its obligations to provide protection and security. Furthermore, a discussion about 
the standard’s application will address whether and to what extent the standard 
provides for protection and security that goes beyond physical security. In addition, 
the study will focus on whether and to what extent a host state’s level of 
development can affect the application of the standard in individual cases. The 
possible overlap between the standard and other investment principles, in particular 
the standard of fair and equitable treatment, expropriation, denial of justice, national 
treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment, will also be addressed.  
Part III deals with issues relating to the violations of the standard. In Chapter 6, 
the violations of the standard and their many manifestations will be addressed and 
analyzed. The chapter will address whether certain fact-based scenarios can be 
established in which the standard is most commonly violated. This is necessary due 
to the fact that a violation can take many forms. The identification of these forms 
and under what circumstances they might are arise will provide for a clearer picture 
about the dangers which an investor is faced with after having made the investment. 
Finally, Chapter 7 contains a summary of findings and conclusionary remarks. 
19
 
1.3 The use of categories 
This dissertation is the result of research based on material, old and new, that 
consists of international instruments, customary international law derived from state 
practice, general principles of international law and principles extracted from various 
arbitral awards that further describe treaty law and customary international law. For 
the purpose of organizing material, I employ categories for different formulations of 
the standard in various international investment instruments,2 relationship between 
the treaty-based standard of full protection and security and customary international 
law3, arguments and concepts found in numerous arbitral awards within the context 
of due diligence4 and fact-based scenarios where the standard is most frequently 
violated.5 It is important to stress that the purpose of such categorization is to 
provide a convenient vehicle for discussion. Therefore, too much technical 
significance should not be accorded to these categories, but emphasis should be on 



















                                                     
2 See Chapter 3.3.2. 
3 See Chapter 3.3.3. 
4 See Chapter 5.4. 
5 See Chapter 6.3. 
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2. THE HISTORY OF THE STANDARD OF FULL PROTECTION AND 
SECURITY  
2.1 Introduction 
The full protection and security standard originates from the treaty practice of the 
United States.6 The standard’s origin is particularly interesting as it has a long history 
of providing protection and security for foreign investors and in that sense 
differentiates itself from another fundamental standard of international investment 
law, namely the standard of fair and equitable treatment.7 Before the standard 
evolved into its current form, some of its substantive elements provided protection 
for aliens as a principle of customary international law. After the materialization of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaties, which were stipulated by states to 
protect nationals travelling or residing abroad, the standard emerged as a principle 
which provided aliens with a more expanded protection for their person and 
property. Still, the growing number of bilateral investment treaties has further 
expanded the standard’s protection from government interference and harassment 
and non-governmental entities. Even recent multilateral and regional instruments 
now incorporate the standard – some of which have entered into force whereas 
others have not. 
This chapter will deal with the history of the standard of full protection and 
security. This aspect of the standard is very practical as it enables a lawyer to 
understand the nature of the standard when applying it in individual cases.8 The 
history of the standard is also important within the context of other sources of law. 
As will be explained, that history is closely linked to the evolution of international 
law in general, including the evolution of the standard within the realm of customary 
international law and the emergence of trade and investment treaties during the past 
two centuries.  
 
                                                     
6 See R. Wilson, Property-Protection Provisions in United States Commercial Treaties, 45 AJIL 83 (1951), p. 
90-97, and same author, The International Law Standard in Treaties of the United States, Harvard University 
Press (1953), p. 92-93. 
7 The standard of fair and equitable treatment first appeared in Article 11(2) of the Havana Charter 
for an International Trade Organization of 1948. The Charter never entered into force. See further R. 
Dolzer and C. Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law, OUP (2008), p. 120. 
8 That is not limited to the full protection and security standard but also applies to other standards. 
The historical evolution of investment standards, as manifested in treaty law, cannot but be taken into 
account when interpreting their substantive content. See Mondev International Ltd. v United States of 
America, ICSID Additional Facility Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award of 11 October 2002, 42 ILM 85 
(2003), paras 116-117. 
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2.2 Protection of nationals abroad – the breakdown of consensus  
Even though the standard of full protection and security currently has its primary 
source in bilateral investment treaties, one of its major substantive elements, namely 
the physical protection of an alien and his property, has been accepted among states 
for centuries. State practice reveals that states have accepted responsibility for the 
failure to protect aliens and their property within their jurisdiction, even though the 
main actors against the aliens are individuals. Many cases can be found which are 
concluded by diplomatic exchanges, state versus state arbitration and mixed 
arbitration.9  
According to one of the fundamental principles of international law – often 
referred to as the minimum standard of international law – an alien is protected from 
unacceptable measures from the host state. As with the emergence of general 
principles of law in general, the emergence of the international minimum standard 
came as a result of grave infringements of the right to property of aliens which had 
occurred on a number of occasions prior to the principle’s acceptance.  
During the colonial expansion of the European states in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century, the need for investment protection through international law 
principles was minimal. Investment was made with colonial expansion and the 
colonies’ legal systems were integrated into the legal system of the imperial powers.10 
Thus, the investors investing in the colonies were provided with investment 
protection by parliaments in the imperial capitals. This meant, in practice, that the 
standard of protection was understood to entail a principle of national treatment 
rather than an international law principle providing protection to an investor in the 
event that municipal law failed to do so. This period of colonial dominance was 
unique in terms of the almost universal acceptance of the principle of protection of 
property – almost all nations accepted the principle. The rather scarce literature on 
the subject during this time has led some commentators to argue that the reason why 
                                                     
9 Regarding diplomatic exchanges, see e.g. J.B. Moore, A Digest of International Law, Vol. VI, 
Government Printing Office (1906), p. 807 (a widow of an American missionary, who was murdered 
in Persia, offered compensation by the Persian government after diplomatic exchanges); regarding 
state versus state arbitration, see e.g. Lusitania case, VII RIAA 32 (1923) (damages were awarded to the 
United States which espoused the claims of its citizens as a result of the sinking of the Lusitania by 
Germany); regarding mixed arbitration, see e.g. Lena Goldfields case, reprinted in A. Nussbaum, The 
Arbitration Between the Lena Goldfields Ltd. and the Soviet Government, 36 Cornell Law Quarterly 31 (1950-
1951), p. 42 et seq (a British company, which was granted a mining concession by the Soviet 
government, instigated arbitral proceedings and was awarded damages). 
10 See M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 2nd ed., CUP (2004), p. 19-20. 
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such little notice was given to it by commentators at the time was the general 
recognition of the inviolability of private property.11  
Following the end of colonialism the need for investment protection increased 
as investors experienced nationalistic and xenophobic tendencies of the newly 
independent states. The breakdown of the consensus, which had been universally 
accepted during colonial expansion and entailed broad protection for the investor, 
accelerated rapidly. Especially after the nationalizations in South America in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century, supported by the Calvo doctrine, and the Russian 
revolution in 1917, it became apparent that the principle of national treatment had 
become ineffective with regards to aliens.12 This ineffectiveness led to the evolution 
of the international principle that aliens were protected by an international minimum 
standard. In the early 1900s there was general agreement amongst international 
lawyers that there existed a minimum standard concerning the treatment of 
foreigners. Elihu Root stated the following in 1910 on the protection of aliens: 
 
“There is a standard of justice, very simple, very fundamental, and of such general 
acceptance by all civilized countries as to form a part of the international law of the world. 
The condition upon which any country is entitled to measure the justice due from it to an 
alien by the justice which it accords to its own citizen is that its system of law and 
administration shall conform to this general standard.”13  
 
Moreover, a number of cases were arbitrated, either before mixed claims 
commissions or by ad hoc arbitration tribunals, in which states espoused the rights of 
their citizens. These tribunals further influenced the doctrine of the international 
minimum standard by referring on numerous occasions to “international standards” 
and “standards of civilization”.14 Thus, the protection of aliens went further than 
previously had been accepted. This led one commentator to link the protection of a 
country’s citizen domiciled in another country to the concept of the state itself – 
protection of nationals abroad became one of the characteristics of a state: 
                                                     
11 J.P. Bullington, Problems of International Law in the Mexican Constitution of 1917, 21 AJIL 685 (1927), 
p. 695 and H. Neufeld, The International Protection of Private Creditors from the Treaty of Westphalia to the 
Congress of Vienna, A.W. Sijthoff (1971), p. 98. 
12 Many nationalization laws did not violate the principle of national treatment as they applied de 
jure to all individuals and entities in the host state regardless of their nationality. They did, however, 
entail de facto discrimination due to the fact that foreign entities owned the industries which were 
affected by the nationalization laws. A case in point is Mexico’s nationalization of the petroleum 
industry in the 1930s where only 1.1 per cent of the industry was owned by Mexican entities. See 
further J.P. Bullington, Problems of International Law in the Mexican Constitution of 1917, 21 AJIL 685 
(1927), p. 703. 
13 E. Root, The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad, 4 AJIL 517 (1910), p. 521-522. 
14 See further A. Roth, The Minimum Standard of International Law Applied to Aliens, A.W. Sijthoff 
(1949), p. 97-99. 
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“States are legal persons and the direct subjects of international law. They are admitted into 
the international community on condition that they possess certain essential characteristics, 
such as a defined territory, independence, etc. In addition, they must manifest their power to 
exercise jurisdiction effectively and, as we shall see, to assure foreigners within it of a 
minimum of rights. This minimum standard below which a state can not fall without 
incurring responsibility to the other members of the international community has been 
shaped and established by the advance of civilization and the necessities of modern 
international intercourse on the part of individuals. The home state of the resident alien is 
concerned not with the legal legitimacy of a foreign government, but with its actual ability to 
fulfil the obligations which this international standard imposes upon it. The resident alien 
does not derive his rights directly from international law, but from the municipal law of the 
state of residence, though international law imposes upon that state certain obligations which 
under the sanction of responsibility to the other states of the international community, it is 
compelled to fulfill. When the local state fails to fulfill these duties, “when it is incapable of 
ruling, or rules with patent injustice,” the right of diplomatic protection insures to those 
states whose citizens have been injured by the governmental delinquency.”15  
 
This situation led to numerous cases in which governments paid compensation due 
to the adverse effects of actions of government officials or private individuals and in 
some cases because of the inaction of government officials after nationals had taken 
matters into their own hands by killing aliens or destroying their property.16 
This breakdown of the consensus continued as a result of the aftermath of the 
First and Second World Wars in forms of confiscation of property based upon 
political ideology and the growing number of newly independent states, particularly 
in Africa and Asia, that were eager to gain economic independence by taking control 
of their natural resources and thus depriving investors from capital-exporting (former 
imperial) countries of their investment.17 
The position of new states in South America has been clear – they have opposed 
the principle of an international minimum standard. As previously mentioned, the 
Calvo doctrine, based upon a study by the Argentine jurist Carlos Calvo, emerged in 
South America during civil strife and attacks of revolutionary forces which followed 
the independence of the South American states. According to Calvo’s theory, aliens 
had, by investing in another country, subjected themselves to the same laws and 
                                                     
15 E.M. Borchard, Basic Elements of Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, 7 AJIL 497 (1913), p. 516-
17. 
16 The United States paid compensation to Italy after a mob in March 1871 lynched a number of 
Italians in New Orleans. The Italians, who were in custody of the government, were charged with the 
murder of a chief of police which was considered to be the “result of machinations of a secret society 
called the Mafia.” See further J.B. Moore, A Digest of International Law, Vol. VI, Government Printing 
Office (1906), p. 837. Similarly, China paid indemnities to the United States for injuries suffered by 
Americans during the Tientsin riot in June 1870 as it was considered that Chinese officials had not 
dispersed an angry crowd. See B.H. Williams, The Protection of American Citizens in China: Cases of 
Lawlessness, 17 AJIL 489 (1923), p. 492. 
17 See R.D. Bishop, J. Crawford and W.M. Reisman, Foreign Investment Disputes – Cases, Materials and 
Commentary, Kluwer Law International (2005), p. 3-4. 
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regulations that applied to nationals. The host country could at its discretion – 
without being bound by an international standard – define the legal framework which 
applied to all individuals and entities under its jurisdiction. Hence, the state could 
guarantee the protection of aliens as long as the same protection applied to its 
nationals.18 However, the Calvo doctrine was unable to remain at the forefront of 
academic discussion as arbitral awards and decisions of claims commissions, which 
were established in order to adjudicate disputes following revolutionary times in 
Central and South America, came to the conclusion that compensation had to be 
paid to the parties affected.19 
Following the aftermath of the two World Wars, newly independent states in 
Africa and Asia became fierce critics of the international minimum standard. Shortly 
prior to their emergence, the United Nations General Assembly, which at that time 
consisted almost only of former colonial powers, adopted Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 
14 December 1962 on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources,20 which 
stated: 
 
“Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or reasons of 
public utility, security or the national interest which are recognized as overriding purely 
individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases the owner shall be 
paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in the State taking such 
measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international law.” [emphasis 
added] 
 
Only twelve years later the General Assembly, whose composition had changed 
dramatically due to the emergence of new African and Asian member states, adopted 
Resolution 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974, referred to as the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States.21 This resolution emphasized national 
sovereignty without mentioning state adherence to international law: 
                                                     
18 See generally concerning the Calvo doctrine, E. Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, 
Banks Law Publishing (1915), p. 792 et seq and D. Shea, The Calvo Clause, a Problem of Inter-American and 
International Law and Diplomacy, Minneapolis (1955), p. 16-20.  
19 See for arbitral awards e.g. Delagoa Bay Railway Case, J.B. Moore, International Arbitrations, Vol. II, 
Government Printing Office (1898), p. 1865, in which the United Kingdom and the United States 
instigated arbitral proceedings against Portugal because of its seizure of the Delagoa Bay Railway 
constructed under a concession agreement; but for claims commissions see e.g. the Mixed and Special 
Claims Commissions established between United States and Mexico in 1927, which dealt with cases 
arising out of civil strife in Mexico. See further 4 RIIA (1930), p. xiii. In the former case, Portugal was 
ordered to pay considerable compensation. In the latter cases, Mexico was ordered to pay 
compensation where US nationals had been killed and their property damaged. 
20 UNGA Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, “Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources”. 
21 UNGA Resolution 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974, “Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States”. 
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“To nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in which case 
appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such measures, taking into 
account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State considers 
pertinent. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall 
be settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and 
mutually agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful means be sought on the basis of 
the sovereign equality of States and in accordance with the principle of free choice of 
means.” [emphasis added] 
 
Resolutions of the UN General Assembly are non-binding instruments. However, 
when concerned with general norms of international law, they cannot be ignored as 
they reflect the official positions of states and can in that sense provide a basis for 
progressive development of law, especially in terms of influencing customary 
international law.22 This view was reflected by the umpire in Texaco Overseas Petroleum v 
Libyan Arab Republic where he came to the conclusion that Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 
14 December 1962 on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources did reflect the 
majority view of states with regard to expropriation whereas Resolution 3281 
(XXIX) of 12 December 1974 could only be understood as portraying a de lege ferenda 
aspect of international law for the states which adopted the resolution in the General 
Assembly. The rejection of the principles contained therein by states opposed to the 
resolution could only be understood as contra legem.23 
Foreign direct investment directed towards the developing world declined 
considerably in the 1970s and 1980s. This had a number of reasons – the three 
principal which have been mentioned in this context are, firstly, the protectionist 
position of the developing world towards foreign direct investment and their 
unwillingness to adhere to the international principles advocated by the capital-
exporting countries by expropriating foreign owned businesses without 
compensation. Secondly, the developing countries implemented ambitious tax 
schemes that were intended to raise tax revenue. Thirdly, the economic downturn in 
the world economy strained the inward flow of investment and led to a decline in 
foreign direct investment for the developing countries. Even though the global flow 
of foreign direct investment increased far more than world trade and output in the 
early 1980s, the developing countries remained marginalized due to the fact that the 
bulk of foreign direct investment was directed towards other developed countries. 
This led to the situation that although foreign direct investment to developing 
                                                     
22  I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, OUP (2008), p. 15. 
23 Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. and California Asiatic Oil Co. v Libya, Award 19 January 1977, 17 ILM 
389 (1979), p. 491-92.  
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countries increased between the periods 1980-1989, their share of total inflows of 
foreign direct investment fell from 25 per cent to 18 per cent.24 
The consequence of this development was that the pendulum began to swing in 
the other direction. After the developing countries had implemented structural 
changes increasing the role of the state, often by expropriating foreign direct 
investment projects and implementing various tax schemes, the same states were 
forced to reconsider their strategy in the face of disappointing operating results of 
state-owned enterprises and lesser tax revenue. Out of this necessity developing 
countries began to attract foreign investment and privatize state-owned enterprises. 
The effects of the “lost decade” in Latin America and Africa began to reverse as the 
developing countries embraced the principles of the Washington consensus.25 This 
policy change affected the pattern of BITs which were at this point in time the most 
used instrument in terms of stipulating the substantive and procedural principles 
concerning investment protection. Historically, almost all BITs stipulated had one 
developed country as a contracting party. This lead to the situation where developed 
countries accounted for 83 per cent of all BITs made at the end of the 1980s. After 
the emergence of developing countries as active participants in the sphere of bilateral 
investment schemes, the influence of developed countries became proportionally 
lower; as of 1996 the developing countries had concluded such a considerable 
number of BITs, that the developed countries accounted only for 62 per cent of the 
worldwide total of BITs.26 
 
2.3 Codification of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaties 
Bilateral treaties concerning the friendly relations of nations have been in existence 
for over two centuries. The early bilateral treaties were the Friendship, Commerce 
and Navigation treaties which were concluded by states from the mid-eighteenth 
                                                     
24 UNCTAD, World Investment Report: The Triad of Foreign Direct Investment (1991), p. 83. It is worth 
mentioning that the level of foreign direct investment has historically varied considerably between 
regions and countries. As an example, only ten developing countries received about seventy five per 
cent of total inflows of foreign direct investment throughout the 1980s, namely Singapore, Brazil, 
Mexico, China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Egypt, Argentina, Thailand and Colombia. See further 
UNCTAD, World Investment Report: The Triad of Foreign Direct Investment, United Nations (1991), p. 10. 
25 The concept of the “Washington Consensus” was coined in a policy paper in 1989. It entailed 
ten principles concerning economic reform which were thought to be needed for the economic 
benefit of developing countries. See further J. Williamsson, ‘What Should the World Bank Think 
About the Washington Consensus?’, World Bank Research Observer, International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, Vol. 15, No. 2 (August 2000), p. 251-264. 
26  UNCTAD, World Investment Report: Transnational Corporations, Market Structure and Competition Policy, 
United Nations (1997), p. 19-20. 
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century onwards.27 The United States made the first treaty with France shortly after 
having declared independence; the treaty with France was concluded in 1778.28 The 
United States remained active and concluded a number of treaties with its allies, in 
particular with the Netherlands in 1782 and with Sweden in 1783, with the purpose 
of establishing alliances strengthening not only commerce but also military alliances, 
e.g. access to ports and navigation in internal waters.29  
In addition to stipulating principles applicable to commerce, these FCN treaties 
contained provisions relating to foreign property of individuals engaged in business 
activities in the other state, access to local courts, tax issues, customs treatments, etc. 
Even though the FCN treaties did later on cease to be made by states, they continued 
to influence their relations considerably, as can be seen in the ELSI case (and 
discussed in Chapters 5.4.5 and 5.5.4), in which the United States made use of many 
provisions in an US-Italy FCN treaty relating to the dispute in the case, including a 
provision providing most constant protection and security.30 
As discussed previously, the right to property and its inviolability was almost 
universally recognized among states and the responsibility of states to indemnify 
those affected in the event that foreign individuals or their property were damaged. 
This was reflected in the FCN treaties which did not at that time refer to an 
international standard, but incorporated the principle of national treatment. An 
example stating that aliens should receive national treatment is the Convention of 
Friendship, Commerce and Extradition between the United States and Switzerland, 
Art. 2(3): 
 
“In case of war or of expropriation for purposes of public utility, the citizens of one of the 
two countries residing or established in the other shall be placed upon an equal footing with the 
citizens of the country in which they reside, with respect to indemnities for damages they may have 
sustained.”31 [emphasis added] 
                                                     
27 See H. Neufeld, The International Protection of Private Creditors from the Treaty of Westphalia to the 
Congress of Vienna, A.W. Sijthoff (1971), p. 97-98, and M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign 
Investment, 3rd ed., CUP (2010), p. 180. 
28 See Treaty of Amity and Commerce Between the United States and France, concluded on 
February 6, 1778. It is available at <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fr/788-1.asp>. It 
should be noted, in addition, that the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United States and 
France was made on the same day as the Treaty of Alliance with France which created a military 
alliance between these nations against the United Kingdom. 
29 See K.J. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the United States, 21 Cornell Int’l L.J. 
201, p. 203, and M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 2nd ed., CUP (2004), p. 209. 
30 Case concerning Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI), (United States of America v Italy) ICJ, Decision rendered 
on 20 July 1989, ICJ Reports (1989).  
31 See Convention of Friendship, Commerce and Extradition between the United States and 




These early treaties did not address investments, as they are presently understood, 
but focused mainly on commerce. However, the treaties recognized the principle that 
citizens of the contracting parties were entitled to enjoy protection and security in 
their business operations in either country. The Treaty of Amity, Commerce and 
Navigation of 1825 between Great Britain, the world’s greatest industrial and 
commercial nation at the time, and Colombia, a smaller, newly independent and 
emerging nation, stipulated that: 
 
“…the merchants and traders of each nation, respectively, shall enjoy the most complete 
protection and security for their commerce; subject always to the laws and statutes of the two 
countries respectively.”32 [emphasis added] 
 
However, it was not before long that the treaty provisions became wider in scope 
and was not longer limited to merchants and traders. The Treaty of Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation between Argentina and the United States stipulated: 
 
“There shall be between all the territories of the United States and all the territories of the 
Argentine Confederation a reciprocal freedom of commerce. The citizens of the two 
countries, respectively shall have [...] generally [...] enjoy, in all their business, the most complete 
protection and security, subject to the general laws and usages of the two countries 
respectively.”33 [emphasis added] 
 
The language used to describe the protection of aliens and their property was not 
uniform. In addition to “most complete protection and security”, other formulations 
were used, including “full and perfect protection”.34 Another formulation can be 
found in Article 13 of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Navigation and Commerce 
between the United States and Venezuela: 
 
“Both the contracting parties, promise, and engage formally, to give their special protection to the 
persons and property of the citizens of each other, of all occupations, who may be in the territories 
subject to the jurisdiction of the each other [...].”35 [emphasis added] 
 
                                                     
32 See Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain and Colombia, April 18, 
1825, Art. 2, reproduced in T.C. Hansard, The Parliamentary History of England – The Parliamentary 
Debates, Vol. XIV (1826), p. 111.  
33 See Convention of Friendship, Commerce and Extradition between the Argentina and the 
United States of July 27, 1853, Art. 2, at <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/argen02.asp>.  
34 See Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Paraguay of 
February 4, 1859, Art. IX and Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United 
States and Costa Rica concluded on July 10, 1851, Art. VII, as cited in K.J. Vandevelde, The Bilateral 
Investment Treaty Program of the United States, 21 Cornell Int’l L.J. 201, p. 204-5. 
35 See Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Navigation and Commerce between the United States and 
Venezuela of May 31, 1836, at <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/venez_001.asp>.  
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The interesting aspect of these last two formulations is that they were not limited to 
merchants or alien traders, but concerned aliens who were subjected to the 
jurisdiction of the contracting parties regardless of their occupation. Despite the last 
provision cited, the Venezuelan government implemented the following decree to 
counter the vast amount of claims presented by aliens and their governments due to 
mob violence and property damage resulting from the revolution of 1873: 
 
“[...] neither domiciled foreigners nor wayfarers have the right to resort to diplomatic 
channels, unless when, having exhausted legal resources before the competent authorities, it 
may clearly appear there has been a denial of justice or notorious injustice.”36  
 
This decree and similar statutory provisions were used by the Venezuelan 
government and other Latin American countries to denounce responsibility. 
Venezuela implemented a law in 1903 in which the aforementioned principle was 
reiterated. Despite that provision, most European states, most notably the United 
Kingdom, Germany and Italy, continued to make claims against Venezuela. The 
dispute resulted in the severance of diplomatic relations followed by a seizure of 
Venezuelan gunboats and a blockade of the Venezuelan coast resulting in the 
country’s capitulation and acknowledgement of all claims presented by the European 
powers.37 This development led – needless to say – to the stipulation of the Drago-
Porter Convention according to which states agreed not to take recourse to armed 
force for the recovery of contract debts claimed from one state by another state as 
being due to its nationals.38 
Despite different positions as to what extent states were responsible for aliens 
and their property – a situation which was not clarified by numerous FCN treaties – 
states continued to enter into FCN treaties, predominantly with the United States. 
These FCN treaties continued to focus mainly on commercial matters up until World 
War II, but after that FCN treaties were directed more toward investment protection 
as matters relating to trade were dealt with in separate treaties, in particular the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.39 However, these new FCN treaties lost 
momentum, in particular with regard to the United States, as developing countries, 
                                                     
36 See J. Goebel Jr., The International Responsibility of States for Injuries sustained by Aliens on account of Mob 
Violence, Insurrections and Civil Wars, 8 AJIL 802 (1914), p. 834.  
37 See J. Goebel Jr., The International Responsibility of States for Injuries sustained by Aliens on account of Mob 
Violence, Insurrections and Civil Wars, 8 AJIL 802 (1914), p. 837 and 848-49. 
38 See Drago-Porter Convention on the Limitation of Employment of Force for Recovery of 
Contract Debts of October 18, 1907 and A. Cassese, International Law, 2nd ed., OUP (2005), p. 32-34. 
39 See R. Dolzer and C. Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law, OUP (2008), p. 17, and K.J. 
Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the United States, 21 Cornell Int’l L.J. 201, p. 203-
207. 
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which had grown increasingly sceptical of the benefits derived from foreign 
investment, became reluctant to commit themselves to the standards of protection 
stipulated in the treaties.40 Moreover, another development began to affect treaty 
practice, namely the emergence of a new category of treaties that further accelerated 
the demise of FCN treaties. Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) emerged in the early 
1960s where more emphasis was put on investment protection.41 
 
2.4 The emergence of bilateral investment treaties 
Modern BITs are, in their current version, a European invention. The first BIT was 
concluded between Germany and Pakistan in 1959.42 The overriding purpose for the 
conclusion of the treaty was the protection of foreign investment. Germany lost 
almost all of its pre-war foreign investments after the Second World War as these 
investments were confiscated by host states demanding compensation from 
Germany for damage caused as a result of the war – a war started by Germany in 
violation of international law. After having negotiated extensively with various 
countries and failed to protect its investments, the German government began a 
program of stipulating bilateral investment agreements.43 
The Germany-Pakistan BIT included various substantive provisions on 
investment protection, such as a provision describing protection and security. Article 
3(1) of the treaty stipulated the following: 
 
“Investments by nationals or companies of either party shall enjoy protection and security in the 
territory of the other Party.”44 [emphasis added] 
 
Thus, the first BIT contained a principle prescribing the standard of full protection 
and security and by doing so continued to provide a source to the standard in treaty 
law as had been done previously by FCN treaties. In contrast, the terms “equitable” 
and “fair and equitable” did not appear until the 1948 Havana Charter. Subsequently, 
the term “equitable” began to appear in FCN treaties of the United States, such as 
with Ireland (1950), Greece (1954), France (1960), Pakistan (1961), Belgium (1963) 
and Luxembourg (1963). Other countries, in particular Germany and the 
                                                     
40 J.W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign 
Investment in Developing Countries, 24 International Lawyer 655 (1990), p. 656-57. 
41 R. Dolzer and M. Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties, p. 10-11 (1995), reprinted in R. D. Bishop, J. 
Crawford and W. M. Reisman, Foreign Investment Disputes – Cases, Materials and Commentary, Kluwer Law 
International (2005), p. 47. 
42 See Treaty between Germany and Pakistan of November 25, 1959, 457 UNTS 23. 
43 See R. Dolzer and C. Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law, OUP (2008), p. 18. 
44 See Treaty between Germany and Pakistan of November 25, 1959, 457 UNTS 23. 
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Netherlands, used “fair and equitable treatment” when stipulating investment 
protection in their BITs.45  
Other countries followed suit and established their own programs concerning 
the protection of foreign investment. Shortly after Germany’s treaty with Pakistan, 
other European countries, such as Switzerland, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, 
the Netherlands and Belgium, entered into numerous BITs, many of which with their 
former colonies. Encouraged by the European experience the United States 
established a program in 1981 which filled the vacuum left by the discontinued FCN 
program. Still, the United States did not enter into as many BITs as the European 
countries. It is not clear why this program was not as successful as the FCN program 
and many reasons have been attributed to the greater success of the European 
programs. Firstly, the United States did not exert pressure to start negotiations with 
individual states as it did not want the BIT to be an instrument for changing existing 
policy, but rather to reflect a country’s previously held position towards foreign 
investment; if a country was not receptive to the US Model BIT, the United States 
would not pursue the matter.46 Secondly, the European countries were open to 
making concession with regard to the scope of protection of the investment, e.g. free 
convertibility of local currency, protection against expropriation, etc. Thirdly, in 
many cases the European countries entered into BITs with their former colonies; it 
could be argued that the newly independent states were predisposed to strengthen 
the existing relationship with their former colonial powers.47 
It is safe to say that the number of BITs increased steadily since the completion 
of the Germany-Pakistan BIT. The number of BITs doubled every ten years from 
the 1960s until the 1990s. However, the number of BITs exploded in the 1990s when 
1330 BITs were made. At the end of 2010, the number of BITs had reached 2,807.48 
As we shall see in Chapter 3, the structure and substantive provisions of BITs 
are generally similar. Surprisingly, they almost always address similar issues 
concerning the rights and obligations of the host state and an investor. After a 
generally stipulated preamble, a BIT would address particular issues, namely: (1) 
admission of investment, (2) substantive provisions concerning expropriation, fair 
                                                     
45 See further C. Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law, 
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46 K.J. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the United States, 21 Cornell Int’l L.J. 201, 
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and equitable treatment, full protection and security, (3) compensation and (4) 
dispute settlement.49 Individual components have evolved considerably since the first 
BITs were made. An example are clauses of dispute settlement which stipulate the 
choices available to parties if a legal dispute arises. The first generation of BITs 
presupposed that if the dispute could not be settled through diplomatic negotiations, 
it would be settled through state-state ad hoc arbitration tribunal.50 Later BITs have 
kept the state-state arbitration option in the event that a dispute would arise between 
the contracting parties, but with regard to dispute related to a particular investment 
the BITs have included an additional provision establishing an investor-state 
arbitration. This latter option has in most cases enabled investors to instigate arbitral 
proceedings by referring to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention).51 This 
development is interesting taking into account the criticism which the former option 
received, namely that only states could be parties to disputes before the International 
Court of Justice and the need for a forum in which investors had the possibility of 
resolving their disputes with the investment’s host state.52 
 
2.5 The success and failure of multilateral instruments 
The stipulation of the standard of full protection and security has not been limited to 
the bilateral sphere alone. As the capital exporting countries, many of which were 
colonial powers, began to lose control of their colonies due to their struggle for self-
determination in the 1950s, an evolution began which had the purpose of countering 
the popular notion of developing states pertaining to the inviolability of property. A 
number of instruments were drafted, almost all of which have not entered into force. 
However, despite the fact that these multilateral instruments were not implemented, 
some of them have affected considerably the substantive provisions and structure of 
other treaties negotiated between states because of cross-pollination of various 
provisions from multilateral instruments to BITs.53  
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33
The multilateral and regional instruments which have been researched for the 
purposes of this study differ considerably in nature with regard to investment 
protection. These instruments are very different in substance. Some instruments are 
meant to deal specifically with investment and provide an overall general framework 
for FDI covering many parts of investment operations, including general provisions 
on the promotion and protection of investment, investment liberalization, etc. 
Others are more general and cover the balance that needs to be struck between the 
investor and the interests of the host state, including a state’s right to guard cultural 
rights and consumer protection.54 
Surprisingly, the Havana Charter, one of the major multilateral instruments 
drafted after the Second World War, did not contain a provision prescribing the 
standard of full protection and security. However, the Charter clearly recognized and 
emphasized the importance that nationals of other countries be afforded 
opportunities for investment and security of existing and future investments.55 
Therefore, the parties to the Charter undertook, having recognized the need for 
investments to be afforded security, to provide reasonable opportunities for 
investments acceptable to them and adequate security for existing and future 
investments.56 Because of this fact, the meaning of the Charter with regard to the 
evolution of the standard of full protection and security is limited.57 The Charter 
never entered into force mainly because of the reluctance of the United States 
Congress to ratify it and also because of objections of business groups to provisions 
concerning foreign investment.58 
One of the most significant efforts to facilitate a multilateral approach to 
investment protection was an effort launched by groups of European business 
people and lawyers, under the leadership of Hermann Abs, the chairperson of 
                                                     
54 For an example of the former, see Agreement on Promotion, Protection and Guarantee of 
Investments among Member States of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference of 1981 and 
ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments of 1987. For an example of the 
latter, see International Agreement on Investment prepared by Consumer Unity & Trust in association 
with the United Nations Non-governmental Liaison Service in 1998. 
55 Article 12(1)(b) of the Havana Charter stated: “The international flow of capital will be 
stimulated to the extent that Members afford nationals of other countries opportunities for 
investment and security for existing and future investments.” 
56 Article 12(2)(a)(i) of the Havana Charter stated that Members were: “to provide reasonable 
opportunities for investment acceptable to them and adequate security for existing and future 
investments…”. 
57 The Havana Charter had more influence on the evolution of the FET standard. See note 6. 
58 See A.F. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law, 2nd ed., OUP (2008), p. 27-28, and M. Sornarajah, 
The International Law on Foreign Investment, 1st ed., CUP (1995), p. 187. 
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Deutsche Bank, and Lord Shawcross, former Attorney-General of the United 
Kingdom. In 1959, the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on the Protection of 
Foreign Property was introduced dealing with investments abroad.59 According to 
Article I of the Draft Convention the contracting parties proclaimed that property 
should be accorded protection and security. Hence, this was the first multilateral 
document which produced the concept of “constant protection and security”. 
However, it was also remarkable for the simple reason that it was the first instrument 
that provided for an investor-state approach to investment disputes.  
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in Europe 
(OECD) took the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention and adopted it in its efforts to 
produce a convention on the protection of foreign property.60 The attempt of the 
OECD to stipulate an instrument was published in its 1962 Draft Convention on the 
Protection of Foreign Property.61 Despite considerable discussions within the 
organisation a consensus could not be reached. In 1967, another attempt was made 
with the reissuance of the convention. The Council Resolution that adopted the new 
draft stated in its preamble: 
 
“Observing that the Draft Convention embodies recognised principles relating to the 
protection of foreign property combined with rules to render more effective the application 
of these principles.”62 
 
It is surprising that the organization could not, despite being composed mainly of 
capital-exporting states, reach a compromise in adopting it as a multilateral 
convention. The Draft Convention included a reference to the full protection and 
security standard. 
In 1992, the Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment were 
adopted by the Development Committee of the Board of Governors of the 
                                                     
59 The Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention was partly based on the Köln Draft Convention, or 
International Convention for the Mutual Protection of Private Property Rights in Foreign Countries, 
which was a draft convention published by a German business group in 1957. See F. Tschofen, 
Multilateral Approaches to the Treatment of Foreign Investment, 7 ICSID Review (1992), p. 389. 
60 Germany introduced the draft as a proposal for a multilateral treaty. For the reasons leading up 
to that submission and what the proposal sought to achieve see L. Shawcross, The Problems of Foreign 
Investment in International Law, Académie De Droit International – collected courses of the Hague Academy of 
International law, Vol. 102 (1961), p. 361-363. 
61 Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, 2 ILM (1963) 241. 
62 Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, reprinted in 7 ILM (1968) 117 with 
Resolution C(67)102 of the Council on the Draft Convention adopted on 12 October 1967. 
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International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.63 In Section III, the Guidelines 
stated, after having dealt with the fair and equitable treatment standard and other 
principles, that in all cases “…full protection and security will be accorded to the 
investor’s rights regarding ownership, control and substantial benefits over his 
property, including intellectual property.” 
The OECD continued its efforts to draft a text concerning investments and 
their protection. In 1998, the organisation concluded its Draft Negotiating Text for a 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) where the full protection and security 
standard was included with other absolute standards. However, this effort by the 
OECD did not succeed despite intensive negotiations. Further negotiations were 
abandoned by the OECD as individual member states decided to pursue further 
negotiations pertaining to a multilateral investment regime under the auspices of the 
WTO.64 Again, the efforts of the member states of the WTO came to an end in 2004. 
Even though none of the previously mentioned multilateral instruments have 
entered into force, examples can be found to the contrary. A number of investment 
instruments deal directly or indirectly with the protection of investments. One of 
these instruments is the 1985 Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA Convention). According to the Convention, a number of 
preconditions have to be met before insurance coverage can be extended to an 
investment. According to Article 12(d)(iv) of the MIGA Convention, which deals 
with eligible investments, the MIGA Agency has to satisfy itself as to “the 
investment conditions in the host country, including the availability of fair and 
equitable treatment and legal protection for the investment.”65  
 
2.6 Regional instruments 
Efforts to formulate investment protection provisions concerning foreign investment 
developed much later at the regional level compared to earlier attempts within the 
multilateral sphere. These regional agreements have not always been limited to 
investment alone, but have focused both on trade and investment. These regional 
initiatives are of importance as there might be a certain spill-over effect from regional 
                                                     
63 World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, reprinted in 31 ILM 
1379 (1992). 
64 For reasons why the initiative was discontinued see R. Dolzer and C. Schreuer, Principles of 
International Investment Law, OUP (2008), p. 26. 
65 See Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, 27 ILM 1288 
(1988).  
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cooperation to bilateral treaty practice of member states. Needless to say, regional 
cooperation is often influenced by the bilateral treaty practice of its member states.  
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Canada, the 
United States of America and Mexico entered into force in 1994.66 The agreement’s 
objectives were inter alia to establish a free trade area in which barriers to trade were 
eliminated and cross-border movement of goods and services facilitated. In addition, 
the agreement was intended to increase investment opportunities and provide for 
investment protection. The agreement contains in its Article 1105 a clause stipulating 
that member states should accord treatment in accordance with international law, 
including full protection and security. As will be discussed in Chapter 3.3.2.3.2, this 
provision has become topical due to its formulation, how various arbitral tribunals 
have interpreted it and how members of NAFTA have attempted to influence the 
process of interpretation.  
Another regional instrument, which could be taken as an example, is the 
agreement stipulated under the auspices of the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference, an international organisation of 57 Muslim states. The Agreement on 
Promotion, Protection and Guarantee of Investments among Members States of the 
Organisation of the Islamic Conference includes reference to the full protection and 
security standard that obliges states to provide adequate protection and security. This 
agreement, which was originally stipulated in 1981, can be considered a part of an 
initiative taken by a number of Arab countries in order to facilitate the flow of 
investment between Arab capital-exporting and Arab capital-importing countries. 
Other initiatives were also taken in order to achieve that objective, e.g. the 
establishment of the Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation.67 
The Energy Charter Treaty was signed in 1994 and entered into force in 1998. 
The treaty is intended to establish a multilateral framework for energy cooperation 
and promote energy security through competitive energy markets. The treaty focuses 
on the protection of foreign investments, non-discriminatory conditions for trade, 
resolution of disputes between contracting parties or investors and host states and 
the promotion of energy efficiency. In the event that a dispute arises an investor can 
in accordance with Article 26 of the treaty instigate arbitral proceedings under the 
ICSID Convention, an arbitral tribunal established under the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, before the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce or before courts or administrative tribunals of the contracting party to 
the dispute. As a list of the 51 member states reveals – a list which includes Finland 
                                                     
66 North American Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Canada, the Government 
of Mexico and the Government of the United States, 32 ILM (1993) 605. 
67 UNCTAD, Investment Provisions in Economic Intergration Agreements, United Nations (2006), p. 14-15. 
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in Western Europe and Japan in Southeast Asia – the treaty can be considered a 
sectoral instrument rather than a regional one. In addition, 22 states have observer 
status to the treaty. The treaty describes in Article 10(1) that investments shall enjoy 
full protection and security, but includes also a description of state action from which 
contracting parties are to refrain.68 
Some regional instruments provide for protection, but also include references to 
national treatment or include requirements linked to the investment’s admission to 
the host state. Examples of the former are the Colonia and Buenos Aires Investment 
Protocols of MERCOSUR. Both protocols provide for “full protection” but refer 
also to national treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment.69 An example of the 
latter is the Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments made 
under the auspices of the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN), an 
organisation established in 1967 with ten Southeast Asian countries. In 1987, 
ASEAN adopted the agreement clearly stating that its contracting parties should 
ensure full protection of investments made within the territory of that contracting 
party.70 However, while including such a provision, it also included numerous 
restrictive requirements. Pursuant to Article II of the agreement, investments are to 
be approved in writing and registered with the authorities in the host country. In 
2009, the ASEAN member states adopted the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment 
Agreement in which the substantive standard of full protection and security was 
addressed in greater detail.71 However, this new agreement does not eliminate the 
restrictive requirements contained in the Agreement for the Promotion and 
Protection of Investment of 1987. According to Article 4(a), the ASEAN 
Comprehensive Investment Agreement of 2009 defines “covered investments” as an 
investment of an investor in the territory of any other member state that has been 
admitted and specifically approved in writing by a competent authority.  
 
                                                     
68 The Energy Charter Treaty, signed on 17 December 1994, reprinted in 34 ILM 360 (1995). 
69 See Protocol on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments in MERCOSUR 
(“Colonia Protocol”), 17 January 1994. This protocol covers investments that are made by investors 
coming from states that are parties to MERCOSUR. See also Protocol for the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments coming from States not Parties to MERCOSUR (“Buenos Aires 
Protocol”), 5 August 1994. This protocol covers, as its name suggests, investments made by investors 
that come from states that are not parties to MERCOSUR. 
70 ASEAN Agreement signed on 15 December 1987 by Brunei Darussalem, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand and later acceded to by Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos and 
Cambodia, available at <http://www.asean.org/6464.htm>. 
71 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement signed 26 February 2009 by Brunei Darussalem, 




2.7 Non-governmental initiatives 
A number of non-governmental initiatives have been undertaken by organizations 
concerning the protection of investments. The overall effects of these initiatives, 
with the exception of the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investments Abroad, 
are uncertain. Still, a general description of these attempts is necessary for the 
purposes of this study. 
The International Code for Fair Treatment for Foreign Investments was 
prepared by two committees of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and 
published by the organisation in 1949. Article 5 of the Code is based upon the 
principle of national treatment, but with the caveat of international law, in the event 
that municipal law does not suffice, with regard to civil rights recognized by the 
other contracting party or international law.72 Again, in another attempt, in 1972, the 
ICC adopted the Guidelines for International Investment. According to Article 
V(3)(a) the host country’s government “[s]hould respect the recognized principles of 
international law, reflected in many international treaties regarding the treatment of 
foreign property [...].” It must come as a surprise that the standard of full protection 
and security is not described whereas the fair and equitable standard is mentioned. 
In 1998, a non-governmental organization, Consumer Unity & Trust Society – 
Centre for International Trade, Economics and Environment, prepared a draft on an 
international investment agreement. Pursuant to Article IX, paragraph 1.1, a 
contracting party was to accord full protection and security to investments in its 
territory: 
 
“(a) Each Contracting Party shall accord, to investments (in its territory) of investors of 
another Contracting State, fair and equitable treatment and full and constant protection and 
security, including such treatment, protection and security in respect of the operation, 
management, maintenance, use enjoyment or disposal of such investments. 
                                                     
72 Article 5 of the ICC Code states: “In the territories of each of the High Contracting Parties, the 
treatment extended to the nationals of the other High Contracting Parties shall be not less favourable 
than that applied to their own nationals, in respect of the legal and judicial protection of their person, 
property, rights and interests, and in respect of the acquisition, purchase, sale and assignment of 
moveable and immoveable property of any kind.  Should the nationals of one of the High Contracting 
Parties not enjoy the full benefit of the civil rights generally recognized by the other High Contracting Parties or by 




(b) In no such case shall a Contacting Party accord, to such investments, treatment or 
protection that is less favourable than that required by customary internaitonal law.”73 
[emphasis added] 
 
The document is an attempt to lay out an equitable alternative international 
agreement on investment that would promote social justice, equity, transparency and 
accountability. It serves as an example where civil society is engaged as a stakeholder 
in addressing issues dealing with investment and development.74  
  
2.8 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the history of the standard of full protection and security. As 
this chapter has revealed, the standard rests upon an old principle of international 
law, in particular the principle that a state must protect foreigners and their property 
within its borders. This fundamental principle has been so well recognized that 
individual states have adhered to it in many cases since the 1800s. Examples can be 
found where states have without any particular pressure being asserted against them 
paid compensation because of damage caused to aliens or, in some cases, individuals 
that would according to the current legal framework governing foreign investment be 
considered investors. 
However, the consensus, which formed a customary principle of international 
law, could not be maintained, especially after the newly independent African states 
began to assert themselves in the international arena demanding control of their 
natural resources following their struggle for independence. This shift was met with 
an initiative of capital-exporting states that produced numerous BITs. In parallel, 
capital-exporting states led multilateral efforts – efforts that have been unsuccessful 
in terms of adopting a multilateral instrument, but successful in influencing the 
content of the many BITs entered into among states. 
Therefore, the current situation seems to be that the full protection and security 
standard does not differ from other standards in international investment law, e.g. 
the standard of fair and equitable treatment, in the sense that its main foundation 
seems at present to rests upon international investment treaties. It is stipulated in 
numerous treaties, although the provisions found in BITs, multilateral or regional 
                                                     
73 Consumer Unity & Trust Society, International Agreement on Investment, first draft prepared in 1998, 
reprinted in UNCTAD, International Investment Instruments: A Compendium, Vol. V (Regional Integration, 
Bilateral and Non-governmental Instruments, United Nations (2000), p. 364. 
74 UNCTAD has worked with various partners in this field. They include The World Association of 
Investment Promotion Agencies (WAIPA), the World Bank Group, OECD, UNIDO, ICC, NGOs 
and national, subregional and institutions of higher learning. See further Annex to the Sao Paulo 
Consensus dealing with UNCTAD XI Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships, 25 June 2004, TD/410, p. 25 
et seq.  
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instruments are not uniform. However, there is a difference in the way these 
standards came to be, or from where they originated. As discussed in this chapter, 
the standard of full protection and security has a strong relationship with an existing 
principle of international law, whereas the standard of fair and equitable treatment 
does not. The first time a reference was made to the fair and equitable treatment 
standard was in the Havana Charter of 1948. After having being included in that 
instrument, which never entered into force, it began to be used in the numerous US 
FCN treaties concluded thereafter. Eventually, this wording was adopted by the 
German and Swiss BITs that followed. So, when these two standards are compared, 
one can fully state that the full protection and security has a longer history in 
international law.  
Despite the fact that the standard is also mentioned in multilateral and regional 
instruments, its effects are very different in scope. Some regional instruments, e.g. 
NAFTA, have wide ranging consequences due to numerous arbitral awards, whereas 
others, e.g. ASEAN, are of limited use due to restrictive requirements which subject 
investments to the regulatory authority of the host state.  
It is also worth noting that the multilateral instruments described above have not 
been adopted despite repeated attempts by nations and international organizations. 
These instruments have been, needless to say, in favour of protection for foreign 
direct investment and have therefore marked a stark difference to the instruments 
passed in the UN General Assembly that have emphasized the control of nations 
over their natural resources. 
However, when discussing the full protection and security standard, it is not 
sufficient to look only at the evolution of the principles governing the protection of 
aliens, but also to recognize and assess the impact of the numerous legal instruments 
that have been stipulated and provide for full protection and security to investors and 
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3. SOURCES OF THE FULL PROTECTION AND SECURITY 
STANDARD 
3.1 Introduction 
As the preceding chapter has revealed, a principle pertaining to the protection of 
aliens has had a long history in international law. However, that protection – 
including its scope and nature – has changed considerably as the sources of 
international law have evolved depending on the ever-changing content of customary 
international law, the emergence of FCN treaties and bilateral investment treaties. 
Taking into account this fact, it is necessary to take a closer look at the sources of the 
full protection and security standard.  
A number of issues need to be addressed when discussing the sources of the 
standard of full protection and security. The standard has, as other parts of 
international law, been affected by the increasing fragmentation of international 
law.75 Therefore, different approaches can be taken depending on whether the 
standard should be approached through international law in a classical way or 
whether it should be described through the viewpoint of international investment 
law. 
This chapter will cover both approaches for a number of reasons. First, it is 
necessary to explore the sources of international law in general due to the fact that 
the protection of aliens and their property – the predecessor of the current standard 
of full protection and security – evolved at a point in time when the current sources 
of international investment law were not available. Second, in order to obtain the 
most accurate picture of the current sources of international investment law, its 
preceding sources need to be explored, not only for historical purposes, but also 
because it serves the purpose of this study to ascertain the substantive content and 
scope of the standard. A more complete picture will be obtained of the standard and 
its ramifications as a result.  
 
                                                     
75 See International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law 
Commission, finalized by Martti Koskenniemi. A/CN.4/L.682 of 13 April 2006, p. 11. 
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3.2 Sources of international law 
The system of sources of law in international law varies considerably from any 
municipal law system. One of the most important differences is that international law 
is non-hierarchical.76 Hence, the two-pronged approach in municipal law in which a 
distinction is made between formal sources of law and material sources of law does 
not apply in international law.77 Despite the lack of constitutional machinery of law-
making, the sources of international law are generally thought to be found in Article 
38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.78 It reads as follows: 
 
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes  
    as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting States; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.79 
 
One of the questions which has been raised with regard to Article 38(1) concerns the 
significance of the sequence in the enumeration of sources. After having discussed 
the non-constitutional nature of international law, as opposed to municipal law, one 
might think that the sequence of (i) international conventions, (ii) international 
custom and (iii) general principles of law do not have any meaning in practice. 
However, that is not the case as can be seen when the sources are applied in practice. 
The sequence in the enumeration of sources follows a logical structure, namely that it 
proceeds from more special to the more general rules or principles, from bilateral 
agreements between two states to the general principles of law.80  
                                                     
76 See H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed., Clarendon Press (1994), p. 213-237. 
77 Formal sources are legal procedures and methods which acknowledge the creation of rules 
generally applicable and legally binding for the entities which are subjected to them. Material sources 
provide an approach which varifies substantively the rules which have been correctly adopted. See 
further I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6th ed., OUP (2003), p. 3 et seq.  
78 For a critical view concerning Article 38 and its status as stipulating the sources of international 
law, see L. Oppenheim, International Law, 9th ed., Harlow – Longman (1992), p. 24, where the author 
argues that Article 38 cannot itself create the legal validity of the sources of international law as the 
article itself belongs to one of the sources which it describes, namely an ‘international convention’. 
79 International Court of Justice, Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945), available at 
<http://www.icj-cij.org>. 
80 See M. Akehurst, The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law, 47 BYIL (1974-1975), p. 273-285, 
and K. Zemanek, The Legal Foundations of the International System, Académie De Droit International – collected 
courses of the Hague Academy of International law, Vol. 266 (1997), p. 131-133.  
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Still, an umpire cannot but be bound of the statutory principle articulated in 
Article 38(1) subpara. (d), in which a distinction is made between the first three 
sources and the last two sources, i.e. treaty law, customary international law and 
general principles of law, on one hand, and judicial decisions and scholarly writing, 
on the other. This division of main sources and subsidiary sources of international 
law must be considered to be indicative of the interpretation and application of the 
three main sources in Article 38(1).81 
The continued fragmentation of international law has ignited the debate whether 
individual parts of international law, such as specialized parts of international 
economic law (WTO law, investment law), have become self-contained regimes.82 
Such fragmentation often leads to the usage of the “principles of international 
investment law” or “principles of international human rights law” – usage that often 
assumes that the principles referred to differ from what the general principles of 
international law provide in similar situations. But regardless of whether this 
distinction has any practical relevance in individual cases, it has become clear that 
international investment law is at present considered a specific field of law in terms 
of having evolved to the extent that it is considered to possess such terminology as 
to be examined as a distinct field of law.83 This is not to say that international 
investment law is an autonomous legal subsystem – it is more a specific field of law 
that at present forms an integral part of general international law. Such consensus is 
supported by practical examples found in individual sources of international law. The 
full protection and security standard is referred to in numerous investment 
instruments, as mentioned in Chapter 2, judgments of the ICJ and awards of arbitral 
tribunals. As will be discussed in greater detail in this Chapter, the standard is also 
found in customary international law and general principles of international law. This 
inter-relationship is in constant development due to the growth of this genre of law, 
in particular through the increasing number of BITs, state practice as it contributes 
to customary international law and an upsurge in arbitral awards. 
                                                     
81 See H. Mosler and K. Oellers-Frahm ‘On Art. 92’ in B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United 
Nations – A Commentary, OUP (2002), p. 1159-1160. See also International Law Commission, 
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law . 
Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, finalized by Martti Koskenniemi. 
A/CN.4/L.682 of 13 April 2006, p. 65. 
82 For a discussion on the concept of ‘self-contained regimes’, see B. Simma, Self-Contained Regimes, 
16 NYIL (1985) 111-36 and B. Simma and D. Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained 
Regimes in International Law, EJIL (2006), Vol. 17, No. 3, p. 483. For a discussion on the concept itself 
within the context of investment law, see M. Hirsch, ‘Interactions between Investment and Non-
Investment Obligations in International Investment Law’ in C. Schreuer, P. Muchlinski and F. Ortino 
(eds.), Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law, OUP (2008), p. 154 et seq. 
83 R. Dolzer and C. Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law, OUP (2008), p. 2. 
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3.3 Sources of international investment law 
3.3.1 General 
The sources of international investment law, in their present form, stem from the 
sources of international law.84 The increase in economic activity, including foreign 
investment, which has been coupled with the conclusion of numerous BITs, has 
increased the distinctive characteristics of this field of law. Furthermore, an upsurge 
in arbitral awards has added extensively to the substantive principles of investment 
law regardless of which source of law they are based upon: investment treaties, 
customary international law or general principles of law. In addition, academic 
publications have grown significantly in number. Hence, the need to address the 
sources of international investment law independently. 
 
3.3.2 International investment treaties 
3.3.2.1 Structure of investment treaties and its implications 
The international investment treaty is one of the most important instruments in any 
investor-state relationship as it provides for the substantive provisions regulating that 
relationship. Moreover, the instrument is of particular importance due to the fact that 
a state, which subjects itself to such an instrument, relinquishes a part of its 
sovereignty in an agreement with another state, i.e. the investor’s home state, in order 
to establish an investor-friendly framework designed to attract foreign investment. 
Therefore, an investment treaty will contain a balance between the state’s interest in 
attracting foreign investment while not being subjected to absolute investments 
standards vis-à-vis the interest of the investor to be able to invest believing that the 
investment will be protected from adverse effects.  
The structure of an investment treaty is of general importance with regard to the 
interpretation of particular provisions of the treaty. Two provisions are relevant for 
this discussion: the introductory provisions concerning the object and purpose of the 
treaty and the substantive provisions containing the protection of the investment 
from adverse effect. The relationship between these types of provisions will become 
apparent, in particular after a dispute has arisen, due to the fact that the former 
emphasizes the purpose accepting foreign investment and its positive effects, 
whereas the latter articulates in greater detail the international standards which 
protect the investment from actions of the state or third parties.  
                                                     
84 As discussed in Chapter 2, earlier increases in economic activity were governed by national laws 
through the principle of national treatment. See also R. Baldwin and P. Martin, Two Waves of 
Globalization: Superficial Similarities, Fundamental Differences, in H. Siebert (ed.), Globalization and Labour 
(1999), p. 3-4. 
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This is particularly evident when a treaty is interpreted according to Article 31 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that includes many of the tools used 
by tribunals to apply the often vague substantive elements of investment standards in 
contentious proceedings.85 As will be discussed later in Chapter 4, it is due to, inter 
alia, the vague substantive content of the full protection and security standard that 
arbitral tribunals have referred to customary international law when interpreting 
substantive provisions in individual cases. 
 
3.3.2.2 Bilateral investment treaties 
3.3.2.2.1 The meaning of different parts and their structure 
BITs currently are the most commonly used instrument providing for protection to 
investors and their investments. Their structure is somewhat uniform although 
differences between the early BITs and the later ones can be seen – the latter group 
contains investment protection which is wider in scope compared to the former 
group.86 
The BITs researched for the purposes of this study contain numerous versions 
of the full protection and security standard.87 The words “protection” and “security” 
form the substantive elements of the standard and can be found in various parts of a 
BIT. The former word is unique in the sense that it appears in every title of every 
BIT researched for this paper. That is the case even though a BIT does not mention 
the full protection and security standard in its substantive part. The word also 
appears quite frequently in a BIT’s preamble where the parties recognize that the 
encouragement and protection of investments will be conducive to the stimulation of 
business initiative and increase prosperity between the contracting parties. And 
finally, the word will usually appear in the substantive part of the treaty where the 
contracting states commit themselves to providing full protection and security. In 
short, the word “protection” will appear in the title of a BIT, its preamble and 
substantive parts. The word “security” appears usually only in the substantive part of 
a BIT – in the part which deals with full protection and security and the part which 
focuses on security interests of a state. 
                                                     
85 See Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS, p. 331. Article 
31(1) is reproduced in Chapter 4. 
86 An example of this evolution is the definition of investment. Earlier BITs contain a general 
definition of investment whereas later editions contain a detailed definition covering intangible parts 
of the investment, e.g. trademarks and intellectual property rights. See Chapter 5.5.5. 
87 A study of 550 BITs was undertaken in order to analyze their structure and content within the 
context of the full protection and security standard. These BITs are available at UNCTAD’s website 
<http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch____779.aspx>. Examples can be found in Annex 
I. 
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The BITs researched for this study reveal that states take different approaches 
with regard to how the BITs, as legal instruments, provide investment protection. 
Three main categories can be found: (1) Agreements which differentiate between 
investment promotion and investment protection; (2) Agreements which address 
jointly investment promotion and investment protection; and (3) Agreements which 
do neither; the agreements of this last category provide for formal protection but 
their substantive provisions either provide incomplete protection or no protection at 
all. It is necessary to explore this categorization in greater detail. 
 
(1) Agreements which differentiate between investment promotion and investment protection 
The first group contains instruments that feature, like all other BITs researched for 
this study, the concept of “protection” in their titles. These treaties also include the 
concept in its preamble. Typically, this type of instrument will describe in a separate 
article or a paragraph a state’s obligation to promote investments which are made in 
accordance with its laws. Subsequently, the instruments will address the investment 
protection itself, often in another article or paragraph.  
An example of this approach can be found in the United Kingdom-Argentina 
BIT. There, the word “protection” appears in the title and preamble of the treaty. 
Subsequent articles presuppose a distinction between promotion and protection. 
Article 2 deals with investment promotion and investment protection. Article 2(1) of 
the BIT, which deals with promotion, states: 
 
“Each Contracting Party shall encourage and create favourable conditions for investors of 
the other Contracting Party to invest capital in its territory, and, subject to its right to 
exercise powers conferred by its laws, shall admit such capital.”  
 
The obligation to provide protection is to be found in Article 2(2) of the same BIT: 
 
“Investments of investors of each Contracting Party shall at all times be accorded fair and 
equitable treatment and shall enjoy protection and constant security in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party. Neither Contracting Party shall in any way impair by unreasonable or 
discriminatory measures the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of 
investments in its territory of investors of the other Contracting Party. Each Contracting 
Party shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments of 
investors of the other Contracting Party.” [emphasis added] 
 
Here, substantive investment standards are not mentioned in the paragraph dealing 
with investment promotion, but are included in a special paragraph dealing with 
investment protection. Examples can be found whereby a distinction between 
investment promotion and protection is made, but protection is a substantive 
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element in both fields. The Netherlands-Bahrain BIT prescribes in Article 2, which 
deals with investment promotion, the following: 
 
“Either Contracting Party shall, within the framework of its laws and regulations, promote 
economic cooperation through the protection in its territory of investments of investors of the 
other Contracting Party. Subject to its right to exercise powers conferred by its laws or 
regulations, each Contracting Party shall admit such investments.” [emphasis added] 
 
The obligation to provide protection is to be found in Article 3(1) of the same BIT: 
 
“Each Contracting Party shall ensure fair and equitable treatment of the investments of 
investors of the other Contracting Party and shall not impair, by unreasonable or 
discriminatory measures, the operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or 
disposal thereof by those nationals. Each Contracting Party shall accord to such investments 
full security and protection.” [emphasis added] 
 
Therefore, while emphasizing protection during the investment’s promotion and its 
subsequent treatment, a distinction between investment promotion and investment 
protection is made. Scholars have advocated for this distinction between promotion 
and protection.88  
 
(2) Agreements which address jointly investment promotion and investment protection 
The second category includes instruments that mention investment protection in 
their respective titles. However, the instruments’ substantive articles contain a more 
mixed approach to the two concepts of promotion and protection of investments. 
Another consequence of this approach is that emphasis of the full protection and 
security in the instrument’s preamble diminishes. Rather, greater emphasis is put on 
the fair and equitable treatment standard. A case in point is the Denmark-India BIT. 
Here, the preamble of the treaty does not mention protection, but prescribes the 
following: 
 
“Recognizing that a fair and equitable treatment of investments on a reciprocal basis will 
serve this aim.” 
 
Article 2(2), which deals both with promotion and protection, states: 
 
                                                     
88 See P. Juillard, ‘L’évolution des sources du droit des investissement’, 250 RCADI 13 (1994), p. 
28. See also UNCTAD, Investment Promotion Provisions in International Investment Agreements, UNCTAD 
Series on International Investment Policies for Development, United Nations (2008), which focuses 
on investment promotion and the role international investment agreements play when countries have 
decided to apply investment promotion measures.  
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“Investments of investors of each Contracting Party shall at all times enjoy full protection and 
security in the territory of the other Contracting Party and shall not be subject to unreasonable 
or discriminatory measures.” 
 
This mixed approach also often entails that the treatment of the investments is dealt 
with in a separate article. The Denmark-India BIT stipulates in Article 3 how the 
investment should be treated. There emphasis is put on fair and equitable treatment 
not only as such but also coupled with a description which is specifically targeted. In 
addition, both of these formulations of the standard are stipulated with the standards 
of national treatment and most-favoured-nation.89  
 
3) Agreements provide for limited protection or no protection  
The BITs found in this third group have an approach not based upon the two 
previously mentioned. These BITs are not structured but tend to mix together 
different structures. As will be discussed later, this approach can have grave 
consequences to the detriment of the investment protection. 
A clear example of this approach is the Russian-Moldovan BIT. This instrument 
obliges the state concerned to provide investment protection. According to Article 
2(2), the investment’s host country obliges itself to guarantee, in accordance with its own 
legislation, full and unconditional legal protection of the investment. This provision led 
the umpire in the Bogdanov case – a case concerning an investment dispute between a 
Russian investor and the state of Moldova, to conclude: 
 
“The wording of article 2(2) of the BIT makes clear that the full protection principle is not 
to be considered as a corrective of the host country’s legislation, but has to be applied in 
accordance with the host country’s law. As long as the restrictions [...] are in accordance with 
Moldovan law, therefore, the full protection standard of the BIT may not be deemed 
violated.”90 
 
                                                     
89 Article 3 in the Denmark-India BIT states the following: 
(1) Each Contracting Party shall in its territory accord to investments made by investors of the 
other Contracting Party fair and equitable treatment which in no case shall be less favourable than that 
accorded to the investments of its own investors or to investors of any third state, whichever is the 
more favourable from the point of view of the investor. 
(2) Each Contracting Party shall in its territory accord to investments of investors of the other 
Contracting Party, as regards their management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of their 
investment, fair and equitable treatment which in no case shall be less favourable than that accorded 
to investments of its own investors or to investors of any third State, whichever of these standards is 
the more favourable from the point of view of the investor. 
(3) In addition each Contracting Party shall accord to investors of the other Contracting Party 
treatment which shall not be less favourable than that accorded to investors of any third state.  
90 Bogdanov v Republic of Moldova, Award 22 September 2005, SCC, para 4.2.3. 
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Here, two parts are mixed together, namely “in accordance with its own laws” and 
“full protection and security”. The former provision is usually used when dealing 
with investment promotion – a state is to admit investments that are made in 
accordance with its own laws. The latter provision is a traditional provision providing 
for protection with regard to the investment itself. It is safe to say, regardless of 
whether that conclusion is correct or not, that such a provision renders the 
investment protection, which the BIT was supposed to guarantee, useless for the 
investor. In addition, a provision of this nature goes against the aim of the BIT, i.e. 
to provide investment protection in cases when action or inaction of the state, which 
might be based on national laws, turns out to damage the investment. The protection 
provided for by the full protection and security standard becomes void.  
A similar example can be found in the Thailand-India BIT whereby substantive 
investment standards are subjected to the host state’s law. Article 3(2) of the 
agreement prescribes: 
 
“Investments and returns of investors of each Contracting Party in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party, shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment including 
protection and security under the laws of the other Contracting Party.” [emphasis added] 
 
Needless to say, this formulation might provide an opportunity for the host state, if a 
dispute would arise, to argue that the protection and security owed to the investor 
should not go further than the host state’s law prescribed. That, in effect, would add 
an extra requirement for the investor to show that the host state’s action or inaction 
had violated its laws. It is likely that such an additional requirement would render the 
investment protection insufficient.91 
 
3.3.2.2.2 Overview of different formulations  
In order to get an overview of the many formulations contained in various BITs and 
to be able to analyse them for the purpose of this study, criteria had to be selected to 
limit their number. The combination of countries is based upon a selection for the 
purpose of providing a list of treaties that could be considered representative of the 
main variations of the full protection and security standard. Therefore, the BITs 
researched came from both developing and developed countries: 
                                                     
91 It must be noted that examples can be found in Swedish BITs where a distinction was made 
between investment promotion and investment protection. Despite that distinction, these BITs did 
not provide for protection and security, or at least did so in a limited way. See e.g. the Sweden-Russia 
BIT in Annex I. The BIT makes the distinction between promotion and protection, but does not 
mention the full protection and security standard. The treaty only states that “the investments made 
by investors of one contracting party in the territory of the other contracting party enjoy full protection 
in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement”.  
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Developing countries    Developed countries 
1. Argentina     1. Belgium-Luxembourg 
2. China     2. Finland 
3. Czech Republic    3. Germany 
4. Egypt     4. Netherlands 
5. India     5. Sweden 
6. Indonesia     6. Switzerland 
7. Thailand     7. United Kingdom 
8. Turkey     8. United States of America 
      
In addition to these countries, the BITs of other countries will be addressed 
indirectly, especially in the event that a provision has been interpreted by an arbitral 
tribunal in investor-state arbitration.  
The clauses used by states in describing the full protection and security standard 
vary considerably. The most common construction is “full protection and security”. 
That is, however, by no means the only formulation. Other versions include “full 
protection,”92 “protection and security,”93 “adequate protection and security,”94 “full 
physical security and protection,”95 “full and constant protection and security,”96 
“constant protection and security,”97 and “most constant protection and security”.98 
A number of treaties go further when prescribing that investment should be 
accorded “full legal protection and security”99 or “full legal protection and legal 
security”.100 
The different variations of the full protection and security standard can be 
divided into the following six categories: (a) The standard appears without any 
reference to other terms; (b) The standard appears with fair and equitable treatment; 
(c) The standard appears with expropriation; (d) The standard appears with relative 
standards; (e) The standard appears with reference to international law; and (f) The 
standard appears within the context of other special obligations. It is necessary to 
look at this more closely, in particular to establish within what context the full 
protection and security standard appears, before analyzing what the legal effects of 
these variations might be in practice. 
                                                     
92 Art. 2(3) Germany-Thailand BIT. 
93 Art. II(4) US-Zaire BIT. 
94 Art. 2(2) Indonesia-Korea BIT. 
95 Art. 3(2) Netherlands-Venezuela BIT. 
96 Art. 10(1) Japan-Korea BIT and Art. 2(2) China-Djibouti BIT. 
97 Art. 2(2) Finland-China BIT. 
98 Art. 3(2) Thailand-Peru BIT. 
99 Art. 4(2) Australia-Argentina BIT. 
100 Art. 4(1) Germany-Argentina BIT. 
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(a) The standard appears without any reference to other terms 
The full protection and security standard often appears as an independent stand-
alone standard. The Austria-Saudi Arabia BIT contains the following clause in Article 
4(1): 
 
“Investments by investors of either contracting party shall enjoy full protection and security in 
the territory of the other contracting party.” [emphasis added] 
 
This is clearly the simplest version of the standard in treaty practice. Other variations 
can be found, such as the Finland-Brazil BIT, which emphasizes that investments are 
to be protected at all times: 
 
“Investments by investors of either contracting party shall at all times enjoy full protection and 
security in the territory of the other contracting party.” [emphasis added] 
 
However, such additions will generally not lead to any difference in protection, not 
unless additional substantive elements are added to the standard. The Belgium-Korea 
BIT attaches an element of de jure and de facto discrimination in Article 1(2): 
 
“Such investments, goods, rights and interests shall also enjoy continuous protection and security, 
excluding all unjustified or discriminatory measures which would “de jure” or “de facto” 
hinder their management, maintenance, utilization, enjoyment, or liquidation.” [emphasis 
added] 
 
Thus, additional substantive elements are attached to the standard that formulate in 
greater detail what the host state is to refrain from doing.   
 
(b) The standard appears with the fair and equitable treatment standard 
The standard is frequently formulated with the fair and equitable treatment standard. 
Article 2(2) of the Czech-South Africa BIT states: 
 
“Investments of investors of either Party shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable 
treatment and shall enjoy full protection and security in the territory of the other Party.” 
[emphasis added] 
 
Some countries not only include the two standards in the same sentence, but also 
include with them a description of actions that are particularly targeted. This 
approach is frequently used in the treaty practice of the United Kingdom. Article 2(2) 




“Investments of nationals or companies of each Contracting Party shall at all times be 
accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy full protection and security in the territory 
of the other Contracting Party. Neither Contracting Party shall in any way impair by 
unreasonable or discriminatory measures the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or 
disposal of investments in its territory of nationals or companies of the other Contracting 
Party. Each Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with 
regard to investments of nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party.” [emphasis 
added] 
 
Thus, the substantive standards are formulated with a description of actions that the 
host state should refrain from doing and then followed by an “umbrella clause” that 
states that any obligations should be observed. 
The relationship between the two standards is a complex one and often directly 
affected because of the particular formulation of the standards’ relationship in treaty 
law. The France-Argentina BIT notes in Article 5.1 that the full protection and 
security standard should be considered a part of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard: 
 
“Investments made by investors of either Contracting Party shall enjoy in the territory and 
the maritime zone of the other Contracting Party, full protection and security, pursuant to the 
principle of fair and equitable treatment mentioned in Article 3 of this Agreement.” 
[emphasis added] 
 
This version of the standard is not common in treaty practice. Usually the standards 
of fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security are formulated 
independently. However, this formulation became topical in the Vivendi v Argentina 
case. Despite acknowledging its “specific wording”, the tribunal did not limit the 
scope of the standard. In contrast, the tribunal stated, when dealing with whether the 
standard was limited to the protection of physical security or not, that such limitation 
could not be found in the way in which the standard was formulated. If the parties to 
the treaty had intended to limit the scope of the standard, they could have done so in 
the treaty itself. Therefore, the tribunal concluded that the standard should be 
thought to cover any act that deprived an investor, on one hand, of protection and 
security and, on the other hand, fair and equitable treatment.101 
 
                                                     
101 Vivendi Universal S.A. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award of 22 May 2007, 
para 7.4.15.  
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(c) The standard appears with expropriation 
Some countries prefer to include the standard within the context of expropriation. 
This is particularly the case in German treaty practice. An example is Article 4 of the 
Germany-Philippines BIT which bears the heading “Expropriation and Compens-
ation”, but includes a provision that states that investments made by investors shall 
enjoy full protection and security.102 In the recently re-negotiated Germany-
Venezuela BIT,103 reference to the full protection and security standard appears both 
in Article 2(2), which deals with promotion and protection, and in Article 4(1), which 
covers expropriation and compensation: 
 
“Investments of the investors of either Contracting Party shall enjoy constant protection and 
security in the territory of the other Contracting Party.” [emphasis added] 
 
“Investments by investors of either Contracting Party shall enjoy full protection and security in 
the territory of the other Contracting Party.” [emphasis added] 
 
This structure and formulation seem to emphasize, therefore, that a higher level of 
protection is provided for on more than one occasion concerning the protection of 
investments.  
 
(d) The standard appears with relative standards 
In contrast to formulating the full protection and security standard with absolute 
standards, e.g. fair and equitable treatment, the standard appears on numerous 
occasions with relative standards, in particular the national treatment standard and 
the most-favoured-nation standard. An example of this kind of formulation can be 
found in the Egypt-Nigeria BIT which states: 
 
“[…] each Contracting Party shall accord to such investments full security and protection which 
in any case shall not be less than that accorded either to investments of its own nationals and 
companies or to investments of nationals and companies of any third state, whichever is 
more favourable to the nationals and companies concerned.” [emphasis added] 
 
                                                     
102 Article 4(1) of the Germany-Philippines BIT. This provisions can be found in Annex I.  
103 The Germany-China BIT was signed on 1 December 2003 and replaced the Agreement of 7 
October 1983 between the Federal Republic of Germany and the People’s Republic of China on the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments. The change of BIT serves as an example 
that countries may change their BIT taking into account their level of development and the fact that a 
country that once was a capital importing country may amend its investment policy when it starts to 
export capital to other countries. See further N. Gallagher and W. Shan, Chinese Investment Treaties: 
Policies and Practice, OUP (2009), 3.45 et seq. 
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Here, full protection and security, an absolute standard, is coupled with two relative 
standards. This formulation is interesting as it establishes a close connection between 
the full protection and security standard and two other standards that depend on the 
treatment of the parties’ own nationals or nationals of third states. Thus, a legal 
assessment needs to be implemented taking into account different tertium comparationis 
that will eventually determine the level of investment protection depending on the 
protection which the relative standards provide for. This connection of the full 
protection and security standard with, e.g., the standard of national treatment serves 
as an example that the treaty in question is a bilateral treaty. It shows that a country is 
at times only willing to accord protection to foreign investors on the basis of 
reciprocity.104  
 
(e) The standard appears with reference to international law 
The investment treaties reviewed reveal that the standard seldom appears with 
reference to international law. Such a formulation is most frequently used by the 
United States. Article 3(1) of the United States-Mexican BIT prescribes: 
 
“Each Contracting Party shall accord full protection and security to the investment made by the 
other Contracting Party’s investors, in accordance with International Law and shall not, 
through legally groundless actions or discriminatory measures, hinder the management, 
maintenance, development, usage, enjoyment, expansion, sale, or where applicable, 
disposition of such investments.” [emphasis added] 
 
However, reference to international law was more often used where the full 
protection and security standard was formulated in the same sentence as the fair and 
equitable treatment standard. Again, the treaty practice of the United States serves as 
an example – the United States-Estonia BIT states in Article 3(a): 
 
“Investments shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment, shall enjoy full 
protection and security and shall in no case be accorded treatment less than required by 
international law.” [emphasis added] 
 
                                                     
104 Reciprocity has been an important element in various standards of international economic law. 
Examples of this can be found as far as the Magna Carta of 1215, Article 41, which provides that 
foreign merchants shall be “safe and secure” when entering or leaving England. In times of war, 
foreign merchants could only be safe in England if English merchants were safe in enemy country. See 
further G. Schwarzenberger, The Principles and Standards of International Economic Law, 117 RCADI 5 
(1966), p. 22, and Article 41 of the Magna Carta, reprinted in J.C. Holt, Magna Carta, 2nd ed., CUP 




The effect of such a formulation is a complicated matter and has varied in practice. 
While formulations of this kind have at times played a role in some cases, they have 
not played a part in other cases.105 The relationship between the treaty-based standard 
and international law will be discussed separately in Chapter 3.3.3.3. 
 
(f) The standard appears in addition to provisions covering war, revolution and mob violence 
A number of BITs contain provisions describing the right of an investor to be 
compensated due to losses as a result of war or other armed conflicts, revolution, a 
state of national emergency, revolt, insurrection or riots. The Australia-India BIT 
states: 
 
“Investors of one Contracting Party whose investments in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party suffer losses owing to war or other armed conflict, a state of national emergency or 
civil disturbances shall be accorded by the latter Contracting party treatment, as regards 
compensation, restitution, indemnification or other forms of settlement, no less favourable 
than that which the latter Contracting Party accords to its own investors or investors of any 
third state.”106 [emphasis added] 
 
Some BITs go even further with regard to events from which the investor suffers. 
The Austria-Mexico BIT states: 
 
“An investor of a Contracting Party which has suffered a loss relating to its investment in the 
territory of the other Contracting Party due to war or to other armed conflict, state of 
emergency, revolution, insurrection, civil disturbance, or any other similar event, or acts of 
God or force majeure, in the territory of the latter Contracting Party, shall be accorded by the 
latter Contracting Party, as regards restitution, indemnification, compensation or any other 
settlement, treatment no less favourable than that which it accords to its own investors or to 
investors of any third state, whichever is most favourable to the investor.”107 [emphasis 
added] 
 
Thus, if a government would provide its own investors or investors of any third state 
with compensation resulting from an act of God or force majeure, such a measure 
                                                     
105 See e.g. AMT v Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award of 21 February 1997, 36 ILM 1531 
(1997), para 6.06, and Noble Ventures v Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award 11 October 
2005, para 164. In both cases the relevant BIT contained a clause refering to international law by 
stating that the investment should in no case be accorded treatment less than that required by 
international law. That formulation was considered to be of “fundamental” importance in the former 
case, whereas as in the latter case the tribunal stated that it was doubtful whether the treaty provision 
of full protection and security could be understood as being wider in scope than the duty to protect 
and secure aliens according to customary international law. 
106 Australia-India BIT, Article 8. 
107 Austria-Mexico BIT, Article 6. 
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would go further than the protection the investor is entitled according to customary 
international law.  
Such formulations entail some overlap with customary international law. The 
international minimum standard has historically included protection covering 
revolution, insurrection, mob violence and civil disturbance. In the Youmans case, the 
US-Mexican Claims Commission referred to the argument in the Jeannotat case when 
deciding upon whether Mexico should compensate a son of an American citizen who 
was killed as a result of an attack orchestrated by armed officials and a mob: 
 
“It has been alleged that in the above-mentioned instance the sacking was done by the 
released prisoners, and by a mob belonging to the population of the town; but, if it were so, 
it was the military force commanded by officers who put it in the power of the convicts and 
incited the mob to assist them in their acts of violence and plunder. It does not appear that 
without the arrival of the military force, which ought to have protected the peaceable 
inhabitants of the town, there would have been any inclination to commit such acts of 
violence. The umpire is therefore, of opinion that compensation is due to the claimants from 
the Mexican Government.”108  
 
In a situation where there is overlap between the protection provided for according 
to the BIT and the protection according to customary international law, the question 
arises how that might affect the position of an investor in a legal dispute. Should the 
investor rely upon the BIT or is it sufficient to rely on the principle derived from 
customary international law?  
An answer to the question can only depend on an analysis of recent arbitral 
awards dealing with events that are stipulated in the relevant investment treaty, 
namely armed conflict, revolution, insurrection, civil disturbance, etc. Here, the first 
investor-state investment dispute provides guidance. In AAPL v Sri Lanka the 
investment was damaged during armed conflict between the Sri Lankan army and 
revolutionary forces.109 The tribunal recognized that the United Kingdom-Sri Lanka 
BIT prescribed that an investment should be accorded full protection and security. 
Despite that a treaty provision prescribing the standard was obviously applicable to 
the dispute in question, the tribunal entered into a detailed discussion on the 
obligation of the state according to customary international law. In Pantechniki v 
Albania the investor suffered damage following civil unrest of such magnitude that 
the state’s police were unable to provide protection and security. The tribunal 
analyzed the treaty-based standard and obligations of the state according to 
                                                     
108 Thomas H. Youmans (USA) v United Mexican States, IV RIAA (1926), p. 115. 
109 AAPL v Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award of 21 June 1990, 30 ILM 577 (1991) 
paras 67-69. 
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customary international law.110 Therefore, a tribunal’s approach can only be based 
upon an assessment taking all factors into account based on the investor’s interests. 
Given the common approach taken by tribunals of applying both the treaty-based 
standard and customary international law, most tribunals will be likely to include 
both the protection provided by the BIT and customary international law. 
 
(g) The standard is not included in the treaty  
Finally, there are BITs that do not contain any reference to the full protection and 
security standard. These agreements often omit any reference to substantive 
standards, but focus more on the relative standards of most-favoured-nation and 
national treatment.  
The China-Turkey BIT provides an example. It, needless to say, contains the 
concept of “protection” in its title and emphasizes that the agreement is concluded 
concerning the reciprocal promotion and “protection of investments”.111 However, 
no article on full protection and security is incorporated in its substantive part. In a 
similar way the Italy-Bangladesh BIT also omits any reference to the full protection 
and security standard. The treaty’s title includes reference to “protection” and the 
preamble acknowledges that offering encouragement and “mutual protection” to 
investments will contribute to stimulating business. However, a substantive article on 
full protection and security is not to be found.112  
Various trends could be seen flowing from BITs made by both capital importing 
and exporting countries. In general the full protection and security standard was 
more frequently omitted in older agreements compared to agreements made in 
recent years. It was to be expected that capital exporting countries, such as Germany, 
the United Kingdom and United States, have for decades consistently included the 
full protection and security standard in their BITs. But surprisingly, other capital 
exporting countries, such as Sweden, have not included any reference to the 
standard.  
                                                     
110 Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Engineers v Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/21, Award 
30 July 2009, para 81. 
111 The China-Turkey BIT was entered into on 13 November 1990. The Chinese BIT program did 
not provide for a wide investment protection during its early years. That has, however, changed as a 
result of the fact that the country is not only importing capital but also exporting capital. China is 
currently the second largest recipient of foreign direct investment in the world, but finds itself ever 
more often in the position of a capital exporting country. Whereas the early Chinese Model BITs did 
not contain a reference to full protection and security, the current Chinese Model BIT contains a full 
protection and security clause. See further N. Gallagher and W. Shan, Chinese Investment Treaties: Policies 
and Practice, OUP (2009), para 3.45 et seq. 
112 This is also the case in the Egypt-Botswana BIT, India-Indonesia BIT, Sweden-Mexico BIT and 
Australia-Philippines BIT. See further Annex I.   
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Another trend is that capital importing countries have not included the standard 
in their BITs, but have rather included the relative standards of most-favoured-
nation and national treatment when dealing with investment promotion, treatment 
and protection issues. However, that practice has in individual cases changed 
following an upsurge in economic activity. When the economies of these countries 
expand, often resulting in a higher level of development, a change follows, leading to 
increasing outflows of capital. That leads later to more frequent use of the full 
protection and security standard in the BIT practice of these states. Two examples 
illustrating this development are China and Turkey. These countries’ early BITs did 
not include the standard, but their later treaties have done so.113  
 
3.3.2.3 Regional treaties 
3.3.2.3.1 The meaning of different parts and their structure 
The full protection and security standard did not enjoy a prominent role in regional 
treaties as in the FCN treaties prior to the Second World War and the bilateral 
treaties of the post war era. The parties to the Economic Agreement of Bogotá of 
1948 – a treaty that did not enter into force – did not include the standard in the 
treaty. However, state parties proclaimed their intention to stimulate the flow of 
private capital “…to the extent that nationals of other countries are afforded 
opportunities for investments and security for existing and future investments”.114 
More recent regional agreements frequently include the standard.  
Regional treaties researched for this thesis reveal a more diverse group of 
investment instruments compared to BITs. In contrast to the many BITs covered, 
regional agreements do not exclusively deal with investment, but cover free trade or 
other types of economic activity.  
This affects the role that the substantive concepts of the full protection and 
security standard play in regional treaties. Therefore, the concept of “protection”, 
which appears repeatedly in the title, preamble and individual articles of BITs, does 
not appear as frequently in the title and preamble of regional treaties. Two treaties 
                                                     
113 See, for comparison, on one hand, the Turkey-Bangladesh BIT of 1987 and the Turkey-Portugal 
BIT of 2001 and, on the other, the China-Germany BIT of 1981 and China-Germany BIT of 2003. 
The older treaties did not include any reference to the full protection and security standard, but the 
younger treaties do. The model BITs for both countries include a reference to the full protection and 
security standard. See Turkey Model BIT (2000) in UNCTAD, International Investment Instruments: A 
Compendium, UNCTAD/DITE/3, Vol. VIII, United Nations (2000), p. 281, and Chinese Model BIT 
(2003), reprinted in R. Dolzer and C. Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law, OUP (2008), p. 
352. 
114 Economic Agreement of Bogotá, Article 22(2). See Annex II. 
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serve as an example in this regard, namely the North American Free Trade 
Agreement and the Energy Charter Treaty.  
The divergence between regional agreements and BITs leads also to a different 
situation with regard to the structure of these agreements. Structures describing the 
difference between investment promotion and investment protection are non-
existent in free trade agreements, whereas they can be found in regional investment 
agreements or sectoral agreements.  
 
3.3.2.3.2 Overview of different formulations  
Regional treaties vary considerably with regard to what kind of formulations are used 
to prescribe investment protection when compared to stipulations contained in BITs. 
An example of a stipulation of the full protection and security standard can be found 
in the Agreement on Promotion, Protection and Guarantee of Investments among 
Member States of the Islamic Conference. The agreement states the following in 
Chapter 2: 
 
“The contracting parties shall permit the transfer of capitals among them and its utilization 
therein in the fields permitted for investment in accordance with their laws. The invested 
capital shall enjoy adequate protection and security and the host state shall give the necessary 
facilities and incentives to the investors engaged in activities therein.”115 [emphasis added] 
 
Here, the full protection and security standard is included in an article dealing with 
transfer of capital and investment incentives. These two latter concepts are 
frequently addressed in independent articles in various BITs.116 But, interestingly, the 
standard is referred to within the context of the host state’s obligation to provide 
necessary facilities and incentives to investors. In addition, Chapter 3, which bears 
the heading “Investment Guarantees”, contains provisions that formulate the right to 
expropriate, to adopt preventive measures from a competent legal authority and 
executive measures of judicial institutions. Other regional investment instruments 
                                                     
115 Agreement on Promotion, Protection and Guarantee of Investments among Member States of 
the Islamic Conference, Article 2. 
116 See e.g. Switzerland-Thailand BIT and Netherlands-Chile BIT; in the former treaty Article 3 
deals with admission and encouragement of investments, Article 4 addresses investment protection 
and Article 6 covers transfer of payments connected to the investment. In the latter treaty Article 2 
deals with admission, Article 3 with investment protection and Article 4 with free transfer of 




describe the standard in a similar manner, such as the ECOWAS Energy Protocol 
that promises “most constant protection and security”.117 
In 1987, the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) adopted an 
Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, which mentions that 
standard within the context of arbitrary and discriminatory measures. It states in 
Article 4(1):  
 
“Each Contracting Party shall, within its territory ensure full protection of the investments 
made in accordance with legislation by investors of the other Contracting Parties and shall 
not impair by unjustified or discriminatory measures the management, maintenance, use, 
enjoyment, extension, disposition or liquidation of such investments.”118 [emphasis added] 
 
In February 2009, the ASEAN member states adopted the ASEAN Comprehensive 
Investment Agreement in which the substantive standard of full protection and 
security was addressed in greater detail. Article 11 of the agreement states:  
 
“1. Each Member State shall accord to covered investments of investors of any other 
Member State, fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.  
2. For greater certainty: 
(a) fair and equitable treatment requires each Member State not to deny justice in any legal 
or administrative proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process; and 
(b) full protection and security requires each Member State to take such measures as may be 
reasonably necessary to ensure the protection and security of the covered investments. 
3.  A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of this Agreement, or 
of a separate international agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of 
this Article.”119 [emphasis added] 
 
This formulation is more descriptive but does not necessarily entail a higher level of 
protection, especially when the caveat “reasonably necessary” is taken into account. 
Even though a strict textual interpretation of this formulation would not lead to such 
a conclusion, it could be argued that this formulation is influenced by the due 
diligence principle of customary international law.120 
                                                     
117 ECOWAS Energy Protocol was signed on 31 January 2003. ECOWAS comprises of Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. The Protocol is reprinted in UNCTAD, International 
Investment Instruments: A Compendium, UNCTAD/DITE/4, Vol. XIII, (2005), p. 7. 
118 The ASEAN Agreement was signed 15 December 1987 by Brunei Darussalem, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand and later acceded to by Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos 
and Cambodia, available at <http://www.asean.org/6464.htm>. 
119 The ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement was signed 26 February 2009 by Brunei 
Darussalem, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, 
available at <http://www.asean.org/documents/FINAL-SIGNED-ACIA.pdf >. 
120 The concept of due diligence will be discussed in Chapter 5.4. 
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Other agreements include language that might lead to a higher level of 
protection. The Agreement between the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and 
Costa Rica on trade and investment includes the following clause in Article X.04(1): 
 
“Investments of either Party shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment, and 
shall enjoy full legal protection and security in accordance with international law.”121 [emphasis 
added] 
 
Arbitral cases have shown that when tribunals are faced with such an expansive 
formulation – “full legal protection and security” – they become susceptible to 
arguments that emphasize the need to extend investment protection not only to 
physical protection but also to protection against measures that change the regulatory 
framework, which the investment is subjected to, in such a way that the investor’s 
legitimate expectations are violated.122 
Two regional instruments, the basis for numerous disputes, are of particular 
importance, namely the Energy Charter Treaty and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement.  
The Energy Charter Treaty is a sectoral treaty dealing with investment in the 
energy sector. The instrument contains in Article 10(1) principles pertaining to 
investment promotion, protection and treatment, such as the standards of fair and 
equitable treatment and full protection and security: 
 
“Each contracting party shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty encourage and 
create stable, equitable, favourable and transparent conditions for Investors […] to make 
Investments in its Area. Such conditions shall include a commitment to accord at all times to 
Investments of Investors […] fair and equitable treatment. Such Investments shall also enjoy 
the most constant protection and security and no Contracting Party shall in any way impair by 
unreasonable or discriminatory measures their management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or 
disposal. In no case shall such Investments be accorded treatment less favourable than that 
required by international law, including treaty obligations. Each Contracting party shall 
observe any obligations it has entered into with an Investor or an Investment of an Investor 
of any other Contracting Party.”123 [emphasis added] 
 
                                                     
121 Agreement between the Caribbean Communicy, acting behalf of the Governments of Antigua 
and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago and Costa Rica, signed 9 March 
2004, reprinted in UNCTAD, International Investment Instruments: A Compendium, UNCTAD/DITE/4, 
Vol. XIV, (2005), p. 206. 
122 See Siemens v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award of 6 February 2007, para 
308. 
123 The Energy Charter Treaty was signed on 17 December 1994, reprinted in 34 ILM 360 (1995). 
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This provision contains numerous substantive elements that are formulated in an 
unusual manner – it incorporates in a single provision various investment principles 
that are usually addressed in different treaty provisions. Such a stipulation can make 
it challenging for an investor to articulate claims despite relying on investment 
standards which might have a clear foundation in theory, but which are not stipulated 
uniformly in practice. A case in point is the Plama Consortium v Bulgaria, a case that 
arose under the Energy Charter Treaty. There, the tribunal criticised the arguments 
of the claimant relating to government actions that the claimant thought created 
“unstable, inequitable, unfavourable and non-transparent conditions.” The tribunal 
pointed out that the “[c]laimant did not, however, set out the content of this 
standard or to explain precisely how it has been violated. The only specific reference 
in this regard is that the amendment of [...] allegedly created unstable and inequitable 
conditions.”124 Thus, even though a standard is stipulated with other substantive 
elements, it is imperative to adhere to the content that is known and acknowledged 
in practice. 
Another interesting aspect of Article 10(1) is its assertion concerning the 
relationship with customary international law, namely that “[i]n no case shall such 
Investments be accorded treatment less favourable than that required by 
international law, including treaty obligations.” It is not uncommon that treaties prescribe 
that protection shall not fall below that which was “required by international law”. 
However, no clear difference is made between treaty obligations or customary 
international law. That silence has lead to a vibrant academic discussion as to what 
the reference to international law entails and the relationship between treaty-based 
standards and the international minimum standard.125 The Energy Charter Treaty, 
however, mentions treaty obligations explicitly whereas other treaties, including most 
BITs, do not. 
The North American Free Trade Agreement is a free trade agreement between 
Canada, the United States and Mexico that contains twenty-two chapters and focuses 
mainly on trade in goods as understood in Article XXIV of the GATT. However, 
Chapter 11 of the agreement contains provisions covering investments. Article 1105 
states: 
 
                                                     
124 Plama Consortium Ltd. v Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award of 27 August 
2008, para 169 et seq. 
125 F.A. Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 52 BYIL (1981), p. 244; S. 
Vasciannie, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law and Practice, 70 BYIL 
(1999), p. 104-105 and 139-144; C. Schreuer, Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice, 6 Journal 
of World Investment and Trade (2005), p. 359-364; A. Newcombe and L. Paradell, Law and Practice of 
Investment Treaties – Standards of Treatment, Kluwer Law International (2009), p. 264-275.  
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“Article 1105: Minimum Standard of Treatment 
1. Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment in 
accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and 
security. 
2. Without prejudice to paragraph 1 and notwithstanding Article 1108(7)(b), each Party shall 
accord to investors of another Party, and to investments of investors of another Party, non-
discriminatory treatment with respect to measures it adopts or maintains relating to losses 
suffered by investments in its territory owing to armed conflict or civil strife. 
 
3. Paragraph 2 does not apply to existing measures relating to subsidies or grants that would 
be inconsistent with Article 1102 but for Article 1108(7)(b).” 
 
This formulation led to various approaches by arbitral tribunals where disputes 
concerning an alleged violation of investment standards were adjudicated. In two 
cases in particular, the S.D. Myers and the Pope & Talbot cases, the tribunals expanded 
the scope of Article 1105 to a degree that the contracting parties thought it necessary 
to respond. In the former case, the tribunal came to the conclusion that a violation of 
Article 1102 entailed in addition a violation of Article 1105; in the latter case the 
tribunal held that the fair and equitable standard went beyond the international law 
standard. That development led to the publication of an interpretive note by the 
NAFTA Free Trade Commission (FTC).126 It states: 
 
“B. Minimum Standard of Treatment in Accordance with International Law. 
1. Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of 
treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to investments 
of investors of another Party. 
2. The concepts of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’ do not 
require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary 
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens. 
3. A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of the NAFTA, or 
of a separate international agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of 
Article 1105(1).”127 
 
The influence of the note on NAFTA jurisprudence has been varied. Some tribunals 
seem to have agreed with the note’s content, some opined that they lacked 
competence to review its content, whereas others did not have an opportunity to 
address it because its legitimacy was not a contentious issue in the arbitral 
                                                     
126 D.A. Gantz, The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions: From NAFTA to the United States-Chile Free 
Trade Agreement, Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 679 (2003-2004), p. 713. 
127 NAFTA Free Trade Commission Clarification Related to NAFTA Chapter 11, Decision 31 July 
2001, available at <http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/nafta-chapter11.pdf> .  
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proceedings.128 It is, however, worth noting that the restrictive approach aimed for by 
the parties to NAFTA has influenced treaty law. Here, the United States-Chile free 
trade agreement serves as an example. The agreement states in Article 10.4: 
 
“1. Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with customary 
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security. 
2. For greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary international law minimum 
standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to 
covered investments. The concepts “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and 
security” do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by that 
standard, and do not create additional substantive rights. The obligation in paragraph 1 to 
provide: 
(a) “fair and equitable treatment” includes the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, 
or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process 
embodied in the principal legal systems of the world; and 
(b) “full protection and security” requires each Party to provide the level of police protection 
required under customary international law. 
3. A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of this Agreement, or 
of a separate international agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of this 
Article.”129 
 
It is clear that this provision not only contains elements from Article 1105 and the 
FTC’s interpretive note of 2001, but goes even further when it incorporates 
traditional concepts, e.g. denial of justice, into the standard’s definitions according to 
the trade agreement.130 
Other regional instruments seem not to go as far as the Energy Charter Treaty 
and North American Free Trade Agreement in offering substantive standards of 
protection. In contrast, these instruments often combine the substantive standards, 
including the full protection and security standard, with one of the relative standards 
or both. Examples of this are the Colonia and Buenos Aires Investment Protocols of 
MERCOSUR. Article 3(2) of the former provides:  
 
                                                     
128 Mondev International Ltd. v United States of America, ICSID Case (Additional Facility) No. 
ARB(AF)/99/2, Award of 11 October 2002, 42 ILM 85 (2003), para 100, ADF Group Inc. v United 
States of America, ICSID Case (Additional Facility) No. ARB(AF)/00/1, Award of 9 January 2003, 6 
ICSID Reports 470, 527, para 177, and Loewen Group et al v United States of America, Case No. 
ARB(AF)/98/3, para 127.  
129 Other examples can be found in free trade agrements of the United States. See, e.g., Article 15.5 
of the United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (2003) and Article 11.5 of the United States-
Australia Free Trade Agreement (2004). In both cases annexes or exchange letters describe in greater 
detail the substantive content of the international minimum standard of customary international law.  
130 See J. Paulsson, Denial of Justice in International Law, CUP (2005), p. 6, with regard to the cross-
pollination effect this has on the concept of denial of justice. 
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“Each Contracting Party will give full protection to those investments and grant them a not less 
favourable treatment than granted to investments of their own national investors or third 
state investors.”131 [emphasis added] 
 
Article 2(C)(2) of the latter prescribes: 
 
“Each State Parties shall grant full protection for such investments, and may not accord them a 
treatment less favourable than that granted to the investments of its own national investors, 
or the investments made by investors from other states.”132 [emphasis added] 
 
Other agreements do not mention the standard within the context of other relative 
standards, but mention arbitrary or discriminatory measures. As mentioned before, 
ASEAN adopted in 1987 an Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments that provided for “full protection” in its Article IV(1). In addition, the 
contracting parties of the Agreement were not to “impair by unjustified or 
discriminatory measures the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment, extension, 
disposition or liquidation” of the investments made. While the Agreement included 
this provision, it also included numerous restrictive requirements. Pursuant to Article 
II of the Agreement, investments were to be approved in writing and registered with 
the authorities in the host country. The adoption of the ASEAN Comprehensive 
Investment Agreement in 2009, which addressed in Article 11 the standard of full 
protection and security in greater detail, did not eliminate the restrictive requirements 
contained in the Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment of 
1987. According to Article 4(a), the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement 
of 2009 defines “covered investments” as an investment of an investor in the 
territory of any other member state that has been admitted and specifically approved 
in writing by a competent authority.  
 
3.3.2.4 Multilateral treaties 
3.3.2.4.1 The meaning of different parts and their structure 
Attempts in the multilateral sphere to formulate instruments ensuring investment 
protection have been fraught with difficulties. Even though these instruments have 
                                                     
131 Protocol on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments in MERCOSUR 
(“Colonia Protocol”), 17 January 1994. This protocol covers investments that are made by investors 
coming from states that are parties to MERCOSUR. 
132 Protocol for the Promotion and Protection of Investments coming from States not Parties to 
MERCOSUR (“Buenos Aires Protocol”), 5 August 1994. This protocol covers, as its name entails, 
investments made by investors that come from states that are not parties to MERCOSUR. 
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not been adopted, they have at times been influential in providing formulations that 
have been used in BITs and other instruments.133  
The substantive concepts of the full protection and security standard do appear 
in numerous multilateral instruments researched for this paper. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the full protection and security standard was not included in the Havana 
Charter, although that first attempt recognized the importance of security for existing 
and future investments. However, other instruments incorporate the standard, e.g. 
the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investments Abroad and the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment. It is worth noting that these instruments were formulated 
under the auspices of capital exporting countries or organizations of which they 
formed a part. Other instruments remain silent as their scope is at times more general 
in nature due to attempts by developing states to curb the power of multinational 
corporations. An example of these efforts is the UNCTC Draft Code on 
Multinational Corporations. None of said efforts were accepted despite being 
formulated when the political climate encouraged and favoured their drafting. 
This disagreement was to mirror what would eventually happen. States had 
different opinions as to the level of protection owed to an investor. The 
disagreement was not limited to capital exporting and capital importing countries, 
but could also be found amongst various capital exporting countries. Thus, efforts 
taken under the auspices of the World Bank have been formulated as guidelines, 
whereas initiatives taken by inter alia the OECD have remained unsuccessful.134  
The multilateral instruments researched as a part of this study approach the issue 
of promotion and protection of investment differently. Thus, while some 
instruments differentiate between investment promotion and investment protection, 
others do not – a fact that makes categorization not only more difficult but also of 
limited practical importance.  
 
3.3.2.4.2 Overview of different formulations  
The multilateral treaties vary considerably to the BIT and regional investment regime 
as the formulations of different standards are even more diverse compared to the 
stipulations contained in the BITs. 
                                                     
133 Examples of influential documents are the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention of 1965 and the 
OECD Draft Conventions on the Protection of Foreign Property of 1962 and 1967. See further 
Chapter 2.5. 
134 See M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 2nd ed., CUP (2007), p. 269 et seq. 
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The Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investments Abroad of 1959 
contained in its Article I a clause prescribing that property should be protected and 
secured. Article I of the Draft Convention stated: 
 
“Each Party shall at all times ensure fair and equitable treatment to the property of the 
nationals of the other Parties. Such property shall be accorded the most constant protection and 
security within the territories shall not in any way be impaired by unreasonable or 
discriminatory measures.”135 [emphasis added] 
 
The purpose of adopting substantive standards of this nature coupled with investor-
state arbitration was inter alia to depoliticize disputes pertaining to investments by 
providing investors with a course of action where they would not have to depend on 
the support of their home states.136  
The instrument was never adopted, but was under consideration of the OECD. 
Somewhat later, the OECD drafted its Draft Convention on the Protection of 
Foreign Property. That document, which was adopted in 1962 and then again in 
1967, was particularly interesting as it stemmed from an organization composed 
mainly of capital exporting countries. Even more interesting is the lack of consensus 
amongst the member states of the OECD to open the instrument for signature. 
Article 1(a) of the 1967 Draft Convention stated the following with regard to full 
protection and security: 
 
“Each party shall at all times ensure fair and equitable treatment to the property of the 
nationals of the other Parties. It shall accord within its territory the most constant protection and 
security to such property and shall not in any way impair the management, maintenance, use, 
enjoyment or disposal thereof by unreasonable or discriminatory measures.” [emphasis 
added] 
 
Here, the full protection and security standard appears with the fair and equitable 
treatment standard and includes a list of actions that are specifically targeted. 
According to the commentary that accompanied the Draft Convention there was an 
established principle of international law according to which a state was bound to 
respect and protect the property of aliens. Three rules flowed from this principle, 
namely the (i) fair and equitable treatment, (ii) most constant protection and security, 
                                                     
135 See Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property reprinted in 
UNCTAD, International Investment Instruments: A Compendium, UNCTAD/DITE/2, Vol. V, Regional 
Integration, Bilateral and Non-governmental Instruments (2000), p. 332. 
136 See I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, The Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention to Protect Private Foreign Investment: 
Comments on the Round Table, 10 Journal of Public Law (1961), p. 109. However, this idea was criticized 
by some as it would limit the investor’s home state to have control over the claim. See on this point, 
G. Schwarzenberger, The Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investments Abroad: A Criticial Commentary, 9 
Journal of Public Law (1960), p. 162-163.  
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and (iii) arbitrary and discriminatory measures.137 The meaning of this document, 
even though it would never enter into force, was considerable as it affected the 
content and structure of many subsequent BITs entered into by states. The reason 
for this evolution was the willingness of the member states of OECD to incorporate 
various parts of these multilateral instruments into their bilateral investment 
treaties.138 
In the early 1990s, a World Bank study group of experts introduced a document 
containing principles on the treatment of investment. The document, Guidelines on 
the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, was published in 1992 as guidelines 
because the group thought that the political climate at the time was not prepared for 
binding rules on investment.139 Article 3(a) prescribed:  
 
“With respect to the protection and security of their person, property rights and interests, and to 
the granting of permits, import and export licenses and the authorization to employ, and the 
issuance of the necessary entry and stay visas to their foreign personnel, and other legal 
matters relevant to the treatment of foreign investors as described in Section 1 above, such 
treatment will, subject to the requirement of fair and equitable treatment mentioned above, 
be as favorable as that accorded by the State to national investors in similar circumstances. In 
all cases, full protection and security will be accorded to the investor’s rights regarding ownership, 
control and substantial benefits over his property, including intellectual property.” [emphasis 
added] 
 
However, the OECD was of the opinion that the current climate, in favour of 
liberalization in general due to a policy change by developing countries with regard to 
the New International Economic Order, was ready for a binding treaty on 
investment protection. In 1994, the organization began its project of formulating the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). Article IV.1.1 of the Draft Negotiating 
Text for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment stated: 
 
“Each Contracting Party shall accord to investments in its territory of investors of another 
Contracting Party fair and equitable treatment and full and constant protection and security. In no 
case shall a Contracting Party accord treatment less favourable than that required by 
international law.”140 [emphasis added] 
 
                                                     
137 See OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property with Notes and 
Comments and Resolution C(67)102 of the Council on the Draft Convention adopted on 12 October 
1967, reprinted in 7 ILM 117 (1968), p. 119. 
138 F.A. Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 52 BYIL, (1981), p. 241.  
139 World Bank Group, Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, Legal Framework for the 
Treatment of Foreign Investment. Vol. II (1992), p. 35-44. 
140 OECD, Multilateral Agreement on Investment, Draft Consolidated Text, 22 April 1998, Doc. 
No. DAFFE/MAI(98)7/REV1, Chapter IV, Article 1.1; General Treatment. 
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This article is accompanied by an article dealing with expropriation and an article 
covering protection from strife. The latter article is of importance as it subjects the 
investor to a particular principle in certain circumstances, similar to various BITs: 
 
“3.1. An investor of a Contracting Party which has suffered losses relating to its investment 
in the territory of another Contracting Party due to war or to other armed conflict, state of 
emergency, revolution, insurrection, civil disturbance, or any other similar event in the 
territory of the latter Contracting Party, shall be accorded by the latter Contracting Party, as 
regards restitution, indemnification, compensation or any other settlement, treatment no less 
favourable than that which it accords to its own investors or to investors of any third State, 
whichever is most favourable to the investor.”141 
 
The difference between the two articles is of importance. The former article contains 
an absolute provision that is not curtailed by a national treatment or most-favoured-
nation clause. However, the latter article provides for a relative form of protection.142 
In addition to this provision, an additional clause is included with regards to damage 
caused by government forces: 
 
“3.2. Notwithstanding Article 3.1, an investor of a Contracting Party which, in any of the 
situations referred to in that paragraph, suffers a loss in the territory of another Contracting 
Party resulting from 
 
(a) requisitioning of its investments or part thereof by the latter’s forces or authorities, or 
(b) destruction of its investment or part thereof by the latter’s forces or authorities, which 
was not required by the necessity of the situation, 
 
shall be accorded by the latter Contracting Party restitution or compensation which in either 
case shall be prompt, adequate and effective, and with respect to compensation.” 
 
A clause of this nature is similar to clauses frequently found in the United Kingdom 
and the United States.143 The effect of this provision is, needless to say, to curtail the 
scope of the relative nature of Article 3.1 in a way that the state, where the 
investment is to be found, will have a limited possibility to take over parts of the 
investment, e.g. housing facilities necessary to combat civil strife, or destroy the 
investment, e.g. for the purpose of subduing revolutionary forces. As will be 
discussed in Chapter 4.3.3, investors have had limited success in basing their cases on 
provisions of this nature.  
                                                     
141 OECD, Multilateral Agreement on Investment, Draft Consolidated Text, 22 April 1998, Doc. 
No. DAFFE/MAI(98)7/REV1, Chapter IV, Article 3.1; Protection from Strife. 
142 The difference between these approaches was emphasized in the commentary to the 
consolidated text of the agreement. See OECD, Multilateral Agreement on Investment, Commentary 
to the Consolidated Text, 22 April 1998, Doc. No. DAFFE/MAI(98)8/REV1, p. 29. 
143 See, e.g., Article 4 of the United Kingdom-Singapore BIT of 1978 and Article IV of the United 
States-Nicaragua BIT of 1995. 
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3.3.2.5 The effect of different formulations 
The international instruments reviewed in the preceding chapters contain various 
formulations of the standard. Some versions only mention the standard itself and are 
quite simple as a result. Others are more elaborate and mention, in addition, other 
substantive elements incorporating concepts whose purpose is to add to the 
investment protection that is to be accorded to investors. It must be noted, however, 
that the effect of these provisions varies depending on whether they are to be found 
in a BIT or a regional or multilateral instrument. While BITs are effective in 
providing for investment protection, other instruments are less effective, with few 
exceptions, due to the failure of states to agree on their substantive content at the 
regional or multilateral level. Moreover, the relationship between these different 
types of instruments is also influenced by the fact that multilateral and regional 
instruments have had, despite not having entered into force, a considerable effect on 
the content of BITs. There seems to have been a cross-pollination of concepts and 
structures from multilateral and regional instruments to BITs.  
With regard to BITs, in particular, it is safe to state that their structure is more 
coherent than the structures of other international instruments dealing with the full 
protection and security standard. However, despite these coherent structures, BITs 
include different formulations of the standard. Treaty law has revealed that while 
some formulations are minimalistic, others include, in addition to the basic 
formulation of the standard, references to other concepts that fall outside the scope 
of the standard but fall under the scope of principles that are founded, in whole or in 
part, on other sources of law, e.g. customary international law.  
The question arises how this might affect the standard when applied to a 
particular dispute – should articles in a BIT that contain the simpler version of the 
standard be applied differently from articles that incorporate other substantive 
elements? These questions cannot be answered unless a legal assessment has been 
made as to whether the standard in the respective BITs include any additional 
elements to those which are thought to be included according to the traditional 
theory of the full protection and security standard.  
Still, some lines have to be drawn in extreme cases, in particular when it comes 
to differentiating the full protection and security standard from other principles of 
international law concerning foreign investment. Thus, a provision in a BIT 
stipulating the full protection and security standard in the article dealing with 
expropriation, as has been shown, could not be considered to exclude the principle 
of expropriation. Both principles should be considered independently. If an umpire 
would conclude that expropriation had not taken place, then he would be at liberty to 
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assess independently whether the standard of full protection and security would have 
been violated. The same conclusion can be drawn concerning similar situations 
subjected to fair and equitable treatment and arbitrary and discriminatory measures.  
 
3.3.3 Customary international law 
3.3.3.1 Customary international law and foreign investment 
Customary international law plays an important role in the field of international 
investment law. The formation of customary international law within the context of 
foreign investment is the same as in general international law. Its substantive 
components consist of (a) state practice that is uniform and representative and (b) 
carried out in such a way that it constitutes evidence of a belief that the practice is 
obligatory by a legal rule requiring it, or opinio juris. This definition has been accepted 
by international tribunals and in academia.144  
Despite a general consensus that customary international law is to be established 
by exploring the objective and subjective criteria of state practice and opinio juris, 
there are issues that affect the field of foreign investment in particular. This field of 
law has, needless to say, been affected by the accelerated formulation of BITs. While 
these investment treaties contain numerous principles and standards, new issues have 
become topical, including what effect customary international law has on treaty-
based standards and what is the nature of the relationship between these two sources 
of law. This is particularly relevant due to the fact that the various treaty-based 
standards are often formulated in such a way that it becomes important to consider 
whether account should be taken of customary international law.145 
 
3.3.3.2 Customary international law as a minimum standard 
Historically, the status of an alien in a host country within the context of the 
international minimum standard of customary international law has been a topical 
issue both in academia and arbitral practice.146  
                                                     
144 See for a general discussion on the concept of customary international law and its formation, M. 
Mendelson, “The Formation of Customary International Law”, Académie De Droit International – collected 
courses of the Hague Academy of International law, Vol. 272 (1998), p. 155-410, and International Law 
Association, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law 
(London 2000), available at <http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/30>. 
145 See T. Gazzini, The Role of Customary International Law in the Field of Foreign Investment, 8 Journal of 
World Investment and Trade (2007), p. 691 et seq. 
146 See e.g. E. Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, The Banks Law Publishing 
(1915) and C. Eagleton, The Responsibility of States in International Law, New York University Press (1928) 
and Harry Roberts (USA) v United Mexican States, IV RIAA (1926), p. 77, and Daniel Dillon (USA) v 
United Mexican States, IV RIAA (1928), p. 368. 
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The classical approach of customary international law concerning the status of 
an alien is that an alien who acquires legal interest in a foreign state thereby submits 
himself to the sovereignty of that state, including its jurisdiction and municipal law.147 
This has, however, not always been widely accepted as the general principle. Even 
though many states were under no obligation not to discriminate against aliens, 
commentators of international law were in agreement, as early as the 18th century, 
that customary international law subjected states to an obligation of protection. In 
earlier periods many governments were entitled according to international law to 
treat an alien and his legal interest with unhampered discretion if that treatment was 
founded on municipal law.148 
The breakdown of consensus concerning the status of aliens following 
decolonization, a development often accompanied by subsequent revolutions and 
civil disturbance, lead to the emergence of the international minimum standard.  
Arbitral practice and academic discussion that followed focused extensively on the 
status of aliens in their country of residence because the status of the alien in 
question was largely governed by municipal law that was in violation of customary 
international law. Therefore, the relationship between municipal law and customary 
international law became topical.149 However, the ever-growing number of BITs has 
affected the status of customary international law within the context of protection of 
an alien and his property, or, as these concepts are now referred to: the investor and 
his investment. Due to this evolution there has been a shift in focus from the 
relationship between municipal law and customary international law to the 
relationship between treaty standards and customary international law. That was 
reflected by the tribunal in the Mondev case which stated that:  
 
“…the vast number of bilateral and regional investment treaties (more than 2000) almost 
uniformly provide for fair and equitable treatment of foreign investment, and largely provide 
for full security and protection of investment […] On a remarkably widespread basis, States 
have repeatedly obliged themselves to accord foreign investment such treatment. In the 
Tribunal’s views, such a body of concordant practice will necessarily have influenced the 
                                                     
147 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International law, 7th ed., OUP (2008), p. 520-521. 
148 H. Neufeld, The International Protection of Private Creditors from the Treaties of Westphalia to the Congress 
of Vienna (1648-1815), A.W. Sijthoff  (1971), p. 94. 
149 This is also reflected in the field of state responsibility as it was researched under the auspices of 
the United Nations. There, the status of the alien dominated the field of state responsibility when the 
International Law Commission decided to put the subject on its agenda in 1949. It was not until the 
International Law Commission approved of reconceptualising the subject of state responsibility in 
1963 that a more general approach was taken. See Yearbook of the International Law Commission 
1963, Vol. II (Part One) Doc. A/CN.4/152, p. 227-228, paras 4-5. 
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content of rules governing the treatment of foreign investment in current international 
law.”150 
 
In a recent case before the International Court of Justice, the first investment case to 
be argued before the Court in decades, the Court took note of this development and 
its effect on other fields of law: 
 
“...in contemporary international law, the protection of the rights of companies and the 
rights of their shareholders, and the settlement of the associated disputes, are essentially 
governed by bilateral and multilateral agreements ... In that context, the role of diplomatic 
protection somewhat faded...”151 
 
Therefore, the vast amount of BITs has affected customary international law.152 
These treaties have codified principles that form a part of the international minimum 
standard.153 But even though the relationship between customary international law 
and treaty law is traditional in the sense that treaty law takes precedence over 
customary law between the states parties to the treaty, customary international law 
has served as an important tool in individual cases, especially concerning issues 
which are difficult to address substantively due to the rather limited scope of the 
concepts of “protection” and “security” in investment treaties. Thus, customary law 
has supplemented treaty law in many cases and these sources of law have been 
applied side by side.154  
 
                                                     
150 Mondev International Ltd. v United States of America, ICSID Case (Additional Facility) No. 
ARB(AF)/99/2, Award of 11 October 2002, 42 ILM 85 (2003), para 117.  
151 Case concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v Congo) (Preliminary Objections) (ICJ General List No. 
103, 24 May 2007), para 88.  
152 In 2004, Professor Hindelang described the influence and close relationship between treaty law 
and customary international law in the following way: “…the States have left us today with a network 
of more than 2,300 BITs – a broad statement that almost the whole community of States views 
foreign investment favourably and its protection by international law not only desirable but necessary. 
Can this, however, also be viewed as a statement in favour of common principles embodied in 
customary international law? The answer is almost certainly yes.” See S. Hindelang, Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, Custom and a Healthy Investment Climate – The Question of Whether BITs Influence Customary 
International Law Revisited, 5 Journal of World Investment and Trade (2004), p. 806. 
153 See T. Gazzini, The Role of Customary International Law in the Field of Foreign Investment, 8 Journal of 
World Investment and Trade (2007), p. 697-698.  
154 In AAPL v Sri Lanka a tribunal was faced with the task of interpreting the full protection and 
security standard as it was stipulated in the UK-Sri Lanka BIT. Despite analyzing the treaty-based 
standard, the tribunal based its decision considerably on customary international law. See further 




3.3.3.3 The relationship between the treaty-based standard and the minimum 
standard of customary international law 
The relationship between customary international law and treaty law has led to 
divergence in arbitral practice as to the nature of the relationship. Is a treaty-based 
standard an independent standard in the sense that its content should be determined 
without considerations to customary international law, or does custom serve as an 
important and necessary component when determining its content? Is a violation of 
the customary minimum standard a violation of the full protection and security 
standard? Is every violation of the full protection and security standard a violation of 
the international minimum standard? Arbitral practice reveals different opinions. 
In earlier times, tribunals applied customary international law when assessing 
governmental acts and whether a state had committed an international delinquency 
as regards to the treatment of an alien. In the Neer case – a case decided in 1927 – the 
US-Mexican Mixed Claims Commission adjudicated a dispute relating to the death of 
an American citizen. The commission noted: 
 
“[I]t is in the opinion of the Commission possible to go a little further [...], and to hold (first) 
that the propriety of governmental acts should be put to the test of international standards, 
and (second) that the treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an international 
delinquency, should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an 
insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international standards that every 
reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency.”155 
 
This discussion has been considered descriptive of the status of the international 
minimum standard as it stood in the 1920s.156 But even after the emergence of treaty 
law in its current form, different and non-uniform formulations of BITs have 
resulted in various arguments put forth by tribunals when using the international 
minimum standard in determining the substantive content of the full protection and 
security standard. These arguments can be divided into three categories depending 
on whether the international minimum standard is thought as a limitation to the 
treaty-based standard, an equivalent of the standard or an addition to the standard. It 
is necessary to deal with these issues individually. 
 
 
                                                     
155 L.F. Neer (USA) v United Mexican States, IV RIAA (1926), p. 61-62. 
156 See Mondev International Ltd. v United States of America, ICSID Case (Additional Facility) No. 
ARB(AF)/99/2, Award of 11 October 2002, 42 ILM 85 (2003), para 115. 
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(1) The minimum standard as a minimum requirement compared to the treaty-based standard 
The FCN treaties that predated the current BIT treaty regime included references to 
protection of persons and property, including “most constant protection and 
security”. According to Article V, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the FCN Treaty between 
the United States and Italy, nationals were to receive protection and security: 
 
“1. The nationals of each High Contracting Party shall receive, within the territories of the 
other High Contracting Party, the most constant protection and security for their persons and 
property, and shall enjoy in this respect the full protection and security required by international law. 
3. The nationals, corporations and associations of either High Contracting Party shall within 
the territories of the other High Contracting Party receive protection and security with respect to 
the matters enumerated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, upon compliance with the 
applicable laws and regulations, no less than the protection and security which is or may hereafter 
be accorded to the nationals, corporations and associations of such other High Contracting 
Party and no less than that which is or may hereafter be accorded to the nationals, 
corporations and associations of any third country.”157 [emphasis added] 
 
The International Court of Justice commented on Article V in its judgment in the 
ELSI case. The Court emphasized not only the importance of the treaty-based 
standard in the FCN treaty between the United States and Italy, but that the treaty-
based standard would have to conform to the minimum international standard. The 
Court noted: 
 
“The primary standard laid down by Article V is “the full protection and security required by 
international law”, in short “the protection and security” must conform to the minimum 
international standard. As noted above, this is supplemented by the criteria of national 
treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment. The Chamber is here called upon to apply 
the provisions of a treaty which sets standards – in addition to the reference to general 
international law – which may go further in protecting nationals of the High Contracting 
Parties than general international law requires […].”158  
 
Thus, a treaty-based standard could provide for additional protection beyond that 
found in general international law, but could not go below the international 
minimum standard. 
Similarly, it is not uncommon that a BIT provision includes a reference 
concerning the scope of the investment protection, namely that the investment shall 
be accorded fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security and shall in 
                                                     
157 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the 
Italian Republic of 1948 and the 1951 Supplement to that Treaty. 
158 Case concerning Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI), (United States of America v Italy) ICJ, Decision rendered 
on 20 July 1989, ICJ Reports (1989), para 111. 
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no case be accorded treatment less than required by international law. Article II(2)(a) 
of the US-Bulgaria BIT 1992 states: 
 
“Investments shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment, shall enjoy full 
protection and security and shall in no case be accorded treatment less than that required by 
international law.”159 
 
Here, the most topical issue is what the third part of the clause entails, namely that 
protection and security “shall in no case be accorded treatment less than that 
required by international law”. The tribunal in Azurix v Argentine Republic understood 
an identical provision in the US-Argentina BIT of 1991 to “set a floor”, but shortly 
thereafter deemed the difference as immaterial due to the evolution of the 
international minimum standard making it similar to the treaty standard as 
interpreted according to VCLT.160 
 
(2) The minimum standard as a limitation of the treaty-based standard 
Customary international law has also been used to limit the possibility of tribunals to 
extend the scope of treaty-based standards. Thus, a tribunal cannot extend the 
application of a treaty-based standard further than “a ceiling” provided by the 
customary minimum standard. This has been especially relevant in cases where the 
distinctive formulation of a treaty standard has led to controversy within the context 
of the international minimum standard.  
The most prominent example addressing the question of the relationship 
between treaty-based protection clauses and the minimum standard is the 
formulation of Article 1105(1) of NAFTA, a formulation which emphasizes a close 
relationship of the fair and equitable treatment standard and the full protection and 
security standard with international law.161 The interpretation of this formulation by a 
number of NAFTA tribunals led to the publication of FTC’s interpretative note. 
There, the parties to NAFTA declared and assumed that the substance of the 
standard reflected the requirements of the customary minimum standard as accepted 
in general international law pertaining to the treatment of aliens.  
This applies, needless to say, only to disputes subjected to NAFTA, but this 
approach to equate the fair and equitable treatment standard and the full protection 
and security standard to the international minimum standard has been controversial. 
                                                     
159 The same provision can also be found in Art. II(2)(a) of the US-Argentina BIT 1991 and Art. 
II(2)(a) of the US-Armenia BIT 1992. 
160 Azurix Corp. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award of 14 July 2006, paras 361 
and 364.  
161 Article 1105(1) of NAFTA is reproduced in Chapter 3.3.2.3.2 and Annex II. 
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NAFTA tribunals have supported it, but other tribunals have rejected it.162 In one of 
the more recent cases, Glamis Gold Ltd v USA, the tribunal argued that: 
 
“As explained above, the minimum standard of treatment of aliens established by customary 
international law, and by reference to which the fair and equitable treatment standard of 
Article 1105(1) is to be understood, is an absolute minimum, a floor below which the 
international community will not condone conduct. To maintain fair and equitable treatment 
as an absolute floor, a breach must be based upon objective criteria that apply equally among 
States and between investors.163  
 
The efforts of the NAFTA governments to influence the scope of liability according 
to Chapter 11 after the establishment of the treaty regime is problematic for various 
reasons. These efforts undermine the original concept of establishing a treaty-based 
investment protection scheme that provides for a stable investment environment. In 
addition, the efforts of these governments could influence the protection provided 
for their own investors’ interests’ in other countries. Thus, the efforts serve the 
NAFTA governments when they are respondents in arbitral disputes, but investors’ 
interests are jeopardized.164 Lastly, reliance of ICSID tribunals on arbitral awards in 
general, including awards in Chapter 11 cases, could have an impact on legal disputes 
subjected to BIT provisions.165 
 
(3) The minimum standard as an equivalent of the treaty-based standard 
The two preceding categories have rested upon the assumption that there is a 
difference between the treaty-based standard and the minimum standard. In addition, 
these categories have presupposed that that difference either serves as a minimum 
requirement (“floor”) or as a limitation (“ceiling”) to the treaty-based standard. This 
category, in contrast, does not make that distinction and considers the minimum 
standard as equivalent to the treaty-based standard. 
                                                     
162 The tribunals in Mondev International Ltd. v United States of America, ICSID Case (Additional 
Facility) No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award of 11 October 2002, 42 ILM 85 (2003), para 122, and ADF 
Group Inc. v United States of America, ICSID Case (Additional Facility) No. ARB(AF)/00/1, Award of 9 
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163 Glamis Gold Ltd. v United States of America, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Award 8 June 2009, para 
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164 D.A. Gantz, The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions: From NAFTA to the United States-Chile Free 
Trade Agreement, Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 679 (2003-2004), p. 685-689. 
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Argentina BIT of 1991. Azurix Corp. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award 14 July 
2006, para 334. 
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In AAPL v Sri Lanka the tribunal dealt with a treaty-based standard that did not 
refer to international law. The tribunal entered into a detailed discussion about the 
interrelationship of the standards and stressed that the inclusion of the words 
“constant” and “full” could be intended to strengthen the standard of protection and 
security to such an extent that it would provide higher protection than the minimum 
standard of general international law.166 Still, the tribunal applied customary 
international law when deciding the case: 
 
“Once failure to provide “full protection and security” has been proven (under Article 2.(2) 
of the Sri Lanka/U.K. Treaty or under a similar provision existing in other bilateral 
Investment Treaties extending the same standard to nationals of a third State), the host 
State’s responsibility is established, and compensation is due according to the general 
international law rules and standards previously developed with regard to the States failure to 
comply with its “due diligence” obligation under the minimum standard of customary 
international law.”167 
 
Similarly, the tribunal in AMT v Zaire concluded that the protection and security of 
the investment required by the BIT’s provisions should be in conformity with and 
not any less than those recognized by international law. It argued: 
 
“For the Tribunal, this […] requirement is fundamental for the determination of the 
responsibility of Zaire. It is thus an objective obligation which must not be inferior to the 
minimum standard of vigilance and of care required by international law.”168 
 
The tribunal in the Noble Ventures case remained critical as to whether the treaty-based 
standard, which provided for protection and security without any reference to 
international law, could be considered to provide a higher level of protection: 
 
“[…] that it seems doubtful whether that provisions can be understood as being wider in 
scope than the general duty to provide for protection and security of foreign nationals found 
in the customary international law of aliens. The latter is not a strict standard, but one 
requiring due diligence to be exercised by the State.” 169 
 
After having acknowledged the similarities with the ELSI case, which had been 
sceptical towards limiting the discretion of the state despite an obligation to provide 
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protection and security, the tribunal failed to see any violation of the customary 
international law standard. 
In Azurix Corp. v Argentina the tribunal took note of the stipulation of the full 
protection and security standard in the US-Argentina BIT which provided for 
protection, but curtailed it by stating that it should not fall below that which was 
“required by international law”. The tribunal expressed the opinion that this entailed 
that the treaty-based standard should not provide protection higher than required by 
international law. However, the tribunal asserted later in its award that the difference 
was immaterial due to the evolution of the minimum standard and its similarity with 
the terms of the BIT: 
 
“[…] the minimum requirement to satisfy this standard has evolved and the Tribunal 
considers that its content is substantially similar whether the terms are interpreted in their 
ordinary  meaning, as required by the Vienna Convention, or in accordance with customary 
international law.”170 
 
In a more recent award, Vivendi v Argentina, which was a case dealing with a particular 
formulation of the standard, the tribunal also remained critical towards arguments 
referring to the notion that the minimum standard should limit the scope of the 
treaty-based standard. Here, both the claimant and the respondent presented their 
versions of the fair and equitable treatment standard and the full protection and 
security standard. The tribunal dismissed any arguments which stated that the 
standard should be limited to and weighed against the international minimum 
standard. Instead, it argued by referring to the BIT’s provisions, which emphasized 
that the investment should be treated in conformity with the principles of international 
law, not as required by international law, that such a stipulation could not be 
understood as a limitation to the standard of treatment. In addition, the tribunal 
emphasized that the minimum standard had evolved considerably since the 1920s 
and that it should be applied autonomously in individual cases.171 
 
                                                     
170 Azurix Corp. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award 14 July 2006, para 361. 
See also para 364 of the same award. 
171 The tribunal’s discussion concerning the fair and equitable treatment is also relevant to the full 
protection and security standard due to a particular formulation in the French-Argentina BIT. Article 
5(1) of the treaty stated: “...investments...shall enjoy...protection and full security in accordance with 
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the principles of international law.” See Vivendi Universal S.A. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/97/3, Award of 20 August 2007, paras 7.4.5.-7.4.7 and 7.4.13. 
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3.3.3.4 Can a clear conclusion be drawn? 
It is disputable whether any clear conclusion can be drawn from arbitral practice 
concerning the relationship between the treaty-based standards and customary 
international law. A number of tribunals have in their arguments entertained the 
question, regardless of whether the treaty-based standard includes a reference to 
international law or not, as to whether the minimum standard and the treaty-based 
standard are one and the same substantively. Despite acknowledging the importance 
of the treaty-based standard, a combination of that standard and the minimum 
standard of customary international law has been applied due to the fact that their 
substantive content has been considered similar or identical. This lack of clarity in 
arbitral practice is, however, not isolated to the full protection and security standard, 
but applies a fortiori to other standards.172 
An arbitral tribunal cannot but be bound by the sources of international 
investment law. Treaty law and customary international law are sources that are not 
arranged in a hierarchical way. Therefore, these sources of law can co-exist and apply 
simultaneously to a dispute at hand. That applies even though the treaty does not 
include any reference to a particular standard, e.g. fair and equitable treatment or full 
protection and security, for the simple reason that these standards are partly based on 
customary international law that bind states independently of treaty law.  
It must be stressed that this does not entail that customary international law 
overrides treaty law. To the contrary, if an arbitral tribunal is of the opinion that a 
treaty provision is formulated in a way that it can be interpreted without any reliance 
on customary international law, it should prevail with reference to the principle lex 
generalis – lex specialis. An example of such a scenario can be found Phillips Petroleum 
Co. Iran v Iran which dealt inter alia with the question whether the provision “in no 
case less than that required by international law” in Article IV(2) of the Treaty of 
Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran 
of 1955 was limited to full protection and security or applied also to the taking of 
property. The former standard included a reference to international law whereas the 
latter standard did not. The tribunal stated that the reference to international law: 
 
“…clearly relates to the standard of ‘most constant protection and security’ set forth in the 
same sentence and cannot be understood as modifying the taking and compensation 
requirements of the second and third sentence of that paragraph, which contains no 
reference to international law and which clearly and completely describe the requirements for 
takings and compensation. Concerning the argument that treaties generally should be 
                                                     
172 See V. Heiskanen, ‘Arbitrary and Unreasonable Measures’ in A. Reinisch (ed.), Standards of 
Investment Protection, OUP (2008), p. 108-109. 
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interpreted in the light of customary law as it may evolve, the Tribunal has already found in 
the INA award that the Treaty of Amity as lex specialis prevails in principle over general 
rules.”173 
 
This principle also leads to the conclusion that treaty law can describe to what extent 
customary international law should affect treaty-based provisions. Examples can be 
found where a formulation plays a role in defining the relationship between the 
treaty-based standard and customary international law. The Netherlands-Venezuela 
BIT states the following:  
 
“If the provisions of law of either Contracting Party or obligations under international law 
existing at present or established hereafter between the Contracting Parties in addition to the 
present Agreement contain a regulation, whether general or specific, entitling investments by 
nationals of the other Contracting Party to a treatment more favourable than is provided for 
by the present Agreement, such regulation shall to the extent that it is more favourable 
prevail over the present Agreement.”174 
 
However, when a treaty either omits articles defining the nature of the relationship or 
does not formulate provisions in such a way that they can be interpreted without any 
reference to other methods of interpretation, customary international law can be 
used to provide additional guidance when individual concepts are interpreted – or in 
other words complete individual treaty-based concepts.175 
This balancing of the treaty-based standards vis-á-vis the customary international 
law standard could have considerable significance in practice depending on which of 
the two is relied more upon by tribunals during the process of interpretation. The 
difference lies in the different nature of these two standards. The treaty-based 
standard must be interpreted within the context of other treaty provisions – many of 
which are designed to promote foreign direct investment and provide for protection 
of investment made. The latter is based on customary international law and by its 
very nature provides for minimal protection as established by a centuries-old state 
practice that has, as of late, been influenced by thousands of BITs. Consequently, in 
order to violate the standard, a state would have to show a different level of 
inappropriateness – a relatively higher degree of inappropriateness is needed in order 
to violate the minimum standard of customary international law compared to the full 
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protection and security standard that has its foundation in treaty law.176 This generally 
means that any violation of the international minimum standard of customary 
international law is most likely a violation of the treaty-based full protection and 
security standard. However, not every violation of the treaty-based standard is a 
violation of the international minimum standard of customary international law.177 
In conclusion, it is safe to assert that a balanced approach taking into account 
the different sources upon which the standard rests seems most appropriate. Such a 
method makes it inevitable to employ a case-by-case approach whereby the facts of 
individual cases are subjected to the full protection and security standard. Even 
though such a method might be problematic, as it might result in a casuistic standard, 
the solution will present itself by exploring the vast amount of cases that have been 
adjudicated from the beginning of the last century to today.  
 
3.3.4 General principles of law recognized by civilized nations 
General principles of international law concerning the protection and security of 
aliens have a long documented history within the context of the protection of aliens 
in a host state. Its status has, as other sources of international law, been affected by 
numerous developments which have taken place at various times and intervals during 
the last century. It is generally accepted amongst scholars that this source of law is of 
considerable importance. It has been argued that general principles of law “lie at the 
very foundation of the legal system and are indispensable to its operation”178 and that 
the concept has played “a prominent role in arbitrations between States and foreign 
nationals”.179  
The current version of Article 38(1)(c) stems from the statute of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice. Even though it is clear that the purpose of this 
provision is to avoid the problem of non liquet by the then World Court, now the 
International Court of Justice, it was not easily formulated due to a difference of 
opinion between the drafters of the statute of the Permanent Court of International 
                                                     
176 See Saluka Investments B.V. v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Partial Award of 17 March 
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177 Here, parallels can be drawn between the full protection and security standard and the fair and 
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Justice.180 However, it is clear following a consensus reached during the stipulation 
process that this provision permits the World Court to deduce rules relevant to a 
particular case by analogy from existing rules accepted in domestic law of all civilized 
states or even from other general principles of law.181  
The important function of such a source cannot be underestimated as argued by 
the British-United States Claims Arbitral Tribunal of 1910. In Eastern Extension, 
Australasia and China Telegraph Company Ltd. v United States, a dispute was adjudicated 
concerning damage caused to an investment of a London-based company. The 
company had entered into a concession agreement granted by the Government of 
Spain concerning telegraph cables connecting Manila and Hong Kong. During the 
US-Spanish War of 1898 the US Naval forces destroyed the cable which resulted in a 
case brought by Great Britain before the arbitral tribunal. The tribunal noted when 
dealing with the contention that no treaty or specific rules of international law could 
be found to which the dispute would be subjected: 
 
“International law, as well as domestic law, may not contain, and generally does not contain, 
express rules decisive of particular cases; but the function of jurisprudence is to resolve the 
conflict of opposing rights and interests by applying, in default of any specific provision of 
law, the corollaries of general principles, and so to find ... the solution of the problem. This is 
the method of jurisprudence; it is the method by which the law has been gradually evolved in 
every country resulting in the definition and settlement of legal relations as well between 
States as between private individuals.”182 
 
General principles of law are deduced by analogy from existing rules found in various 
national legal systems that are considered to represent the international community. 
This entails that the principles must be found by a comparative study of national 
legal systems whereby individual rules and principles will be used in abstract for the 
needs of the international legal order.  
The way in which general principles of law come into existence is interesting 
within the context of international investment law. Even though the field of foreign 
investment is heavily influenced by states, in particular through the making of 
treaties, it provides for a system of rules and principles that applies to transactions of 
                                                     
180 See e.g. the different opinions of Baron Deschamps and Mr. Elihu Root in the Advisory 
Committee of the League of Nations, which held its meetings during 16 June – 24 July 1920, who 
influenced the stipulation process and lead to the current version of Article 38(1)(c) in B. Cheng, 
General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, Stevens & Sons Ltd. (1953), p. 6 et 
seq.  
181 See further on Article 38, A. Pellet in A. Zimmermann et al (eds.), The Statute of the International 
Court of Justice: A Commentary, OUP (2006), p. 677. 
182 Eastern Extension, Australasia and China Telegraph Company Ltd. (Great Britain) v United States, VI 
RIAA (1923), p. 114-115. 
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private entities.183 The content of the primary sources of this field of law, i.e. treaty 
law and custom, is determined by the actions and inaction of states, as subjects of 
international law, through treaty making and custom. In contrast, general principles 
of international law are established by a comparative study of various legal systems. 
The content of this source of law is derived from municipal law which applies to 
relationships and transactions where private entities play a bigger role compared to 
international law. Therefore, general principles of law are an important source of law 
– albeit a subsidiary one – when it comes to interpretation of treaties or as a tool for 
completing treaties or customary rules via the process of gap-filling.184  
It has been pointed out within the context of international investment law that 
the application of the principle of state responsibility concerning the protection of 
aliens and their property in cases adjudicated by the various claims commissions 
focused not on the treatment of foreign investment, but the physical security of an 
alien.185 The implications of this fact, and the further expansion of investment 
protection provided by an ever-growing BIT regime, raised the question whether 
general principles of law are less important than before. Arbitral practice points to 
the contrary as can be seen in three international law cases which dealt with legal 
disputes at different times and used general principles of law to determine various 
substantive obligations, including the concept of “unjust enrichment”, the concept of 
“pacta sunt servanda” and the concept of “protection and security”. The first case 
was adjudicated prior to the great upsurge in the making of BITs, the second case 
deals with general international law within an applicable law clause in a concession 
agreement and the last example deals with a state’s obligation according to a treaty 
provision and general principles of law. 
In the Lena Goldfields case, the tribunal was faced with a London-based company 
which had acquired a concession agreement from the Russian Government in 1925 
with regard to gold mining operations in Russia. Only four years later the Russian 
Government adopted a different policy – the “Five-Year Plan” – which lead to the 
development of the USSR and its economy on Communist principles and resulted in 
a class war against capitalistic enterprises. This policy change produced great 
difficulty for the investor and his employees. That situation made it impossible for 
                                                     
183 See T. Gazzini, General Principles of Law in the Field of Foreign Investment, 10 Journal of World 
Investment and Trade (2009), p. 109. 
184 C. Schreuer, International and Domestic Law in Investment Disputes – The Case of ICSID, 1 Austrian 
Review of International and European Law (1996) 89, p. 107, and same author, The ICSID Convention – 
A Commentary, CUP (2001), p. 614, para 112. 
185 Mondev International Ltd. v United States of America, ICSID Additional Facility Case No. 
ARB(AF)/99/2, Award 11 October 2002, 42 ILM 85 (2003), para 115. Despite this general statement, 
it must be noted that some cases are similar to investment cases, e.g. Irene Roberts case in Venezuela 
Arbitrations of 1903, Government Printing Office (1904) p. 142-145.  
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the investor to operate not only because of change in policy but also because of 
direct actions taken by Soviet authorities resulting in arbitration proceedings against 
the Government.186 During the proceedings the matter of governing law needed to 
be addressed. The counsel for the plaintiff argued (the Soviet Government 
participated in the initial phase of the proceedings, but later ceased to do so) that 
Soviet laws should govern all domestic matters of the contract, including 
interpretation, unless excluded by the contract itself. It was, however, also argued by 
plaintiff’s counsel that for other purposes general principles of law should govern: 
 
“But it was submitted by him that for other purposes the general principles of law such as 
those recognized by Article 38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice 
at the Hague should be regarded as “the proper law of the contract” and in support of this 
submission counsel for Lena pointed out that both the Concession Agreement itself and also 
the agreement of June, 1927, whereby the coal mines were handed over, were signed not 
only on behalf of the Executive Government of Russia generally but by the Acting 
commissary for Foreign Affairs, and that many of the terms of the contract contemplated 
the application of international rather than merely national principles of law. In so far as any 
difference of interpretation might result the Court holds that this contention is correct.”187 
 
The arbitral tribunal concluded that the Soviet Government was in breach of the 
contract and awarded the plaintiff considerable damages by referring to the principle 
of unjust enrichment; a principle of general international law. 
In the Texaco case, an investor instigated legal proceedings against Libya following 
the country’s decision to nationalize its oil industry. The investor had been granted 
an oil concession, the agreement for which included an arbitration clause that 
determined applicable law if a dispute arose between the parties. The clause included 
a reference to the “principles of law of Libya common to the principles of 
international law and in the absence of such common principles then by and in 
accordance with the general principles of law […].” A sole arbitrator, Professor 
Dupuy, argued that this provision presupposed an analysis whether contracts should 
be honoured according to Libyan law and principles of international law.  He 
concluded on that point: 
                                                     
186 The various actions taken by the authorities entailed grave violations of the international 
minimum standard. These actions included lack of police protection which resulted in massive theft of 
gold, workers of the company losing trade union and political rights as a result of working for the 
company, harassment of organizations of central and local power, in particular a raid carried out by 
police forces where documents important to the company’s operation were seized and numerous 
officers of the company were prosecuted for “counter-revolutionary activity and espionage”. See 
further the text of the award in Appendix to A. Nussbaum, The Arbitration Between the Lena Goldfields 
Ltd. and the Soviet Government, 36 Cornell Law Quarterly (1950-1951) 31, p. 48-49. 
187 See A. Nussbaum, The Arbitration Between the Lena Goldfields Ltd. and the Soviet Government, 36 
Cornell Law Quarterly (1950-1951) 31, p. 50. 
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(1) On the one hand, as regards the principles of Libyan law: regardless of the source of 
Libyan law taken into consideration, whether we refer to the Sharia […] (“O ye believers, 
perform your contracts!”) or to the Libyan Civil Code [Articles 147 (“The contract makes the 
law of the parties”) and 148 (“A contract must be performed in accordance with its contents 
and in compliance with the requirements of good faith”] one is led to the same conclusion 
[…]: that Libyan law recognizes and sanctions the principle of the binding force of contracts. 
(2) On the other hand, as regards the principle of international law: from this second point 
of view, it is unquestionable, as written by Professor Jessup in concluding his opinion […] 
that the maxim ‘pacta sunt servanda’ is a general principle of law; it is essential foundation of 
international law.188 
 
Even though a dispute has been subjected to a treaty provision, a court will also take 
into account general principles of law during the process of interpretation. As argued 
by the International Court of Justice in the Iranian Hostage case, a state is obliged, even 
though a particular dispute is subjected to a FCN treaty provision, according to 
general international law, to provide protection and security to an alien: 
 
“So far as concerns the two private United States nationals seized as hostages by the 
invading militants, that inaction entailed, albeit incidentally, a breach of its obligations under 
Article II, paragraph 4, of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular 
Rights which, in addition to the obligations of Iran existing under general international law, requires the 
parties to ensure “the most constant protection and security” to each other’s nationals in 
their respective territories.”189 [emphasis added] 
 
Arbitral tribunals that have dealt with cases subjected to the ICSID Convention have 
applied various concepts that rest upon general principles of law as a source of law.190 
However, despite the vast number of BITs that provide investment protection for 
investors, these investment instruments do not always include an applicable law 
clause. Article 42 of ICSID, which refers to “such rules of international law as may 
be applicable” has proven to be an indispensable tool for tribunals as it is understood 
to entail all sources of general international law as defined by Article 38(1) of the 
statute of the International Court of Justice.191 
                                                     
188 Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. and Californian Asiatic Oil Co. v Libya, Award of 19 January 1977, 17 
ILM 1, para 51. 
189 Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Iran) 
ICJ, Decision rendered on 24 May 1980, ICJ Reports (1980), para 67. 
190 See e.g. AAPL v Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award 21 June 1990, 30 ILM 577 
(1991), para 56, concerning the concept of burden of proof and Total SA v Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/04/1, Award of 27 December 2010, para 127, concerning legitimate expectations 
within the context of fair and equitable treatment. 
191 See C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention – A Commentary, CUP (2001), p. 608, para 103 et seq. 
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Therefore, general principles of law can be used by tribunals during the process 
of adjudication for various purposes. Reference to this source may assist tribunals in 
using principles that are not provided for in a treaty, but may be necessary for the 
treaty’s proper function as determined by the tribunal in question.192 However, taking 
into account the increasing number of BITs, most of which include standards that 
are formulated in an open way, such as the standard of full protection and security, 
this source of law will be used as a tool to support or further define the proper 
meaning of the treaty text as interpreted and understood by the tribunal. Here, 
parallels can be drawn between other concepts of international law, which are 
founded upon customary international law, that are increasingly affected by the 
increasing number of BITs or international human rights conventions.193 
 
3.3.5 Arbitral awards 
While the status of this source of law has long been debated, it has at the same time 
long been acknowledged in academia and practice that judicial decisions are of 
immense importance.194 The importance of this source of law is somewhat surprising 
taking into account its origin. According to Article 38(1) judicial decisions are a 
subsidiary source of law. This was acknowledged during the debates that took place 
in the Advisory Committee of Jurists that later led to the formulation of the statute 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice, the forerunner of what is now 
Article 38. Or as Baron Deschamps stated: 
 
“Doctrine and jurisprudence no doubt do not create law; but they assist in determining the 
rules which exist. A judge should make use of both jurisprudence and doctrine, but they 
should serve only as elucidation.”195 
 
                                                     
192 See T. Gazzini, General Principles of Law in the Field of Foreign Investment, 10 Journal of World 
Investment and Trade (2009), p. 107-109 and C. McLachlan, ‘Investment Treaties and General 
International law’, in A.K Bjorklund, I.A. Laird and S. Ripinsky (eds.), Investment Treaty Law – Current 
Issues III; Remedies in International Investment Law and Emerging Jurisprudence of International Investment Law, 
British Institute of International and Comparative Law (2009), p. 142-143. 
193 See H.E. Zeitler, ‘Full Protection and Security’, in S.W. Schill (ed.), International Investment Law 
and Comparative Public Law, OUP (2010), p. 199, and J. Bering et al, General Public International Law and 
International Investment Law – A Research Sketch on Selected Issues, The International Law Association 
German Branch Sub-Committee on Investment Law, December 2009, available at 
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194 See e.g. H. Lauterpacht, Development of International Law by the International Court, Stephens and 
Sons (1957), p. 8-22, G. Schwarzenberger, International Law as Applied by Courts and Tribunals, Vol. I, 
Stephens and Sons (1957), p. 30 et seq, and G. Fitzmaurice, ‘Some Problems Regarding the Formal 
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195 Permanent Court of International Justice, Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès-Verbaux, of the 
Proceedings of the Committee, 16 June-24 July (The Hague, 1920), p. 336. 
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Discussions of this kind and the interests of states to preserve control over the 
development of the international legal system influenced the stipulation of Article 59 
of the ICJ statute which includes a caveat emphasizing that the decisions of the 
World Court have no binding force except between the parties to a particular case.196 
The formulation “determining the rules which exist” is particularly interesting taking 
into account how difficult it can be to determine what customary law entails. This 
fact has only added authority to judicial decisions as a (subsidiary) source of law.197  
The views of commentators, which concern the judgments of tribunals as 
sources of law, are applicable mutandis mutatis to arbitral awards. Both doctrine and 
arbitral awards refer frequently to earlier decisions despite the caveat of Article 59 of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice. This has been acknowledged by 
leading authorities in both international law and international investment law – 
Herch Lauterpacht stated with regard to judicial decisions in general: [j]udicial 
decisions, particularly when published, become part and parcel of the legal sense of 
the community.”198 In addition, Jan Paulsson has stated that: “it is pointless to resist 
the observation that precedents generate norms in international law…” and “…a 
special jurisprudence is developing from the leading awards in the domain of 
investment arbitration [that] can only be denied by those determined to close their 
eyes.”199 
So, despite the fact that there is no legal obligation for a tribunal to follow a 
conclusion decided by another tribunal, there seems to be consensus that arbitral 
awards are of considerable importance.200 But how does this legal reality manifest 
itself in practice? The tribunal in AES v Argentina emphasized the independence of 
each tribunal to approach the subject matter before it, but also took into account that 
earlier decisions were of importance: 
 
 
                                                     
196 See further on Article 38, A. Pellet in A. Zimmermann et al (eds.), The Statute of the International 
Court of Justice: A Commentary, OUP (2006), p. 677. 
197 R.Y. Jennings ‘What is International Law and how do we tell it when we see it?’ in M. 
Koskenniemi (ed.), Sources of International Law, Ashgate (2000), p. 42. 
198 E. Lauterpacht (ed.), International Law: Being the Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht, Vol. II, CUP 
(1975), p. 473-474. 
199 J. Paulsson, International Arbitration and the Generation of Legal Norms: Treaty Arbitration and 
International Law, Paper delivered to the ICCA, Biennial Conference, June 2006, p. 3 and 14. 
200 See C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, CUP (2009), p. 1101, and G. Kaufmann-
Kohler, Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse? The 2006 Freshfields Lecture, Arbitration 
International, Vol. 23, No. 3, LCIA (2007), p. 368, about the issue whether the principle of stare decisis 
exists in international law.  
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“Each tribunal remains sovereign and may retain, as it is confirmed by ICSID practice, a 
different solution for resolving the same problem; but decisions on jurisdiction dealing with 
the same or very similar issues may at least indicate some lines of reasoning of real interest; 
this Tribunal may consider them in order to compare its own position with those already 
adopted by its predecessors and, if it shares the views already expressed by one or more of 
these tribunals on a specific point of law, it is free to adopt the same solution … precedents 
may also be rightly considered, at least as a matter of comparison and, if so considered by the 
Tribunal, of inspiration.”201  
 
Similarly, the tribunal in Oostergetel v Sloval Republic argued that is was not bound, but it 
was to pay due consideration to earlier decisions: 
 
“In its Decision on Jurisdiction, the Tribunal has already stated – and it restates here – that it 
is not bound by previous decisions, but is of the opinion that it must pay due consideration 
to earlier decisions of international tribunals and that, subject to compelling contrary 
grounds, it has a duty to adopt solutions established in a series of consistent cases.”202  
 
Moreover, arbitral awards have become one of the most valuable sources of law in 
international investment law due to the frequent rate of adjudication of investment 
disputes by arbitrators.203 However, the de-centralized nature of the dispute 
settlement system in investment arbitration and the different quality of individual 
awards can lead to extreme situations, the most extreme of which occurs when 
arbitral tribunals dealing with similar subject matters reach opposite conclusions.204 
Another element meriting mention in the context of investment arbitration is 
the different methodologies used by investment tribunals when dealing with 
individual cases. The often vague formulation of investment treaty standards, 
including the full protection and security standard, makes interpretation a process 
whereby the investment tribunal has considerable discretion how to establish the 
standard’s substantive content. Due to the vague concepts often used, tribunals have 
difficulty in concretizing the substantive elements of the standard – different 
approaches are taken, some tribunals rely on treaty law whereas others employ a 
combination of treaty law and customary international law. Arbitral practice shows 
that various substantive elements are used when determining the substantive content 
                                                     
201 AES Corp. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17, Decision on Jurisdiction of 26 
April 2005, paras 30-31.  
202 Oostergetel v Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Award 23 April 2012, para 145.  
203 The cumulative number of known treaty-based cases adjudicated by arbitral tribunals reached 
390 by the end of 2010. During 2010, at least 25 new treaty-based arbitration cases were filed. See 
UNCTAD, World Investment Report: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development, United 
Nations (2011), p. 100-103. 
204 See Lauder v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Award 3 September 2001 and CME v Czech 
Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Partial Award of 13 September 2001. 
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of the standard and which obligations the host state owes to the investor. Such a 
development is to be expected taking into account how open and ambiguous the 
treaty standards are and how difficult it can be to determine customary international 
law. This situation is problematic not only for the investor but also for the host state 
as it is difficult to predict what should be expected from either party or, even 
whether the investor can contribute to the damage caused to the investment.  
The problems relating to various discrepancies stemming from arbitral practice 
necessitate considerable restraint when dealing with arbitral awards. Various 
examples can be found where arbitral tribunals invest considerable time to describe 
facts and procedure in great detail. However, the tribunal’s material assessment 
within the context of a principle or a standard’s substantive elements is surprisingly 
shallow. In such a scenario it can be tempting to go further in an attempt to 
determine the substantive content of a standard and draw conclusions from the 
parties’ submissions. Therefore, some commentators have sought, when determining 
the content of an investment protection standard, to draw conclusions not from the 
awards themselves, but also from submissions by the parties, such as counter-
memorials, where the a party provides its counter-arguments in response to the 
claims of the opposing party.205  
It should be stressed that even though submissions by the parties’ counsel can 
play an important role and influence the conclusion of the tribunal, they have to be 
viewed and assessed in their proper context.206 A memorial or a counter-memorial is 
an instrument presented in an investment dispute that is being adjudicated before an 
arbitral tribunal. Its purpose is to present the arguments and counter-arguments to 
the claims of the opposing party. The nature of the adjudication process – as a 
process concerned with a legal dispute – is adversarial. That fact leads to the situation 
in which the parties present their claims and arguments not as they see de lege lata but 
within the context of the dispute being adjudicated and in support of their position. 
Needless to say, tribunals have recognized this situation. In PSEG v Turkey the 
tribunal noted concerning this issue:  
                                                     
205 See I. Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in the International Law of Foreign Investment, 
OUP (2007), p. 139. There, the following argument is made: “One possible starting point in the 
identification of the FET content may be by looking at the shared expectations of the parties 
concerning FET.” 
206 See regarding the importance of council’s submissions on behalf of parties to a dispute T.W. 
Wälde, “Interpreting Investment Treaties” in C. Binder, U. Kriebaum, A. Reinisch and S. Wittich 
(eds.), International Investment Law for the 21st Century – Essays in honour of Christoph Schreuer, OUP (2009), 
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Bjorklund, I.A. Laird and S. Ripinsky (eds.), Investment Treaty Law, Current Issues III; Remedies in 
International Investment Law – Emerging Jurisprudence of International Investment law, British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law (2009), p. 102-103. 
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“As it is by now customary in investment arbitration, the aggrieved party invokes the breach 
of every BIT clause dealing with the standards of the investor’s protection, while the 
Respondent vehemently denies any breach. This the Claimants have done in the present 
case, with the sole exception that they have not claimed direct expropriation of the 
investment. The Government of Turkey denies any breach of the BIT.”207  
 
It is therefore commonplace that a party to an investment dispute identifies all the 
relevant clauses of the BIT which in his opinion are violated and that to which the 
dispute is subjected. In contrast, the respondent state denies every violation which it 
is accused of. Such a scenario can only lead to the conclusion that there is 
considerable need for a careful approach when general conclusions from memorials 
and counter-memorials are drawn. 
Other tribunals have been liberal in interpreting the legal meaning and effect of 
individual decisions. A case in point is one of the major decisions concerning the 
evolution the full protection and security standard, the Neer case of 1927. In this case 
the US-Mexican Claims Commission acknowledged that governmental acts should 
be put to the test of international standards and the treatment of an alien must 
“...amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty...” to be considered an 
international delinquency. Even though the origins of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard and the full protection and security standard are entirely different 
– the full protection and security standard originates from the FCN treaties and state 
practice whereas the fair and equitable treatment standard originates in treaty law 
after the end of the Second World War – the Neer case has been used as an example 
of a violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard.208 
Unfortunate as such developments may be, it cannot be ignored that arbitral 
awards are important for the mere fact that they determine the substance of various 
investments standards included in BITs. So, despite the fact that these standards are 
often formulated in an open and ambiguous manner, their substantive content is 
brought to life depending on how and the way in which an arbitral tribunal subjects 
the facts of its case to the standard. This process of adjudication with the increasing 
number of arbitral awards that deal with similar treaty language has led to a situation 
where a more detailed body of jurisprudence is developing. This evolution has 
contributed considerably to the development of international law and international 
investment law.209 
                                                     
207 PSEG Global Inc. and Konya Ilgin Elektrik Üretim ve Tícaret Limited Sirketi v Republic of Turkey, ICSID 
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3.3.6 Writings of highly qualified publicists 
Due to the wide nature of the formulation of the treaty-based standard, tribunals are 
inclined to seek guidance in writings of highly qualified publicists. Again, the 
argument of the first major investment award provides guidance. The tribunal in 
AAPL v Sri Lanka discussed extensively writings of numerous publicists, including 
Vattel, Cheng, Zemanek and Brownlie, in great detail in order to provide a 
substantive assessment of the elements of treaty protection and the burden of proof 
before international tribunals.210 Another example is the Parkerings v Lithuania case. 
The tribunal argued that the variation of language in treaty law did not make a 
significant difference in the level of protection and referred to academic writings in 
support of this notion.211 In Pantechniki v Albania, the umpire referred to Professor 
O’Connell’s treatise on international law and Newcombe and Paradell’s monograph 
on international investment law when assessing the scope of the due diligence 
principle.212 Having recited the academic text, the umpire subjected the facts of the 
case to the premise thus established.213 In Suez and InterAgua v Argentina and Suez and 
Vivendi et al v Argentina, the tribunal referred to Professor Freeman’s lecture at the 
Hague Academy of International Law and Professor Brownlie’s treatise on principles 
of international law describing the meaning of due diligence.214 
In addition, tribunals have referred to studies made by international 
organizations that have sought to further define the substantive elements of the full 
protection and security standard or describe state practice within the context of 
customary international law. It is clear that these documents do not fall under the 
sources of law as prescribed in Article 38 of the Statue of the International Court of 
Justice or under the structure provided for in Articles 31-33 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. Still, it happens on occasion that a tribunal seeks 
guidance in documents produced by international organizations that are involved 
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with investment. A case in point is the tribunal in Biwater Gauff v Tanzania. In this 
case, the tribunal referred to a study published by UNCTAD when addressing 
whether the standard included an obligation of result of an obligation of good faith 
efforts and what conclusions could be drawn from earlier case law in that regard.215 
In the Mondev case, the tribunal similarly referred to another study published by 
UNCTAD when discussing “a reasonable evolutionary interpretation of Article 
1105(1)” of NAFTA.216  
 
3.4 The status of international investment law within the sphere of public 
international law and municipal law 
Another issue is relevant within the context of the sources of international 
investment law, regardless of whether international investment law should be 
researched as a part of international law or as a special category in itself: the effect of 
the situation that every dispute concerning international investment law constitutes a 
case of mixed arbitration – a dispute involving a private entity and the host state.  
One of the more obvious peculiarities of a dispute between a sovereign state and 
a private entity is the fact that the former is a subject of international law, whereas 
the latter is not. This mixture complicates the status of the investment transaction – 
namely whether it should be thought to fall under the sphere of public international 
law or municipal law.  
Traditionally, a clear distinction is made between public law and municipal law; 
both are discussed in two different genres of law. International law is the law that 
governs the relationships between sovereign states, whereas municipal law is applied 
in a particular state and controls the relationship between citizens and their 
relationship with the executive branch of government.217 Sub-categories in both 
international law and municipal law cover the substantive principles of these genres 
in greater detail; public international law contains inter alia international economic 
law, international human rights law, whereas municipal consists of constitutional law, 
administrative law, law of contracts, employment law, tax law, etc.  
A dispute between an investor and a sovereign state can, depending on the 
nature of the dispute, deal with issues which are treated in the sub-categories which 
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have been mentioned. The line between international law and municipal law can, 
therefore, be blurred in practice.218 The problems linked to this situation are well 
reflected in arbitral practice. Should the law of the host state, the law of the investor’s 
home state and the law of a third country apply to the legal dispute? To what extent 
should international law play a role in that context? 
A lawyer will be faced with numerous issues when dealing with a dispute 
between an investor and a state. First, the investment will most likely be channelled 
through a vehicle – a legal entity – incorporated under the laws of the host state. 
That entity will probably have entered into an agreement, e.g. a concession 
agreement, stipulated and executed taking into account many laws of the host state, 
e.g. laws dealing with natural resources, building laws and regulations, tax laws, 
employment laws, etc. Hence, the first legal system to explore will probably be 
municipal law, not international law.219 Second, the national laws of the host state of 
the investment might not be compatible with the obligations of the state. This 
situation is unlikely to arise when an investment agreement is signed, but might do so 
later in the event of a regime change in the host country.220 The effects of this might 
have different repercussions depending on whether they are subjected to municipal 
laws of the host state or international law. Therefore, the law applicable to the 
investment and the legal dispute pertaining to the investment is of paramount 
importance. 
Historically, it has not been self-evident what law should be applicable to the 
dispute at hand. The Permanent Court of Justice argued in the Serbian loans case: 
 
“Any contract which is not a contract between States in their capacity as subjects of 
international law is based on the municipal law of some country.”221   
 
                                                     
218 This is particularly topical if the BIT includes substantive elements that are subjected to 
muncipal law. A case in point is the UK-Czech Republic BIT. The terms “asset” and “investment” 
refer to rights and claims which have a financial value for the holder – in doing so, the BIT established 
a link between itself and municipal law. See further C. McLachlan, L. Shore and M. Weiniger, 
International Investment Arbitration – Substantive Principles, Oxford University Press (2009), p. 183-184. 
219 That does not necessarily mean that the investor’s legal position is negatively affected. In some 
cases municipal law is very advantageous to the investor as can be seen in the Albania’s national law 
dealing with investment. According to Article 8(2) of the Albanian Law on Foreign Investment of 
1993 a foreign investor “...may submit the dispute for resolution and the Republic of Albania hereby 
consents to the submission thereof, to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes.” See further Tradex v Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/94/2, Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 
December 1996, 14 ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal 161, 174 (1999).  
220 In many cases, municipal laws stipulated after the investment has been made are the primary 
reason for the investment dispute. See e.g. CME v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Partial 
Award of 13 September 2001 and Sempra Energy v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, 
Award of 28 September 2007. 
221 Serbian Loans Case, PCIJ, Judgment, No. 14, 1929, Series A, 1929, No. 20, p. 41. 
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This obiter dictum of the Permanent Court of Justice created a presumption that took 
considerable effort to change in arbitral practice. As mentioned before, the investor 
in the Lena Goldfields case was successful in arguing that the dispute should be 
subjected to international law despite the fact that there was no provision to that 
effect in the concession agreement. Other cases are also of importance in this 
context. In three cases – Texaco v Libya, Liamco v Libya and BP v Libya – investors 
instigated legal proceedings after Libya’s decision to nationalize its oil industry. All 
investors had been awarded concession agreement to extract oil in the host countries. 
All the agreements included a choice of law clause that sought to delocalize the 
concession agreement by stating that the agreement should be governed by 
“principles of law of Libya common to the principles of international law and in the 
absence of such common principles then by and in accordance with the general 
principles of law […].” Three different arbitrators came to three different 
conclusions with respect to applicable law; international law, Danish law (lex arbitri) 
and Swiss law and international law (application of lex arbitri and international law).222  
The various issues that arbitrators had to deal with in earlier times have become 
moot as a result of the wide-ranging BIT regime currently in place. The likelihood of 
establishing a state’s responsibility solely on principles that are based on general 
principles of law, as was done in the Lena Goldfields case, is lower than before. This has 
led to a situation where substantive principles govern to a large extent the investment 
of foreign investors during the process of adjudication. These principles, which 
almost without exception concern fair and equitable treatment, full protection and 
security and expropriation are provided for by states in the form of BITs, regional 
agreements or multilateral agreements. All these types of agreements are instruments 
stipulated and interpreted in accordance with public international law and provide 
the substantive principles upon which the investor’s claim, in the event of a violation, 
rests. Moreover, the arbitral tribunals which adjudicate the disputes between states 
and investors are established in accordance with public international law – many of 
which according to the 1965 ICSID Convention or 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitral Rules. 
Both of these arbitral frameworks are, needless to say, instruments of public 
international law, as they are stipulated by states and signed by them. 
Therefore, the current state of play is that there is continuous interaction 
between, on one hand, international law and municipal law and, on the other hand, 
general international law and international investment law. As to the former point, 
the interplay between municipal law and international law can be considerable when 
                                                     
222 See Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. and Californian Asiatic Oil Co. v Libya, 17 ILM 1 (1978), Libyan 
American Oil Co. v Libya, 20 ILM 1 (1978) and British Petroleum Exploration Co. v Libya, Award 10 
October 1973, 53 ILR 297 (1973). 
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deciding on e.g. the nationality of an investor, whether a public authority should be 
considered a part of the host state, whether government measures should be 
considered tantamount to expropriation or whether the government action or 
inaction failed to provide the necessary protection of an investment. Therefore, the 
division of international law and municipal law is difficult to sustain when dealing 
with the particulars of a complicated investment dispute. As to the latter point, the 
obligations owed to the investor according to the relevant bilateral investment treaty 
are not free standing obligations which are to be applied in a vacuum, but take into 
account other principles of law. Similarly, any division between general international 
law and international investment law can at times be seen as superfluous rather than 
as having any practical importance.  
Therefore, the reality is that municipal law and international can at times apply 
both to investment transactions, in particular when these two fields of law lead to the 
same conclusion. However, if discrepancy exists between these two fields of law to 
such an extent that municipal law is contrary to international law, the latter will most 
likely prevail and decide the outcome.223  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at the various sources of international law upon which the 
full protection and security standard rests. The research has revealed that the 
standard was included in the first BIT ever stipulated, the Germany-Pakistan BIT of 
1959. When the standard is included in a treaty, it is formulated in various ways and 
often linked to the fair and equitable treatment standard or to the relative standards 
of national treatment or most-favoured-nation standard. Needless to say, such 
combination will influence the standard’s application in practice. In addition to being 
included in BITs, the standard also forms a part of various multilateral and regional 
treaties. There, the standard becomes a part of international instruments which do 
not focus exclusively on investment, but also cover trade related matters. These 
treaties include another group of formulations that are often distinctly different and 
at times more detailed compared to the formulations found in various BITs.  
                                                     
223 For an overview, see C. Schreuer, ICSID Convention – A Commentary, CUP (2009), p. 617 et seq. 
It must be noted that scholars remain divided on the issue of whether international law prevails in the 
event that municipal law is contrary to international law. See P. Weil, The State, the Foreign Investor, and 
International law – The No longer Stormy Relationship of a Ménage À Trois, 15 ICSID Review 401 (2000), p. 
409, where the importance of international law is emphasized. For an opposing view, see E. Gaillard 
and Y. Banifatemi, The Meaning of “and” in Article 42(1), Second Sentence, of the Washington Convention: The 
Role of International Law in the ICSID Choice of Law Process, 18 ICSID Review 375 (2003), p. 403-409.  
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The full protection and security standard is also founded upon customary 
international law. This source of law played a crucial role in earlier times due to the 
importance of the international minimum standard as applied by claims commission 
in the first half of the last century. However, one can argue that its stature has been 
affected by the vast number of BITs leading to a structural change that is a result of 
the increasing number of treaty-based standards to which investments are subjected 
to. It is important to stress at the same time that this change is not as dramatic as 
originally presumed. The main reason for this assumption is that customary 
international law is a source of law independent from treaty law. Therefore, both 
sources of law can be applied to a particular dispute independently. As has been 
discussed, various treaty formulations of the full protection and security standard 
refer explicitly to customary international law. Therefore, these two sources of law 
can be connected regardless of what the intention of the parties to the treaty might 
be by doing so.  
General principles of law are, as a source, of particular importance, not least 
because of their different nature compared to the two sources previously mentioned. 
This source is derived from various municipal jurisdictions and can only be 
determined by a comparative study of different legal systems. Therefore, the general 
principles stem from systems that are, in contrast to the system of international law, 
influenced by non-state actors. In addition, this source of law plays a considerable 
role, taking into account the often vague concepts inherent in treaty law and the 
uncertain content of customary international law, as a tool for completing treaties 
and customary rules of international law. 
The last two sources covered in this chapter – arbitral awards and writings of 
highly qualified publicists – are subsidiary ones. It was revealed that arbitral awards 
have become important due to the frequent rate of adjudication. However, while 
arbitral awards have shed light on various substantive concepts of treaty law and 
determined the content of customary international law, they are not without faults. 
The different quality of awards and the non-uniform methodology of arbitral 
tribunals has at times created problems and raised more questions than answers. 
Despite these problems, arbitral awards serve as an important source due to the fact 
that various awards have contributed considerably to the development of 
international law and in that way clarified both concepts and determined obligations 
of states and investors that are parties to legal disputes. With regard to the writings of 
highly qualified publicists, they have had considerable influence in individual cases, 
while their overall influence remains uncertain.  
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Taking into account the structural change that has occurred with the ever-
growing number of BITs, it is only logical to look more closely towards the 
interpretation and application of the standard of full protection and security. Chapter 
4 will focus on interpretation, but Chapter 5 will deal with the standard’s substantive 




4. INTERPRETATION OF THE STANDARD OF FULL PROTECTION 
AND SECURITY 
4.1 Introduction 
The interpretation of the full protection and security standard, as the interpretation 
of other standards of international investment law, is not entirely undisputed. That 
does not, however, mean that these standards can be used without restriction or 
without the use of accepted rules of interpretation. To the contrary, this situation 
makes it particularly important that umpires rely on the content of the relevant BIT, 
declarations of interpretation provided by entities authorized to do so, and rules 
provided for in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
The purpose of this study is to examine in greater detail how arbitral tribunals 
have interpreted the standard, in particular their interpretation of different 
formulations when arguing for a certain conclusion. This is important for both 
structural and substantive reasons. 
The system of sources of law has, as discussed in preceeding chapters, changed 
considerably after the end of the Second World War, in particular with the 
conclusion of the FCN treaty regime and with the emergence of a BIT-dominated 
regime of investment protection. Thus, emphasis has shifted structurally within the 
system of sources of law. In addition, the scope of protection has changed – with the 
emergence of the fair and equitable treatment standard and the ever-widening 
concept of an investment – and increased the level of protection. That has, however, 
not lead to a uniform interpretation/usage of the standard in individual arbitral cases.  
As became increasingly clear during the stipulation process of the ILC’s Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility, states have had difficulty agreeing on the substantive 
content of various rules and principles of international law dealing with that subject 
matter.224 That was the main reason for the adoption of a new approach on 
distinguishing between primary and secondary rules of state responsibility. In a 
structure of that nature interpretation becomes increasingly important. Whereas the 
objective elements of a primary rule can often easily be found in treaty law or in 
another rule of international law, the conduct attributed to the state in question is 
more problematic. Establishing whether an act or omission is attributable to a state is 
                                                     
224 The disagreement was such that little progress was made. In 1957, the International Law 
Commission postponed the discussion of the special rapporteur’s proposals. See Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission 1957, Vol. I, UN Doc. No. A/CN.4/SER.A/1957, p. 181. 
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most often a matter of interpretation and application of the primary rule in question 
taking into account all relevant facts of each case.225 Therefore, it is important to 
discuss in greater detail the process of interpretation and the different approaches 
taken by tribunals.  
 
4.2 General considerations as regard interpretation 
4.2.1 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
The main task of an arbitral tribunal is to adjudicate. After having dealt with 
jurisdictional issues raised by the parties to the dispute, the tribunal’s first step is to 
recognise where the legal dispute of the two parties lies. That entails that the tribunal 
has, firstly, to establish the applicable law and, secondly, to establish the facts of the 
case. Having established these two fundamental parts of the dispute the tribunal is 
able to adjudicate.226  
The starting point for any tribunal adjudicating an investment dispute is the text 
of the relevant BIT, in particular the provision that describes that full protection and 
security should be accorded to the investor and his investment. The fact that a 
tribunal is faced with the task of interpreting treaty law makes Article 31 and 32 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) highly relevant, but these 
articles are generally considered to codify customary international law.227 Article 31 
states: 
 
“1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to 
the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection 
with the conclusion of the treaty; 
                                                     
225 J. Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility, Introduction, Text and 
Commentaries, CUP (2005), p. 82. 
226 As established by the Permanent Court of International Justice, a dispute is “a disagreement on 
a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or interests between the parties.” See Mavrommatis 
Palestine Concessions (Greece v United Kingdom), Judgment No. 2, 1924, PCIJ Reports, Series A, No. 2, p. 
11. This definition has been adopted by the International Court of Justice, cf. e.g. Case concerning East 
Timor (Portugal v Australia), ICJ, Judgment rendered 30 June 1995, ICJ Reports (1995), para 21, where 
the Court argues in greater detail that a legal dispute is a dispute on points of law or fact – something 
which can be determined objectively.  
227 See e.g. Mondev International Ltd. v United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, 
ICSID Additional Facility Award of 11 October 2002, 6 ICSID Reports 192; 42 ILM 85 (2003), at 
para 43: “…the question is what the relevant provisions mean, interpreted in accordance with the 
applicable rules of interpretation of treaties. These are set out in Articles 31-33 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which for this purpose can be taken to reflect the position under 
customary international law.” 
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(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the 
treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty 
or the application of its provisions; 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement 
of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so 
intended.”228 
 
According to Article 31 a distinction is to be made between three approaches to 
treaty interpretation. All these approaches are embodied in the article’s first 
paragraph which notes that a treaty should be interpreted in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty (objective approach), taking into account 
in their context (subjective approach) and in the light of the treaty’s object and 
purpose (teleological approach).229  
Article 32 is also highly relevant with regards to interpretation. It provides as 
follows: 
 
“Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory 
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning 
resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the 
interpretation according to article 31: 
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”230 
 
Some arbitral tribunals cite from the very outset, when interpreting relevant 
provisions dealing with full protection and security, the VCLT in general or the rules 
set forth in Article 31 of the VCLT. It is appropriate to refer to the first investor-
state arbitral award, AAPL v Sri Lanka, which focused on the application of the full 
protection and security standard. The tribunal argued that: 
 
 
                                                     
228 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS, p. 331. 
229 See the ILC’s commentaries on Article 31 of the VCLT in the Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission 1966, Vol. II, p. 218, para 2 and p. 220, para 12 et seq (the commentaries to Article 
31 are to be found under Article 27 of the ILC draft). 
230 Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS, p. 331. 
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“…the first task of the Tribunal is to rule on the controversies existing in this respect by 
indicating what constitutes the true construction of the Treaty’s relevant provisions in 
conformity with the sound universally accepted rules of treaty interpretation as established in 
practice, adequately formulated by l’Institut de Droit International in its General Session in 
1956, and as codified in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.”231  
 
Similarly, the tribunal in Siemens v Argentina emphasized the importance of Article 31 
before addressing the individual concepts of the standard: 
 
“The allegations of the parties will require that the Tribunal interpret the Treaty. In this 
respect and as a general matter, the Tribunal recalls that the Treaty should be interpreted in 
accordance with the norms of interpretation established by the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties of 1969 [...] Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention requires that a treaty be 
“interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”232  
 
Other tribunals acknowledge and emphasize that the full protection and security 
standard should be construed in accordance with accepted rules of treaty interpret-
ation.233 However, in the great majority of awards no examples can be found where 
tribunals cite the VCLT when applying the full protection and security standard. In 
Wena v Egypt and Suez and Vivendi et al v Argentina and Suez and InterAgua v Argentina 
reflect this practice of non-referral, but the tribunals start their argumentation by 
briefly citing the relevant treaty provisions, subjecting various facts to the treaty 
provisions and analyzing earlier case law dealing with the full protection and security 
standard.234  
The reasons for the lack of references to VCLT are numerous. First, tribunals 
often have referred to the VCLT early on in the award when determining applicable 
law to which the legal dispute should be subjected.235 Second, arbitral tribunals often 
deal with the fair and equitable treatment standard before addressing the full 
                                                     
231 AAPL v Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award of 21 June 1990, 30 ILM 577 (1991) 
para 38. See also e.g. Lauder v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Award 3 September 2001, para 
292 and Oostergetel v Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Award 23 April 2012, para 140. 
232 Siemens v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award of 6 February 2007, para 80.  
233 Rumeli Telekom v Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award of 29 July 2008, 
para 668.  
234 See Wena Hotels Ltd. v Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award of 8 December 
2000, 41 ILM 896 (2002), para 84 et seq, and Suez and Vivendi et al v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/19, Award of 30 July 2010, para 158 et seq, and Suez and InterAgua v Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/19, Award of 30 July 2010, para 152 et seq.  




protection and security standard.236 Therefore, an additional reference to VCLT when 
addressing the full protection and security standard might be seen as superfluous. 
Third, it could be argued that the methods of objective, subjective or teleological 
interpretation of treaty interpretation could be considered relatively ineffective in 
providing guidance as to the meaning of the concepts of “protection” and “security” 
due to their general character and the lack of travaux préparatoires. This nature of the 
standard makes it more challenging to apply it in individual cases and contributes the 
non-uniform approach taken by tribunals.237 That applies to the full protection and 
security standard in the same way as it applies to other standards, including the 
standard of fair and equitable treatment.238  
 
4.2.2 The meaning of “protection” 
According to The Concise Oxford English Dictionary the word ‘protection’ means 
“the action or state of protecting or being protected”. The word stems from the 
Latin word ‘protegere’ which means “cover in front”.239 The French concept of 
‘protection’ means “protection” or “guard” and the Spanish concept of ‘protección’ 
means “protection” or “defence”.240 Finally, the German concept of ‘Schutz’ means 
in its literal sense “protect”.241 Thus, there seems to be no substantive difference in 
its literary meaning in the languages which are used in formulating BITs.  
The concept of protection appears in various parts of BITs. It appears always in 
the title of the BIT regardless of whether it is included in the preamble or the body 
of a treaty. A typical formulation of a treaty’s title is “Treaty between [...] and [...] 
concerning the reciprocal encouragement and protection of investments.”242 It 
appears almost always in the preamble – an example of a conventional formulation is 
“Recognising that the encouragement and reciprocal protection of such investment 
                                                     
236 See e.g. Lauder v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Award 3 September 2001, para 292 and 
305 and Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v United Mexican States, Additional Facility Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award of 29 May 2003, paras 155 and 177 and Saluka v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL 
Arbitration, Partial Award, 17 March 2006, paras 296 and 486-496. 
237 See H.E. Zeitler, The Guarantee of “Full Protection and Security” in Investment Treaties regarding Harm 
caused by Private Actors, Stockholm International Arbitration Review (2005), p. 27 et seq. 
238 This challenge has lead commentators to propose additional approaches to determine the 
meaning of the substantive elements of fair and equitable treatment. See J. Bering et al, General Public 
International law and International Investment Law – A Research Sketch on Seltected Issues. The International 
Law Association, German Branch, Sub-Committee on Investment Law, December 2009, p. 11 et seq. 
239 The Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 11th ed., OUP (2004), p. 1154. 
240 The Collins Spanish-English Dictionary, 5th ed., Harper Collins (1997), p. 579, and The Collins 
Robert French-English Dictionary, Collins (1985), p. 530. 
241 The Oxford Duden German Dictionary, OUP (1997), p. 647. 
242 The title of the US-Turkey BIT of 1985, for example, states: “Treaty between the United States 
of America and the Republic of Turkey concerning the reciprocal encouragement and protection of 
investments.” For an overview of selected BITs containing various formulations see Annex II. 
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will be conducive to the stimulation of individual business initiative and will increase 
prosperity in both States.”243 As to the body of the treaty, formulations providing for 
the substantive elements of the standard are various and different in nature. The 
standard often appears as a stand-alone principle, in conjunction with the fair and 
equitable treatment standard within the context of expropriation or in connection 
with international law in general. A typical formulation of the concept of protection 
in the full protection and security standard would constitute the following structure: 
 
“Investments of nationals or companies of either Contracting Party shall at all times be 
accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy full protection and security in the territory 
of the other Contracting Party.”244 [emphasis added] 
 
“Investments of investors of each Contracting Party shall at all times be accorded treatment 
in accordance with customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment and 
full protection and security, in the territory of the other Contracting Party.”245 [emphasis added] 
 
“Investments by investors of each Contracting Party shall at all times enjoy full protection and 
security in the territory of the other Contracting Party. Neither Contracting Party shall in any 
way impair in its territory by unreasonable or discriminatory measures the management, 
maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of investments by investors of the other 
Contracting Party.”246 [emphasis added] 
 
While a positive formulation is the most common formulation in the BITs that were 
the subject of this study, a negative formulation could also be found on occasion: 
 
Except for measures required to maintain public order, such investments shall enjoy 
continuous protection and security, i.e. excluding any unjustified or discriminatory measure which 
could hinder, either in law or in practice, the management, maintenance, use, possession or 
liquidation thereof.247 [emphasis added] 
 
The concept has played a vital role in international law as a substantive part of the 
international minimum standard prescribing the obligations of states to protect 
foreigners residing within their borders. It is this backdrop to the formulation of the 
standard – protection of aliens and their property – that is particularly important 
within the context of investment protection. The question whether the treaty-based 
                                                     
243 See the preamble of the Thailand-India BIT of 2000 which states: “Recognising that the 
encouragement and reciprocal protection of such investment will be conducive to the stimulation of 
individual business initiative and will increase prosperity in both States.” For an overview of selected 
BITs containing various formulations see Annex II. 
244 UK-Philippines BIT, Art. 3(2). 
245 UK-Mexico BIT, Art. 3. 
246 Finland-Brazil BIT, Art. 2(2). 
247 Belgium/Luxembourg-Nigeria BIT, Art. 3. 
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standard is formulated with the purpose of describing the general obligation of states 
of protection, or to increase the level of protection when dealing with investments, 
can only be answered after an assessment on a case-by-case basis.  
It is, however, clear that the word ‘protection’ entails in general an obligation to 
protect. That entails the obligation to provide for institutions that either protect the 
investment (e.g., police force or courts of law) or a legal framework that grants 
security by enabling the investor to protect itself (legal rules that protect property 
rights and institutions that enables the investor to guard its interest).248 In such a 
scenario an investor is in a position to guard his interest. He can expect (or request 
protection if he has knowledge of a threat) that the host state will exercise its powers, 
e.g. police force, and in that way subject anyone who intends to commit or has 
committed actions that have an adverse effect on the investment to the law that 
protects the investment.  
The question arises what the meaning of “full protection” entails, as opposed to 
“protection”. The international minimum standard provided for protection and 
security of aliens when residing in another country than their home country. That 
protection was, however, not understood to include “full protection”, but only 
“protection”. In recent case law tribunals have afforded this formulation additional 
importance and argued that the word “full” entails an increased level of protection. 
The tribunal in the Biwater case argued that the word meant not only protection from 
adverse action of third private parties, but also from adverse action from the state 
itself.249 The tribunal in the Siemens case concluded that the word “full” extended the 
investment protection of the BIT to intangible assets/investments.250 In the Azurix 
case the tribunal argued that the effect of the word’s inclusion leads to the situation 
that a secure investment environment was protected.251  
However, there are limits as to how far a tribunal is willing to stretch the level of 
protection when determining the repercussions of the concept of “full protection”. 
Tribunals have rejected arguments that would entail that the standard should incur 
absolute liability to the state and would as such serve as a guarantee for investors for 
any losses.252 The investor in the AAPL case argued that the words “full” and “enjoy” 
should be understood as establishing an obligation that was absolute in nature – a 
                                                     
248 C. Schreuer, ‘Interrelationship of standards’ in A. Reinisch (ed.), Standards of Investment Protection, 
OUP (2008), p. 4. 
249 Biwater Gauff Ltd. v United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award 24 July 
2008, para 729. 
250 Siemens v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award of 6 February 2007, para 303. 
251 Azurix Corp. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award 14 July 2006, para 408. 
252 See e.g. Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v United Mexican States, Additional Facility Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award of 29 May 2003, para 177, and Noble Ventures v Romania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/11, Award 12 October 2005, para 164.  
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strict liability obligation – which would in effect lead to a situation where the investor 
enjoyed a guarantee against losses. The tribunal rejected the idea with reference inter 
alia to customary international law and arbitral cases noting that such an 
understanding would render other parts of the BIT in question “superfluous”. The 
tribunal cited Freeman when describing the applicable principle with regard to strict 
liability: 
 
“The State into which an alien has entered … is not an insurer or a guarantor of his security 
… It does not, and could hardly be asked to, accept an absolute responsibility for all injuries 
to foreigners.”253 
 
Therefore, the concept of ‘protection’ indicates exactly what it means. The state has 
an obligation to protect. However, that obligation is far from absolute and should be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis. The fact that the concept of protection forms a part 
of a standard leads to the conclusion that two factors reign supreme when applying 
the standard. First, various different sources of law must be taken into account when 
determining its substantive content, namely treaty, custom and general principles of 
law. Second, an arbitrator is not allowed to apply his own idiosyncratic definition of 
the concept, but must adhere to the various disciplines needed to ascertain the 
concept according to the sources. In such a scenario, the concept cannot be 
determined in abstract, but must be interpreted taking into account the facts of the 
case. However, as will be explored, customary international law plays a pivotal role in 
determining the nature of the obligation and what behaviour obliges the state to act 
in order to protect the party in question.  
 
4.2.3 The meaning of “security” 
The Concise Oxford English Dictionary described the meaning of ‘security’ as “the 
state of being free or feeling secure”. In addition, the dictionary names as an 
additional meaning “the safety of a state or organization against criminal activity such 
as terrorism”. The word comes from the Latin word ‘securitas’, from ‘securus’ which 
means “free from care”.254 The French word ‘sécurité’ means “security” and the 
                                                     
253 See AAPL v Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award 21 June 1990, 30 ILM 577 (1991) 
para 45 et seq and A.V. Freeman, Responsibility of States for Unlawful Acts of their Armed Forces, 88 RCADI 
267 (1955), p. 276. 
254 The Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 11th ed., OUP (2004), p. 1301.  
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Spanish word ‘seguridad’ means “security”.255 Identically, the German language 
concept of ‘Sicherheit’ conveys the same meaning.256  
In contrast to the word ‘protection’, the concept of security appears only in the 
body of the treaties researched. A typical formulation of the concept of security, as a 
part of the full protection and security standard, is usually as follows: 
 
“Investments by investors of either Contracting State shall enjoy full protection and security in 
the territory of the other Contracting State.”257 [emphasis added] 
 
“Investments or returns of investors of either Contracting Party shall at all times be accorded 
fair and equitable treatment in accordance with principles international and shall enjoy full 
protection and security in the territory of the other Contracting Party.”258 [emphasis added] 
 
“Investment shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment, shall enjoy full 
protection and security and shall in no case be accorded treatment less than that required by 
international law.”259 [emphasis added] 
 
Still, different variations of the concept appear in various BITs, such as “full security 
and protection”,260 “adequate physical security and protection”,261 “full physical 
security and protection”262 and “protection and constant security”.263  
The question arises what legal effect the word “security” has in practice. A 
textual interpretation lead to the conclusion that an investor should be in a state of 
being free or feeling secure – in practical terms this means that the investor should 
be able to manoeuvre freely in connection to his economic activities. However, more 
importantly, in particular due to the fact that the word “security” almost only appears 
with the word “protection”, the question should be asked and answered what legal 
effect the words “protection and security” have in practice. Is there any difference in 
substance between the concepts of “protection” and “security” when formulated 
together in a BIT prescribing that an investor and his investments shall enjoy “full 
protection and security”? A textual interpretation of the concepts, which is important 
not least because of the lack of travaux préparatoires in the traditional sense, seems to 
                                                     
255 The Collins Spanish-English Dictionary, 5th ed., Harper Collins (1997), p. 649, and The Collins 
Robert French-English Dictionary, Collins (1985), p. 612. 
256 The Oxford Duden German Dictionary, OUP (1997), p. 661. 
257 Germany-Philippines BIT, Art. 4.1.  
258 Argentina-Canada BIT, Art. 2(4).  
259 US-Ecuador BIT, Art. II(3)(a).  
260 Egypt-Nigeria BIT, Art. 2(3). 
261 This formulation is found in a number of Indonesia BITs. See e.g. Indonesia-Netherlands BIT, 
Art. 3(1); Indonesia-Chile, Art. IV(1) and Indonesia-Bangladesh BIT, Art. III(1). 
262 Netherlands-Venezuela BIT, Art. 3(2). 
263 UK-Argentina BIT, Art. 2(2). 
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lead to a negative conclusion. While protection means “the action of protecting 
someone or something, or the state of being protected”, security means “the state of 
being free from danger or threat”. In general, the rule must be that the concepts can 
in certain circumstances mean the same thing, but it is, however, not self-evident that 
the same meaning would always be applied. 
Here, it is appropriate to mention the fact that while these obligations generally 
oblige a state to protect and secure an investment, they have particular importance 
during periods of civil unrest, demonstrations, insurrections or full-scale revolutions. 
It is helpful to differentiate among these scenarios in order to understand the 
practical effects of the concepts. Arbitral practice reveals that there is one recurrent 
pattern when it comes to the application of the concepts of “protection” and 
“security” – it is important to examine the circumstances of each case and to 
determine whether individual acts or omissions can lead to the conclusion that a state 
has not provided for the protection owed to the investor. Here, three cases will be 
discussed dealing with different scenarios where an investment was purportedly 
damaged by a third party: (i) during peacetime in a stable society; (ii) during 
demonstrations against the investment; and (iii) during revolutionary times. 
In Parkerings v Lithuania, an investor entered into an agreement with a city 
concerning the management of its parking system. The investor installed payment 
machines in various parts of the city in order to collect fees for parking. These 
machines were repeatedly vandalized by third parties. The police opened an 
investigation but was unable to find the perpetrators of the damage caused. The 
tribunal noted the following: 
 
“The Claimant alleges damages to its materials due to vandalism. However, the Claimant 
does not show that such vandalism would have been prevented if the authorities had acted 
differently. The Claimant only contends that the police did not find the authors of this 
offence. Both parties agree that Lithuanian authorities started an investigation to find the 
authors of the vandalism [...] The Arbitral Tribunal finds that the record does not show in 
which way the process of investigation amounted to a violation of the Treaty.”264  
 
In another case, TECMED v Mexico, an investor participated successfully in an 
auction of real property, buildings and facilities relating to a controlled landfill of 
hazardous industrial waste. Shortly after the purchase the investor experienced 
difficulties relating to the license needed to operate the landfill. The landfill became a 
contested issue in the community that resulted in civil unrest and demonstrations 
against the project. Finally, the authority responsible for renewing the operating 
                                                     
264 Parkerings-Compagniet A.S. v Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award of 11 September 
2007, paras 356-357. 
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license of the landfill rejected the investor’s further application for renewal and 
requested that the investor submit a program for the closure of the landfill. The 
investor argued that the host state had failed to provide protection and security 
during demonstrations against the project. The tribunal rejected the claim as it 
considered: 
 
“[…] that the Claimant has not furnished evidence to prove that the Mexican authorities, 
regardless of their level, have encouraged, fostered, or contributed their support to the 
people or groups that conducted the community and political movements against the 
Landfill, or that such authorities have participated in such movement. Also, there is not 
sufficient evidence to attribute the activity or behaviour of such people or groups to the 
Respondent pursuant to international law.”265  
 
The obligation to provide protection and security becomes particularly difficult 
during civil unrest and mob violence that reaches revolutionary proportions. In the 
case of United Painting Co., Inc. v Iran an investor left equipment in storage with the 
National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) that was later taken by the company or 
entities under its control. The Iran-US Claims Tribunal argued the following: 
 
“From the evidence before it, the Tribunal concludes that the equipment had been left […] 
in storage. It is an accepted principle of law that such a circumstance normally confers an 
obligation on the entity in charge to protect the property of third parties which is left in its 
exclusive control. For this reason the Tribunal finds that the loss of the equipment must in 
principle be deemed to be NIOC’s responsibility.”266  
 
As these cases show, an investor is often subjected to direct or indirect violence. The 
main cause for the violence can be either independent in itself (not related to the 
                                                     
265 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v United Mexican States, Additional Facility Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award of 29 May 2003, para 176. 
266 United Painting Co., Inc. v Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 458-11286-3 rendered on 30 
December 1989, reprinted in 23 Iran-US Claims Tribunal Reports 351, p. 370-371. It must be noted 
that the evolution of events during the Iranian revolution are of particular interest as it serves as an 
example where a government, which is under the obligation to provide protection and security, 
gradually loses control of a country. Therefore, the jurisprudence of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal 
could have provided guidance as it deals with events that start in the form of civil unrest and lead to 
full-scale revolution. Under such conditions it can be difficult to decide whether actions against aliens 
are perpetrated by groups of private individuals or groups of individuals that are associated with a new 
government. However, while the principles of international law were objectively described by the 
tribunal, their subjective application is at times controversial. A case in point is how the tribunal 
addressed the concept of “constructive expulsion” according to international law in e.g. Short v Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Award No. 312-11135-3 rendered on 14 July 1987, 14 Iran-US Claims Tribunal 
Reports 20, Rankin v Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 326-10913-2 rendered on 3 November 1987, 4 
Iran-US Claims Tribunal Reports 135, and Yeager v Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 324-10199-1 
rendered on 2 November 1987, 17 Iran-US Claims Tribunal Reports 92. See C.N. Brower and J.D. 
Brueschke, The Iran-US Claims Tribunal, Martinus Nijhoff (1998), p. 364-365. 
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investment itself, e.g. violence in connection to a revolution that is taking place) or 
directly linked to the investment (often linked to the investment in the form 
environmental issues or statements made by politicians following privatization 
projects). Therefore, the situations, which words “protection and security” need to 
cover, are numerous – a fact that makes it difficult to predict with accuracy to which 
extent a state must go in order to secure the investment in question. It does not 
come as a surprise, therefore, that arbitral tribunals have sought assistance from 
customary international law when determining the obligation of a state within the 
context of full protection and security. This requires further analysis of the nature of 
the obligation to provide protection and security to an investor and his investment.267 
 
4.3 Interpretation in practice 
4.3.1 Textual interpretation – ordinary meaning 
Investment tribunals faced with questions pertaining to the meaning of “protection” 
and “security” have usually, as a starting point, emphasized that these concepts be 
interpreted in accordance with Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention.268 
Investment tribunals have as a starting point emphasized the importance of 
textual interpretation – or in other words the “ordinary meaning” of the terms of the 
instrument that is interpreted. That has in individual cases lead to a conclusion that 
rejects an expansive interpretation put forth by the investor. The tribunal in AAPL v 
Sri Lanka rejected the notion argued by the investor that the generally formulated full 
protection and security standard should interpreted as to entail strict liability to which 
the host state was subjected to. The tribunal noted: 
 
“In conformity with Rule (B), the words “shall enjoy full protection and security” have to be 
construted according to the “common use which custom has affixed” to them, their “usus 
loquendi”, “natural and obvious sense”, and “fair meaning”.”269  
                                                     
267 It is obvious that the “security” to be provided to an investor overlaps with the concept of 
“security” that is to be found in various human rights instruments. Following the end of the Second 
World War numerous legal and non-legal instruments were concluded and adopted with the purpose 
of ensuring the security of individuals from various violations originating from government actions. 
These instruments include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 3), International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 9) and the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Article 5). That can in some cases lead to scenarios of potential conflict, in particular concerning the 
privatization of services that are considered to be a human right. See further U. Kriebaum, ‘Privatizing 
Human Rights – The Interface between International Investment Protection and Human Rights’ in A. 
Reinisch and U. Kriebaum (eds.), The Law of International Relations – Liber Amicorum Hanspeter Neuhold, 
Eleven International Publishing (2007), p. 168. 
268 See Chapters 4.2.2-4.2.3. 
269 AAPL v Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award of 21 June 1990, 30 ILM 577 (1991) 
para 47.  
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Similarly, other tribunals have emphasized the wording of a particular provision. A 
case in point is the tribunal in GEMPLUS and TALSUD v Mexico. In this case, the 
claimant argued that the relevant provision provided for protection beyond physical 
violence. The tribunal stated: 
 
“The Tribunal considers that the two BIT provisions relating to the Respondent’s obligation 
to provide ‘protection’ are materially similar for the purposes of the present case, despite 
their different wording and different scope […] Such ‘protection’ provisions, in the form of 
the wording here under consideration, do not generally impose strict liability on a host state under 
international law; and the mere fact of other unlawful conduct in the form of expropriation 
or inequitable and unfair treatment by the host state is not, without more, to be treated as a 
breach of these provisions.”270 (emphasis added) 
 
The tribunal in Total v Argentina emphasized the “plain reading of the terms used” 
according to Article 31 VCLT when addressing individual concepts of the standard 
and noted that a particular formulation, which included reference to the fair and 
equitable treatment standard, supported a particular understanding of individual 
concepts:  
 
“A plain reading of the terms used in Article 5(1) of the BIT, in accordance with Article 31 
VCLT, shows that the protection provided for by Article 5(1) to covered investors and their 
assets is not limited to physical protection but includes also legal security. The explicit 
linkage of this standard to the fair and equitable treatment standard supports this inter-
pretation.”271 (emphasis added) 
 
In another case, Siemens v Argentina, the investment tribunal was also faced with the 
question of whether the full protection and securitiy standard entail the protection of 
“legal security”. It noted that the elements of ordinary meaning and contextual 
meaning during the process of interpretation: 
 
“As a general matter and based on the definition of investment, which includes tangible and 
intangible assets, the Tribunal considers that the obligation to provide full protection and 
security is wider than “physical” protection and security. […] In its ordinary meaning “legal 
security” has been defined as “the quality of the legal system which implies certainty in its 
norms and, consequently, their foreseeable application.” It is clear that in the context of this 
meaning the Treaty refers to security that it is not physical. In fact, one may question given the 
qualification of the term “security”, whether the Treaty covers physical security at all. 
Arguably it could be considered to be included under “full protection”, but that is not an 
issue in these proceedings.”272 (emphasis added) 
 
                                                     
270 GEMPLUS S.A. and TALSUD S.A. v Mexico, ICSID Joined Additional Facility Cases No. 
ARB(AF)/04/3 and ARB(AF)/04/4, Award of 16 June 2010, paras 9-9 and 9-10. 
271 Total SA v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Award of 27 December 2010, para 
343. 
272 Siemens v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award of 6 February 2007, para 303.  
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Textual interpretation of individual substantive elements of the standard in treaty law 
has greatly influenced the standard and to what extent it protects the investment. 
That has lead to a discussion in various tribunals as to the meaning of “full” in “full 
protection and security”. In Axurix v Argentina, the tribunal contemplated whether 
such an adjective could extend the protection of the standard. It concluded that it 
should do so: 
 
“However, when the terms “protection and security” are qualified by “full” and no other 
adjective or explanation, they extend, in their ordinary meaning, the content of this standard 
beyond physical security.”273 (emphasis added) 
 
In contrast, the tribunal in the Suez Vivendi v Argentina emphasized that the treaty-
based standard did not include the adjective – a fact that would lead to the 
conclusion, amongst other factors, to limit the protection of the standard to physical 
security: 
 
“As far as this Tribunal is concerned, it is inclined to think that the absence of the word 
“full” or “fully” in the full protection and security provisions in the Argentina-Spain and the 
Argentina-U.K. BITs supports this view of an obligation limited to providing physical 
protection and legal remedies for the Spanish and U.K. Claimants and their assets.”274  
 
Interestingly, examples can be found where a tribunal deviates from a conclusion 
that might, from the outset, seem to be more logical. The tribunal in Suez Vivendi v 
Argentina was faced with a particularly broad formulation of the full protection and 
security standard.275 The tribunal emphasized that earlier decisions did not analyse or 
give a clear reason for departing from the “historical interpretation traditionally 
employed” on the contentious point at issue: 
 
“While strict textual interpretation of the treaty language would lead this Tribunal to 
conclude that the applicable BITs in the present cases do not have the expansive scope on 
which the Claimants are basing their claim, there is another reason for the Tribunal not to 
follow the interpretation made in [earlier case law]. Neither […] awards provide a historical 
analysis of the concept of full protection and security or give any clear reason as to why it 
was departing from the historical interpretation traditionally employed by courts and 
tribunals and expanding that concept to cover non-physical actions and injuries.”276  
 
                                                     
273 Azurix Corp. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award 14 July 2006, para 408.  
274 Suez and Vivendi et al v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Award 30 July 2010, para 
175. The same approach was followed in a similar case; Suez and InterAgua v Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/17, Award of 30 July 2010, para 169.  
275 Article 5(1) of the France-Argentina BIT stated: “Investments made by investors of one 
Contracting Party shall be fully and completely protected and safeguarded in the territory” (emphasis added). 




Therefore, a closer look of a provision’s text often shows that a presumed 
understanding of the concepts of protection and security is not as clear as one might 
think before an assessment of a provision’s substantive meaning is conducted. 
 
4.3.2 Object and purpose 
According to Article 31 of the VCLT the object and purpose of a treaty is to be 
taken into account during the process of interpretation.277 The preambles of BITs 
usually do not include a provision of the full protection and security standard as 
such. However, almost all preambles researched for this thesis state the objective to 
be achieved with the promulgation of the treaty: the promotion and protection of 
investments. The US-Argentina BIT includes the following provision in its preamble: 
 
“Recognising that the encouragement and reciprocal protection under international 
agreement of such investments will be conducive to the stimulation of individual business 
inititative and will increase prosperity in both states.”278  
 
Given the open formulations of the full protection and security standard in various 
BITs, one would think that tribunals would refer to the object and purpose of the 
relevant treaty, not least because all BITs include the world protection in their title 
and almost always in their preamble. However, reference to the objective and 
purpose in a treaty’s preamble is not as common within the context of the full 
protection and security standard as one might expect. 
This lack of reference to the object and purpose of the relevant BIT is in stark 
contrast to the other most common standard of international investment law – the 
standard of fair and equitable treatment. Arbitral tribunals repeatedly refer to the 
object and purpose of the relevant BIT when addressing that standard and its 
substantive elements.279  
                                                     
277 See Chapter 4.2.1. 
278 The US-Argentina BIT goes on to include the standard by prescribing in Article 2(2) that 
investors are to enjoy “protection and constant security” in the territory of the other party. 
279 See e.g. Lauder v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Award 3 September 2001, para 292, 
Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v United Mexican States, Additional Facility Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award of 29 May 2003, para 156, Saluka Investments B.V. v Czech Republic, 
UNCITRAL Arbitration, Partial Award of 17 March 2006, para 298, National Grid Plc. v Argentine 
Republic, UNCITRAL Award, 3 November 2008, para 170, Suez and InterAgua v Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Award of 30 July 2010, paras 194-201, Suez and Vivendi et al v Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Award of 30 July 2010, paras 211-220 and Oostergetel v Slovak 
Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Award 23 April 2012, paras 228-230. 
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In AAPL v Sri Lanka, the investor empasized that the words “enjoy” and “full” 
in the treaty based standard had substituted the due diligence obligation of general 
international law with “strict liability” principle to which the host state was subjected 
to. The tribunal did not concur inter alia with reference to the object and purpose of 
the relevant BIT: 
 
“According to Rule (C) […], proper interpretation has to take into account the realization of 
the Treaty’s general spirit and objectives, which is clearly in the present case the encouragement 
of investments through securing an adequate environment of legal protection. But, in the 
absence of travaux préparatories in the proper sense, it would be almost impossible to 
ascertain whether Sri Lanka and the United Kingdom had contemplated during their 
negotiations the necessity of disregarding the common habitual pattern adopted by the 
previous treaties, and to establish a “strict liability” in favour of the foreign investor as one 
of the objectives of their treaty protection.”280 (emphasis added) 
 
The specific relationship established between the full protection and security 
standard and the fair and equitable treatment standard in various treaties has at times 
had the effect that the full protection and security standard is interpreted within the 
context of a treaty’s object and purpose. In Vivendi v Argentina, the two standards 
were connected in such a way in the France-Argentina BIT that the full protection 
and security standard was to be considered a part of the principle of fair and 
equitable treatment. The tribunal took particular note of the treaty’s preamble: 
 
“…the Tribunal notes the parties’ wish, as stated in the preamble, for the Treaty to create 
favourable conditions for French investment in Argentina, and vice versa, and their 
conviction that the protection and promotion of such investments is expected to encourage 
technology and capital transfers between both countries and to promote their economic 
development.”281 (emphasis added) 
 
It then went on to conclude that the full protection and security standard could not 
be limited to physical security alone. 
 
4.3.3 Contextual interpretation 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties clearly indicates that the 
concept of “context” plays an important role during the process of interpretation.282 
The concept is included in the first three paragraphs of Article 31. However, it is 
                                                     
280 AAPL v Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award of 21 June 1990, 30 ILM 577 (1991) 
para 51. 
281 Vivendi Universal S.A. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award 20 August 2007, 
para 7.4.4. 
282 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is reproduced in Chapter 4.2.1. 
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important to note that it serves different roles in these three paragraphs.283 Tribunals 
have determined the meaning of the full protection and security standard with 
reference to various provisions of the same BIT.284 When interpreting the fair and 
equitable treatment standard and the full protection and security standard, the 
tribunal in Middle Eastern Cement v Egypt took into account other provision of the BIT 
relevant to the case, most notably provisions dealing with government actions 
“tantamount to expropriation” and the “due process of law”. The respondent was 
found to have violated the BIT as it had not informed the investor that part of his 
investment was to be auctioned off.285 In Saluka v Argentina, the tribunal took note 
that the full protection and security standard was linked to the fair and equitable 
treatment standard and was to provide protection for investments which were 
defined broadly. That context led to a higher level of protection: 
 
“Given that these terms are closely associated with fair and equitable treatment, which is not 
limited to such physical situations, and in the context of the protection of investments broadly 
defined to include intangible assets, the Tribunal finds no rationale for limiting the 
application of a substantive protection of the Treaty to a category of assets – physical assets 
– when it was not restricted in that fashion by the Contracting Parties.”286 (emphasis added) 
 
Investment instruments often include references to the full protection and security 
standard in different parts of the body of the treaty. A case in point is the Germany-
Venezuela BIT that includes a stand-alone formulation of the standard in Article 2 
dealing with protection of investments: 
 
“This Agreement shall apply to investments of nationals or companies of either Contracting 
Party that have been made in the territory of the other Contracting Party in accordance with 
its laws. The investments shall enjoy full protection under this Treaty.”287 
 
In addition, the same BIT also includes another formulation in Article 4 which 
essentially concerns expropriation: 
 
                                                     
283 See A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 2nd ed., CUP (2007), p. 234, for the logical structure 
of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties. 
284 Similar provisions in other BITs can also be of relevance if an investment standard prescribes 
that the treatment of an investor should not be less favourable than the treatment accorded by a 
Contracting Party to nationals of third states. See AAPL v Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, 
Award of 21 June 1990, 30 ILM 577 (1991) para 54.  
285 Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co. C.A. v Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6, Award 12 
April 2002, para 143.  
286 National Grid Plc. v Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL Award, 3 November 2008, para 187.  
287 Article 2(2) of the Germany-Venezuela BIT prescribes in the original version: “Dieser Vertrag 
findet Anwendung auf Kapitalanlagen von Staatsangehörigen oder Gesellschaften einer Vertrags-
partei, die im Hoheitsgebiet der anderen Vertragspartei gemäß deren Gesetzgebung vorgenommen 
worden sind. Die Kapitalanlagen genießen vollen Schutz dieses Vertrags”. 
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“Investments by nationals or companies of one of the Contracting Parties shall enjoy in the 
territory of the other Contracting Party full legal protection and security.”288 
 
The repeated inclusion of the full protection and security standard in different 
context could affect its interpretation in practice, as it seems to indicate that a higher 
level of protection should be provided for in different circumstances. Any other 
conclusion would be contradictory – why repeat the full protection and security 
standard in an article, whose substance regulates a state’s right to expropriate, if it is 
to have the same meaning as the general formulation of the standard. An inter-
pretation that deprives a treaty provision of any meaning seems an unlikely 
proposition.289   
Numerous BITs include clauses that deal with revolutionary forces, mob 
violence, civil disturbance, etc. These clauses prescribe how an investor should be 
treated in the event that he suffers damage caused during such circumstances. An 
example of such a provision is the Italy-Egypt BIT. Article 4, which deals with 
“Compensation for Damage or Loss”, states:  
 
“(1) Investments by nationals or companies of either Contracting party shall enjoy full 
protection in the territory of the other Contracting Party. 
(2) Nationals or companies of either Contracting Party whose investments suffer losses in 
the territory of the other Contracting Party owing to war, other armed conflict, or to other 
incidents considered as such by the international law [sic], shall be accorded treatment not 
less favourable by such other Contracting Party than that Party accords to its own nationals 
or companies, as regards indemnification or compensation. 
(3) Nationals or companies of either Contracting Party shall enjoy most-favoured-nation 
treatment in the territory of the other Contracting Party in respect of the matters provided 
for in the present Article.”290  
 
Here, Article 4(2) does not provide for that the investor should be compensated, but 
only that he should not be discriminated against, if nationals of the host state or 
nationals of third states are compensated. However, some BITs go even further and 
provide for a right to compensation if the investment is taken over by the host state’s 
                                                     
288 Article 4(1) of the Germany-Venezuela BIT prescribes in the original version: “Kapitalanlagen 
von Staatsangehörigen oder Gesellschaften einer Vertragspartei genießen im Hoheitsgebiet der 
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289 Other examples can be found where scholars have contemplated whether one treaty provision 
should influence the interpretation of another provision, e.g. whether the fair and equitable treatment 
standard should be considered a different obligation from the full protection and security standard. 
See C. Schreuer, ‘Introduction: Interrelationship of Standards’, in A. Reinisch (ed.), Standards of 
Investment Protection, OUP (2008), p. 4. 
290 See e.g. Article 5 of the Italy-Egypt BIT and Waguih Elie George Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v Egypt, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award 1 June 2009, para 539. 
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armed forces. The UK-Sri Lanka BIT includes a similar provision to Article 4(2) of 
the Egypt-Italy BIT, but then prescribes the following: 
 
“Without prejudice to paragraph (1) of this Article, nationals and companies of one 
Contracting Party who in any of the situations referred to in that paragraph suffer losses in 
the territory of the other Contracting Party resulting from  
(a) requisitioning of their property by its forces or authorities, or 
(b) destruction of their property by its forces or authorities which was not caused in 
combat action or was not required by the necessity of the situation,  
shall be accorded restitution or adequate compensation […].”291  
 
The effect of this provision is that an investor does not need to prove that the state 
has acted unlawfully, only that he has suffered damage due to the actions of the state 
listed in the relevant provision.292 Here, the context of individual parts of a BIT, in 
which the full protection and security standard can be found, needs to be established 
following a substantive assessment in order to determine which part is applicable to 
the dispute at hand. This becomes topical, in particular, in cases where the BIT 
envisages different situations under which the full protection and security standard 
can be invoked, such as during an armed conflict, revolution, etc. If the investor is 
unable to establish that the investment is damaged during such a scenario, the general 
formulation of the standard should be applied.  
The context of individual provisions has become topical in a number of cases. 
In AAPL v Sri Lanka, the tribunal was faced with Article 2(2) providing for a general 
formulation of the full protection and security standard and Article 4(2) mentioned 
above. The tribunal interpreted the two articles in their context: 
 
“Moreover, both Rules (D) and (E) [interpretation rules emphasizing “integral context” and 
“principle of effectiveness”] confirm the Tribunal’s opinion, as Article 2.(2) should not be 
taken separately out of the Treaty’s global context. […] The Claimant’s contention that 
Article 2.(2) adopted a standard of “strict liability” would lead logically to the inevitable 
conclusion that Article 4 in its entirety becomes superfluous, in the sense that according to 
the Claimant’s interpretation the Parties were not serious in adding their Treaty two 
provisions which are not susceptible of getting any application in practice. Such an 
interpretation has to be rejected in application of Rule (E) [interpretation rule emphasizing 
the “principle of effectiveness”] which requires that Article 2.(2) be interpreted in a manner 
that does not deprive Article 4 from having any meaning or scope of applicability.”293  
 
                                                     
291 See Article 4(2) of the UK-Sri Lanka BIT.  
292 See S. Ripinsky and K. Williams, Damages in International Investment Law, British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law (2009), p. 25. 
293 AAPL v Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award of 21 June 1990, 30 ILM 577 (1991) 
para 52.  
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Having established that the contextual difference between the two articles, the 
tribunal noted that in order to apply Article 4, the investor was required to prove that 
the damage had occurred in a way that the provision described. Here, an investor, 
which based its claims on this provision, would bear a “heavy burden of proof”.294  
This issue also became topical in another case, LESI et al v Algeria, which dealt 
with severe security issues that threatened the investment. The relevant BIT included 
two formulations of the standard, one general in nature and another specific to 
damage caused in war and during revolutionary times: 
 
“Investments made by nationals or legal persons of a Contracting State, shall enjoy in the 
territory of the other Contracting State, protection and constant security, fully and 
completely, excluding any unreasonable or discriminatory measures that could hinder, in law 
or in fact, their management, maintenance, use, possession, processing, or liquidation subject 
to measures necessary to maintain public order.”295 
 
“Nationals or legal persons of a Contracting State whose investments suffer losses owing to 
war or other armed conflict, revolution, state of national emergency or revolt occurring in 
the territory of the other Contracting State, benefit, from the latter, treatment no less 
favorable than that accorded to its own nationals or legal persons or to those of the most 
favored nation.”296 
 
The tribunal argued that it could not employ both articles cumulatively, but 
understood the latter article to be an exception to the general principle of full 
protection and security – a fact that should lead to a restrictive interpretation.297 The 
tribunal then entered into an assessment whether the respondent had undertaken 
measures to ensure the full protection and security of the investor and his 
investment. The tribunal noted that the parties to the dispute were in agreement that 
fighting had taken place between government forces and terrorism groups that 
                                                     
294 AAPL v Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award 21 June 1990, 30 ILM 577 (1991) paras 
57-64. 
295 Article 4.1 of the Algeria-Italy BIT prescribes in the original version: “Les investissements 
effectués par des nationaux ou personnes morales de l’un des Etats contractants, bénéficient sur le 
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No ARB/05/3, Award of 12 November 2008, para 173. 
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plus favorisée.” See LESI et al v Algeria, ICSID Case No ARB/05/3, Award of 12 November 2008, 
para 173. 
297 LESI et al v Algeria, ICSID Case No ARB/05/3, Award of 12 November 2008, paras 174-175. 
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affected the investment and that the disagreement concerned whether the security 
measures undertaken by the respondent had been reasonable and not less favourable 
than that accorded to the respondent’s own nationals or nationals of third states. The 
tribunal described the various security measures undertaken by the respondent – 
these measures included meetings with local authorities to discuss security issues, 
providing for the services of a private security company to increase security, 
allocation of army personnel to deal with security issues and other support provided 
for by the host state’s army. Having compared these measures to the treatment 
accorded to nationals in general, the tribunal then concluded: 
 
“Given the prevailing security situation after the conclusion of the Agreement the Algerian 
state, Article 4.5 of the Agreement - lex specialis - is applicable. The Defendant, having taken 
several security measures to provide protection to the Group, has fulfilled its obligation by 
according the investor protection not less favorable than that accorded to its own nationals. 
Section 4.5 of the Agreement is not violated.”298 
 
The question arises why BITs include provisions of this nature – provisions that only 
require that damage be caused by the state in question under certain circumstances. 
According to UNCTAD there seem to be two principal reasons. First, the 
organization argues that customary international law does not state that property 
destruction caused in military action should be compensated – such provisions are 
meant to deal with this vacuum of customary international law. Second, the 
organization notes that the rationale for clauses addressing war and civil disturbance 
is that these are exceptional situations that are often excluded from investment 
insurance agreements.299 
 
4.3.4 Can the intention of the parties be ascertained? 
The intention of the parties to a treaty is not as such included in Articles 31 and 32 
of the Vienna Convention.300 Despite this fact, tribunals inquire or refer to various 
instruments, e.g. other treaties made by a party or transmittal notes used by the 
parties to ratify the treaty, during the process of interpretation. In doing so, a tribunal 
seeks to ascertain the meaning of various concepts included in a treaty.  
Needless to say, the starting point of any tribunal seeking the intention of parties 
to a treaty is the treaty itself. In AAPL v Sri Lanka, the tribunal was faced with 
contradictory arguments from the parties to the dispute as to the level of protection 
                                                     
298 LESI et al v Algeria, ICSID Case No ARB/05/3, Award of 12 November 2008, para 182. 
299 UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995-2006: Trends in Investment Rulemaking, United Nations 
(2007), p. 52.  
300 Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties are reproduced in Chapter 
4.2.1. 
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provided for by the US-Sri Lanka BIT. The tribunal emphasized the principle of due 
diligence of customary international law when interpreting the treaty: 
 
“In the opinion of the present Arbitral Tribunal, the addition of words like “constant” or 
“full” to strengthen the required standard of “protection and security” could justifiably 
indicate the Parties’ intention to require within their treaty relationship a standard of “due 
diligence” higher than the “minimum standard” of general international law. But, the nature 
of both the obligation and ensuing responsibility remain unchanged, since the added words 
“constant” or “full” are by themselves not sufficient to establish that the Parties intended to 
transform their mutual obligation into a “strict liability”.”301 [emphasis added] 
 
The intention of the parties to a treaty has also become topical within the context of 
whether the protection provided for in an investment agreement was limited to 
physical protection or not. One of the core arguments for this conclusion has been 
the fact that the formulation of the BIT does not include the word ‘physical’. This 
was the case in Vivendi v Argentina that concerned a concession agreement pertaining 
to a water and sewage system. The tribunal was faced with a particular formulation of 
the full protection and security standard, namely that investments were to enjoy 
“…protection and full security in accordance with the principle of fair and equitable 
treatment.” It started by interpreting the fair and equitable treatment standard within 
the context of the BITs’ object and purpose. Having noted that the conviction of the 
parties to the treaty had been to protect and promote investment, the tribunal went 
on to conclude that the full protection and security standard was to be interpreted as 
to include protection beyond physical security alone – the parties’ intention to the 
contrary could not be found in the text of the treaty: 
 
“As to these competing positions, the Tribunal notes that the text of Article 5(1) does not 
limit the obligation to providing reasonable protection and security from “physical 
interference”, as Respondent argues. If the parties to the BIT had intended to limit the 
obligation to “physical interferences”, they would could have done so by including words to 
that effect in the section.”302 [emphasis added] 
 
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that recourse may 
be had to the supplementary means of interpretation. However, the article only 
includes two examples of what instruments might be of help in that process, namely 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of the treaty’s conclusion.  
                                                     
301 AAPL v Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award of 21 June 1990, 30 ILM 577 (1991) 
para 50. 
302 Vivendi Universal S.A. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award 20 August 2007, 
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124
Tribunals have reverted to the travaux preparatoires of a treaty in order to ascertain 
the intention of the parties to the treaty. However, that approach is often of limited 
use due to the fact that the travaux preparatories either does not exist or is not 
accessible, in particular when BITs are concerned.303 States that are in the process of 
negotiating a BIT usually do not negotiate every provision between themselves, but 
rely on model BIT templates. Preparatory work of the treaty are often not accessible 
as a result. This scenario prompted Professor Wälde to argue with regard to the use 
of the travaux: 
 
“What these features do is to place a question mark over the use of travaux under Article 32 
VCLT, but also over too much reliance on established interpretation maxims such as ‘e 
contrario’ or the principle of effectiveness of each element of the text. These assume a degree 
of perfection and information with the drafters that did not exist.”304 
 
This has not, however, lead to a situation whereby tribunals are reluctant to identify 
various instruments, including those that are produced in order to ratify these 
instruments, for the purpose of treaty interpretation. In the Mondev case, the tribunal 
emphasized that transmittal letters of parties to the treaty in question during the 
process of ratification could provide information about a state’s position towards the 
content of a treaty: 
 
“It is often difficult in international practice to establish at what point obligations accepted in 
treaties, multilateral or bilateral, come to condition the content of a rule of customary 
international law binding on States not party to those treaties. Yet the United States itself 
provides an answer to this question, in contending that, when adopting provisions for fair 
and equitable treatment and full protection and security in NAFTA (as well as in other 
BITs), the intention was to incorporate principles of customary international law. Whether or 
not explanations given by a signatory government to its own legislature in the course of 
ratification or implementation of a treaty can constitute part of the travaux preparatoires of the 
treaty for the purposes of its interpretation, they can certainly shed light on the purposes and 
approaches taken to the treaty, and thus can evidence opinio juris.”305  
 
                                                     
303 Multilateral treaties, such as NAFTA and ICSID, provide for exceptions here. In 2004, the 
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305 Mondev International Ltd. v United States of America, ICSID Additional Facility Case No. 
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The tribunal then took into account Canada’s Statement on Implementation of 
NAFTA and transmittal notes, which accompanied various BITs when they were 
submitted to the United States Senate.306 The tribunal also analyzed similar language 
in transmittal notes that followed the US-Ecuador and US-Albania BITs in order to 
substantiate the US official position on the relationship between the substantive 
standards of fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security and the 
minimum standard of customary international law.307 
Interpretative notes issued by the parties to the relevant treaty can play a role in 
ascertaining the intention of the parties to the treaty. In the CME case, the parties to 
the Dutch-Czech BIT met following the publication of an award which declared that 
the Czech Republic had violated the Dutch-Czech BIT. The parties to the treaty 
issued a “Common Position” that included an understanding on various issues 
related to the legal dispute. Subsequently, the Czech Republic argued that the tribunal 
should take the “Common Position” into account during the quantum phase of the 
arbitral proceedings. The tribunal did not concur as it could not find any foundation 
for the Common Position in the Dutch-Czech BIT itself.308 In contrast, the 
interpretative note issued by Free Trade Commission established according to 
NAFTA in order to determine further the substantive meaning of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard and the full protection and security standard in Article 
1105(1) had more influence on later proceedings. The tribunal in the ADF case stated 
the following with regard to this instrument and its effect: 
 
“We begin by noting that the Free Trade Commission (FTC) created under Article 2001 
consists of cabinet-level representatives of the NAFTA Parties and its mandate includes the 
“[resolution of] disputes that may arise regarding [the] interpretation or application of 
[NAFTA].” An interpretation of a NAFTA provision rendered by the FTC is under Article 
1132(2) binding on this and any other Chapter 11 Tribunal.”309  
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It is safe to say that interpretative declarations of this sort have a mixed record in 
influencing arbitral tribunals established following an award that is considered wrong 
on substance by the parties to the treaty. In addition, it must be somewhat special, as 
a matter of policy, that the parties to a treaty, which has the stated purpose to 
provide for investment protection, try ex post facto to influence the arbitral 
proceedings that are taking place. While there is nothing that prevents states that are 
parties to a treaty to issue such interpretative notes, they can be considered 
questionable when viewed through the prism of the principles of good faith, equality 
of arms and legitimate expectations.310  
 
4.4 Treaty interpretation and customary international law 
Any research on the interpretation of the full protection and security standard reveals 
that a number of tribunals include a limited analysis on the treaty-based standard, 
including the inherent meaning of the concepts of “protection” and “security”. 
Instead, a tribunal’s analysis is often based on customary international law, in 
particular within the context of physical protection and security. Customary 
international law seems, therefore, to provide tribunals with a tool to clarify the 
concepts of “protection” and “security” as understood in customary international 
law. This parallel discussion of investment tribunals pertaining to the treaty-based 
standard vis-á-vis the customary international law standard often becomes more a 
question of application of the “standard” rather than a question of treaty 
interpretation according to Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention.  
The tribunal in AMT v Zaire was faced with a treaty-based standard that included 
the standard formulation of “full protection and security” but then prescribed that 
the investment should not be accorded treatment less than required by international 
law. The tribunal began its assessment by reciting the treaty-based standard but 
directly thereafter emphasized the importance of customary international law:   
 
“These treatments of protection and security of investments required by the provisions of 
the BIT of which AMT is beneficiary must be in conformity with its applicable national laws 
and must not be any less than required by international law. For the Tribunal, this last 
requirement is fundamental for the determination of the responsibility of Zaire. It is thus an 
objective obligation which must not be inferior to the minimum standard of vigilance and of 
care required by international law.”311 
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In Noble Ventures v Romania the tribunal was faced with a similar formulation of the 
standard that included a reference to international law. The tribunal stated: 
 
“With regard to the Claimant’s argument that the Respondent breached Art. II (2)(a) of the 
BIT which stipulates that the “Investment shall ... enjoy full protection and security”, the Tribunal 
notes: that it seems doubtful whether that provision can be understood as being wider in 
scope than the general duty to provide for protection and security of foreign nationals found 
in the customary international law of aliens.”312 
 
Similarly, the tribunal in El Paso v Argentina emphasized that despite the treaty-based 
standard, the fundamental obligation was one of prevention and repression according 
to customary international law. Moreover, the concept of due diligence played a 
considerable role in determing the extent of those obligations: 
 
“The BIT requires that Argentina provide “full protection and security” to El Paso’s 
investment. The Tribunal considers that the full protection and security standard is no more 
than the traditional obligation to protect aliens under international customary law […] A 
well-established aspect of the international standard of treatment is that States must use “due 
diligence” to prevent wrongful injuries to the person or property of aliens caused by third 
parties within their territory, and, if they did not succeed, exercise at least “due diligence” to 
punish such injuries.”313 
 
However, even in cases where there is no reference to international law, a tribunal 
will seek guidance in customary international law when interpreting the treaty-based 
standard. In AAPL v Sri Lanka, the BIT to which the legal dispute was subjected to 
included a stand-alone formulation of the full protection and security standard. Still, 
the tribunal focused heavily on the concept of due diligence as established by 
customary international law.314 Similarly, the tribunal in Wena v Egypt recited the 
treaty-based standard, which did not include reference to international law, and then 
focused its attention to the respondent’s obligation of vigilance – an obligation of 
customary international law.315 
Even though some tribunals emphasize the “historical development” or the 
“traditional interpretation” of the full protection and security standard – elements 
refer to how the part of the standard that rests upon customary international law – 
their conclusions are reached under the rubric of interpretation. The tribunal in Suez 
and InterAgua v Argentina was faced with an expansive formulation that prescribed that 
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the investment should be “fully and completely protected and safeguarded”. The 
tribunal argued in length that a difference was to be made between the treaty-based 
standard and the due diligence obligation of customary international law: 
 
“Having considered the specific language of both of the applicable BITs and the historical 
development of the “full protection and security” standard under international law, as well as the recent 
jurisprudence, this Tribunal is not persuaded that it needs to depart from the traditional 
interpretation given to this term. Consequently, the Tribunal concludes that under the applicable 
BITs, Argentina is obliged to exercise due diligence to protect investors and investments 
primarily from physical injury, and that in any case Argentina’s obligations under the relevant 
provisions do not extend to encompass the maintenance of a stable legal and commercial 
environment. As a result, in the instant case Argentina has not violated its obligations under 
the respective BIT provisions.”316 (emphasis added) 
 
Is a tribunal that applies treaty law, which includes a reference to international law, 
asked to apply customary international law as it stood when the treaty was entered 
into by the parties or customary international law as it stands when the dispute is 
adjudicated? In practice this seems a question that would not change the legal 
position of either party in any major way. However, that proposition is only 
applicable to the parts of the international minimum standard that are generally not 
disputed, such as that the international minimum standard provides for physical 
protection and security. Questions pertaining to whether customary international law 
includes protection of legal security, i.e. whether the intangible investments should 
enjoy physical protection and security or whether the minimum standard provides 
for protection beyond physical security in the form of legal framework, could be 
affected.  
In the Mondev case, this became a topical issue, namely whether the customary 
international law applicable to the case was the standard that existed in 1994 or the 
standard as referred to by the FTC Commission in its interpretative note.317 The 
tribunal noted that the parties to the dispute were in agreement that the international 
minimum standard by its very nature continued to evolve even after an instrument 
providing for investment protection had been concluded. The tribunal agreed with 
the parties’ understanding and argued that:  
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“…there can be no doubt that, by interpreting Article 1105(1) to prescribe the customary 
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of 
treatment to be afforded to investments of investors of another Party under NAFTA, the 
term “customary international law” refers to customary international law as it stood no 
earlier than the time at which NAFTA came into force. It is not limited to the international 
law of the 19th century or even of the first half of the 20th century, although decisions from 
that period remain relevant. In holding that Article 1105(1) refers to customary international 
law, the FTC interpretations incorporate current international law, whose content is shaped 
by the conclusion of more than two thousand bilateral investment treaties and many treaties 
of friendship and commerce. Those treaties largely and concordantly provide for “fair and 
equitable” treatment of, and for “full protection and security” for, the foreign investor and 
his investments. Correspondingly the investments of investors under NAFTA are entitled, 
under the customary international law which NAFTA Parties interpret Article 1105(1) to 
comprehend, to fair and equitable treatment and to full protection and security.”318 
 
As a result, it seems logical to apply the current customary international law standard 
as it stood when the legal dispute is adjudicated, not unless any other documents of 
legal significance indicate that a different approach should be taken.319  
In cases where there is no reference in the treaty-based standard to the 
international minimum standard of customary international law, it is clear that 
customary international law is applied as a separate legal basis to the dispute in 
question. In many such cases tribunals apply the customary principle of due diligence 
when determining the state obligation to provide protection – such an application of 
the due diligence principle often includes a historical discussion that takes into 
account earlier jurisprudence, in particular derived from various claims 
commissions.320 One of the more clear examples of this scenario is the Parkerings v 
Lithuania award. The formulation of the full protection and security standard was 
very limited. The Norway-Lithuania BIT prescribed that each contracting party 
should accord to investments “equitable and reasonable treatment and protection.” 
The tribunal noted that despite the fact that the instrument only mentioned 
protection, both parties had referred to awards that dealt with full protection and 
security. The tribunal then referred to the criteria of due diligence as defined by 
customary international law: 
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“A violation of the standard of full protection and security could arise in case of failure of 
the State to prevent the damage, to restore the previous situation or to punish the author of 
the injury. The injury could be committed either by the host State, or by its agencies or by an 
individual.”321 
 
Another example is the award in Pantechniki v Albania. The umpire in the case began 
his assessment by reciting the standalone formulation of the full protection and 
security standard in the Greece-Albania BIT, but then entered into an elaborate 
discussion of the due diligence principle of customary international law.322 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter set out to discuss the way in which the full protection and security 
standard is interpreted. Here, the research of arbitral awards showed that the point of 
departure for investment tribunals is Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention. That 
entails that treaty law – most notably the relevant BIT and the substantive elements 
of Article 31-32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties – is of particular 
importance when determining the substantive content of a state’s obligation to 
provide for protection and security. 
Arbitral awards also revealed that the textual interpretation of the substantive 
elements of the standard plays the most important role in treaty interpretation. In 
contrast, the object and purpose of the relevant treaty plays a lesser role, not unless 
the full protection and security standard is linked specifically to the fair and equitable 
treatment standard. Moreover, it is important to note that contextual interpretation 
becomes particularly important in individual cases when more than one formulation 
of the standard is included in a treaty or when there is a specific provision dealing 
with damage caused in particular circumstances, such as during war or armed 
conflict. Furthermore, examples of awards can be found where the intent of the 
parties to the relevant treaty has played a role. While the text of the treaty itself is 
usually considered to most accurately describe the joint intent of the contracting 
parties, other instruments have also been employed by tribunals in order to 
determine further the meaning of individual concepts of the standard. These 
instruments include interpretative statements issued by the contracting parties, 
documents used during the ratification process of the relevant BIT and similar 
provisions of other international instruments.  
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Arbitral awards revealed at the same time that while arbitral tribunals employ 
traditional methods of interpretation, which are based on the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, they at times seek guidance in customary international law, or, in 
other words, the “historical application of the standard”. Tribunals have in that way 
approached legal disputes by entering into a normative discussion on the treaty-based 
elements of the standard followed by an approach that relies on the facts of the case 
at hand within the context of other sources of law, such as customary international 
law. 
The various approaches undertaken by tribunals have, despite their non-uniform 
nature, clarified the way in which arbitral tribunals address the substantive elements 
of the full protection and security standard and, more importantly, revealed that the 
approach taken by tribunals does not always focus exclusively on interpretation. 
These approaches can be summarized in the following way: 
 
(1) An investment tribunal will apply Articles 31-32 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties when interpreting the substantive elements of the relevant 
BIT in individual cases (AAPL v Sri Lanka and Siemens v Argentina and 
GEMPLUS and TALSUD v Mexico); 
(2) Investment tribunals will focus on the “ordinary meaning” (AAPL v Sri Lanka, 
Total v Argentina and Axurix v Argentina,), “object and purpose” (Vivendi v 
Argentina), contextual interpretation (Middle Eastern Cement v Egypt, Saluka v 
Argentina and LESI et al v Algeria) and the “intention of the parties” (AAPL v Sri 
Lanka and Vivendi v Argentina) when interpreting the treaty-based standard of full 
protection and security.  
(3) When the full protection and security standard appears in various forms, or 
other specific provisions related to the standard, in the same BIT, an arbitral 
tribunal will employ the specific standard, if applicable and if the investor has 
fulfilled the necessary burden of proof in order to substantiate his claims. If the 
specific standard is not relevant, the tribunal will apply the general standard of 
protection and security (AAPL v Sri Lanka and LESI et al v Algeria ); 
(4) The interpretation of the full protection and security standard is frequently 
affected by the customary international law – this leads to the influence of 
customary international law on treaty law (AAPL v Sri Lanka) or that customary 
international law is applied as a independent source of law (AMT v Zaire, Wena 
Hotels v Egypt and El Paso v Argentina), in particular with reference to the 
“historical interpretation of the standard” (Suez and Vivendi et al v Argentina and 
Suez and InterAgua v Argentina). 
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In summary, the conclusion must be that arbitral tribunals adhere to the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties when interpreting the standard. However, due to 
the general nature of the standard’s substantive elements, tribunals also rely 
considerably on customary international law – either through treaty interpretation or 
by applying customary international law as an independent source of law. This 
approach of relying on customary international law influences the process of 
interpretation and adds individuality to it that makes the standard more flexible when 
all relevant facts are taken into account – as a result, general rules of interpretation do 
















5. THE CONTENT OF THE STANDARD OF FULL PROTECTION AND 
SECURITY 
5.1 Introduction 
After having discussed the interpretation of the full protection and security standard, 
it is appropriate to enter into a discussion on other elements that play a considerable 
role in its application in individual cases. The standard of full protection and security 
is, by definition, a standard. That fact has considerable effect on its content. A 
standard must, as a concept, be differentiated from a rule or a principle of law. This 
has been accepted both in theory and practice in national jurisdictions from which 
the concept stems.323 
The standard’s substantive content needs to be addressed independently and 
within the context of its various sources. It is here where other obligations become 
relevant, most notably the obligation of due diligence, which enables a tribunal that 
has established the objective meaning of the standard’s substantive elements to 
explore the subjective element of the standard within the context of the facts of the 
case before it. However, while the due diligence obligation provides information 
about how far the standard should be applied in individual cases, it also raises 
questions as to how far the substantive elements of the standard can be stretched in 
practice. This customary obligation of due diligence has wide-ranging consequences 
due to its relationship with the international minimum standard. Its practical 
consequences become particularly clear when a state, which has not entered into a 
BIT covering investments in particular, contemplates to act or not to act when 
dealing with an investor – that state owes an obligation to an investor as an alien 
residing within its borders to protect him and his property as an obligation based on 
customary international law and general international law.  
A discussion concerning the outer limits of the standard’s application raises 
various issues concerning not only the standard’s application but also the standard’s 
connection with other standards. International law standards do not operate in 
isolation from one another, but are inter-linked on various levels. Thus, two or more 
standards can be applied depending on their various sources for the attainment of 
different objectives. An investor who loses an argument that his investment has been 
expropriated, or that actions of a state are tantamount to expropriation, is able to 
argue that the full protection and security standard has been violated. As noted by 
                                                     
323 G. Schwarzenberger, The Principles and Standards of International Economic Law, 117 RCADI 7 
(1966), p. 67 et seq.  
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the International Court of Justice in the ELSI case, the FCN treaty in question 
mentioned the “most constant protection and security” but included also a reference 
to general international law. This reference prompted the court to argue: “The 
Chamber is here called upon to apply the provisions of a treaty which sets standards 
– in addition to the reference to general international law – which may go further in 
protecting nationals of the High Contracting Parties than general international law 
requires”.324 Thus, there is a need to address the standard’s relationship with other 
standards and their sources.  
 
5.2 Conceptual issues – substantive elements of the standard 
5.2.1 The concepts of protection and security prior to the evolution of the BIT  
The substantive elements of the standard are protection and security. Both elements 
have a long history in international law and most notably as a part of the minimum 
standard of customary international law. Thus, the obligation to protect and secure 
aliens arises from customary international law. 
The concepts of protection and security were first mentioned within the context 
of merchants travelling from one state to another. In Article 41 of the Magna Carta 
of 1215, merchants were entitled to “…be safe and secure in leaving and entering 
England, and in staying and travelling in England…”325 This protection was later 
extended in England by the Statute of the Staple of 1353 as foreign merchants were 
put under the protection of the sovereign.326 An example of a clause that provided 
for protection of merchants can be found in Article XVII of the Treaty of 
Commerce between Great Britain and Russia of 1766: 
 
“Russian merchants in the dominions of Great-Britain, shall […] have the same protection 
and justice, which, according to the laws of that kingdom, are granted to other foreign 
merchants, and shall be treated as the subjects of the most favoured nation.”327 
 
                                                     
324 Case concerning Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI), (United States of America v Italy) ICJ, Decision rendered 
on 20 July 1989, ICJ Reports (1989), para 111. 
325 J.C. Holt, Magna Carta, 2nd ed., CUP (1992), p. 461. 
326 This practice of affording protection to foreign merchants was, in fact, older, as it originated 
from the Italian city-states in the Holy Roman Empire. However, the relations between these states 
can hardly be considered international relations as that concept was later understood, but could be 
construed as having been quasi-international. See G. Schwarzenberger, The Principles and Standards of 
International Economic Law, 117 RCADI 7 (1966), p. 21-22.  
327 See A Collection of All the Treaties of Peace, Alliance and Commerce between Great-Britain and Other Powers 
from the Revolution in 1688 to the Present Time, Vol. II (1771), p. 318-327. 
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Another example of a clause providing for “most complete protection and security” 
for merchants and traders can be found in the Treaty of Commerce between the 
United Kingdom and the United States of 1815. Article 1 stated inter alia that: 
 
“…generally the Merchants and Traders of each Nation respectively shall enjoy the most 
complete protection and security for their Commerce but subject always to the Laws and 
Statutes of the two countries respectively.”328 
 
Scholarly writings up to this point had acknowledged that there was an obligation 
incumbent upon the state (sovereign) to provide for protection for foreign 
merchants. Grotius stressed that no power had the right to prevent one nation from 
trading with another. He acknowledged the need for sovereigns to protect not only 
foreign merchants, but also trade in general. He noted that for such a “security and 
protection” of trade the sovereign would be entitled to levy moderate and reasonable 
duties to counter the expenses incurred relating to the protection.329 In addition, 
Grotius acknowledged that when a foreigner was murdered while residing in another 
country, the crime committed would establish the debt of the host state:  
 
“In this case we find that the personal liberty of subjects, which may be considered as a kind 
of incorporeal right, including the right of residing where they please, or doing whatever they 
may think proper, is made answerable for the debt of the state, who is bound to punish the 
criminal acts of her subjects: so that the subjects suffers constraint, till the state has 
discharged the debt, which it is bound to pay; and by the payment of this debt is meant the 
punishment of the guilty.”330 
 
In his treatise Law of Nations, Vattel conceived a similar duty owed to aliens by the 
host state (sovereign) regardless of their activity or occupation. He distinguished 
between foreign persons that permanently lived in another country and foreign 
persons that visited or resided temporarily within another country. As to the former 
group, he argued that they were subjected to the laws of the host state and the 
treatment accorded to the nationals of that state. That entailed that an alien’s home 
state could not interfere as it had to respect the jurisdiction of the host state, 
including its right to charge the alien for offences allegedly committed. In the event, 
that such a process was unjust or justice was denied, or rules violated, the home state 
                                                     
328 See Convention to Regulate the Commerce between the Territories of the United States and his 
Britannick Majesty of 3 July 1815. The treaty is available at the following homepage: 
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329 H. Grotius, De Jure belli ac pacis, Book II, Chapter 2, translated by A.C. Campbell, M. Walter 
Dunne Publisher (1901), p. 97. 
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of that person would acquire jurisdiction to protect its subject.331 With regard to the 
latter group, which consisted of aliens that travelled to another country for business 
or pleasure and stayed there only for a limited period of time, he argued: 
 
“The sovereign ought not to grant an entrance into his state for the purpose of drawing 
foreigners into a snare: as soon as he admits them, he engages to protect them as his own 
subjects, and to afford them perfect security, as far as depends on him. Accordingly, we see 
that every sovereign who has given an asylum to a foreigner, considers himself no less 
offended by an injury done to the latter, than he would be by an act of violence committed 
on his own subject.”332 
 
These statements are problematic due to their brevity – no substantive concepts or 
other elements can be found that would guide a practitioner faced with the problem 
of determining the scope of protection and security to a particular set of facts. It is 
not until the treatises’ of later writers, such as Wharton and Moore, that further 
details emerge supported by material that reproduces official statements of the 
United States with various countries.333 Later, Oppenheim provides commentary as 
to what extent the nature of the obligation that a state owes to an alien.334 The 
approaches taken by scholars at that time focused on the protection and security of 
aliens as being a matter of a state’s self-preservation and a part of international legal 
personality. Therefore, protection and security of aliens was described through a 
two-sided prism that consisted of, first, a state’s jurisdiction over individuals residing 
in its territory and, second, a discussion on state responsibility for acts of either 
governmental agencies or of private persons.335  
The multitude of cases that are the subject of respected writers at the time reveal 
recurrent patterns as to what was protected. In short, a state would be responsible 
for unlawful acts of its agents and agencies, but not responsible for acts of private 
persons. However, injurious acts of private persons could lead to international 
responsibility if a state intentionally, maliciously or even negligently failed to exercise 
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due diligence by preventing the act or pursue all necessary remedies after the act had 
been committed.336 This obligation was limited to an alien’s person and property and 
generally excluded various business dealings. That led to a situation whereby 
agreements made with foreign governments, or contract violations of a foreign 
government to be more precise, generally did not fall within the purview of 
diplomatic protection, not unless the violation was so severe that it could be 
considered “a confiscatory breach of contract”.337 
This poses a conceptual problem when applying the “old doctrine” of 
protection and security to cases involving investment disputes. Taking into account 
the ever-widening definition of the concept of investment, as defined by a growing 
number of BITs and other instruments, one must exercise considerable constraint in 
extracting general principles from state practice of the last two centuries.  
Following this caveat pertaining to the concepts of “protection” and “security”, 
it is necessary to mention an additional concept of importance. Even though these 
concepts of “protection” and “security” make up for the substantive elements 
needed to address, they must be examined within the context of the subject matter of 
which they form a part, namely a “standard”. It will, therefore, become necessary to 
investigate what the concept of a standard entails. Here, various issues are relevant to 
what the concept of a standard consists of and how it can be differentiated from 
other concepts usually applied by scholars and practitioners. 
 
5.2.2 The concept of a standard 
5.2.2.1 Standards as non-sources of law 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which is generally 
considered to encapsulate the sources of international law, does not include the 
concept of a standard. It has been acknowledged by publicists that the article’s three- 
pronged structure – which consists of treaties, custom and general principles, in 
addition to judicial teachings and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists – 
entails a description of the generally accepted sources of international law.338  
It is, however, generally agreed that international law lacks, despite Article 38 
and the sources mentioned therein, a constitutional machinery similar to those of 
nation states. This lack of structure, which would provide for tools to distinguish the 
                                                     
336 R. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, ‘State Responsibility in International law’, in R. Provost (ed.), State 
Responsibility in International Law, Ashgate/Dartmouth (2002), p. 111 et seq concerning the role of due 
diligence within the context of state action and actions taken by private entities. 
337 J.B. Moore, A Digest of International Law, Vol. VI, Government Printing Office (1906), p. 722 et 
seq.  
338 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 7th ed., OUP (2008), p. 1-5.  
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sources formally and materially, as known in national jurisdictions, leads to a fluid 
state of affairs in terms of how norms are created and what constitutes international 
law.339 Or, as acknowledged by Simma and Verdross: 
 
“In contrast to national law, international law does not know a numerus clausus in its norm 
creation  … Norm creation is not limited to particular kind of sources but finds itself in a 
state of liquid aggregation.”340 
 
The result of this situation is that norm creation is a process, which includes various 
declarations made by states portraying their will to the subject matter at hand, by 
means of recognition, tolerance or by disputing certain acts or situations which have 
or can have an effect on norm creation over time.  
While it is apparent that a standard is not a source of law, it is obvious that it is a 
legal concept that has considerable effect in international law. Scholars have pointed 
out that there must be a fundamental difference between a standard and the rules 
included as sources of law according to Article 38 of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice. The standard, as a non-source of law, is based on rules that form a 
part of the sources of international law. Therein lies the different nature of the 
standard vis-á-vis other sources of law. Even though the standard is to be found 
within the international legal system, it is an abstraction of rules of international 
law.341 So, when a standard is applied to a particular legal dispute between an investor 
and a state, it is not the standard that stricto sensu obliges the state to provide full 
protection and security, but the rules from which the standard is abstracted. These 
rules are almost always based on treaty law, but can also be established in customary 
international law.342 Other scholars have sought to identify the concept of a standard 
in more concrete terms by pointing to its various functions in general. In that sense a 
line has to be drawn between standards depending whether they used in national 
jurisdictions, e.g. common law or German law, or in international law. As to the 
standards in the latter category, they can play a considerable role as tools of 
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interpretation, guideline or yardstick of “…reasoning for existing but open hard law 
rules and principles.”343 It is in this context, namely when binding and non-binding 
norms coincide, where standards seem to add to the traditional sources of 
international law. 
 
5.2.2.2 The usage of standards in national and international law 
Standards played a considerable role in various jurisdictions long before the 
establishment of the Westphalian system of international law. Roman law used 
numerous standards that are still used in national jurisdictions. Tort law has used 
bonus pater familias as a standard of behaviour in order to decide whether a person has 
shown culpable behaviour in particular circumstances. The principle of good faith – 
negotia bonae fidei – has been used as a standard applicable to contractual obligations. 
Many jurisdictions apply a multitude of standards, most notably common law 
systems. Common law applies various standards of care when dealing with 
negligence and its consequences in tort law.344 In their studies on the historical 
origins of the standard as a concept, both Roscoe Pound and Al Sanhoury argued 
that standards had been unknown to primitive societies and could only be found in 
legal systems that had obtained a certain level of development.345 
The wide scope of the concept has influenced its structure and usage in 
international law and international relations. In terms of international law, the 
international minimum standard ranks amongst the most important standards. 
Historically, that concept of a standard has been used most often within the context 
of the international minimum standard. The objective or subjective nature of the 
international minium standard has been topical ever since the breakdown of the 
consensus enjoyed by foreigners in the settlements of the colonial powers. The 
colonial powers argued for an objective standard whereas the newly independent 
states emphasized either its subjective application or argued against its existence. 
However, a strict subjective interpretation of the international minimum standard 
goes, by its very nature, against the international minimum standard as its purpose is 
to provide an alien with protection independent of the particular situation of the host 
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country. That position was argued by the US-Mexican General Claims Commission 
in the Hopkins case which emphasized that “[t]he citizens of a nation may enjoy many 
rights which are withheld from aliens, and, conversely, under international law aliens 
may enjoy rights and remedies which the nation does not accord to its own 
citizens.”346 
During the interwar periods the concept of a standard was studied considerably. 
A study made by Roscoe Pound on the nature of the standard in 1919 differentiated 
between four different norms. First, there were rules that were detailed. The rules 
were clearly defined and applicable to particular situations. They were common in 
earlier societies with less developed legal systems. Among examples of ancient codes 
made up by detailed rules, Pound’s study quoted Hammurabi’s law: “If a free man 
strike a free man, he shall pay ten shekels of silver.” Here, no legal assessment is 
needed, but deductive reasoning suffices to provide an answer. Thus, rules were 
almost always particular in nature and provided for an answer to the problem at 
hand. Second, there were principles, which were “…general premises for judicial and 
juristic reasoning, to which we turn to supply new rules, to interpret old rules, to 
meet new situations, to measure the scope and applications of rules and standards 
and reconcile them when they conflict.”347 An example of these principles was the 
principle of unjust enrichment – that one shall not unjustly enrich himself at the 
expense of another. Third, there are legal conceptions. These conceptions are well 
defined and enable lawyers to classify cases – a defined legal conception subjects a 
particular set of circumstances or facts or transactions to certain legal consequences. 
Examples of these conceptions included contract, tort, sale, etc. – building blocks of 
law study to categorize cases for structural purposes. Fourth, there were standards, 
which are defined as “…legally defined measures of conduct, to be applied by or 
under the direction of tribunals.” These standards would include inter alia the bonus 
pater familias, the standard of due care and the standard of due process of law in terms 
of validity of legislation vis-á-vis the US constitution. Thus, the standards were 
necessary to every particular case involving a multitude of variant factors and 
necessitating an assessment of reasonableness or fairness. In addition, the standards 
usually contained moral elements and called for common sense or moral judgment in 
lieu of deductive logic.348 
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The structure of these norms was gradual from casuistic and particular rules that 
could be applied logically to standards that varied in application with changes in 
circumstances, time and in the context to which they are applied. Despite its complex 
and ambiguous structure, Pound emphasized, in line with other commentators at the 
time, e.g. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., that the standards were tools for 
assessing conduct and in doing so provided for security of an individuals’ interest: 
 
“These standards have a variable application with time and place, and contain a large moral 
element. Yet they are significant legal institutions. The legally defined measure of conduct, 
applied by or under the direction of a tribunal is as much a part of the machinery by which, 
organized society secures interests as the precise rules which it uses for the same purpose in 
other situations.”349 
 
In this structure the intuition and experience of the arbitrator played a considerable 
role due to the moral element of the standard. However, while this approach 
emphasized experience, it also stressed the importance of logic as a source of 
reasoning. Thus, experience was not to be used exclusively, neither only deductive 
logic, but a mixture of both in individual cases.350 Here, again, references to the views 
of Justice Holmes concerning US tort law can be found. With regard to whether 
logic should dictate adjudication, Justice Holmes argued: “these judgments depend 
on intuitions too subtle for any articulate major premise.”351  
International lawyers that advocated for a tort-law approach to state action 
encountered a problem on the international plane with regard to how such an 
approach should be applied to states. The logic was based on an argument of 
similarities. A distinction was made between what kind of situations and what 
interest were to be protected. The reason for why rules applied to property, but 
standards to individuals, was because of similarities that could be drawn from 
different situations. While rights of states over some interests, e.g. their territorial 
waters or immunity of government owned property, necessitated clear rules, as was 
the case with property in national law, the conduct of a nation and its actions, similar 
to individuals in national law, should be subjected to individualized standards. Thus, 
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action of a “civilized nation” was to be subjected to standards applied with some 
degree of individualization with consideration of the circumstances of the case.352  
In addition to scholarly analysis of the interwar period, lawyers frequently 
referred to standards in order to protect the life, freedom and property of individuals 
under the rubric of physical protection of aliens in a host state. Thus, the concept of 
an international standard was repeatedly used in numerous cases. As discussed 
earlier, the US-Mexican Claims Commission referred to “international standards” in 
the Neer case. The commission did not limit itself to that one case, but continued to 
refer to international standards in other subsequent cases, such as the Faulkner case, 
Roberts case, Swinney case, Teodoro case, Venable case, Chattin case, Dillon case, Harkrader case, 
and the Mecham case.353 
Vast numbers of treaties were concluded after the end of the Second World 
War, a development which one might think would lead to the diminished the role of 
the “standard” in international law. However, that did not happen and the 
“standard” continued to be used as a tool for either determining the substantive 
elements of international law or as a tool for developing coherence amongst nations 
in various fields of international law, such as international labour law, international 
economic law and human rights law.354 A case in point is the International Labour 
Organization that continued to base its work on a standard setting procedure as it 
had done since its inception. With the increase of economic relations and 
transactions amongst nations, standards increased in importance and were studied.355 
In addition, the development of international human rights law made use of a 
standard-based language. A case in point is the Preamble of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights which states that:  
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“...the General Assembly proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common 
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and 
every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind...”356 (emphasis added)  
 
While this document is not a binding instrument stricto sensu, the two other major 
human rights instruments stipulated under the auspices of the United Nations, 
namely the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966, are binding upon those 
that have ratified them.357 As a consequence, the rights of aliens and their property 
were subjected to various international human rights regimes and the international 
minimum standard pertaining to the protection of foreigners and their property.358 
The most recent document describing the tenets of state responsibility, the 
Draft Articles of State Responsibility prepared by the International Law 
Commission, has acknowledged the importance of the concept of a “standard”. The 
approach of the Draft Articles, which is built on the dichotomy of primary and 
secondary rules of state responsibility, does not provide for the principles often 
necessary to determine the substantive obligations of states in international law. 
Therefore, the Draft Articles emphasize the importance of the standard, in particular 
when determining the objective or subjective nature of the responsibility of states: 
 
“Whether the responsibility is “objective” or “subjective” in this sense depends on the 
circumstances, including the content of the primary obligation in question. The articles lay 
down no general rule in that regard. The same is true of other standards, whether they 
involve some degree of fault, culpability, negligence or want of due diligence. Such standards 
vary from one context to another for reasons which essentially relate to the object and 
purpose of the treaty provision or other rule giving rise to the primary obligation. Nor do the 
articles lay down any presumption in this regard as between the different possible standards. 
Establishing these is a matter for the interpretation and application of the primary rules 
engaged in the given case.”359 
 
Thus, the standard, as a concept, still enjoys an important role in international law. 
The question arises whether earlier doctrine is still applicable to present problems of 
international law, in particular international investment law.  
 
                                                     
356 UN GA resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948. 
357 M. Nowak, Introduction to the International Human Rights Regime, Martinus Nijhoff (2003), p. 75. 
358 See First Report of F.V. Garcia-Amador, Special Rapporteur on International Responsibility, 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1956, Vol. II, UN Doc. No. A/CN.4/96, p. 199, and 
Second Report of F.V. Garcia-Amador, Special Rapporteur on International Repsonsibility, Yearbook 
of the International Law Commission 1957, Vol. II, UN Doc. No. A/CN.4/106, p. 121. 
359 J. Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility - Introduction, Text and 
Commentaries, CUP (2005), p. 82. 
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5.2.2.3 Does past doctrine apply to present problems? 
A caveat seems to be appropriate when answering whether earlier doctrine and 
arbitral awards can still be applied when addressing present problems of international 
investment law. 
The strict categorization of rules, principles, legal concepts and standard, as 
discussed by Pound, has not been supported by later scholars or tribunals. In 
contrast, Brownlie warned about the “inappropriateness of rigid categorization of the 
sources”.360 In addition, both the Permanent Court of Justice and the International 
Court of Justice have argued that even though same concepts might appear in 
different sources, they are in essence the same: 
 
“the association of the terms “rules” and “principles” is no more than the use of a dual 
expression to convey one and the same idea, since in this context “principles” clearly means 
principles of law, that is, it also included rules of international law in whose case the use of 
the term “principles” may be justified because of their more general and more fundamental 
character.”361 
 
Moreover, it must be said that the extensive discussion of earlier scholars 
emphasizing the intuition and expertise of the judge seems alien to modern doctrine. 
It is true that arbitrators and judges must rely, in practice, on the experience and 
expertise which they have accumulated over time when adjudicating disputes. 
However, established methods of interpretation constitute the tools to be used in the 
process of adjudication. That includes using the various substantive elements of the 
standard, which might vary taking into account treaty law, customary law or decisions 
of arbitral tribunals, in order to establish the substantive content. The tribunal in 
Mondev emphasized that when it argued how the standards of fair and equitable 
treatment and full protection and security, as stipulated in Article 1105(1) of 
NAFTA, were to be interpreted: 
 
“a reasonably evolutionary interpretation of Article 1105(1) is consistent both with the 
travaux, with the normal principles of interpretation and with the fact […] the terms “fair 
and equitable treatment” and “full protection and security” had their origins in bilateral 
investment treaties in post-war period. In these circumstances the content of the minimum 
                                                     
360 See I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 5th ed., OUP (1998), p. 19. 
361 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v United States of America), ICJ, 
Judgment rendered on 12 October 1984, ICJ Reports (1984), p. 246, para 79. See also Chorzów Factory, 
(Merits) (Germany v Poland) PCIJ Reports, Series A, No. 17 (1928), p. 29 where the Court stated it is “a 
principle of international law, and even a general conception of law, that any breach of an engagement 
involves an obligation to make reparation.” 
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standard today cannot be limited to the content of customary international law as recognized 
in arbitral decisions of the 1920s.”362 
 
“A judgment of what is fair and equitable cannot be reached in the abstract; it must depend 
on the facts of the particular case. It is part of the essential business of courts and tribunals 
to make judgments such as these.”363 
 
“Article 1105(1) did not give a NAFTA tribunal an unfettered discretion to decide for itself, 
on an subjective basis, what “fair” or “equitable” in the circumstances of each particular case 
[…] the Tribunal is bound by the minimum standard as established in State practice and in 
the jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals. It may not simply adopt its own idiosyncratic standard 
of what is “fair” and “equitable” without reference to established sources of law.”364 
 
Thus, an arbitrator enjoys considerable discretion due to the nature of the standard 
as a legal instrument with vague substantive elements. However, when assessing and 
determining the standard’s substantive content regardless of whether it is based on 
treaty, custom or other sources, an arbitrator must adhere to the established 
principles used when applying these sources: (i) when interpreting the treaty-based 
standard, a tribunal must adhere to established principles of interpretation, including 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; (ii) when assessing the content of 
customary international law, the tribunal must adhere to the principles used in 
establishing state practice and opinio iuris; and (iii) when using arbitral awards as a 
subsidiary source of law a tribunal must use constraint depending on whether the 
case is comparable to the one being adjudicated. It is important to note with this last 
point in particular that practice has shown awards to be different in quality and that 
experience of arbitrators can play a role when applying principles relating to different 
sources.365 Thus, awards should not be read in a non-critical way. 
 
5.2.3 The standard’s substantive elements and due diligence 
Despite the fact that the standard of full protection and security is composed of the 
substantive elements of “full”, “protection” and “security”, international courts and 
tribunals have not exclusively limited themselves to these elements, but submitted 
states to a due diligence test. The course was set in the landmark investment 
                                                     
362 Mondev International Ltd. v United States of America, ICSID Additional Facility Case No. 
ARB(AF)/99/2, Award 11 October 2002, 42 ILM 85 (2003), para 123. 
363 Mondev International Ltd. v United States of America, ICSID Additional Facility Case No. 
ARB(AF)/99/2, Award 11 October 2002, 42 ILM 85 (2003), para 118. 
364 Mondev International Ltd. v United States of America, ICSID Additional Facility Case No. 
ARB(AF)/99/2, Award 11 October 2002, 42 ILM 85 (2003), para 119. 
365 J. Paulsson, ‘Awards–And Awards’, in A.K. Bjorklund, I.A. Laird and S. Ripinsky (eds.), 
Investment Treaty Law, Current Issues III; Remedies in International Investment Law – Emerging Jurisprudence of 
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arbitration case – AAPL v Sri Lanka – that turned out to be the first case in which 
the arbitration request was exclusively based on a treaty provision instead of an 
arbitration agreement between the investor and the host state.366 
This fact made the case unusual because prior to that point arbitration had been 
a consensual affair. If an investor claimed that his rights had been violated, he would 
have had difficulties in instigating arbitration proceedings unless an arbitration 
agreement between him and the host state had been stipulated previously. In the 
event that no such agreement was in force, a state could object to an arbitration 
tribunal’s jurisdiction. This was, however, not the case in the case of AAPL v Sri 
Lanka; the claimant based his claim on Article 8(1) of the UK-Sri Lanka BIT, which 
submitted any legal dispute between an investor and a contracting party to the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, and the respondent did 
not object to the tribunal’s jurisdiction. Thus the case went forward.367 
Another aspect of the case was to become more influential and turn out to be 
the starting point for a body of law concerning investment treaty jurisprudence. 
When faced with applicable law, the tribunal sought to interpret the “full protection 
and security” standard not only according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, but also by subjecting the host state to a due diligence test. It was the 
relationship of a treaty-based standard and the due diligence standard that led to the 
conclusion that the state had violated its obligations to the investor: 
 
“Once failure to provide “full protection and security” has been proven (under Article 2.(2) 
of the Sri Lanka/U.K. Treaty or under similar provisions existing in other bilateral 
Investment Treaties extending the same standard to nationals of a third State), the host 
State’s responsibility is established, and compensation is due according to the general 
international law rules and standards previously developed with regard to the States failure to 
comply with its “due diligence” obligation under the minimum standard of customary 
international law […] Hence, any foreign investor, even if his national State has not 
concluded with Sri Lanka a Bilateral Investment Treaty containing a provision similar to that 
of Article 2.(2), would be entitled to a protection which requires “due diligence” from the 
host State, i.e. Sri Lanka. Failure to comply with this obligation imposed by customary 
international law entails the host State’s responsibility.”368 
                                                     
366 AAPL v Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award 21 June 1990, 30 ILM 577 (1991) para 
18. 
367 J. Paulsson, Arbitration without Privity, ICSID Review-FIJL, Vol. 10, Number 2, p. 232 et seq. See 
also same author ‘Arbitration without Privity’ in T.W. Wälde (ed.), The Energy Charter Treaty: An East-
West Gateway for Investment & Trade, Kluwer Law International (1996), p. 422, concerning the new 
reality that arbitral agreements would cease to be a precondition for investor-state arbitration: “This 
new world of arbitration is one where the claimant need not have a contractual relationship with the 
defendant, and where the tables could not be turned; the defendant could not have initiated the 
arbitration, nor is it certain of being able even to bring a counterclaim”.  
368 AAPL v Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award 21 June 1990, 30 ILM 577 (1991) paras 
67 and 69. 
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Having established the treaty-based standard of full protection and security according 
to Art. 2(2) of the UK-Sri Lanka BIT and the due diligence obligation according to 
customary international law, the tribunal established a relationship between these two 
concepts by applying the so-called ‘renvoi’ technique. It argued: 
 
“In the light of the above-stated international law precedents and authorities, the arbitral 
Tribunal has to review the evidence submitted by both Parties in the present case in order to 
establish the proven facts, and to determine whether these facts sustain the Claimant’s 
allegation that the Respondent Government failed to comply with its obligation under the Sri 
Lanka/U.K. Bilateral Investment Treaty (particularly the standard provided for in Article 
2.(2), as well as by virtue of the rules governing State responsibility under general 
international law (which becomes necessary applicable by virtue of the renvoi contained in 
Article 4.(1) of the Treaty).”369 
 
Thus, the use of the renvoi technique served as an important tool in establishing the 
liability of the state.370 This approach enabled the tribunal to determine, once failure 
to provide full protection and security according to Article 2(2) had been proven, the 
standard of derogation required to establish a violation of the due diligence standard 
according to Article 2(2). Having established liability, the tribunal moved on to 
compensation issues in accordance with the principles of general international law.371  
Other tribunals have also adhered to the approach of submitting a state, despite 
there being a treaty-based standard available to the tribunal, to a due diligence test 
when assessing whether its action or inaction has resulted in liability. The tribunal in 
                                                     
369 AAPL v Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award 21 June 1990, 30 ILM 577 (1991) para 
78. 
370 The ‘renvoi’ technique is a principle dealing with conflict of laws. The principle entails, in its 
original form, a method or technique for resolving a problem that arises out of the difference between 
a connecting factor of two independent systems or sources of law. See further J. O’Brien, Conflict of 
Laws, Cavendish Publishing (1999), p. 133 et seq. The principle has within the context of international 
law been applied by connecting treaty law and customary international law. As investment treaties 
generally are based on and recognize treatment standards which are also based on customary 
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customary international law standards of treatment. Thus, by applying the renvoi technique, which in 
effect entails a reference to customary international law, when interpreting treaty-based standards, 
effect and meaning is not only given to the treaty-based standards of treatment but rules of customary 
international law also gain continued validity. See M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign 
Investment, 3rd ed., CUP (2010), p. 335. 
371 The third arbitrator dissented and criticized the tribunal for employing the renvoi technique to 
establish the liability of the state. The arbitrator argued that the full protection and security standard 
prescribed in Article 2(2) of the UK-Sri Lanka BIT was a standard general in nature. In contrast, 
Article 4(1), which specifically dealt with losses incurred by an investor due to civil war. Therefore, 
treaty interpretation based on the principle of generalia specialibus non derogant could only lead to the 
conclusion that the specific rule of Article 4(1) governing investment losses resulting from civil 
disturbances should prevail over the general protection clause in Article 2(2). See further the 
dissenting opinion AAPL v Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award 21 June 1990, 30 ILM 577 
(1991), p. 634 et seq.  
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AMT v Zaire recognized the treaty-based standard of full protection and security in 
addition to mentioning the importance of the “obligation of vigilance” when 
assessing whether the state had occurred liability.372 In Noble Ventures v Romania, the 
tribunal refrained from entering into a detailed investigation whether the treaty-based 
standard of full protection and security had been violated, but stated that the investor 
had failed to show that alleged losses could have been prevented had the state 
exercised due diligence.373 In contrast, in Vecchi v Egypt the tribunal acknowledged 
that the standard of protection expected of the host state was not absolute and that 
the host state should therefore exercise due diligence in preventing harm to an 
investment. That had not been done as Egypt had allowed expropriation to occur 
and not taken steps to return the investment to the investor.374 In a recent case, 
Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Engineers v Albania the umpire entered into a detailed 
discussion about the concept of due diligence within the context of a treaty-based 
standard of full protection and security and concluded that the due diligence 
principle should be affected by the resources available to a state.375 And finally, Suez 
and Vivendi v Argentina, a tribunal was faced with the task of applying a treaty-based 
standard that prescribed that an investment should be “fully and completely 
protected and safeguarded in the territory”. This led the tribunal to analyse the nature 
of the due diligence obligation and treaty-based standard of full protection and 
security. It concluded that despite the specific language of the BIT it would not 
depart from the historical application of the standard, namely to limit protection to 
physical protection. Therefore, the respondent was obliged to provide physical 
protection as further defined by the due diligence obligation.376  
In summary, tribunals have applied the treaty-based standard of protection and 
security when determining a state’s obligation owed to an investor. However, these 
tribunals have sought to use a due diligence rule to further define the substantive 
elements of the standard. Therefore, the due diligence rule does not substitute the 
full protection and security obligation, but serves as an additional tool to determine 
the substantive content of the concepts of “full”, “protection” and “security”. This 
leads to a situation whereby the standard becomes a living concept as the obligations 
that form a part of it change taking into account the circumstances of each case.  
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5.3 The meaning of state actors and private actors 
General international law within the context of state responsibility prescribes that the 
state is responsible for its internationally wrongful acts committed by its organs and 
public officials that have the authority to act on their behalf.377 In addition, general 
international law prescribes that states are not, as such, responsible for acts of private 
parties.378 Here a line must be drawn between the act of a private party and the act or 
omission of a state related to the private act in question. The arguments in the Janes 
case, a case which dealt with the question whether Mexico was responsible for not 
having apprehended and punished a murderer of an American, are descriptive of the 
distinction necessary to make when assessing the nature of a state’s obligation to 
exercise due diligence in connection with a third party’s aggression towards an alien: 
 
“Nobody contends either that the Mexican Government might have prevented the murder 
of Janes, or that it acted in any other form of connivance with the murderer. The 
international delinquency in this case is one of its own specific type, separate from the 
private delinquency of the culprit. The culprit is liable for having killed or murdered an 
American national; the Government is liable for not having measured up to its duty of 
diligently prosecuting and properly punishing the offender. The culprit has transgressed the 
penal code of his country the State; the State [...] has transgressed a provision of international 
law as to State duties.”379  
 
Here, the private act serves as an occurrence that triggers the question of a state’s 
obligation to act or to not act; or, in other words, the question of state responsibility 
arises as a consequence of the private party’s action.  
In such a scenario, as with state responsibility in general, the international 
responsibility of the state is not to be presumed.380 The question does not become 
topical, unless an alien (investor) can prove that a state did not provide protection 
and security to him and his property by failing to exercise due diligence in using its 
authority in a prompt manner and with appropriate force.381 Within the context of 
investment, that principle is almost always supported further by a bilateral investment 
treaty, where the state declares to provide investment protection.  
                                                     
377 See J. Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility – Introduction, Text 
and Commentaries, CUP (2005), p. 77 et seq and A. V. Freeman, Responsibility of States for Unlawful Acts of 
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380 B. Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, Stevens & Sons 
Ltd. (1953), p. 304. 
381 See Sambiaggio case, X RIAA (1903), p. 513 et seq.  
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Such a two-tier system of responsibility, which depends on whether the 
obligation stems from an international wrong committed by agents of the state or is a 
result of action or inaction related to wrongful acts committed by private third 
parties, has practical implications in individual cases. As a result, the concept of an 
actor is important within this context as that influences inter alia the nature of the 
international responsibility.  
There is at times confusion amongst parties to investment disputes concerning 
this point. In AAPL v Sri Lanka, the claimant argued that government forces had 
destroyed the investment, whereas the respondent argued that rebels caused the 
damage. Faced with these conflicting remarks the tribunal pointed out the following: 
 
“In final analysis, no conclusive evidence exists sustaining the Claimant’s allegation that the 
special security forces were themselves the actors of said destruction causing the losses 
suffered. [...] At the same time no conclusive evidence sustains the Respondent’s allegation 
that the destruction were “caused directly by the terrorist action”.”382  
 
The tribunal concluded that a violation of the international responsibility of the state 
had been incurred because the area, where the investment was located, had been 
under the control of government forces and that the tribunal could, due to the fact 
that the proof of fact was extremely difficult, be satisfied with less conclusive 
evidence. 
In other cases, the dispute concerned whether the entity that acted to inflict 
harm on the investment was a part of the government or a private entity. In the Wena 
Hotels v Egypt arbitration it was uncertain which entity was the instigator of a take-
over of an investment. After the investment had been seized by employees of a 
public sector company which supervised the interests of the state in numerous hotel 
projects owned by foreign investors, it became apparent that the government 
minister, who held the only share in the company, did nothing to protect the 
investment or punish the employees of the company for seizing the investment.383 
The tribunal concluded that the full protection and security standard had been 
violated. In contrast, the Rumeli Telekom v Kazakhstan award is an example where it 
was documented that the security forces of the state had enjoined the claimants from 
accessing the premises of the investment. Here, the investor established in 
cooperation with a local business partner, which was owned by family members of 
the president of the Kazakhstan Republic, a joint venture for the purposes of 
                                                     
382 AAPL v Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award of 21 June 1990, 30 ILM 577 (1991) 
para 84. 
383 Wena Hotels Ltd. v Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award of 8 December 2000, 41 
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providing telecommunication services in Kazakhstan. This company was later 
awarded the concession of establishing a mobile phone network in Kazakhstan. This 
business relationship became strained where the security forces made it impossible 
for the investor to enter the premies of the investment. The tribunal concluded that 
these measures could not be attributed to the state because the security forces had 
taken action against the investor upon instructions of the investor’s business partner. 
As the security forces were under the instruction of a private entity, no violation of 
the standard could be found.384 
In addition, cases can be found where there is no dispute whether the entity that 
takes adverse action is a government entity or not. This particularly applies to cases 
when a state privatizes a part of its operation and later takes the investment back or 
when it liberalizes a part of its economy that was under its control, but introduces 
restrictions later on. Arbitral practice seems only to provide different approaches to 
the problem – from concluding that the full protection and security standard only 
provides protection against actions of third parties to concluding that while the 
standard provides protection and security from public and private parties alike it can 
only be limited to physical protection against actions from both these parties. 
An example of the first position is the Eastern Sugar v Czech Republic arbitration 
that dealt with an investor that had invested in the Czech sugar production industry. 
Shortly prior to the country’s accession to the European Union, it started to 
implement new regulatory regimes that resembled EU legislation. This led to the 
implementation of a regulatory regime that subjected the sugar production industry 
to a quota system. The investor argued that this negatively affected the investment 
and that the Czech Republic had not provided for full protection and security. The 
tribunal refused to address issues on the basis of the full protection and security 
standard due to the fact that the actions complained of were state action, but not 
actions of private entities.385 Another example of the first position is the El Paso v 
Argentina arbitration. Here, the claimant had invested in the energy sector of the host 
state. During the economic crisis of 2001-2001, the country amended the regulatory 
structure set up to attact foreign investment. The tribunal acknowledged the treaty-
based standard provided for protection and security, but emphasized that the 
concept was to be understood within the context of customary international law of 
preventing and repressing actions of third parties: 
                                                     
384 The tribunal did not identify which officers of the company had given the order. See Rumeli 
Telekom v Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award of 29 July 2008, para 670 and 
para 711.  
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“El Paso did not specify or determine the duty to act against a third party that has allegedly 
been breached by Argentina under the BIT: all the impugned acts that allegedly violate the 
FPS standard are directly attributable to the GOA and not to any third party. In the present 
case, none of the measures challenged by El Paso were taken by a third party; they all 
emanated from the State itself. Consequently, these measures should only be assessed in the 
light of the other BIT standards and cannot be examined from the angle of full protection 
and security.”386  
 
Needless to say, this approach of limiting the full protection and security standard to 
third parties alone is remarkable, as it does not have foundation in the writings of 
scholars of international law.387  
An example of the second position can be found in the Suez and Vivendi v 
Argentina cases. While the conclusions in these cases are similar to the conclusion in 
Eastern Sugar v Czech Republic, the arguments produced are more elaborate. The cases 
dealt with the privatization of water and sewage systems in the province of Santa Fe 
and Buenos Aires. The government had approached international investors with the 
purpose of privatizing these infrastructure projects and made assurances upon which 
the investors had relied on. During the economic difficulties of 2000/2001, 
Argentina reneged on the promises made which resulted in the total collapse of the 
investor’s legitimate expectations. The tribunal acknowledged that the full protection 
and security standard could apply to state action and action of private third parties. 
However, it went further and noted that according to customary international law the 
protection owed to the investor was only against physical violence, not changes to 
the regulatory framework. Such amendments could only be assessed according to the 
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5.4 The due diligence principle and obligations of the host state 
5.4.1 General 
The concept of due diligence and its implications for states has a long history in 
international law. The failure to use it to prevent injuries to aliens has been 
recognized as a reason to impose international responsibility on a state.389 Its modern 
application in international law dates back to the American civil war when the United 
States claimed compensation from Great Britain in the Alabama case. A number of 
war ships commissioned by the Confederate to be built in England caused damage to 
the Union’s shipping. Great Britain consented reluctantly to refer these claims to 
arbitration. In an arbitration agreement, the Washington Treaty, the concept of due 
diligence was introduced within the context of the responsibility of a neutral state for 
damages caused by private persons acting within its jurisdiction. Not surprisingly, the 
two states had different opinions on the nature of due diligence; Britain opted for a 
restrictive approach, while the United States pursued an interpretation emphasizing 
“active diligence”. The US position prevailed. The arbitral tribunal acknowledged the 
US position and concluded that the US had shown that Great Britain omitted, after 
having being warned by US diplomatic agents during the construction of the ship, to 
take any effective measures to prevent its construction.390 
This does not mean that the state is responsible for the actions of private 
individuals or entities by default. Obviously, a state is responsible for the acts of its 
own agents. However, the nature of state responsibility within the context of 
responsibility for behaviour of private parties is complicated as responsibility can be 
based on acts of states or its entities, omissions of states or a combination of both. 
Here, it is important to look more closely at the nature of the obligation of a state 
when dealing with foreign investment. 
 
                                                     
389 Grotius argued in his treatise De Jure Belli ac Pacis that sovereign princes should be answerable 
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UN Doc. A/CN.4/96, YILC 1957, Vol. II, p. 104 and Report on State Responsibility for the 
International Law Commission, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1961/Add. 1, YILC 1961, Vol. II, p. 47. 
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5.4.2 Negative and positive obligations of the host state 
A state’s obligation with regard to foreign investment is a mixture of different 
obligations. It is important to differentiate between two categories in which different 
demands are made with regard to a state’s action or inaction. 
It is appropriate to refer to the arguments of the umpire in the Sambiaggio case 
concerning this dual nature of the state’s obligation. The deciding umpire had to 
determine whether Venezuela was responsible for damage caused by revolutionary 
forces fighting against the government to property owned by Italian nationals. 
According to Article 4 of the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, between 
the two countries, both contracting states stated that “[t]he citizens and subjects of 
one state shall enjoy in the territory of the other the fullest measure of protection and 
security of person and property...”. In assessing whether Venezuela should incur 
liability because of the damage caused by the revolutionists, the umpire 
acknowledged that a distinction should be made between actions of the state itself 
and actions of third parties. In addition, the umpire stated that a state could only be 
found liable for its own actions, but not for actions of third parties out of its control, 
unless exceptional circumstances would apply. With regard to what substantive 
assessment should take place to determine a state’s obligation in exceptional 
circumstances, the umpire argued:  
 
“The umpire therefore accepts the rule that if in any case of reclamation submitted to him it 
is alleged and proved that Venezuelan authorities failed to exercise due diligence to prevent 
damages from being inflicted by revolutionists, that country should be held responsible. In 
the present instance no such want of diligence is alleged and proved.”391  
 
Therefore, a state’s obligation is, on one hand, with regards to its own agents, 
negative which entails the absence of action. This means within the context of 
international investment law that a state is to refrain from taking action which could 
have adverse effects on the investor and his investment. On the other hand, the 
state’s obligation is positive, i.e. the state is obliged to take action by exercising due 
diligence in the event that the investor and his investment is suffering from adverse 
effects stemming from the action or inaction of a third party or in the event that 
agencies of the state itself have taken action infringing upon the rights of the 
investor.  
                                                     
391 See Sambiaggio case, X RIAA (1903), p. 524. This case was referred to repeatedly by umpires and 
arbitrators in mixed claims commissions after its publication. See e.g. Guastini case, X RIAA (1903), p. 
561; De Caro case, X RIAA (1903), p. 635; J.N. Henriquez case, X RIAA (1903), p. 713. It has also been 
referred to more recently within the context of state responsibility. See e.g. J. Crawford, The 
International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility – Introduction, Text and Commentaries, CUP 
(2005), p. 115-116. 
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The positive obligation becomes relevant after the fact and establishes a three-
pronged obligation which the state has to fulfil. The state has to (1) prevent that 
damage be inflicted upon the investor and his investment; (2) restore the previous 
situation, if possible, after the damage has been caused; and (3) investigate the 
authors of the infringement, charge them accordingly and punish them. It is 
necessary to look closer at this three-pronged obligation relating to the duty to 
protect.392 
 
(1) Duty to prevent damage to the investor 
There is ample evidence that a state has an obligation to prevent that damage be 
inflicted upon aliens residing within its borders.393 During the revolutionary period of 
Central and South America, mixed claims commissions concluded that states had on 
numerous occasions not exercised due diligence to prevent that damage be caused by 
revolutionists. However, the mere fact that an alien is attacked does not suffice. The 
tribunal in the Wipperman case argued with regard to the nature of the obligation of 
the host state concerning prevention: 
 
“Of course, if a government should show indifference with reference to the punishment of 
the guilty authors of such outrages, another question would arise, but as long as reasonable 
diligence is used in attempting to prevent the occurrence or recurrence of such wrongs and 
an honest and serious purpose is manifested to punish the perpetrators, the best evidence of 
which, of course, will be the actual infliction of punishment, we fail to recognize any 
dereliction in the performance of international obligations [...].”394  
 
Similarly, the tribunal in the Noyes case argued when deciding whether Panama had 
incurred liability after an American citizen had been attacked: 
 
“The mere fact that an alien has suffered at the hands of private persons an agression, which 
could have been averted by the presence of a sufficient police force on the spot, does not 
make a government liable for damages under international law. There must be shown special 
circumstances from which the responsibility of the authorities arises: either their behavior in 
connection with the particular occurrence, or a general failure to comply with their duty to 
maintain order, to prevent crimes or to prosecute and punish criminals.”395  
                                                     
392 See for a different approach of applying two categories instead of three categories, H.E. Zeitler, 
The Guarantee of “Full Protection and Security” in Investment Treaties regarding Harm caused by Private Actors, 
Stockholm International Arbitration Review (2005), p. 12, and R. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, ‘State Responsi-
bility in International law’, in R. Provost (ed.), State Responsibility in International law, Ashgate/Dart-
mouth (2002), p. 134-138. 
393 See e.g. E. Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, Banks Law Publishing (1915), p, 220 
et seq and C. Eagleton, The Responsibility of States in International Law, New York University Press (1928), 
p. 125 et seq. 
394 J.B. Moore, A Digest of International Law, Vol. III, Government Printing Office (1906), p. 3041. 
395 Walter A. Noyes (USA) v Panama, VI RIAA (1933), p. 311. 
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Therefore, the principle of due diligence that deals with prevention presupposes two 
obligations different in nature. First, a state must have established and maintain a 
system which enables it to prevent occurrences against aliens within its borders. 
Second, a state has to use that system to prevent harmful occurrences and protect 
aliens and their property.396 This point became particularly clear in the Iran Hostages 
case where the International Court of Justice took note that Iran was not only under 
the treaty obligation to provide “most constant protection and security” according to 
a 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the 
United States and Iran, but was also obliged to respect “...obligations of Iran existing 
under general international law...” to provide protection to the hostages. Having 
stated, in addition, that Iran had the obligation to use all appropriate means 
according to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, it concluded, after 
having taken into account that Iranian authorities had prevented similar attacks in the 
past by employing its security forces, that “the failure of the Iranian Government to 
take such steps was due to more than mere negligence or lack of appropriate 
means.”397  
The matter of prevention has played a role in arbitral practice within the context 
of duty to protect investors in particular. In Wena Hotels the tribunal took note that 
the government had knowledge that an investment project would be seized by an 
entity controlled by the government and that it did nothing to prevent the seizure 
nor to prevent damage from being inflicted on the investment while it was under the 
control of the government-controlled entity. The tribunal argued: 
 
“Although it is not clear that Egyptian officials other than officials of EHC directly 
participated in the [...] seizures, there is substantial evidence that Egypt was aware of EHC’s 
intentions to seize the hotels and took no actions to prevent EHC from doing so. Moreover, 
once the seizures occurered, both the police and the Ministry of Tourism took no immediate 
action to restore the hotels promptly to [...].”398 [emphasis added] 
 
It can therefore be stated, within the context of the duty to prevent, that a state has 
the obligation to have under its control a system, e.g. a police force, a court system, 
which enables the state to act or react to a certain occurrence threatening or 
damaging an alien’s interest or property. However, the principle of due diligence 
seems not to concern itself with whether these systems should be of a certain design 
                                                     
396 R. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, ‘State Responsibility in International law’, in R. Provost (ed.), State 
Responsibility in International law, Ashgate/Dartmouth (2002), p. 114-115. 
397 Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Iran) 
ICJ, Decision rendered on 24 May 1980, ICJ Reports (1980), paras 61-68. 
398 Wena Hotels Ltd. v Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award of 8 December 2000, 41 
ILM 896 (2002), para 84. 
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or consisting of certain parts, but rather how a state uses the resources at its disposal.399 
Thus, an investor is not entitled to a large police force or a high tech court system 
protecting his investment, but rather that to the assurance that his investment is 
sufficiently protected taking into account the circumstances relevant to his 
situation.400 
 
(2) Duty to restore the investor to his previous situation 
A state that commits an international wrong is under the obligation to wipe out the 
legal and material consequences of its action or inaction by re-establishing the 
situation that would have existed if the international wrong had not been committed. 
This principle of restitution, now stipulated in Article 35 of the Draft Articles of 
State Responsibility, was promulgated in the Chorzów Factory case by the Permanent 
Court of International Justice. The court argued first for restitution before 
acknowledging the obligation for compensation: 
 
“This conclusion particularly applies as regards the Geneva Convention, the object of which 
is to provide for the maintenance of economic life in Upper Silesia on the basis of respect 
for the status quo. The dispossession of an industrial undertaking – the expropriation of 
which is prohibited by the Geneva Convention – then involves the obligation to restore the 
undertaking and, if this be not possible, to pay its value at the time of the indemnification, 
which value is designed to take the place of restitution which has become impossible.”401 
 
The state’s reaction to the actions which affect negatively the investor’s position is of 
considerable importance when assessing whether a state had acted with due diligence. 
A violation of the rights of an investor relating to his investment often takes place 
during a certain time span. An investor can lose control of his investment, but the 
host state has it within its capacity to influence the illegal state of affairs that has 
occurred. A state which does not take action to restore the investor by handing the 
investment over to the investor does not exercise sufficient due diligence and violates 
its obligation.  
In the Iranian Hostages case, the International Court of Justice was faced with a 
flagrant treaty violation that began with mob violence, but later developed into state 
acceptance of an international wrong. The treaty violation consisted inter alia of 
failure to protect the inviolability of the premises and the consular staff of the US 
                                                     
399 See H.E. Zeitler, The Guarantee of “Full Protection and Security” in Investment Treaties regarding Harm 
caused by Private Actors, Stockholm International Arbitration Review (2005), p. 12. 
400 See Parkerings-Compagniet A.S. v Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award of 11 September 
2007, para 360, and Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Engineers v Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/21, Award 30 July 2009, para 76. 
401 See The Factory at Chorzów (Germany v Poland) (Merits), (1928) PCIJ Rep., Ser. A. No. 17, p. 47-48. 
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embassy in Tehran according to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. 
The Court argued: 
 
“Its plain duty was at once to make every effort, and to take every appropriate step, to bring 
these flagrant infringements of the inviolability of the premises, archives and diplomatic and 
consular staff of the United States Embassy to a speedy end, to restore the Consulates at 
Tabriz and Shiraz to the United States control, and in general to re-establish the status quo and 
to offer reparation for the damage.” 402 [emphasis added] 
 
In Wena Hotels v Egypt the tribunal acknowledged that the state had not seized the 
investment, but that it had been seized by an independent entity established by the 
government to supervise foreign investment in the country’s tourism industry. 
However, the tribunal was critical about the state’s inaction to assist the investor 
before and after his investment was seized. The tribunal argued: 
 
“Even if the Tribunal were to accept this explanation for Egypt’s failure to act before the 
seizures, it does not justify the fact that neither the police nor the Ministry of Tourism took 
any immediate action to protect Wena’s investment after EHC had illegally seized the hotels 
[...] Egypt could have directed EHC to return the hotels to Wena’s control and make 
reparations. [...] Instead, neither hotel was restored to Wena until nearly a year later [...].”403  
 
Therefore, the state was not only under the obligation to prevent the seizure before it 
happened, but had also an obligation to restore the investment after it had been 
illegally seized by the government-controlled entity.404  
 
(3) Duty to investigate, charge and punish the parties responsible for the violation  
Arbitral practice shows that tribunals have emphasized that the fact that an alien 
suffers aggression does not suffice to establish an international wrong, not unless 
“special circumstances” lead to the conclusion that a state is responsible.405 
Therefore, a state can be in a position where it is unable to prevent an occurrence 
because it does not have knowledge of the disturbances which result in the 
aggression or that the situation escalates so rapidly that the state is unable to react to 
the aggression. In the event that the state is unable to prevent an attack, the 
obligation to investigate, charge and punish the perpetrators responsible arises. 
                                                     
402 Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Iran) 
ICJ, Decision rendered on 24 May 1980, ICJ Reports (1980), para 69. 
403 Wena Hotels Ltd. v Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award of 8 December 2000, 41 
ILM 896 (2002), paras 88, 90-91. 
404 See also Waguih Elie George Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award 
1 June 2009, para 448, where the tribunal emphasizes the duty of the host state to return the 
investment to the investor when state courts have concluded that the taking was illegal. 
405 Walter A. Noyes (USA) v Panama, VI RIAA 308 (1933), p. 311. 
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In the Janes case a widow of an American citizen claimed compensation for the 
failure of the Mexican state to apprehend and punish her husband’s murderer. Her 
husband, a superintendent at a mine company, had been murdered in view of many 
persons, near the company office. The tribunal distinguished between the liability of 
the perpetrator and that of the Mexican state which failed to prosecute him. In 
addition, it noted with regards to the state’s obligation to apprehend and punish that: 
 
“...the person who killed Janes, was well known in the community where the killing took 
place. Numerous persons witnessed the deed. The slayer, after killing his victim, left on foot. 
There is evidence that a Mexican police magistrate was informed of the shooting within five 
minutes after it took place. The official records with regards the action taken to apprehend 
and punish the slayer speak for themselves. Eight years have elapsed since the murderer, and 
it does not appear from the records that [...] has been apprehended at this time. Our 
conclusions to the effect that the Mexican authorities did not take proper steps to apprehend 
and punish the slayer of Janes is based on the record before us consisting of evidence 
produced by both governments.”406 
 
In terms of investment protection Wena Hotels v Egypt provides, again, guidance with 
regards to what effect the failure of a state to investigate, charge and punish the 
perpetrators has on the assessment whether an international wrong has been 
committed. The tribunal took note that neither the government entity, EHC, which 
dealt with investment in Egypt’s tourism industry, nor its senior officials, e.g. Mr. 
Kandil and Mr. Munir, had been punished for forcibly expelling the investor and 
illegally possessing the hotel (the investment). The tribunal argued: 
 
“Finally, neither EHC nor its senior officials were seriously punished for their actions in 
forcibly expelling Wena and illegally possessing the hotels for approximately a year. Although 
several representatives of EHC – including Messrs. Kandil and Munir – were convicted for 
their actions, neither Mr. Kandil nor Mr. Munir was sentenced to serve any jail time. Instead, 
both were fined only EGP 200, which Mr. Munir stated that he has never paid. Also neither 
official appears to have suffered any repercussions in their careers. As noted above, the 
Ministry of Tourism chose not to exercise its authority to remove Mr. Kandil as Chairman of 
EHC and, according to […], he currently is serving as an advisor to a senior member of the 
Egyptian parliament. Since the seizures, Mr. Munir has been promoted to become the Head 
of the Legal Affairs Division at EHC and is expecting a further promotion in the near future. 
This absence of any punishment of EHC and its officials suggest that Egypt condoned 
EHC’s actions.”407 
 
                                                     
406 Laura M.B. Janes (USA) v United Mexican States, IV RIAA (1926), p. 86. See also similar cases Sara 
Ann Gorham (USA) v United Mexican States, IV RIAA (1930), p. 640 et seq and John D. Chase (USA) v 
United Mexican States, IV RIAA (1928), p. 337 et seq.   
407 Wena Hotels Ltd. v Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award of 8 December 2000, 41 
ILM 896 (2002), para 94. 
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In other cases, in particular where the investor has not lost control of his investment, 
but where continuous minor infringements of third parties negatively affect his 
interest in the investment, tribunals have been restrictive towards acknowledging a 
violation of the state. In Parkerings v Lithuania the investor argued that the host state 
had not provided the investor with full protection and security during repeated 
vandalism by third parties. The investor had entered into an agreement concerning 
the management of a parking system and had suffered damage due to that payment 
machines had been vandalized. The tribunal argued: 
 
“The Claimant alleges damages to its materials due to vandalism. However, the Claimant 
does not show that such vandalism would have been prevented if the authorities had acted 
differently. The Claimant only contends that the police did not find the authors of this 
offence. Both parties agree that Lithuanian authorities started an investigation to find the 
authors of the vandalism [...] The Arbitral Tribunal finds that the record does not show in 
which way the process of investigation amounted to a violation of the Treaty.”408  
 
So, similar to what applies in cases of prevention and protection it seems that due 
diligence does not influence what kind of a system, e.g. law enforcement system or 
court system, is available in the country, but how a state uses its system and the resources 
at its disposal. Thus, an investor is generally not entitled to special forces during peace 
time, but rather that offences are investigated and the offenders apprehended and 
punished.409  
In summary, it is clear that the substantive framework, according to which a 
state’s obligation is determined, is far from being clear and simple. A state can violate 
its obligation towards the investor by a breach of a duty to abstain and the state can 
violate its obligation owed to the investor by breaching its duty to take action. The 
former entails that an action violates a negative obligation, whereas the latter entails 
that inaction violates a positive obligation. In order to better understand the 




                                                     
408 Parkerings-Compagniet A.S. v Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award of 11 September 
2007, paras 356-357. 
409 See Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Engineers v Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/21, 
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162
5.4.3 Elements important for discharging due diligence 
5.4.3.1 The state of state responsibility in general 
The basic parameters of due diligence, as described within the context of positive 
and negative obligations of the state, can only play a limited role in understanding the 
nature of state responsibility. There are other factors that have been considered 
important in terms of deciding the nature of state responsibility. An expansive 
academic debate has taken place dealing with whether one of the most important 
elements of state responsibility – fault – should be considered a constituent element 
of state responsibility.  
Scholars have generally been divided into two camps with regard to whether 
state responsibility should be fault based or based on an objective state responsibility 
principle. The first camp, consisting of Lauterpacht and others,410 emphasized the 
role of fault stating that it is believed to correspond with the conception of states as 
moral entities and the concept must as such form the foundation of any legal theory 
of responsibility. The second camp, including Cheng and others411, acknowledged the 
principle of objective responsibility as the dominant rule when assessing state 
responsibility. It is safe to say that this discussion is of limited value when 
determining the full protection and security standard within the sphere of state 
responsibility for the simple reason that addressing the problem within the rubric of 
“either-or” does not provide an answer to the question of state responsibility. In 
addition, the cases dealing with violations of investment protection standards, 
including the full protection and security standard, are concerned with standards of 
conduct required by international law in a very particular context.412  
The ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility did not acknowledge these 
different camps arguing either a subjective fault-based regime or an objective non-
fault regime.413 Therefore, a third approach was introduced in Articles 2 and 12 of the 
Draft Articles based on the argument that no single principle is universal concerning 
whether state responsibility should be based on subjective or objective approach. 
                                                     
410 See H. Lauterpacht, Private law Sources and Analogies of International Law, Longmans, Green and Co. 
Ltd. (1927), p. 135 and C. Eagleton, The Responsibility of States in International Law, New York University 
Press (1928), p. 209.  
411 See B. Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, Stevens & 
Sons Ltd. (1953), p. 218-232 and G. Schwarzenberger, International Law, 3rd ed. Stevens & Sons Ltd. 
(1953), p. 632-641. 
412 See I. Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations, State Responsibility – Part I, Clarendon Press (1983), p. 
37-48, for an overview and a critique of the academic debate between these two different approches 
to state responsibility.  
413 Scholars attempted to provide new approaches prior to the ILC’s adoption. See e.g. R. Pisill-
Mazzeschi, ‘State Responsibility in International law’, in R. Provost (ed.), State Responsibility in 
International law, Ashgate/Dartmouth (2002), p. 98 et seq. 
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Emphasis should, more importantly, be put on the context in question and on the 
content and interpretation of the relevant obligation:  
 
“When scholarly debate bogs down around some dichotomy such as ‘responsibility for 
fault’/‘objective responsibility’, something has almost always gone wrong. Here the problem 
is one of level of analysis: there is neither a rule that responsibility is always based on fault, 
nor one that it is always independent of it – indeed, there appears to be no presumption 
either way. This is hardly surprising, in a legal system which has to deal with a wide range of 
problems and disposes of a limited armoury of techniques. But in any event circumstances 
alter cases, and it is illusory to seek for a single dominant rule. Where responsibility is 
essentially based on acts of omission […] considerations of fault loom large. But if a State 
deliberately carries out some specific act, there is less room for it to argue that the harmful 
consequences were unintended and should be disregarded. Everything depends on the 
specific context and on the content and interpretation of the obligation said to have been 
breached.”414  
 
Needless to say, general principles of the nature described above can be of limited 
use for arbitral tribunals deciding in particular cases whether a state has acted or not 
acted in a way resulting in a precarious situation of an investor. Still, it seems clear 
that this is the situation various tribunals find themselves in resulting in awards 
where neither fault nor strict liability plays a major role. Despite the obvious 
conclusion that the substantive elements of “full”, “protection” and “security” are 
paramount when deciding the legal position of a state vis-á-vis an investor, including 
whether the state has violated its obligation of protecting the investor’s investment, 
case law will show that tribunals have repeatedly applied the due diligence test 
depending on the specific context of the case being dealt with.  
 
5.4.3.2 Elements of due diligence 
Arbitral tribunals seem to apply the due diligence principle at times without much 
analytical reasoning. Despite the fact that neither fault-based responsibility nor 
objective responsibility has been considered the overriding principle when deciding 
the general requirements of state responsibility, several elements concerning the due 
diligence obligation are of importance. It does come as a surprise, taking into account 
the fauna of arbitral cases with which the due diligence has mostly dealt with, that 




                                                     
414 J. Crawford and S. Olleson, The Nature and Forms of International Responsibility, in M.D. Evans, 
International law, 2nd ed., OUP (2006), p. 465. 
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1) The importance of diligence or vigilance 
Numerous cases can be found where states have been found responsible for not 
exercising due diligence when providing for protection to aliens. However, the 
concept of due diligence is not always used in this context, but other similar 
concepts, including the concept of vigilance.  
The umpire Huber who served as the rapporteur in the Spanish Zone of Morocco 
case recognized that a state could not be held responsible for actions of third parties 
unless a treaty or customary international law so prescribed. He argued: 
 
“The principle of non-responsibility in no way excludes the duty to exercise a certain degree 
of vigilance. If a state is not responsible for the revolutionary events themselves, it may 
nevertheless be responsible, for what its authorities do or not do toward the consequence, 
within the limits of possibility.”415  
 
What this obligation entails in practical terms is that the state must take reasonable 
measures or appropriate measures within the context of prevention, restoration and 
investigation, prosecution and punishment as any well-administered government 
could be expected to take in similar circumstances.416 Thus, under ordinary 
circumstances a state is to exercise active vigilance by providing police force, 
administrative tribunals and courts and other institutions necessary in order to fulfil 
its obligation under the rubric of prevention, restoration and investigation, 
prosecution and punishment. In some instances the obligation can be extended to 
extraordinary circumstances, e.g. when a state is in control of a territory of another 
state. The ICJ held in the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo case that an 
occupying power had an obligation of vigilance while in control of a territory of 
another state: 
 
“The Court concludes that it is in possession of sufficient credible evidence to find that 
Uganda is internationally responsible for acts of looting, plundering and exploitation of the 
DRC’s natural resources committed by members of the UPDF in the territory of the DRC, 
for violating its obligation of vigilance in regard to these acts and for failing to comply with its 
obligations […] as an occupying Power in Ituri in respect of all acts of looting, plundering 
and exploitation of natural resources in the occupied territory.”417 [emphasis added] 
 
                                                     
415 See Spanish Zone of Morocco case as cited by B. Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by 
International Courts and Tribunals, Stevens & Sons Ltd. (1953), p. 229. 
416 For the formulation “reasonable measures” see A. V. Freeman, Responsibility of States for Unlawful 
Acts of Their Armed Forces, 88 RCADI 267 (1955), p. 277, but for the formulation “appropriate 
measures” see Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, (Democratic Republic of Congo v Uganda) ICJ, 
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417 See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, (Democratic Republic of Congo v Uganda) ICJ, Decision 
rendered on 19 December 2005, ICJ Reports (2005), para 250. 
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So, generally the obligation owed to the investor is due diligence or active vigilance. A 
state might be subjected to a stricter obligation in individual cases, e.g. when 
providing for protection and security of other states and their representatives 
according to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Similarly, in the event 
a BIT provides for full protection and security, a state must provide for a higher level 
of security than otherwise would be the case, not unless the treaty-based standard 
would be formulated in a particular way.418 If, for example, a BIT would prescribe 
that a state should provide for protection and security not less than those recognized 
by international law, the state should not afford the investor inferior treatment 
compared to “the minimum standard of vigilance and of care required by 
international law”.419  
 
2) Knowledge as an objective presupposition for state action 
Knowledge plays a considerable role as to whether or when a state is obliged to take 
action to protect the investor and his investment. The concept of knowledge – what 
the state knows or ought to have known – leads to a situation where the assessment 
whether a state has acted with diligence or vigilance cannot but be casuistic 
depending on the facts of each case.  
Interestingly, the question of knowledge was asked and answered even before 
Grotius’ treatise on international law. In 1598, Alberico Gentili concluded the 
following when addressing whether a community should be responsible for a private 
act of one of its members: 
 
“One who knows a wrong is free from guilt only if he is not able to prevent it. Therefore, 
the State, which knows because it has been warned, and which ought to prevent the 
misdeeds of its citizens, and through its jurisdiction can prevent them, will be at fault and 
guilty of a crime it does not do so.”420 
 
If state officials have knowledge that an attack will take place, the obligation arises to 
take active measures to prevent or provide protection. This was acknowledged in the 
Chapman case that dealt with the obligation of Mexico to protect an American consul 
in the city of Puerto Mexico. The consul had received death threats that were to be 
                                                     
418 See e.g. Article 1105 of NAFTA and NAFTA Free Trade Commission Clarification Related to 
NAFTA Chapter 11, Decision 31 July 2001. 
419 AMT v Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award 21 February 1997, 36 ILM 1531 (1997), para 
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420 A. Gentili, De Jure Belli Libri Tres, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Vol. II, Chapter 
XXI, Clarendon Press (1933) p. 100. 
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carried out if two Mexican nationals, who had been sentenced to death in the United 
States, would be executed. The consul communicated those threats to the authorities 
and requested that he be provided with adequate protection. Although instructions 
were given concerning his protection, they were not carried out. The consul was 
attacked and seriously injured. A claims commission recognized that a government 
could not be an insurer of aliens; it had a duty to use its means of protection within 
its capacity, especially when public officials of another state were involved, and 
protect them against illegal “acts of which it has notice”.421  
While it is generally accepted that a state has an increased level of diligence after 
having received information about an impending illegal act, the question becomes 
more problematic about what the state should have known. Here, the Corfu Channel 
case is illustrative of the various problems dealing with due diligence. The case dealt 
with a dispute between United Kingdom and Albania following an incident where 
Royal Navy ships stroke mines in the North Corfu Strait.422 In a case brought by the 
United Kingdom, the Court could not find Albania responsible for having laid the 
mines (Albania did not have a navy) or that the minefield had been laid with the 
connivance of the Albanian government (lack of “decisive legal proof”). The Court 
then went on to assess whether the mines could have been laid with the knowledge 
of Albania. In that regard, the Court noted, that knowledge of the minelaying could 
not be imputed to Albania merely because the minefield was discovered in its 
territorial waters and exploded in that area. In this regard the Court stated: 
 
“It is true, as international practice shows, that a State on whose territory or in whose waters 
an act contrary to international law has occurred, may be called upon to give an explanation. 
It is also true that that State cannot evade such a request by limiting itself to a reply that it is 
ignorant of the circumstances of the act and of its authors. The State may, up to a certain 
point, be bound to supply particulars of the use made by it of the means of information and 
inquiry at disposal. But it cannot be concluded from the mere fact of the control exercised by 
a State over its territory and waters that that State necessarily knew, or ought to have known, 
the authors. This fact, by itself and apart from other circumstances, neither involves prima 
facie responsibility nor shifts the burden of proof.”423 
 
                                                     
421 William E. Chapman (USA) v United Mexican States, IV RIAA (1930), p. 623. 
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struck by mines, the Royal Navy cleared the Channel of any mines, including those in Albanian 
territorial waters. See further The Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v Albania) ICJ, Decision rendered 
on 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports (1949), p. 27 and 33. 
423 The Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v Albania) ICJ, Decision rendered on 9 April 1949, ICJ 
Reports (1949), p. 18. 
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Following this statement, the Court examined whether it could be established by 
means of indirect evidence that Albania had knowledge of the minelaying. Despite 
basing its arguments on indirect evidence, the Court states that the “proof may be 
drawn from inferences of fact, provided that they leave no room for reasonable 
doubt.”424 The Court acknowledged that the channel had been under close 
surveillance by the Albanian government – or in other words, had shown a high 
degree of vigilance. It was of particular relevance that the Albania had kept a close 
watch over the Channel and its vigilance sometimes “went so far as to involve the 
use of force”.425 Having taken into account this active vigilance, how Albania acted 
following the explosions and the fact that the mines were positioned very close to the 
coast, the Court concluded that the mines could not have been laid without the 
knowledge of the Albanian government.  
 
3) Foreseeability and the legal effect of time  
The due diligence obligation does not entail that a state should have knowledge of 
any petty crime or minor offences that might affect the investment.426 However, if a 
particular threat materializes, the state is bound to follow that threat as soon as it has 
knowledge of its existence. By doing so the foreseeability of the risk becomes known 
and a state is in a position to determine what “reasonable measures” are necessary. 
Here, the explanatory note to Article 13(1) of the Harvard Draft is illustrative: 
 
“Among the factors to be taken into account in determining whether the duty of due 
diligence has been discharged is that of the foreseeability of the risk. It can be easily assumed 
that a State should have anticipated the possibility of an injury to an alien if mobs are actually 
engaged in riotous activity or are expected shortly to do so or if bands of robbers and 
brigands are allowed to operate in certain portions of a country. A State may also be put on 
notice of a special duty to protect an alien if there has been violence against him or against 
groups of aliens or against nationals of a particular State or against aliens in general in the 
recent past or if there have been threats of violence and criminal conduct. A request for 
protection from an alien may also serve to give notice to the State that it ought to take 
special precautions regarding that alien.”427   
 
                                                     
424 The Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v Albania) ICJ, Decision rendered on 9 April 1949, ICJ 
Reports (1949), p. 18. 
425 The Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v Albania) ICJ, Decision rendered on 9 April 1949, ICJ 
Reports (1949), p. 18-19. 
426 Parkerings-Compagniet A.S. v Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award of 11 September 
2007, paras 356-357. 
427 Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, 
Draft No. 12, 15 April 1961 reprinted in M.M. Whiteman, Digest of International law, Vol. 8, US Gov 
Washington DC (1967) p. 739. 
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Needless to say, this explanatory note was produced within the context of state 
responsibility in general, but there is nothing to suggest that it should not apply to 
investors and their investments, in particular if there is a treaty-based standard 
providing for full protection and security.  
Here, time is also of some importance as that can affect the due diligence 
principle, namely what measures could be considered reasonable taking into account 
the time the government has in order to prevent an occurrence that might have 
adverse effect on an investment. Again, Iran serves as an example where a 
government gradually loses control of a country. The revolution began with civil 
disturbances that later escalated into mass demonstrations, civil unrest in the form of 
general strikes and finally full-scale revolution. It is only logical that the culmination 
of individual occurrences over time affects the level of due diligence owed to an 
investor and in doing so influences the responsibility of a government to act on 
threats and intimidation shown towards an investor. In Sylviana v Iran, the Iran-US 
Claims tribunal described the culmination of events that later lead to the return of 
the Ayatollah Khomeini on 1 February 1979: 
 
“[B]y December 1978, strikes, riots and other civil strife in the course of the Islamic 
Revolution had created classic force majeure conditions at least in Iran’s major cities. By ‘force 
majeure’ we mean social and economic forces beyond the power of the state to control 
through the exercise of due diligence. The situation created in Iran at least during the time 
from December 1979 until 15 February 1979 by civil unrest, strikes, riots and a state of 
general upheaval was such that both the Claimant and the governmental authorities and 
agencies in this case were not able to perform certain of the contractual obligations that they 
had previously undertaken.”428 
 
Time was of also of importance in the arguments of the International Court of 
Justice when it assessed the actions of the students that occupied the US Embassy in 
Tehran in November 1979. In its assessment, the Court divided its approach into 
two phases depending on the time before and after 4 November 1979. Before that 
date the Iranian government failed to provide security for the Embassy and its 
personnel, but the actions of the students were not imputable to Iran. However, 
statements made by the Ayatollah Khomeini after that date translated the illegal acts 
of the students “into acts of State”.429 
In summary, the elements of due diligence – active vigilance, knowledge and 
foreseeability – form the constituent elements that are necessary to assess whether 
                                                     
428 Sylvania Technical Systems Inc. v Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 180-64-1 rendered on 27 June 
1985, reprinted in 8 Iran-US Claims Tribunal Reports 298, p. 308. 
429 Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Iran) 
ICJ, Decision rendered on 24 May 1980, ICJ Reports (1980), para 74. 
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the measures of the state suffice in order for it to fulfil its obligation of due diligence. 
Therefore, the diligence shown must be (i) due diligence or active vigilance, (ii) based 
on knowledge that the state had or should have had, as can be objectively ascertained, 
(iii) based on the likelihood, as can be objectively ascertained, that an impending threat 
would materialize and taking into account the time in which the state had to react.  
 
5.4.4 Different levels of due diligence depending on the nature of disturbances 
The vagueness of the concept of due diligence makes it important to describe further 
to what extent a state must employ its power, including police forces or army units, 
in order to protect an alien and his property; or within the context of foreign 
investment: the investor and his investment.  
The principle that the duty of a state is not an absolute one is supported not 
only in academia but also in arbitral practice. At the same time it is well accepted that 
a government’s failure to use due diligence to prevent an act of a private party that 
affects the investment in an adverse way is ground for international responsibility. 
But how much diligence or vigilance suffices to conclude that the state has fulfilled 
its obligation? Interestingly, the first case that dealt with due diligence is illustrative 
on this point. The tribunal in the Alabama case argued as follows concerning a state’s 
obligation to prevent that third parties violate its neutrality: 
 
“And whereas “due diligence” referred to […] ought to be exercised by neutral governments 
in exact proposition to the risks to which either of the belligerents may be exposed, from a 
failure to fulfil the obligations of neutrality on their part.”430 
 
Umpires and academics alike have attempted to further describe due diligence in 
concrete terms, but no universally accepted formula has been accepted. An example 
is the following attempt in the Salvador Prats case:  
 
“What is the degree of diligence required for the due performance of duty? […] The same 
truth will be expressed in a more practical language by saying that the extent of the duties is 
to be commensurate with the extent of the means for performing the same, and that he who 
has employed all the means within his reach has perfectly fulfilled his duty, irrespective of 
the material result of his efforts.”431 
 
The most well known attempt is the attempt of Professor Freeman in his Lectures at 
the Hague Academy of International Law in 1955:  
 
                                                     
430 J.B. Moore, International Arbitrations, Vol. I, Government Printing Office (1898), p. 654. 
431 J.B. Moore, International Arbitrations, Vol. III, Government Printing Office (1906), p. 2893-2894.  
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“The “due diligence” is nothing more nor less than the reasonable measures of prevention 
which a well-administered government could be expected to exercise under similar 
circumstances […] So in international responsibility, the degree of danger measures the 
nature and amount of the diligence a Government must take to prevent injurious acts to 
another Government or its citizens.”432 
 
Professor Brownlie acknowledged that examples could be found that supported the 
duty to exercise due diligence. In addition, he stressed that state responsibility arises 
when a state has failed to show due diligence, but that “a sliding scale of liability 
related to the standard of due diligence” based on a number of particular examples of 
state action or inaction.433  
Thus, the importance of the subjective part of the standard in the form of fault 
or intent has decreased, but the influence of an objective standard focusing on to 
what extent a state should provide for protection and security has increased.434 Still, 
the subjective part remains important because the objective and subjective part of a 
state’s responsibility depend on the circumstances of the case in question.435 In 
conclusion, the due diligence principle varies depending “on the specific context and 
on the content and interpretation of the obligation said to have been breached.”436 
 
5.4.5 Does the standard entail an obligation of conduct or obligation of result? 
A distinction has been made in academic literature and in international practice 
between obligations of states depending on whether they can be considered 
obligations of conduct or obligations of result.437 While it has been recognized that 
these two concepts can have different meanings depending on the circumstances of 
                                                     
432 A. V. Freeman, Responsibility of States for Unlawful Acts of Their Armed Forces, 88 RCADI 267 (1955), 
p. 277-278. 
433 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 3rd ed., OUP (1979), p. 453, and same author, 
System of the Law of Nations, State Responsibility – Part I, Clarendon Press (1983), p. 162 and 168. 
434 See K. Zemanek on ‘Responsibility of State: General Principles’ in Encyclopedia of Public 
International law, Vol. IV, Elsevier (2000), p. 222.  
435 J. Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility – Introduction, Text and 
Commentaries, CUP (2002), p. 82. 
436 J. Crawford and S. Olleson, The Nature and Forms of International Responsibility, in M.D. Evans, 
International law, 2nd ed., OUP (2006), p. 465. 
437 See e.g. I. Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations, State Responsibility — Part I, Clarendon Press 
(1983) p. 241, C. Tomuschat, “What is a ‘Breach’ of the European Convention on Human Rights”, in 
Essays in Honour of Henry G. Schermers, Vol. 3, Martinus Nijhoff (1994) p. 315 and P. Dupuy, Reviewing 
the Difficulties of Codification: On Ago’s Classification of Obligations of Means and Obligations of Result in Relation 
to State Responsibility, EJIL 1999, Vol. 10 No. 2, p. 371. 
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particular cases and jurisdictions,438 the difference between the concepts in civil law 
has been discussed substantively in the following way: 
“[…] obligations of result involve in some measure a guarantee of the outcome, whereas 
obligations of conduct are in the nature of best efforts obligations, obligations to do all in 
one’s power to achieve a result, but without ultimate commitment. Thus a doctor has an 
obligation of conduct towards a patient, but not an obligation of result; the doctor must do 
everything reasonably possible to ensure that the patient recovers, but does not undertake 
that the patient will recover. Under this conception, it is clear that obligations of result are 
more onerous, and breach of such obligations correspondingly easier to prove, than in the 
case of obligations of conduct or means.”439 
 
Similarly, Professor Dupuy has expressed his views on the subject in the context of 
the Iran Hostages case by stating that if “Iran had been willing and able to demonstrate 
that it had actually taken all appropriate steps to avoid the taking of diplomats as 
hostages, then it would not have been held responsible by the Court.”440  
However, the ICJ did not entertain the question in the Iran Hostages case whether 
the responsibility incurred due to the actions of the Iranian revolutionary guard were 
a violation of an obligation of conduct or result. The issue was addressed by Judge 
Schwebel in his dissenting opinion in the ELSI case. The dispute presented before the 
Court was whether Italy had violated its obligation according to an FCN treaty 
between the US and Italy. An Amerian investor, ELSI, had decided to close down its 
plant due to severe losses. Thus, the investor started a process of closing down the 
factory according to a predetermined strategy. However, the mayor of Palermo 
decided with reference to the delicate economic situation to take over the plant. The 
actions of the mayor resulted in ELSI’s bankruptcy and subsequent forced sale of 
assets which led to lower prices than otherwise would have been the case. The 
requisition was held unlawful before Italian courts, but was not considered a breach 
of the FCN treaty by the International Court of Justice. Judge Schwebel noted in his 
dissenting opinion the distinction made between obligations of conduct and result: 
 
                                                     
438 The concept of guaranteeing a particular result is well known in some jurisdictions, e.g. EU-law. 
Member states of the EU are obliged according to Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament 
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“The particular objects of the obligation not to subject such corporations to arbitrary or 
discriminatory measures are very specifically set out. But the particular means of achieving 
these objects are not. Thus, […] the obligation of Article 1 would seem to be an obligation 
not of means but of result, as international treaty obligations concerning the protection of 
aliens and their interests normally are.”441 
 
In addition, Judge Schwebel referred to an issue which has at times been considered 
to undermine the importance of the division made between these two types of 
obligations, namely whether state action is the primary reason for a certain situation 
or whether the same situation is the reason for actions taken by a state: 
“It may of course be maintained that, even in the absence of the requisition, ELSI would 
have gone bankrupt. That indeed is the essential conclusion of the Italian courts and of this 
Chamber. But his conclusion does not take account of the fact – or of what is believed to 
have been shown in this opinion to be the fact – that, if the requisition had not been 
imposed when it was imposed ELSI would have been enabled to realize materially more 
from its assets than in fact was realized, even if, at some point, ELSI might have been 
obliged to go into bankruptcy.”442 
 
Despite the difficulty entailed in the categorization as to whether a specific action is 
an obligation of conduct or result, the distinction between these obligations can be 
used to classify them and to describe conclusions reached in individual cases.443 
Arbitral tribunals have not subjected the host state to a due diligence test that 
focuses specifically on whether the actions of the state should result in a particular 
result or not, but rather used due diligence as a tool to assess the different nature of 
the obligation which is owed to the investor and whether action taken by a state 
suffices to fulfil that obligation.444 That is not to say that tribunals have not been 
hostile to the idea of applying such an assessment of whether the obligation owed is 
an obligation of result or an obligation of conduct.445 It is acknowledged that the due 
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445 See AMT v Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award 21 February 1997, 36 ILM 1531 (1997), 
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diligence test is not to be understood as an insurance policy against every loss due to 
various forms of civil strife. UNCTAD recognized this feature in its study on the 
investor-state disputes derived from investment agreements:  
 
“while not an obligation of result, an obligation of good faith efforts to protect the foreign-
owned property has been established […] As a result, this standard should be understood as 
being very much a ‘living’ one. It places a clear premium on political stability, and the 
obligation of host countries to ensure that any instability does not have negative effects on 
foreign investors, even above the ability to protect domestic investors.”446 
 
The ‘living’ nature of the due diligence test leads to a situation whereby a distinction 
has to be made depending on the different circumstances, as discussed in the 
previous chapter. Thus, in the event where a state is obliged to prevent a certain act 
towards an investor, the state should have a police force that will prevent damage to  
the investor or his investment. However, knowledge of the state plays a considerable 
role in this respect, in particular if it is objectively impossible to prevent a certain 
event. Thus, it is not sufficient for an investor, who has suffered e.g. random 
vandalism, to point out that the perpetrators were not found by the host state’s 
authorities. It is necessary for the host state to try to find and apprehend the 
individuals responsible for the vandalism, but if such an effort, which entails the 
diligent use of police force and other authorities, does not result in an arrest and 
conviction, the state has not violated its obligation according to the standard. If a 
state, however, is unable to prevent an occurrence, but is successful in apprehending 
the perpetrators after it has taken place, it has an obligation to charge them and 
subsequently punish them. As this part of the state obligation is curtailed by various 
factors, including the independence of the judiciary, various penal court procedures 
concerning burden of proof and human rights protection, the state is incapable of 
guaranteeing a particular result. Thus, the nature of the obligation is to establish and 
maintain a structure, e.g. a police force, judiciary, penal system etc. This first part of 
the obligation is objective in nature and entails an obligation of result due to the fact that 
the structure has to be in place. Another part of the obligation is to use the structure 
to fulfill the obligation owed to the investor. This second part of the obligation is, 
however, different in the sense that entails an obligation of conduct, namely the state has 
to use its best efforts to prevent, apprehend and punish the parties who intend to 
inflict or have inflicted damage to the investment.447  
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447 See R. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, ‘State Responsibility in International law’, in R. Provost (ed.), State 
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5.5 The application of the standard  
5.5.1 Introduction 
One of the most controversial aspects of the standard is its application. It is 
important to note that even though the standard is based on a simple idea, its 
application in practice is at times complex and subjected to numerous requirements.  
It is necessary to take note at the outset that the application of the standard is 
limited in numerous ways. These limitations can be procedural and substantive in 
nature and some are more topical than others. In addition, the issue whether the 
standard should be limited to protection of physical safety or whether is should go 
beyond physical safety has divided arbitral tribunals. Still, the arguments that are used 
to conclude either way provide interesting clues as to how far tribunals might go in 
individual cases. 
 
5.5.2 Procedural and substantive requirements for protection 
The Washington Convention of 1965 – ICSID Convention – marks the starting 
point of any discussion addressing procedural issues in terms of investment 
arbitration, not least because the convention provides for the investor-state dispute 
mechanism that is most frequently used in international investment arbitration.   
One of the fundamental requirements for protection is to be found in Article 25 
of the ICSID Convention that describes the Centre’s jurisdiction.448 The article deals 
with questions of jurisdiction concerning the nature of the dispute (ratione materiae) 
and the parties to the dispute (ratione personae). This article is designed to close a 
procedural gap that existed prior to the formulation of the treaty in terms of 
investor-state arbitration. The conventional model of dispute settlement was built 
upon the fact that individuals and companies would resolve their dispute before 
national courts, whereas states would seek adjudication before the International 
Court of Justice. Therefore, the lack of forum for investor-state arbitration was 
solved with the formulation and adoption of the ICSID Convention.449  
However, Article 25 prescribes numerous requirements for a dispute to be 
resolved by a tribunal established according to the Convention – two of these are 
that the dispute must be a legal dispute and that the legal dispute must be between an 
                                                     
448 The ICSID Convention, 575 UNTS 159. Article 25(1) reads as follows: “The jurisdiction of the 
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449 See C. Schreuer, ICSID Convention – A Commentary, CUP (2009), p. 82. 
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entity domiciled in a contracting state (investor) and a contracting state (host state).450 
In addition, the ICSID Arbitration Rules govern more particular procedural matters, 
including the submission of evidence. Many of these provisions have particular 
importance in practice due to the nature of the disputes being adjudicated. 
One of the issues mentioned in Article 25, which has particular importance in 
practice, is the concept of investment. While the concept of investment is central to 
the Convention, no definition of the concept is to be found there. In practice, 
tribunals rely either on an independent test to determine whether an investment has 
been made or follow a definition of the concept found in most BITs.451 However, the 
concept of investment has particular meaning within the context of full protection 
and security as it has been used to argue, for and against, that the standard should 
not only entail physical protection and security of an investor and his investment, but 
also protection and security in the form of legal protection and stability of the 
regulatory framework.452  
According to Article 34(1) of the Rules of Procedure for Arbitration 
Proceedings the tribunal shall judge the admissibility of any evidence adduced and its 
probative value. The general rule is that the claimant must prove that there has been 
a violation of the standard, the violation is a result of state action or can be attributed 
to the state and that he has suffered damage as a result. Similarly, the respondent 
carries the burden of proof with respect to the facts it alleges. However, cases 
involving the full protection and security standard are sometimes particularly 
complex as the main perpetrator is a third party, not the state itself or its agents. 
During the time of civil unrest or when revolutionary forces control parts of the host 
state, it can be almost impossible to gather conclusive evidence in order to assess 
whether the host state has fulfilled its obligation of due diligence.  
In some cases arbitrators have decided that this situation can lessen the burden 
of proof that the claimant has to fulfil. This situation became an issue in the AAPL v 
Sri Lanka where the arbitrators argued, after having previously established that a 
tribunal may, in cases where proof of a fact present extreme difficulty, be satisfied 
with less conclusive proof: 
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451 See N. Rubins, ‘The Notion of ‘Investment’ in International Investment Arbitration’, in N. 
Horn and S. Kröll (eds.), Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes, Kluwer (2004), p. 283, and E. Gaillard, 
‘Identify of Define? Reflections on the Evolution of the Concept of Investment in ICSID Practice’, in 
C. Binder, U. Kriebaum, A. Reinisch and S. Wittich (eds.), International Law for the 21st Century – Essays 
in Honour of Christoph Schreuer, OUP (2009), p. 403.  
452 See e.g. Siemens v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award of 6 February 2007, para 
308.  
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“Therefore, and faced with the impossibility of obtaining conclusive evidence about what 
effectively caused the destruction of the farm premises during the period in which the entire 
area was out of bounds under the exclusive control of the governmental security force, the 
Tribunal considers the state’s responsibility established in conformity with the previously 
stated international law rules of evidence.”453  
 
The situation does not necessarily become less complex even though it is proven that 
governmental agencies have been shown to have harassed key personnel of the 
investor. In Eureko v Poland, the tribunal took note that authorities had harassed the 
investors’ management. The harassment was considered to be disturbing. In spite of 
that the tribunal concluded: 
 
“However, in any event there is no clear evidence before the Tribunal that the [state] was the 
author or instigator of the actions in question. If such action were to be repeated and 
sustained, it may be that the responsibility of the government of Poland would be incurred 
by a failure to prevent them.”454  
 
Even though the task of fulfilling the burden of proof seems to be challenging 
according to arbitral practice, it is not impossible by any means. In Vecchi v Egypt, an 
investor had bought a large part of oceanfront land on the Gulf of Aqaba on the Red 
Sea from the Egyptian Government. The investor argued that Egypt had through 
various acts and omissions expropriated the investment and violated the standard of 
full protection and security. The investor had learnt about it beforehand that the 
investment was to be expropriated and had requested protection. The tribunal noted: 
 
“Claimants have provided detailed submissions and evidence that, upon learning that 
Resolution No. 83 was about to be implemented and Claimants’ investment seized, […] 
made explicit requests of the Nuweibaa Police that Claimants’ investment be protected. […] 
The requests for protection of […] are recorded in verbatim transcripts made by the 
Nuweibaa Police and the El Tor district Attorney’s office […] Egypt has not denied that the 
asserted requests for protection were made. Indeed Egypt, as Claimant noted, has not 
addressed Claimants’ evidence in this regard at all. Absent any evidence to the contrary the 
Tribunal accepts without reservation Claimants’ evidence and finds that these requests for 
protection occurred.”455  
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177
 
Subsequently, the tribunal concluded that numerous obligations according to the 
Italy/Egypt BIT had been violated, including the full protection and security 
standard.456  
Finally, claimants have had difficulties in presenting their arguments – not least 
because of the often unclear substantive content of various investment standards that 
have not been interpreted uniformly in practice. It is imperative to argue with 
procedural clarity when arguing the legal effects of a state’s action or inaction, in 
particular when applying them to a particular investment standard. In the Plama 
Consortium case, the investor had purchased an oil refinery that had been privatized by 
the government. The investor alleged that the government had amended its laws and 
given statements that incited violence towards the investment. The tribunal 
considered that the arguments put forth by the investor lacked structure and a link to 
the established concepts of investment protection. It argued: 
 
“Only in its Reply does Claimant introduce the claim that Respondent failed to create stable, 
equitable, favourable and transparent conditions. Claimant limited its arguments to claiming 
that it was constantly subjected to “haphazard and opaque” decisions by Respondent and 
that repeated “interventions” created “unstable, inequitable, unfavourable and non-
transparent conditions for PCL-s investment.” [...] Claimant did not, however, set out the 
content of this standard or to explain precisely how it had been violated. The only specific 
reference in this regard is that the amendment of [...] allegedly created unstable and 
inequitable conditions.”457 
 
Thus, even though the standard’s substantive content can at times be disputed, it is 
imperative to adhere to the alleged actions and inactions of the state when subjecting 
them to a particular standard.  
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5.5.3 Protection of physical safety 
Arbitral awards, old and new, provide a collection of examples whereby states are 
obliged to provide protection and security. This obligation applies to providing for 
physical protection and security from state organs or acts of private entities.458 
With regards to state organs, in particular, tribunals have often concluded that 
direct action taken by a state or its entities has led to a situation whereby the investor 
has lost control of his investment or the investment has been severely damaged. In 
AAPL v Sri Lanka, the arbitral tribunal was faced with the repercussions of a 
counter-insurgency operation undertaken by the Sri Lankan military. The investment, 
a shrimp farm, had been completely destroyed during the operation. While it was 
unclear who exactly had destroyed the farm, the tribunal considered the state to have 
been in control of the territory where the investment was situated. The tribunal also 
assessed whether the military operation had been necessary or excessive taking into 
account the situation and concluded: 
 
“Accordingly, the Tribunal considers that the Respondent through said inaction and 
omission violated its due diligence obligation which requires undertaking all possible 
measures that could be reasonably expected to prevent the eventual occurrence of killings 
and property destructions.”459  
 
In AMT v Zaire, the investor was the majority owner of a company that owned a cell-
battery production plant. The investor suffered considerable damage due to looting 
in September 1991 and January 1993, some of which was conducted by Zairian 
armed forces. The tribunal concluded that it did not matter whether state entities or 
third parties conducted the looting. The state’s failure to provide protection and 
security sufficed to establish its responsibility.460 In addition to concluding that the 
state had failed to provide protection and security, the tribunal also decided that the 
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state had violated an additional obligation that dealt specifically with damage caused 
during riots or acts of violence.461 
In Wena v Egypt, the tribunal addressed the take-over of the investment, a hotel, 
orchestrated by a government owned entity that was responsible for the country’s 
relationship with foreign investors in the hotel industry. The hotel was seized despite 
assurances to the contrary that had been given by the Ministry of Tourism. Based on 
substantial evidence the tribunal found that (i) Egypt was aware of the hotel seizures 
before they happened and did not prevent them, (ii) Egyptian police forces did 
nothing to protect the investment, (iii) Egypt did not restore the hotels during the 
one year the seizures lasted, (iv) Egypt failed to prevent damage to the investment 
while it was under its control, (v) Egypt failed to sanction the government entity that 
executed the seizure and its senior officials, and (vi) Egypt refused to compensate the 
damage caused. The tribunal concluded that the full protection and security standard 
had been violated.462  
When the state compromises the investment by direct action, is the use of force 
a presupposition for a violation? Arbitral practice does not seem to be uniform 
whether use of force is necessary to violate the physical safety of an investment. In 
Saluka v Czech Republic, the state privatized a part of its banking system whereby the 
investor had succeeded in acquiring shares in publicly owned bank. After the 
investment had been made, the state amended its regulations that negatively affected 
the investment. The tribunal emphasized that the full protection and security 
standard was limited to protecting physical integrity threatened with the use of force: 
 
“The practice of arbitral tribunals seems to indicate, however, that the “full security and 
protection” clause is not meant to cover just any kind of impairment of an investor’s 
investment, but to protect more specifically the physical integrity of an investment against 
interference by use of force.”463 (emphasis added) 
 
In contrast, the tribunal in Biwater Gauff v Tanzania came to a different conclusion. 
The investor participated successfully in a tender to repair and expand the Dar es 
Salaam water and sewage system. After the investor commenced his activities, the 
government terminated contracts, repealed VAT exemptions and eventually took 
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over the investment. The tribunal dealt with whether use of force was a 
presupposition for a violation: 
 
“In that perspective, even if no force was used in removing the management from the 
offices or in the seizure of City Water’s premises, these acts were unnecessary and abusive 
and amount to a violation by the Republic of its obligation to ensure full protection and 
security to its investors.” 464 
 
When it comes to acts of third parties that threaten the safety of the investment, such 
as social demonstrations of third parties due to the controversial nature of the 
investment, tribunals seem to be of the opinion that the investor must tolerate some 
disruption in connection to those demonstrations. In TECMED v Mexico and Noble 
Ventures v Romania, the arbitral tribunals dealt with demonstrations that, as pointed 
out by the investors, became troublesome following a change in political climate. In 
the former case, an investor had taken part in a privatization project and succeeded 
in acquiring rights over a landfill. However, the political climate towards the 
privatization project changed, resulting in a situation whereby the investment became 
a contentious issue in local politics. Demonstrations and disturbances ensued. The 
investor argued that the Mexican authorities had not provided protection and 
security against the demonstrations. In the latter case, the investor had purchased a 
government owned steel mill. Shortly thereafter, a change in government took place 
that was less open to the transaction. Local unions demonstrated against the investor 
and his ownership of the steel mill. In both cases the tribunals disagreed with the 
investors and in the latter case the tribunal stated that: 
 
“Even assuming the correctness of the Claimant’s factual allegations, it is difficult to identify 
any specific failure by the Respondent to exercise due diligence in protecting the Claimant. 
And even if one concluded that there was a certain failure on the side of the Respondent 
sufficiently grave to regard it as a violation, it has not been established that non-compliance 
with the obligation […] to a material degree. The Claimant has failed to prove that its alleged 
injuries and losses could have been prevented had the Respondent exercised due diligence in 
this regard, nor has it established any specific value of the losses.”465  
 
In a more recent case, Toto v Lebanon, a tribunal was faced with a complaint based 
upon the notion that the host state had not prevented demonstrators, which were 
former owners of land that had been expropriated to construct a motor highway (the 
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investment), to temporary obstruct the investor in his operations. After having cited 
inter alia the ELSI case, the tribunal rejected this part of the complaint in the following 
way: 
 
“In the present case, the temporary obstruction of some expropriated owners did not 
amount to an impairment which affected the physical integrity of the investment. Moreover, 
Toto did not demonstrate that Lebanon could have taken preventive or remedial action that 
it failed to take, and that it acted negligently in relation to the owners’ obstruction.”466  
 
Other tribunals have followed a historical approach emphasizing that the standard 
has historically been limited to physical protection and security. In Rumeli v 
Kazakhstan, the investment was made in the telecom industry. The risk inherent in 
the investment was substantial as it entailed building up a certain type of telecom 
network that was unknown in the country. After the investment became successful, 
public officials allegedly orchestrated a scheme whereby the investor lost control of 
the investment. The tribunal argued that the standard only obliged the respondent to 
provide for a certain level of protection from “physical damage”.467 In a similar 
approach, the tribunal in BG Group Plc v Argentina argued that the original meaning of 
the full protection and security standard had traditionally been associated with 
“physical security” of the investor and the investment.468 As allegations concerning 
physical violence or damage had not been made, the tribunal could not find a 
violation. However, the tribunal acknowledged that a number of tribunals had 
concluded that the full protection and security standard incorporated an obligation to 
provide for “a secure investment environment”, but did not find it appropriate to 
depart from the original meaning of the standard.469 
The reasoning for limiting a state’s obligation to physical protection and security 
is, needless to say, of crucial importance. However, the arguments used to deny an 
investor any further protection, i.e. legal protection or obligation to maintain a stable 
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legal framework, is of equal importance as they often include elements that a tribunal 
considers necessary to extend the protection further.  
 
5.5.4 Protection beyond physical safety  
A number of tribunals have gone further and contemplated whether the full 
protection and security standard entails an obligation to provide legal security, or to 
maintain a legal framework that is stable and secure in terms of both physical, 
commercial and legal security. However, arbitral awards are particularly non-uniform 
in this context. At the same time, some tribunals have had reservations that widening 
the scope of the standard would be lead to an overlap with fair and equitable 
treatment and some forms of expropriation.470 Different patterns appear in arbitral 
tribunals as to how extensive the legal protection should be in individual cases. 
 
1) Legal system available to investor 
Tribunals have often concluded that when a state provides the investor access to its 
legal system, regardless of whether it is access to the administrative or judicial part of 
the system, the state has fulfilled its obligation even though it has not been able to 
prevent an occurrence that has had adverse effect on the investment. Here, the ELSI 
case is illustrative on two different points. The case dealt with efforts of an American 
investor to liquidate his investment after having realized that it would not be 
profitable. Thus, the investor set out a scheme for the purpose of “orderly 
liquidation” of the investment. The situation was delicate as the company employed 
about 800 Italian workers. Shortly after the company had dismissed all the workers, 
the mayor of Palermo ordered the company to be requisited for six months. In 
addition to this action, workers occupied the company plant. The company instigated 
legal proceedings in order to reverse the order of the mayor. The appellate body, 
which dealt with the appeal, did not pass judgment on the order until 16 months 
later. At that time the mayor’s order had expired. Before that period, the company 
was forced to declare bankruptcy. This led the United States to bring a case before 
the International Court of Justice. Firstly, the United States argued that the Italian 
state had failed to prove most constant protection and security when it failed to 
prevent workers from occupying the company’s plant shortly after it had been taken 
over by public authorities as ordered by the Mayor of Palermo. Secondly, the United 
States argued that it had taken an appellate body 16 months to rule on the order 
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which enabled the state to take over the plant – that in itself constituted a violation 
of the protection and security standards stipulated in Article V, paragraphs 1 and 3. 
The Court concluded that no violation of Article V, paragraphs 1 and 3, had taken 
place.471 As to the first issue, the ICJ argued that even though the FCN treaty 
between the United States and Italy prescribed that nationals of the contracting states 
should enjoy “most constant protection and security” that could not be construed as 
guaranteeing that property should never in any circumstance be occupied or 
disturbed.472 With regard to the second issue, the ICJ agreed that while the time taken 
by the appellate body was undoubtedly long it did not constitute a violation of the 
international minimum standard of full protection and security.473 
The Lauder and CME cases are particularly interesting because there the tribunals 
dealt with the same facts, the same standard, but reached different conclusions. The 
facts of the cases were that an American investor made an investment in the media 
business in the Czech Republic. In 1993, the investor established a business 
relationship with a Czech counterpart – a relationship that enabled him to launch a 
successful TV station. From the very start of the business a Czech regulatory body 
made comments as to how the investment should be structured and thus affected the 
relationship of the investor with its Czech counterpart. In order to accommodate 
these comments the investor and the Czech entity decided to organize their 
relationship in a certain way – a two tier structure was adopted in which the Czech 
entity was the license holder, but the investor was the operator. Under this structure 
the investor had exclusive use of the broadcasting license granted to the Czech entity. 
In 1996 the Czech media law was changed which eventually convinced the regulatory 
body to alter its original position. The regulatory body informed the parties 
concerned that it thought that the structure should be altered. Despite some 
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opposition the parties altered their two-tier structure in a way that the exclusive use 
of the investor was not guaranteed in the same way as it had been previously. 
Subsequently, an ongoing commercial dispute ensued between the investor and his 
Czech counterpart in 1999. That dispute eventually lead to the termination of the 
relationship by the Czech entity and made it impossible for the investor to continue 
his participation in the Czech media market as it did not have access to a 
broadcasting license. The investor instigated arbitral proceedings in which he argued 
that changes made to the Czech media law, government interference with regard to 
the structure of his investment and the termination of the business relationship by 
his Czech business partner was tantamount to a violation of inter alia the standard of 
full protection and security.  
The tribunal in Lauder v Czech Republic rejected the claims of the investor by 
pointing out that changes made to the media law did not have adverse effects on the 
business of the investor, in fact, the changes were considered to his favour at the 
time. Moreover, the tribunal pointed out that the main cause for the loss of the 
investor were not the actions or inactions of the Czech authorities but the 
termination of a contractual relationship between the investor and his Czech 
counterpart. No obligation of due diligence existed which obliged the Czech 
authorities to intervene in a dispute between two companies over the nature of their 
legal relationship. It then stated: 
 
“The investment treaty created no duty of due diligence on the part of the Czech Republic to 
intervene in the dispute between the two companies over the nature of their legal 
relationships. The Respondent’s only duty under the Treaty was to keep its judicial system 
available for the Claimant and any entities he controls to bring their claims, and for such 
claims to be properly examined and decided in accordance with domestic and international 
law. There is no evidence - not even an allegation - that the Respondent has violated this 
obligation.474 
 
As the investor had made use of the Czech judicial system, the tribunal could not 
find a violation of the standard of full protection and security. In contrast, the 
tribunal in CME v Czech Republic concluded that the legal security of the investment 
had been removed, as will be discussed below.475 
Arbitral tribunals have not considered social demonstrations, which have 
according to investors had adverse effect on the investment, to be violations of the 
standard as such. Following such unrest, the government often implements measures 
that also affect the investment in a negative way. If the host state grants the investor 
                                                     
474 Lauder v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Award 3 September 2001, para 314. 
475 CME v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Partial Award 13 September 2001, para 613. 
185
access to his judicial system or administrative system, it might have fulfilled its 
obligation in terms of full protection and security. In Tecmed v Mexico, the tribunal 
emphasized that the investor had had access to the judicial system in order to guard 
his interest against government measures.476 Similarly, in Saluka v Czech Republic, the 
tribunal dealt with two measures that affected the investment – first, a freezing order 
that prohibited the sale of shares of the newly privatized company and, second, a 
search and seizure operation undertaken by the host state’s police. The tribunal held 
on both counts that the investor had had access to an appellate body and a revision 
before the constitutional court. Therefore, no violation of the full protection and 
security standard occurred: 
 
“Even assuming that the freezing of the IPB shares held by Saluka may be State conduct 
within the scope of the “full security and protection” clause, the Tribunal […] fails to see a 
procedural denial of justice that would violate the Czech Republic’s Treaty obligations. The 
absence of further appeals against decisions of the last instance for appeals is not per se a 
denial of justice. The alleged denial of Saluka’s right to be heard is the basis for the petition 
lodged with the Constitutional Court. Nothing therefore emerges from the facts before the 
Tribunal that would amount to a manifest lack of due process leading to a breach of 
international justice and to a failure of the Czech Republic to provide “full protection and 
security” to Saluka’s investment.”477 
 
“The Claimant furthermore complains of the search of […] Prague Representative Office 
and the seizure of […] documents. According to the Claimant, these police actions were 
illegal and violated […] fundamental rights to the inviolability of privacy and home, to the 
protection against unauthorized interference with its privacy and unauthorized gathering of 
data, and to the protection of ownership rights. […] Saluka […], however, successfully 
lodged a petition with the Czech Constitutional Court which in a decision of 10 October 
2001 held in favour of Saluka.”478   
 
Surprisingly, a broad definition of the full protection and security standard has not 
always been considered to establish an obligation to maintain a stable legal and 
commercial environment. In Suez and Vivendi v Argentina, a tribunal was faced with 
the task of interpreting the standard that prescribed that an investment should be 
“fully and completely protected and safeguarded”. The dispute concerned 
infrastructure projects that had been privatized but later taken over by the 
government during economic difficulties. The tribunal held that this expansive 
formulation of the standard in treaty law could not be applied without taking into 
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account the historical application of the standard. That approach led to the 
conclusion that the standard entailed a due diligence obligation to protect the 
investor from physical harm, but excluded an obligation to maintain a legal and 
commercial environment. Still, the obligation to protect an investment from physical 
harm included an obligation to provide “adequate mechanisms and legal remedies for 
prosecuting State organs or private parties responsible for the injury caused.”479 
 
2) Can physical security of an intangible asset be achieved?  
Before addressing arbitral awards that deal with the issue of whether the obligation to 
provide protection and security entails protection beyond physical security, it is 
necessary to address one problem in particular which was raised by the tribunal in 
Siemens v Argentina. As noted by the tribunal, the definition of the concept of 
investment has expanded considerably following the ever increasing number of BITs 
– an evolution that has led to the inclusion of more types of assets than before and, 
in effect, expanded the level of protection. Therefore, the full protection and security 
standard also provides protection for intangible investments, including contract 
claims, according to most BITs.480 It is, however, questionable to see, as stated by the 
tribunal in Siemens v Argentina, in what way full protection and security beyond 
physical safety can be provided to an intangible investment:  
 
“As a general matter and based on the definition of investment, which included tangible and 
intangible assets, the Tribunal considers that the obligation to provide full protection and 
security is wider than “physical” protection and security. It is difficult to understand how the 
physical security of an intangible asset would be achieved.”481  
 
It is obviously correctly stated by the tribunal that the physical security of an 
intangible asset is difficult to implement – a principle containing these substantive 
provisions comes close to an oxymoron. However, the reason for protecting 
investments that take an intangible form, e.g. various contract rights, shareholder 
rights or copyrights, can be as great as protecting tangible investments. In addition, 
the fact that the investment is intangible does not change the fact that the investment 
is to be protected, but only the way in which the investment is to be protected. So, 
the protection owed to the investor cannot be physical in the literal sense, but must 
be in the form of providing structures to the investor that protect the investment, 
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e.g. police force, court system, administrative system, etc. In these cases a state’s 
obligation can take the form of providing police protection to the investor in the 
sense of securing the premises of a venue where a shareholder meeting is being held 
or closing down criminal business operations which have the aim of interfering with 
the investment. Other forms would also become part of a state’s obligation, 
including providing the investor with remedies to address violations against his 
intangible property, such as providing for a legal system that enables the investor to 
instigate legal proceedings before a court. That would apply inter alia in cases where 
e.g. a patent is stolen, copied or imitated – the state must provide for remedies that 
enable the investor to take action and enforce any awards that are necessary to 
protect the investment.482 It is important to emphasize that this does not entail an 
overlap with the fair and equitable treatment standard because the state’s 
participation does not entail treatment, but is a reaction to adverse effects caused by 
third parties to the investment.   
 
3) Legal security – Legal protection  
Tribunals have noted that the wide definition of the concept of investment leads to 
the conclusion that the protection of the investment cannot be limited to physical 
security alone. In individual cases tribunals are in a particular position because they 
are faced with a wide formulation of the full protection and security standard, namely 
“full legal protection and legal security”, “fully and completely protected and 
safeguarded” or “full legal protection to investments of investors of the other 
Contracting Party”.483 
In contrast to the conclusion of the tribunal in the Lauder v Czech Republic, the 
tribunal in CME v Czech Republic decided that the host state had violated the full 
protection and security standard. The claimant in these arbitration proceedings was 
CME, a company domiciled in the Netherlands and in the ownership of Mr. Lauder, 
the party to the former arbitration proceedings. Here, the assessment of the same 
circumstances, in particular the role the regulatory body played during the beginning 
of the business in 1993 and proposed amendments to the investment structure in 
1996, and how its role affected the investment, was very different. The state’s 
inaction during a commercial dispute in 1999 – a dispute which later led to the 
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termination of the business relationship – was thought to be of considerable 
importance with regard to the standard of full protection and security. The tribunal 
argued, when assessing whether the state had violated the standard of full protection 
and security, the following: 
 
“The Media Council’s actions in 1996 and its actions and inactions in 1999 were targeted to 
remove the security and legal protection of the Claimant’s investment in the Czech Republic. The 
Media Council’s (possible) motivation to regain control of the operation of the broadcasting 
after the Media Law had been amended as of January 1, 1996 is irrelevant. The host State is 
obligated to ensure that neither by amendment of its laws nor by actions of its administrative 
bodies is the agreed and approved security and protection of the foreign investor’s 
investment withdrawn or devalued. This is not the case. The Respondent is therefore in 
breach of this obligation.”484 (emphasis added) 
 
In Azurix Corp v Argentina, the investor had invested in a utility that distributed 
drinking water and disposed of sewerage water. The investor argued that the host 
state had failed to implement a tariff regime and that the host state had not 
completed certain works related to the infrastructure necessary for the concession. 
After having cited Wena v Egypt and Occidental v Ecuador, the tribunal concluded that 
the standard ought not be limited to physical security and that:  
 
“[…] full protection and security was understood to go beyond protection and security 
ensured by the police. It is not only a matter of physical security; the stability afforded by a 
secure investment environment is as important from an investor’s point of view. […] However, 
when the terms “protection and security” are qualified by “full” and no other adjective or 
explanation, they extend, in their ordinary meaning, the content of this standard beyond 
physical security.”485 (emphasis added) 
 
In Siemens v Argentina, the investor participated successfully in a bid to design and 
maintain a personal identification and electoral information system. However, the 
host country later requested that the investor postpone the implementation of the 
system and eventually demanded that the contract concerning the investment be 
renegotiated. The tribunal was faced with the task of interpreting an unusually wide 
formulation of the standard.486 The tribunal argued that protection was not limited to 
physical protection alone due to the fact that BIT applicable to the dispute contained 
a very broad definition of the concept of investment. The tribunal further stated that 
the concept of “legal security” had been defined as being “the quality of the legal 
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system which implies certainty in its norms and, consequently, their foreseeable 
application.” Having discussed these issues, the tribunal stated: 
 
“To conclude, the Tribunal finds that the initiation of the renegotiation of the Contract for 
the sole purpose of reducing its costs, unsupported by any declaration of public interest, 
affected the legal security of Siemens’ investment.”487 
 
In Vivendi v Argentine a dispute arose over the privatization of a provincial water and 
sewage system. A concession agreement for 30 years was awarded to the investor. 
Shortly after the investor took over the system, problems arose with the provincial 
authorities concerning a number of issues relating to the investment. The tribunal 
concluded after having cited the cases of ELSI, Wena Hotels, Rankin and Eureko that 
protection and security can “apply to more than physical security of an investor or its 
property, because either could be subject to harassment without being physically 
harmed or seized.”488 
One authority has gone particularly far with regard to arguing for an obligation 
incumbent on the host state of securing a stable legal framework and economic 
stability. In Biwater Gauff v Tanzania, the investor had been awarded a contract to 
repair and expand a water and sewage system. However, the state later terminated the 
contract, repealed tax exemptions and took over the investment. The tribunal argued 
the following concerning how far-reaching the host state’s obligation should be: 
 
“The Arbitral Tribunal adheres to the Azurix holding that when the terms “protection” and 
“security” are qualified by “full”, the content of the standard may extend to matters other 
than physical security.  It implies a State’s guarantee of stability in a secure environment, 
both physical, commercial and legal.  It would in the Arbitral Tribunal’s view be unduly 
artificial to confine the notion of “full security” only to one aspect of security, particularly in 
light of the use of this term in a BIT, directed at the protection of commercial and financial 
investments.”489  
 
The dispute in National Grid v Argentine Republic concerned an investment of the 
claimant in a formerly state-owned company that had been accorded a ninety-five 
year concession agreement to provide high-voltage electricity transmission service. 
The tribunal assessed whether actions of the government, which were a reaction to 
an economic crisis, constituted a violation of the full protection and security 
standard. The tribunal concluded by arguing: 
 
                                                     
487 Siemens v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award of 6 February 2007, para 308. 
488 Vivendi Universal S.A. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award of 20 August 
2007, para 7.4.17. 
489 Biwater Gauff Ltd. v Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award of 24 July 2008, para 729. 
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“The Tribunal concludes that the phrase “protection and constant security” as related to the 
subject matter of the Treaty does not carry with it the implication that this protection is 
inherently limited to protection and security of physical assets. This conclusion is reinforced 
by the inclusion of this commitment in the same article of the Treaty as the language on fair 
and equitable treatment. In applying this standard of protection to the facts of the instant 
case, the Tribunal finds that the changes introduced [...], which effectively dismantled it, and 
the uncertainty reigning during the two years preceding [...], with respect to any possible 
compensation on account of the impact of the measures on Claimant’s investment, are 
contrary to the protection and constant security which the Respondent agreed to provide for 
the investments under the Treaty.”490 
 
One category of awards is of particular interest, namely the awards that reject the 
claimants’ case of extending protection beyond physical safety, but recognise at the 
same time that the scope of the standard can, in individual cases, be extended. In 
Sempra Energy v Argentina, the tribunal argued the following: 
 
“There is no doubt that historically this particular standard has been developed in the 
context of physical protection and the security of a company’s officials, employees and 
facilities. The Tribunal cannot exclude as a matter of principle the possibility that there might 
be cases in which a broader interpretation could be justified. Such situations would, however, 
no doubt constitute specific exceptions to the operation of the traditional understanding of 
the principle. [...] In this case, there has been no allegation of a failure to give full protection 
and security to officials, employees or installations. The general argument made about a 
possible lack of protection and security in the broader ambit of the legal and political system 
has in no way been proven or even adequately developed.”491 
 
One of the latest cases dealing with protection and security, Vecchi v Egypt, touched 
upon actions of the state that violated what would generally be considered legal 
security. The host state took over the investment despite the investor’s repeated 
requests for police protection. The investor successfully challenged the resolution 
that provided legitimacy for the seizure of the investment before Egyptian courts. 
On these issues the tribunal concluded that the conduct shown by the host state had 
fallen well below the standard of protection owed to the investor “both in allowing 
the expropriation to occur and in […] failing to take steps to return the investment 
                                                     
490 National Grid Plc. v Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL Award, 3 November 2008, para 189. Other 
awards have reached similar conclusions when the full protection and security standard is linked to 
fair and equitable treatment. See e.g. Total SA v Argentine Republic, ICSID Award, 27 December 2010, 
para 343. 
491 Sempra Energy Int. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award of 28 September 
2007, paras 323-324. See almost an identical argument in Enron Corp. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/01/3, Award of 22 May 2007, paras 286-287. 
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[…] following repeated rulings of Egypt’s own courts that the expropriation was 
illegal.”492 
 
5.5.5 Conclusion concerning application 
Various cases included in this study reveal two different approaches of tribunals 
when dealing with the standard’s application – one group adheres to the principle 
that the standard’s scope is limited to physical protection whereas the other group is 
of the opinion that protection goes beyond physical safety alone. Which group is 
right? As in any legal dispute, both groups have some merit in the context in which 
they present their arguments. The former group is right that the standard has 
traditionally applied to physical security alone. The latter group is also correct in 
arguing that the standard has also been applied in ways to include legal security.  
With regard to the first arguments which builds upon the presupposition that 
the standard has historically only been subjected to physical protection, it is 
important to note two distinct issues: (i) the general obligation to protect has 
historically not always been limited to physical protection and (ii) international law 
has changed considerably since the argument of the former group was universally 
accepted in arbitral practice.  
Arbitral awards stemming from the inter-war period seem to show that the 
obligation to provide protection and security was not limited to physical protection 
alone. Here, it is important do differentiate between different parts of the obligation 
to provide protection and security depending on whether they entail a duty to prevent, a 
duty to restore or a duty to investigate, prosecute and punish.493 When a state failed to provide 
physical protection, e.g. because it was impossible for the host state to have any 
knowledge that the security of an alien was jeopardised, its obligation became one of 
investigating, prosecuting and punishing those responsible. This part of the 
obligation was, first and foremost, an obligation to provide for the necessary legal 
framework and use that framework in order to protect the alien and his property.494 
As has already been discussed, this last part of investigation, prosecution and 
                                                     
492 Waguih Elie George Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award 1 June 
2009, para 448. 
493 See Chapter 5.4.2.  
494 Arbitral awards from the interwar period show that if a state fails to prevent an attack on an 
alien it has the obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish the perpetrators. See e.g. Lillian Greenlaw 
Sewell, (USA) v United Mexican States, IV RIAA (1930), p. 631-632, John D. Chase (USA) v United Mexican 
States, IV RIAA (1928), p. 339 and Gertrude Parker Massey (USA) v United Mexican States, IV RIAA 
(1927), p. 162. Further examples are mentioned in R. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, ‘State Responsibility in 
International law’, in R. Provost (ed.), State Responsibility in International law, Ashgate/Dartmouth (2002), 
p. 117. 
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punishment is an obligation of best efforts, as opposed to an obligation of result, due 
to the various external effects, such as the independence of the judiciary. However, 
that does not provide the host state with unlimited discretion in that regard, such as 
not preventing the xenophobic arguments be used against the alien in question or 
not implementing court decision’s that have concluded that particular state action is 
in violation of constitutional rights.495  
With regard to the second argument, it is important to note that a structural 
change has been taking place amongst the sources of international investment law – 
the dominant source of law in investment disputes is not customary international law 
or principles contained in FCN treaties, but BITs, most of which have been 
concluded in the last fifty years.496 Those agreements have influenced this sphere 
considerably. One of the most fundamental changes is the ever-widening definition 
of the concept of investment. A case in point is the different definition of the 
concept of investment in the Germany-Pakistan BIT of 1959 compared to the 
definition of the same concept in the Germany-Bosnia Herzegovina BIT of 2001. In 
Article 8 of the Germany-Pakistan BIT497 the concept of investment is defined in a 
simple way compared to the more elaborate definition of investment in Article 1 of 
the Germany-Bosnia-Herzegovina.498 
                                                     
495 See e.g. Loewen Group et al v United States of America, Additional Facility Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 
para 132, and Waguih Elie George Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award 
1 June 2009, para 448. 
496 See Chapter 2 for a general historical overview and Chapter 3 with regard to how the sources 
have changed structurally. 
497 Article 8 of the Germany-Pakistan BIT is as follows: 
“(1) (a) The term “investment” shall comprise capital brought into the territory of the other Party for 
investment in various forms in the shape of assets such as foreign exchange, goods, property rights, 
patents and technical knowledge. The term “investment” shall also include the returns derived from 
and ploughed back into such “investment”. 
 (b) Any partnerships, companies or assets of similar kind, created by the utilisation of the above 
mentioned assets shall be regarded as “investment”. 
498 Article 1 of the Germany-Bosnia-Herzegovina BIT is as follows: 
“1. The term “investments” comprises every kind of asset, in particular: 
(a) movable and immovable property as well as any other rights in rem, such as mortgages, liens 
and pledges; 
(b) shares of companies and other kind of interests in companies; 
(c) claims to money which has been used to create an economic value or claims to any 
performance having an economic value; 
(d) intellectual property rights, in particular copyrights, patents, utility-model patents, industrial 
designs, trade-marks, trade-names, trade and business secrets, technical processes, know-
how, and good will; 
(e) business concessions under public law, including concessions to search for, extract and 
exploit natural resources; 
any alteration of the form in which assets are invested shall not affect their classification as 
investment.”  
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These developments are of importance as they influence the content of the rules 
that govern investment protection, including full protection and security. This 
evolution should make it more difficult to apply a “historical approach” to limit a 
treaty-based standard that provides for “full protection and security” or “full legal 
protection and legal security”. Or as famously noted in the Mondev case where the 
tribunal addressed the relevance of arbitral awards of the 1920s within the context of 
investment protection:  
 
“[...] Neer and like arbitral awards were decided in the 1920s, when the status of the 
individual in international law, and the international protection of foreign investments, were 
far less developed than they have since come to be. In particular, both the substantive and 
procedural rights of the individual in international law have undergone considerable 
development. In the light of these developments it is unconvincing to confine the meaning 
of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and security” of foreign investments to 
what those terms – had they been current at the time – might have meant in the 1920s when 
applied to the physical security of an alien.”499  
 
To conclude, it seems that the standard should, as an absolute minimum, provide for 
physical protection and security of the investment, not unless the relevant BIT is 
formulated in a way to increase the level of protection. In the event that a BIT 
explicitly states that the investment should be accorded “legal security”, a tribunal 
must approach the legal dispute taking into account that the contracting parties have 
indicated a higher level of protection. If, however, no such provision is to be found, 
the conclusion must be that protection in the form of legal security is limited to 
structures dealing with either investigation, prosecution and punish those responsible 
and a legal framework that enables the investor to vindicate his rights. It is safe to 
say, given the frequent rate of legal disputes being adjudicated before arbitral 
tribunals, that more detailed criteria will emerge in the future.  
 
5.6 Does the host state’s level of development affect application? 
5.6.1 Investors in less developed countries  
It is not self-evident that a state would be susceptible to admitting foreign direct 
investment into its territory. The state has no obligation under international law to do 
so.500 However, foreign direct investment is generally considered advantageous to 
states as it increases productive capacity of a country’s economy.501 The benefits of 
                                                     
499 Mondev International Ltd. v United States of America, Additional Facility Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, 
Award of 11 October 2002, 6 ICSID Reports 192; 42 ILM 85 (2003), para 116. 
500 C. Schreuer and R. Dolzer, Principles of International Investment Law, OUP (2008), p. 7. 
501 See OECD, Policy Framework for Investment, Paris 2006, p. 7. 
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foreign direct investment can serve as a powerful tool to increase level of 
development. Investment can, in a similar way as international trade, have beneficial 
effects to a country’s economy. However, the parallels are only limited to the 
beneficial effects of investment and trade due to the different nature of these two 
transactions. Therefore, it is important to differentiate investment from trade – the 
former entails a long-term relationship between the investor and the host country, 
whereas the latter usually consists of a one-time exchange of goods and money.502 
The reasons why a national of a particular state decides to seek opportunities in 
another state are manifold. One of the reasons can be that the national comes from a 
developed country and intends to enter a less developed country to capitalize on its 
resources, which are not being explored. Such a scenario has advantages for an 
investor; he could provide the host state with expertise and funding and have the 
possibility of earning a rate of return on his investment in excess of what would be 
possible in a more developed country. In such cases the investor enjoys an advantage 
due to his expertise and access to funding. However, the investor should realize that 
he enters a less developed country – a situation that entails that he cannot expect to 
enjoy the same protection and security as in his home country.503  
 
5.6.2 Protection reasonable under the circumstances 
Examples can be found in academia and arbitral practice alike that the host state’s 
development could possibly play a role when determining a state’s obligation to 
provide protection and security.  
The different capabilities of states to provide protection and security have not 
gone unnoticed by commentators. It is appropriate to revert to Elihu Root on the 
importance of an international standard: 
 
“If any country’s system of law and administration does not conform to that standard, 
although the people of the country may be content or compelled to live under it, no other 
country can be compelled to accept it as furnishing a satisfactory measure of treatment of 
aliens [...] It is a practical standard and has regard always to the possibilities of government under 
existing conditions. The rights of the foreigner vary as the rights of the citizen vary between 
ordinary and peaceful times and times of disturbance and tumult; between settled and 
ordinary communities and frontier regions and mining camps.”504 [emphasis added] 
 
 
                                                     
502 C. Schreuer and R. Dolzer, Principles of International Investment Law, OUP (2008), p. 3-4. 
503 See N. Gallus, The Influence of the Hosts State’s Level of Development on International Investment Treaty 
Standards of Protection, The Journal of World Investment & Trade, Vol. 6, Number 5, October 2005, p. 
711-712, concerning the different questions of interpretation which need to be addressed depending 
on whether the investment is made in a developed country or a developing country. 
504 E. Root, The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad, 4 AJIL 517 (1910), p. 523. 
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International law has developed considerably after the composition of Root’s 
passage. However, commentators and arbitrators still maintain the position that the 
application of the minimum standard, when deciding on a state’s international 
responsibility, should be proportional to its resources. Borchard recognised that 
violence towards aliens could occasionally happen in well-ordered, as well as less 
well-ordered states, despite ordinary precaution and due diligence exercised by 
governments to prevent it. In addition, he argued that a state could not be held liable 
for mob violence that it was unable to prevent.505 This position was reflected in the 
Harvard Draft on The Law of Responsibility of States for Damage Done in their 
Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners of 1929. In comments to Article 4, 
which dealt with a general duty to maintain a minimum amount of governmental 
organization, “means at [a governments] disposal” were addressed in this way: 
 
“The failure to perform the duty, under normal conditions, may make it impossible for a 
state to avoid responsibility in certain cases where responsibility otherwise would not have 
existed. It is to be recognized, however, that in every state temporary abnormal conditions 
may result in the dislocation of the governmental organization, and such possibility is to be 
taken into account in determining whether responsibility exists in a given case. Even in 
abnormal times, however, a state has a duty to use the means at its disposal for the 
protection of aliens, and a failure to perform this duty may result in its becoming responsible 
to another state injured in consequence thereof. The term “means at its disposal” is 
employed because it is desired to emphasize the instrumentalities of government that may be 
available for use.”506 
 
Similar arguments were acknowledged in the Harvard Draft Convention on the 
International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens of 1961. The explanatory 
note to Article 13(1), which addressed due diligence, stated: 
 
The means which a State has available to protect an alien must also be taken into account. In 
a thinly populated area, it cannot be expected that large police forces be mobilized in order 
to render safe those aliens who may wish to enter the area. It is, however, quite clear that a 
State must not stop at affording protection through police but must, if necessary, attempt to 
maintain order through the intervention of military forces as well. In sum, the duty of state 
to afford protection may vary with the character of the territory in question in the very same 
manner that the acts necessary for the exercise of sovereignty may vary with the nature of 
the terrain, the population and the degree of civilization of the area claimed.”507  
 
 
                                                     
505 E. Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, The Banks Law Publishing Co. (1915), p. 
220-223. 
506 Harvard Draft on The Law of Responsibility of States for Damage Done in their Territory to 
the Person or Property of Foreigners reproduced in 23 AJIL 1929, Special Supplement, p. 133, at 146. 
507 Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsiblity of States for Injures to Aliens, 
Draft No. 12, 15 April 1961 reprinted in M.M. Whiteman, Digest of International law, Vol. 8, p. 739-740. 
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An additional example would be O’Donnell’s treatise on international law where he 
argued that the obligation should take into account the resources available to the 
state in question. However, if it could be established that a “...situation called for 
more police which could have been provided in time and were not...” the situation 
would be different. Thus, a state would violate its obligation if the facts were known 
to its authorities and no action was taken or the action which was taken is inadequate 
taking into account available resources.508 This view has been supported by other 
writers, most recently by Newcombe and Paradell: 
 
“Although the host state is required to exercise an objective minimum standard of due 
diligence, the standard of due diligence is that of a host state in the circumstances and with 
the resources of the state in question. This suggests that due diligence is a modified objective 
standard – the host state must exercise the level of due diligence of a host state in its 
particular circumstances. In practice, tribunals will likely consider the state’s level of 
development and stability as relevant circumstance in determining whether there has been 
due diligence. An investor investing in an area with endemic civil strife and poor governance 
cannot have the same expectation of physical security as one investing in London, New York 
or Tokyo.”509  
 
Arbitral practice supports the notion that the resources of the state should be taken 
into account when assessing the obligation of a state to provide protection. The 
British Claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco case dealt with claims by British subjects 
against Spanish authorities for damage to life or property suffered in the course of 
riots and civil unrest during the insurrection of a tribe, the Rifkabyls, in the Spanish 
Zone of Morocco. Arbitrator Huber argued that even though a state could not be 
made responsible for a particular occurrence, it could not be free from every 
responsibility. To the contrary, a state would be obliged to exercise due diligence 
during a period of civil unrest. The degree of diligence would in this context be 
important and could be characterized as an analogy of the principle of diligentia quam 
in suis, namely that the obligation of a state in terms of degree of vigilance should 
correspond to the means at its disposal – in other words, the state would be obliged 
to do only what it could reasonably be expected to do.510  
Here parallels can be drawn between the general obligation of states to provide 
protection, as described in the British Claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco case, and 
                                                     
508 D. P. O’Donnell, International Law, Vol. II (1970), p. 968 et seq.  
509 A. Newcombe and L. Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties – Standards of Treatment, 
Kluwer Law International (2009), p. 310. 
510 See British Claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco, II RIAA (1923), p. 644 and also B. Cheng, General 
Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, Stevens & Sons Ltd. (1953), p. 220. 
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arbitral practice within the context of investment protection. The approach in these 
disputes is similar, in particular with regard to what the state could reasonably be 
expected to do. While a balancing of interests between states and investors is 
necessary, based on an assessment undertaken on a case-by-case basis, arbitration 
awards seem to favour that investor’s expectations should have an additional 
relevance in that assessment. The Alex Genin v Estonia case dealt with an investor who 
chose to purchase a financial institution privatized by the Estonian state. The 
investor’s banking license was later revoked and his employees allegedly harassed. 
The tribunal denied the claims of the investor and took note that the transaction was 
a part of an effort by a former communist country to reorganize its economy and 
change it into a market-based economy. Having pointed this situation out, the 
tribunal argued “[t]his is the context in which Claimants knowingly chose to invest in 
an Estonian financial institution.”511 Similarly, the tribunal in the Generation Ukraine v 
Ukraine case dismissed the arguments of a US investor. The investor had invested in 
commercial property by acquiring a 49-year leasehold in downtown Kyiv. However, 
the investor argued that local authorities had obstructed and interfered with the 
realisation of the project in a way that was tantamount to expropriation. The tribunal 
argued, after having found that despite frustration and delay caused by bureaucratic 
incompetence of Ukraine authorities, that the investment standard had not been 
breached: 
 
“Finally, it is relevant to consider the vicissitudes of the economy of the state that is host to 
the investment in determining the investor’s legitimate expectations, the protection of which 
is a major concern of the minimum standards of treatment contained in bilateral investment 
treaties. The Claimant was attracted to the Ukraine because of the possibility of earning a 
rate of return on its capital in significant excess to the other investment opportunities in 
more developed economies. The Claimant thus invested in the Ukraine on notice of both the 
prospects and the potential pitfalls.”512  
 
Thus, an investor who invests in a developing country cannot expect to enjoy the 
same level of protection as if the investment would be made in a developed country 
as the application of absolute investment standards, which are formulated in a 
relevant BIT, might be affected by the host state’s development. So, even though the 
host state has an obligation to protect the investment according to international law, 
the state is not necessarily obliged to provide a structure that is the same or 
                                                     
511 Alex Genin v Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award 25 June 2001, para 348. The dispute 
concerned whether the fair and equitable treatment standard had been violated and whether the 
investment had been impaired in an arbitrary and discriminatory way. It is worth noting that the 
investor argued the full protection had not been granted, but that argument was not addressed by the 
tribunal. See, in particular, para 70. 
512 Generation Ukraine v Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9 Award 16 September 2003, para 20.37. 
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equivalent of a similar structure in a more developed country – instead the host state 
is obliged to employ all necessary means at its disposal to discharge its obligation of 
providing for investment protection, including full protection and security. However, 
it is important to emphasize here that this does not mean that the state’s resources 
will never be taken into account. Examples can be found where the efforts of a 
developing state to protect foreign investment has been assessed without special 
regard for the resources available to do so, in particular when the state has taken 
action that either creates the circumstances that enable third parties to damage the 
investment or when the state action itself damages the investment. 513 
This leads to the conclusion that the balancing of interest between the investor 
and the host state can prove to be challenging in practice. If the level of development 
of a host state is to play a role in determining its obligations within the context of 
absolute investment standards, such standards would face the risk of becoming too 
casuistic in practice. The end result would be that these standards, such as the full 
protection and security standard, would become diluted, as their application would 
depend on a case-by-case assessment of a country’s level of development. Needless 
to say, such a scenario would not encourage states to increase their level of 
development as that might incur a stricter obligation to provide for investment 
protection. Here, the due diligence principle becomes particularly important as it 
could serve as a tool to determine, taking into account all relevant facts, including the 
resources available to a state to prevent a particular threat to an investment, the 
obligations of a state to provide full protection and security. In such a way opposing 
interests could be reconciled without departing from the substantive elements of the 
standard. 
 
5.6.3 How could development affect adjudication of investment disputes? 
If the host state’s development is to have an effect in a legal dispute that is being 
adjudicated before an arbitral tribunal, the effect can manifest itself in two different 
ways – either it can have an effect on the legal assessment that determines the host 
state’s obligation to provide protection and security or it can affect the determination 
of damages in the event that a violation of an investment standard has been found.  
 
                                                     
513 These examples include AAPL v Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award 21 June 1990, 
30 ILM 577 (1991), AMT v Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award of 21 February 1997, 36 ILM 
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(2005), p. 40-41. 
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Surprisingly, the two cases that reached different conclusions concerning the full 
protection and security standard – Lauder v Czech Republic and CME v Czech Republic – 
applied similar arguments when discussing to what extent a state is obliged to 
provide investment protection.514 Both tribunals stated that the host state was to 
provide investment protection reasonable under the circumstances despite reaching 
opposite conclusions.515 
One of the cases, where an arbitrator posed the question whether the state’s 
level of development should play a role when determining its obligations to provide 
full protection and security, is Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Engineers v Albania. The 
case dealt with a Greek investor who was selected after a tender to work on bridges 
and roads in Albania. After having worked for three years in the country, the investor 
suffered setbacks due to riots that spread throughout the country following 
numerous ponzi scheme failures.516 Violent incidents led the investor to abandon his 
work site where all equipment was stolen and everything else destroyed. The 
arbitrator discussed that the even though the host state is required to exercise due 
diligence, the level should be determined taking into account particular 
circumstances, including whether an investor was aware that civil strife and poor 
governance affected the host state’s government. After having referred to the 
testimony of the investor’s employees, which confirmed a scenario of “desolation 
and lawlessness” upon the investor’s arrival three years before the riots took place, 
and that the police had informed the investor that they were unable to provide 
protection, the arbitrator refused the investor’s claims in the case.517  
                                                     
514 Lauder v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration Award of 3 September 2001, argued at para 
308: “The Arbitral Tribunal is of the opinion that the Treaty obliges the Parties to exercise such due 
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In contrast, the tribunal in AMT v Zaire did not seem sympathetic to that line of 
argument in principle, but took note of the country’s lack of development when 
deciding on damages. In the case, an investor, who had invested in the production 
and sale of automotive and dry cell batteries, claimed compensation for looting in 
September 1991 and later destruction of its industrial complex in January 1993. 
When addressing the issue of what it meant that the provisions of the BIT should 
not be any less than those recognized by international law, the tribunal emphasized 
that this entailed an “objective obligation” which obliged Zaire not to apply inferior 
treatment compared to the “minimum standard of vigilance and of care required by 
international law”.518 After having reached its conclusion on the merits, the tribunal 
turned to the claim for compensation. AMT claimed compensation in the amount of 
21,9 million US dollars, namely fair market value including interest at a rate 
equivalent to international rates from the date of incurred losses, in addition to all 
cost and expenses. However, the tribunal took note when deciding on the amount of 
damages that compensation should not be decided in the abstract: 
 
“AMT would have liked to adopt a method of calculating compensation including interests 
practicable in the normal circumstances prevailing in an ideal country where the climate of 
investment is very stable, such as Switzerland or the Federal Republic of Germany. The 
Tribunal does not find it possible to accede to this way of evaluating the damages with 
interest in the circumstance under consideration, in which it is apparent that the situation 
remains precarious [...]. It would be neither practical nor reasonable to apply the method of 
assessment of compensation in a way so far removed from the striking realities of the 
current situation [...]. Preferably, the tribunal will opt for a method that is most plausible and 
realistic in the circumstances of the case, while rejecting all other methods of assessment 
which would serve unjustly to enrich an investor who, rightly or wrongly, has chosen to 
invest in a country such as Zaire, believing that by so doing the investor is constructing a 
castle in Spain or a Swiss chalet in Germany without any risk, political or even economic or 
financial or any risk whatsoever.”519  
 
The tribunal awarded the investor an all-inclusive total sum of 9 million US dollars 
carrying an annual interest from the date of the award. In addition, the parties were 
to bear an equal share of the cost of the arbitral proceedings and entirely its own fees 
of counsel. 
 
                                                     
518 AMT v Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award 21 February 1997, 36 ILM 1531 (1997), para 
6.06. 
519 AMT v Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award 21 February 1997, 36 ILM 1531 (1997), paras 
7.14-7.15. 
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5.7 Does the standard overlap with other investment standards? 
The full protection and security standard is by no means the only standard in 
international investment law that provides for protection for foreign investors. Other 
standards include the standard against uncompensated expropriation, the fair and 
equitable treatment standard, arbitrary and unreasonable and/or discriminatory 
measures and national treatment.520 Due to the considerable number of investment 
standards and the vagueness of their substance and non-uniform application, the 
question arises whether the full protection and security standard overlaps with these 
other standards and to what extent that overlap might be.521  
The standards are generally independent but interrelated. The first evidence of 
the independence of individual standards is the distinction made between them in the 
BITs themselves. All of the numerous standards are usually mentioned independently 
in the BITs. It would be rather illogical to mention these standards, but then argue 
that all these stipulations are to be understood as the same standard, especially when 
the treaty text suggests otherwise.522 This has, however, not kept arbitrators from 
equating the full protection and security standard to the fair and equitable treatment 
standard entirely523 or from covering the issues of the full protection and security 
standard when addressing the fair and equitable treatment standard substantively.524 
Yet, other tribunals acknowledge the independence of the standard, in particular the 
part which provides physical protection and security, but refrain from recognizing it 
in the broader ambit of protection and security of a legal or political system.525 With 
regards to other standards, tribunals have not distinctively commented on where the 
standards might overlap, but made a distinction when applying them substantively 
ratione materiae. 
                                                     
520 Some authors would argue that there are other standards. That will, however, not be addressed 
as the most consensus seems to be about those mentioned here. See e.g. C. Schreuer, ‘Introduction: 
Interrelationships of standards’, in A. Reinisch (ed.), Standards of Investment Protection, OUP (2008), p. 1-
7. 
521 The relationship between the BIT regime and EU law has also been topical, especially after the 
accession of Eastern European countries, many of which had entered into BITs with EU member 
states prior to their accession to the Union. See e.g. Eastern Sugar B.V. v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL 
Arbitration, Partial Award 27 March 2007, SCC, paras 115-139. 
522 See this view in C. Schreuer, ‘Introduction: Interrelationships of standards’, in A. Reinisch (ed.), 
Standards of Investment Protection, OUP (2008), p. 4. This has also been acknowledged in arbitral practice, 
see. e.g. Jan de Nul v Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/13, Award of 6 November 2008, para 269. 
523 See Siemens v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award of 6 February 2007, para 
303. 
524 See Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Ecuador, LCIA Administered Case No. UN 
3467, Award 1 July 2004, para 187.  
525 See e.g. Enron Corporation v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/03, Award of 22 May 
2007, para 287, and Sempra Energy International v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, 
Award of 28 September 2007, para 324. 
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The standards can be divided into two categories. The first category consists of 
absolute standards, namely standards that have certain substantive content, which in 
part do not overlap. This category includes inter alia expropriation, fair and equitable 
treatment and full protection and security. The second category consists of relative 
standards. They do not have a substantive content in the same way as the standards 
in the former category, but prescribe that an alien cannot be treated any different 
from the citizens of the state with which the alien is compared or aliens of a third 
country. The former example relates to the national treatment standard, but the latter 
to the MFN standard.  
 
5.7.1 Fair and equitable treatment 
The obligation of a state to provide fair and equitable treatment has become one of 
the most commonly violated obligation by states when dealing with foreign 
investors.526 At first sight the interrelationship between the fair and equitable 
treatment standard and the full protection and security standard seems to be 
considerable. That does not necessarily come as a surprise, in particular taking into 
account the fact that these two standards are often mentioned in the same provision 
dealing with the treatment of investments and investment protection. The Germany-
Hong Kong BIT can be seen as an example of this practice: 
 
                                                     
526 From 1997 to 2007, arbitral tribunals concluded that the fair and equitable treatment standard 
had been breached in the following cases: AMT v Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award, 21 
February 1997, 36 ILM 1531 (1997); Metalclad Corporation v Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1, 
30 August 2000; SD Meyers Inc. v Canada, UNCITRAL Arbitration, First Partial Award, 13 September 
2000; Emilio Augustín Maffezini v Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, 13 November 2000; Wena Hotels 
Ltd. v Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award of 8 December 2000, 41 ILM 896 (2002); 
CME v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Partial Award of 13 September 2001; Middle East 
Cement v Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6, 12 April 2002; Pope & Talbot v Canada, UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Award in Respect of Damages of 31 May 2002, 41 ILM 1347 (2002); Tecnicas 
Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v United Mexican States, Additional Facility Case No. ARB/00/2, Award of 
29 May 2003; MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/7, Award 21 May 2004; OEPC v Republic of Ecuador, LCIA UN3467, Award of 1 July 2004; 
CSOB v Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Award 29 December 2004; Petrobart Ltd. v Kyrgiz 
Republic, Award rendered 29 March 2005, SCC; CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award rendered 25 May 2005; Bogdanov v Republic of Moldova, SCC Award 
of 22 September 2005; LG&E Energy Corp, LG&E Capital Corp and LG&E International Inc. v Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1 Award rendered on 3 October 2006; Saluka Investments B.V. v 
Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Partial Award of 17 March 2006; PSEG Global Inc. and Konya 
Ilgin Elektrik Üretim ve Tícaret Limited Şirketi v Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award of 
19 January 2007; Siemens v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award of 6 February 2007 
and Vivendi Universal S.A. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award of 20 August 2007. 
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“Investments and returns of investors of each Contacting Party shall at all times be accorded 
fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy full protection and security in the area of the 
other Contracting party.”527 
 
Formulations in other BITs, in particular various US treaties, increase the level of 
complexity as they do not only mention the fair and equitable treatment standard and 
the full protection and security standard, but include a reference to the minimum 
standard of international law. Article 3(a) of the US-Latvia BIT states:  
 
“Investments shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment, shall enjoy full 
protection and security and shall in no case be accorded less treatment than that required by 
international law.”528 
 
Thus, not only are the two standards of fair and equitable treatment and full 
protection and security mentioned in the same sentence, but also a reference to the 
international minimum standard is made. This has led commentators to argue that 
the relationship between these three standards seems to be “characterized by a fair 
amount of contradiction and uncertainty”.529  
Arbitral practice reveals that most tribunals acknowledge the close 
interrelationship between the fair and equitable treatment standard and the full 
protection and security standard.530 Other tribunals have equated the fair and 
equitable treatment standard with other standards, including the full protection and 
                                                     
527 See Art. 2(2) of the Germany-Hong Kong BIT. Other similar examples could be mentioned, e.g. 
Art. 2(2) of the UK-Singapore BIT, Art. 3(1) of the Austrian-Mexico BIT, Art. 3(1) of the Denmark-
Bulgarian BIT. 
528 See also the 2004 US Model BIT that contains language designed to limit the power of 
arbitrators to interpret the standards therein. It states in Article 5:  
“1. Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with customary 
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security. 
2. For greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of 
treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to covered investments. The 
concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and security” do not require treatment 
in addition to or beyond that which is required by that standard, and do not create additional 
substantive rights. The obligation in paragraph 1 to provide: 
(a) “fair and equitable treatment” includes the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or 
administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process embodied in 
the principal legal systems of the world; and 
(b) “full protection and security” requires each Party to provide the level of police protection 
required under customary international law.” 
529 See S. Vasciannie, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law and 
Practice, 17 BYIL 99 (1999), p. 143, and I. Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in the 
International Law of Foreign Investment, OUP (2007), p. 183 et seq.  
530 See e.g. Plama Consortium Ltd. v Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award of 27 
August 2008, para 163, where the tribunal argued that the standards were closely interrelated: “This 
interrelation will surface when analysing the Parties’ factual allegations. It does not mean, however, 
that each standard could not be defined autonomously.” 
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security standard, and thus subsumed other standards under the fair and equitable 
treatment standard.531 One of the more far-reaching approaches can be seen in 
Occidental v Ecuador where the tribunal argued: 
 
“In the context of this finding the question of whether in addition there has been a reach of 
full protection and security under this Article becomes moot as a treatment that is not fair 
and equitable automatically entails an absence of full protection and security of the invest-
ment.”532 
 
This approach, however, seems to be a minority view not only in arbitral practice but 
also within academia.533  
In various cases, tribunals have assessed jointly whether the fair and equitable 
treatment standard and the full protection and security standard have been breached 
without making a distinction and without mentioning that the standards are the 
same. In the Wena v Egypt the tribunal assessed jointly whether these two standards 
had been breached without making a distinction between the standards. After having 
described that the host state was aware of intentions to seize the investment, did not 
protect the investment, did not return the investment back to the investor or punish 
the public officials that orchestrated the seizure of the investment, the tribunal 
concluded that “Egypt violated its obligations under Article 2(2) […], by failing to 
accord […] investments ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and 
security.”534 Still, cases can be found where a tribunal will assess separately the 
possible treaty violations of the fair and equitable treatment standard and the full 
                                                     
531 See e.g. Petrobart v the Kyrgyz Republic, Award 29 March 2005, p. 76, in particular the following 
argument: “The Arbitral Tribunal does not find it necessary to analyse the Kyrgyz Republic’s action in 
relation to the various specific elements in Article 10(1) of the Treaty but notes that this paragraph in 
its entirety is intended to ensure a fair and equitable treatment of investments.” available at 
<http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document/Petrobart.pdf> and Noble Ventures v 
Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award 11 October 2005, in particular the following argument 
at para 182: “Considering the place of the fair and equitable treatment standard at the very beginning 
of Art. II(2), one can consider this to be a more general standard which finds its specific application in 
inter alia the duty to provide full protection and security, the prohibition of arbitrary and 
discriminatory measures and the obligation to observe contractual obligations towards the investor.” 
532 Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Administered Case No. 
UN 3467, Award 1 July 2004, para 187. See also Impregilo S.p.A v Argentina, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/17, Award 21 June 2011, para 333. 
533 See e.g. Azurix Corp. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award 14 July 2006, para 
407-408 and Suez and Vivendi et al v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Award 30 July 
2010, para 172 and C. Schreuer, ‘Introduction: Interrelationship of Standards’, in A. Reinisch (ed.), 
Standards of Investment Protection, OUP (2008), p. 4. 
534 Wena Hotels Ltd. v Republic of Egypt, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award of 8 December 
2000, 41 ILM 896 (2002) para 95. 
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protection and security standard despite the fact that the same set of circumstances 
have given rise to the legal dispute at issue.535 
Tribunals have in individual cases acknowledged the distinct nature of the 
standard of full protection and security but also commented on the close relationship 
between the standard and the fair and equitable treatment standard. In Azurix v 
Argentina, the tribunal noted the following: 
 
“In some bilateral investment treaties, fair and equitable treatment and full protection and 
security appear as a single standard, in others as separate protections. The BIT falls in the last 
category; the two phrases describing the protection of investments appear sequentially as 
different obligations in Article II.2(a) […] The Tribunal is persuaded of the interrelationship 
of fair and equitable treatment and the obligation to afford the investor full protection and 
security.”536 
 
Similarly, in Jan de Nul v Egypt the tribunal argued that a distinction had to be made 
between the two standards due to the fact that they were placed in two different 
provisions of the Belgian-Egypt BIT. However, the tribunal also mentioned that this 
distinction had to be made even if the two standards could overlap.537 
Finally, tribunals have commented on the close relationship between the two 
standards in cases when the legal dispute concerns the question of whether the full 
protection and security standard entails an obligation to provide for legal security. In 
Suez Vivendi v Argentina, the tribunal discussed in detail the nature of the obligation to 
provide full protection and security within the context of due diligence. The tribunal 
noted the following with regard to how the two standards should be interpreted: 
 
“The fact that the French BIT employs the fair and equitable treatment standard and the full 
protections and security standard in two distinct articles and refers to them as separate and 
distinct standards leads to the conclusion that the Contracting Parties must have intended 
them to mean two different things. Thus, in interpreting these two standards of investor 
treatment it is desirable to give effect to that intention by giving the two concepts distinct 
meanings and fields of application.”538 
 
                                                     
535 Oostergetel v Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Award 23 April 2012, para 192. However, 
even though the tribunal made the distinction between the two standard, it later stated that “given that 
the BIT full protection and security appears as a specific application of the general FET standard, the 
Tribunals considers it unnecessary to analyze these allegations again separately under Article 3.2.” See 
further same award, para 308.  
536 Azurix Corp. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award 14 July 2006, paras 407-
408. 
537 Jan de Nul v Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/13, Award of 6 November 2008, para 
269. 
538 Suez and Vivendi et al v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Award 30 July 2010, para 
172. See also Suez and InterAgua v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Award 30 July 2010, 
para 166. 
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The result of this analysis is that the fair and equitable treatment and full protection 
and security deal with two different aspects of investment protection, namely the 
treatment of investments and the protection of investments. As a result their content 
can be distinguishable in general with certain particular exceptions where an overlap 
can be established.539 Here, Professor Schreuer’s portrayal provides a description that 
illustrates the core issues: “The FET standard consists mainly of an obligation on the 
host State’s part to desist from behaviour that is unfair an inequitable. By contrast, by 
assuming the obligation of full protection and security the host State promises to 
provide a factual and legal framework that grants security and action by private 
persons as well as State organs. In particular, this requires the creation of legal 
remedies against adverse action affecting the investment and the creation of 
mechanisms or the effective vindication of investors’ rights.”540 
 
5.7.2 Expropriation 
The full protection and security standard does not overlap with the concept of 
expropriation. That concept has generally been thought to entail the taking of a 
property by the state that means the transfer of ownership to the state or a third 
party.541 According to customary international law states have the right to expropriate 
property if the expropriation: (i) is undertaken for a public purpose; (ii) is non-
discriminatory; (iii) complies with the principle of due process of law; and (iv) is 
compensated.542 Other forms of expropriation, which can not be characterized as 
taking in the traditional sense, but are considered indirect expropriation or creeping 
expropriation, include transfer of management of a company or intense interference 
by state authorities to the extent that the investment loses any economic value 
despite the fact that ownership is unchanged.543 Moreover, expropriation does not 
have to entail complete expropriation, but expropriation has at times also been 
                                                     
539 See e.g. I. Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Law of Foreign Investment, 
OUP 2007, p. 157, where she argues: “This [fair and equitable treatment] obligation requries from the 
State similar behaviour as that required by the more specific standard of ‘full protection and security’, 
in the sense that the State is also obliged to physically protect the Investors and their investments in 
case of riots or demonstrators of the population which may result in the destruction of the 
investments.”  
540 C. Schreuer, Full Protection and Security, Journal of International Dispute Settlement, OUP (2010), 
p. 14. 
541 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 7th ed., OUP (2008), p. 532 et seq.  
542 It is of importance how the expropriated property is compensated. The words of Cordell Hull, 
US Secretary of State, have been considered to describe the accepted principle. He stated in 1938: “[I]t 
has been stated with equal emphasis that the right to expropriate property is coupled with and 
conditioned on the obligation to make adequate, effective and prompt compensation”, cited in M. 
Whiteman, Digest of International law, Vol. 8 (US Gov, Washington DC 1967), p. 1020. 
543 A. Reinisch, ‘Expropriation’ in P. Muchlinski, F. Ortino and C. Schreuer (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook on International Investment law, OUP (2009), p. 408.  
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considered partial in arbitral practice.544 However, regardless of what kind of 
measures are used in order to expropriate, the result is usually a total loss of business 
or economic value for the entity that loses control of its property. In contrast, a 
violation of the full protection and security standard usually does not result in a total 
loss of business, although exceptions can be found.545  
It is important to point out that the action, which is more relevant in the context 
of the obligation to provide protection and security, is the action committed by the 
state that is considered tantamount to expropriation. It should be noted that it does 
not matter whether the expropriation or actions tantamount to expropriation lead to 
the taking of a property for governmental purposes or entail transfer of management 
to government officials. Government interference of a certain intensity (often 
justified under the auspices of the regulatory power of the host state) or complete 
lack of protection (often as a result of non-use of the host state’s police force) can be 
considered actions tantamount to expropriation. 
It is, in addition, important to stress that while it is accepted in international law 
that expropriation must be compensated,546 it is also widely accepted that the state 
has at its discretion police powers that derive from its sovereignty and necessity to 
regulate human behaviour amongst its subjects and aliens who reside there. Thus, the 
state can in some cases apply police powers to take private property and – in some 
cases – without compensation, e.g. when applying general taxes, confiscate property 
as a result of criminal behaviour, regulating public health or the environment.547 
However, these actions can be implemented in such a way and under certain 
circumstances that they can be considered actions tantamount to expropriation. The 
assessment then becomes where to draw the line between expropriation (or creeping 
expropriation) and non-compensable regulation or use of police powers.548 
                                                     
544 Still, arbitral practice is divided on the issue. See further U. Kriebaum, Partial Expropriation, 8 
Journal of Investment and Trade (2007), p. 69, in particular p. 73-82. 
545 See Wena Hotels Ltd. v Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award of 8 December 
2000, 41 ILM 896 (2002) and CME v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Partial Award of 13 
September 2001.  
546 The classical international decisions on the subject and that contract rights are also protected 
from expropriation are Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims (Norway v US), I RIAA 307 (1922), p. 332, and Case 
Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v Poland) (1926) PCIJ Reports, Series A, 
No. 7, p. 42.  
547 See L.Y. Fortier and S.L. Drymer, Indirect Expropriation in the Law of International Investment: I know 
it when I see it, or Caveat Investor?, 19 ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal (2004), p. 293, 
and A. Newcombe, The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International Law, 20 ICSID Review – 
Foreign Investment Law Journal (2004), p. 1. 
548 The two theories, namely the “effects doctrine” and the “police powers docrine”, will not be 
discussed here, but I refer to V. Heiskanen, The Doctrine of Indirect Expropriaiton in Light of the Practice of 
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, Journal of World Investment and Trade (2007), p. 216-217.  
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Earlier cases, which predate current investment awards, dealt with issues in 
which the claimant argued not only that property had been expropriated indirectly, 
but also that the protection and security had not been provided. Interestingly, two 
cases brought before the Iran-US Claims Tribunal serve as examples where a claim is 
argued as an indirect expropriation (or taking) claim, but could have been discussed 
within the context of the obligation to provide full protection and security.549  
In Emanuel Too v Greater Modesto Insurance Associates an Iranian national living in 
the United States sought damages for the seizure of his liquor license by the United 
States Internal Revenue Service (IRS). In addition, compensation was sought for loss 
of property due to a forced sale. The tribunal stated concerning the seizure of the 
liquor license and real property:  
 
“With respect to the liquor license, the Respondent has conceded that the IRS did, in fact, 
seize the Claimant’s California general eating place liquor license in order to satisfy over USD 
70,000 worth of overdue withholding taxes. Nevertheless, a State is not responsible for 
taxation or any other action that is commonly accepted as within the police power of States, 
provided it is not discriminatory and is not designed to cause the alien to abandon the 
property to the State or to sell it at a distress price. […] The IRS’s action was a result of the 
Claimant’s failure to pay taxes withheld by him on his employees’ salaries. Nowhere does the 
Claimant suggest that this tax levy was imposed against him because he was an Iranian 
national. Nor has the Claimant proved that the IRS deliberately intended to cause him to 
abandon the property to the State or to sell it a at a distress price. […] This claim is 
dismissed because the Claimant has failed to show that the IRS’s action was anything other 
than a lawful levy for overdue taxes, for which there is no State Responsibility.”550 
 
However, the claimant’s argued also that he had not been provided protection and 
security from attacks and acts of plunder. The tribunal argued: 
 
“The Claimant argues that the Respondent failed to protect his property […] from the 
depredations of anti-Iranian Americans. The Claimant suggests that a State is responsible for 
injuries resulting to a foreign national or his property from the State’s failure to provide 
protection. Nevertheless, the State cannot guarantee the safety of an alien or of alien 
property. Responsibility is incurred only when police protection falls below a minimum 
standard of reasonableness. […] What constitutes reasonable police protection depends on 
                                                     
549 The Iran-US Claims Tribunal was established to resolve disputes, which concerned claims of US 
citizens against Iran and Iranian citizens against the United States, following the revolution of 1979. 
See Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning 
the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, issued 19 January 1981, reprinted in 1 Iran-US Claims Tribunal Reports, 
9. Despite the fact that its jurisdiction is limited to only a certain classes of claims, its awards have had 
profound influence in international law. See further M. Shaw, International Law, 6th ed., CUP (2008), p. 
111, and C.N. Brower and J.D. Brueschke, The Iranian-United States Claims Tribunal, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers (1998),  p. 669.  
550 Emanuel Too v United States of America, Award No. 460-880-2 rendered on 29 December 1989, 
reprinted in 23 Iran-US Claims Tribunal Reports 378, p. 387-388. 
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all the circumstances, including the State’s available resources. Ordinarily, the standard of 
police protection for foreign nationals is unreasonable if it is less than is provided generally 
for the State’s nationals. […] By these standards, the Claimant has failed to show that local 
[…] authorities failed to exercise due diligence in the protection of his property.”551 
 
The tribunal rejected all claims made after having discussed that the regulatory action 
was taken according to procedures not only guaranteed the claimant due process, but 
were implemented in a non-discriminatory manner.  
With regard to investment cases in particular, arbitral practice provides 
numerous examples. The dispute in Biloune v Ghana concerned an investment in the 
form of a resort complex. The investor entered into an investment agreement with a 
government entity that articulated the investment’s structure. Shortly after work on 
the resort complex commenced, the government issued a stop work order and later 
took action and demolished the work which had already been done. The investor was 
arrested and detained for 13 days before being deported. The investor instigated 
arbitral proceedings and based his claims on the investment agreement, not on a 
bilateral investment treaty. The tribunal came to the conclusion that these actions 
had been unfounded and unjustified. Therefore, the investment had been 
“constructively expropriated”.552 In Wena v Egypt the issue in question was similar. 
The investment was in the form of a hotel complex, which was seized by a 
government entity after the investor’s relationship with the entity deteriorated. In 
contrast, though, the investor based his claims on that the investment had been 
expropriated and that the full protection and security standard had been violated. 
The tribunal concluded that the investment had been expropriated and that the full 
protection and security standard had been violated.553 In Middle East Cement Shipping v 
Egypt the dispute concerned an annulment of a government authorization to import 
and store cement. In addition, a ship was seized and auctioned off. The tribunal 
noted: 
 
                                                     
551 Emanuel Too v United States of America, Award No. 460-880-2 rendered on 29 December 1989, 
reprinted in 23 Iran-US claims Tribunal Reports 378, p. 385-386. 
552 Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd. v Ghana Investments Centre and the Government of Ghana, Award 
on Jurisdiction and Liability rendered 27 October 1989, 95 ILR 183, p. 210. The investor did not refer 
to the minimum standard of international law. However, the investor argued that his human rights 
had been violated, a claim rejected by the tribunal as it lacked jurisdiction. However, the case, which 
concerned whether the investment had been expropriated, dealt with government action which could 
have been argued as a violation of an obligation to provide protection and security to foreign 
property. Such cases were not unheard of in the 1980s, cf Amco Asia Corporation and Others v Indonesia, 
Award 20 November 1984, 1 ICSID Reports 413 (1993). 
553 Wena Hotels Ltd. v Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award of 8 December 2000, 41 
ILM 896 (2002), paras 95 and 99.  
210
“Art. 2.2 of the BIT requires that “Investments by investors of a Contacting Party shall, at all 
times, be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy full protection and security, in 
the territory of the other Contracting Party.” This BIT provision must be given particular 
relevance in view of the special protection granted by Art. 4 against measures “tantamount to 
expropriation” and in the requirements for “due process of law” in Art. 4.a.”554 
 
The tribunal found that the procedure, which had been followed in connection with 
the seizure and auction of the investor’s ship, violated the requirements in Article 2.2 
of the BIT.  
Two cases, which arose out of the same dispute, are of particular interest. In 
CME v Czech Republic and Lauder v Czech Republic the dispute concerned an investment 
in TV NOVA, a Czech television station. In both cases claims were made inter alia 
that the investment had been expropriated and that the full protection and security 
standard had been violated – the former case was based on the Netherlands-Czech 
BIT, whereas the latter was based on the US-Czech BIT. The investment was set up 
in a particular way and in cooperation with the Czech Media Council. Two 
companies would be involved where one company, CET 21, would be the holder of 
the broadcasting license and the other, CNTS, would be the operating company. The 
business relationship between these two companies was guaranteed as CET 21 
contributed to CNTS the right to use the license “unconditionally, unequivocally and 
on an exclusive basis”.555 This materialized in 1993, when the business agreement 
which established this structure of exclusivity was approved by the Czech Media 
Council which stated they would be considered an “integral part of the license 
terms”.556 Both companies were directed by the investor’s business partner, a Czech 
national, and TV Nova became one of the most popular television stations in the 
country. However, foreign control of the media became a contested issue in 
domestic politics – a situation that later led to amendments on the country’s media 
law. Due to this new situation the structure was changed in 1996 and the agreements 
that had established the intimate business relationship between CET 21 and CNTS 
revised. According to the new structure CET 21 would not be obliged to give CNTS 
an exclusive right to the broadcasting license, but its obligation would consist of 
providing CNTS with the “use of the know-how of the license”.557 In addition to this 
turn of events, a newly elected Media Council instigated administrative proceedings 
against CNTS for conducting television broadcasting without authorization. After 
this amendment had been finalized, the Czech counterparty of the investor began to 
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exercise more influence and took the view that CET 21 would not necessarily have 
to cooperate with CNTS concerning broadcasting. In effect, CNTS could seek new 
business partners to provide the facilities necessary for operating a television station. 
This finally led to the situation where CET 21 decided in 1999 to terminate the 
agreements between the company and CNTS. Thus, the investor was now in 
possession of facilities to operate a television station but was unable to broadcast its 
material as he was not the holder of a broadcasting license.  
One of the fundamental issues in both arbitration cases was the participation of 
the Media Council concerning the amendment in the business relationship between 
CET 21 and CNTS, which took place in 1996, and its termination in 1999. The 
tribunal in the CME case took the view that actions of the Media Council had played 
a role when the exclusivity arrangement, which guaranteed CNTS an exclusive right 
to the broadcasting license from CET 21, was changed and the part dealing with 
exclusivity dropped. The Media Council, which had previously declared that the 
structure was an integral part of the license terms, reneged on its prior position. That 
made it possible for the former business partner of the investor to terminate his 
business relationship and destroy the investment’s commercial value. Thus, the 
investment had been indirectly expropriated and the full protection and security 
standard violated.558  
In contrast, the tribunal in the Lauder case came to the opposite conclusion. The 
tribunal relied on various points in supporting its conclusion. The main argument 
was that the Czech Media Council had merely used its regulatory powers. In addition, 
the tribunal stressed that the investor had not objected to the disputed actions when 
they were implemented but had cooperated with the Media Council. That argument 
was used against the investor with regard to his claims of expropriation and violation 
of the full protection and security standard.559  
As these cases have revealed, there is a link between actions tantamount to 
expropriation and actions that can be construed as a violation of the full protection 
and security standard. However, the reason why an investor would argue for 
violation of both standards by citing the same actions is tactical rather than relating 
to any direct link between the standards themselves. It is logical to argue at first for 
the most erroneous violation – direct or indirect expropriation – due to the fact that 
if a violation is proven, the investor has a much easier task before him when arguing 
quantification and valuation as expropriation usually leads to the total loss of the 
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investment. Other standards, e.g. fair and equitable treatment and full protection and 
security, usually follow as violations of these standards do not necessarily result in 
total loss of business.560 Thus, these standards cover various distinct fields and are 
complementary in practice, including when individual actions or omissions are 
assessed within the context of individual standards. 
 
5.7.3 Denial of justice 
Denial of justice is usually understood as gross miscarriage of justice. This violation 
of international law usually manifests itself when a system, which is established by a 
particular state for the purpose of administering justice, is considered not to work 
properly, at best, or does not function at all, at worst.  
Historically, academics and practitioners have been divided with regard to what 
constitutes the substantive elements of denial of justice and how expansively the 
concept should be applied. The broadest view was stipulated by Professor Hyde and 
Commissioner Nielsen which entailed that denial of justice had occurred when a 
state had failed to observe concerning an alien “any duty imposed by international 
law or by treaty with his country.”561 However, Professor Eagleton criticised this 
approach as too broad with the immediate result that no distinction could be made 
between the concept and a breach of international law. In contrast, he stressed the 
importance that the concept described a particular type of international illegality, 
distinguishable from other illegal actions of state, and due to that fact had practical 
importance:  
 
“In this sense it serves a valuable purpose […] It has been seen that responsibility may occur 
either before local remedies are sought, because of an international illegality; or afterwards, as 
the result of the failure of these remedies, thus constituting a separate delict. In the one case 
the international illegality may perhaps be repaired by the local remedies offered; in the 
other, such reparation is impossible because it is the failure of the local remedies themselves 
which constitutes the delict. Here are two types of cases to be differentiated, the one a failure 
of due diligence, or other international illegality precedent to appeal to the courts the latter a 
denial of justice. Either is an illegality; and either produces responsibility. But they differ: 
every denial of justice is a violation of international law; but not every violation of 
international law chargeable to the state is a denial of justice. The obligation which a state 
bears toward aliens includes other duties than mere regularity of action on the part of its 
local courts.”562  
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Thus, denial of justice has enjoyed a relationship with a state’s obligation to provide 
protection to an alien and his property. An alien has been able to refer to a state’s 
action or inaction under the rubric of denial of justice or protection owed to the alien 
according to the due diligence standard.  
Early arbitral awards reflected this reality. The interrelationship between denial 
of justice and full protection and security could be described at that time as not being 
a matter of either/or situation in the sense that conduct by a state constituted either a 
violation of full protection and security or a denial of justice. Examples can be found 
where a state was considered to violate its obligations during the process of prevent, 
investigate and punish. In, for example, the Sewell case, bandits killed two Americans 
during a course of a payroll robbery on May 1, 1920. An investigation was 
subsequently launched but was allowed to lapse. It was not until 10 months later that 
efforts were made to ascertain the names of the employees who were working when 
the robbery took place. About a year after the murders, arrests were made of persons 
who could not be identified as the culprits. Finally, just over 15 months after the 
murders took place persons were arrested who confessed to participation and 
implicated others, but they were not to be found. The commission held, taking into 
account that the Mexican government could not explain this delay, that there had 
been “some lack of diligence in the pursuit and apprehension of the culprits” and the 
“imposition of a penalty inadequate to the crime committed constitutes a denial of 
justice.”563 In the Massey case, a case similar to Sewell, the claims commission also dealt 
with the killing of an American subject. The culprit was subsequently arrested and 
imprisoned. However, a jail-keeper unlawfully permitted the accused to escape and 
no evidence was shown that the Mexican authorities took effective measures to 
apprehend the murderer after the escape. The commission concluded that there had 
been a denial of justice because of the “failure of Mexican authorities to take proper 
measures to punish the slayer of Massey.”564 
The question remains what constitutes denial of justice. It is rather challenging 
to locate with accuracy the concept’s substantive elements due to its rather non-
descriptive stipulation. The description of the Harvard Research Draft of 1929 
describes numerous elements: 
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“A state is responsible if an injury to an alien results from a denial of justice. Denial of justice 
exists when there is denial, unwarranted delay or obstruction of access to courts, gross 
deficiency in the administration of judicial or remedial process, failure to provide those 
guarantees which are generally considered indispensable to the proper administration of 
justice, or manifestly unjust, judgment. An error of a national court which does not produce 
manifest injustice is not a denial of justice.”565 
 
The substantive elements of this articulation can be divided into, first, a procedural 
requirement which entails access to courts, and, second, a substantive requirement 
referring to a court’s decision. The first element deals with access to courts or 
tribunals or access to appeal a decision of a lower court/tribunal. This entails, in 
practical terms, that an alien shall have the right to appear before the courts to seek 
justice as a plaintiff or defend himself as a defendant. He is also entitled to introduce 
counterclaims and appeal any judgment rendered in accordance with national law.566 
The second element relates to substantive issues where only decisions, which can be 
considered to produce manifest injustice, are considered denial of justice. This is of 
importance in practice as this prerequisite – manifestly unjust – must be fulfilled. 
Therefore, it does not suffice if a national court errs in applying national law if that 
does not render the judgment manifestly unjust. It is important to stress that despite 
the substantive element of denial of justice, which shall, among other standards, 
provide investment protection, a tribunal adjudicating an investment dispute does 
not serve as appellate tribunal.567 However, if a national court, which is competent to 
apply international law, errs in its application, a tribunal that is competent to apply 
international law is required to substitute the national decision with its own.568  
In terms of current arbitral practice, the concept was described in the Loewen case 
as being “a sense of a lack of due process leading to an outcome which offends a 
sense of judicial propriety”.569 In addition, the tribunal in the Mondev case referred to 
the concept of denial of justice in the following way within the context of the fair 
and equitable treatment standard: 
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“In the end the question is whether, at an international level and having regard to generally 
accepted standards of the administration of justice, a tribunal can conclude in the light of all 
the facts that the impugned decision was clearly improper and discreditable, with the result 
that the investment has been subject to ‘unfair and inequitable treatment’.”570 
 
However, the scope of the concept of denial of justice, in its modern form, has 
narrowed further when compared to its application in older cases dealing with denial 
of justice. As of late, a claim would be made within the context of illegal takings of 
property or violations of the obligation to provide protection to an alien and his 
property in addition to denial of justice. A case in point is the Amco II case. In 1968, 
an agreement was made between a US company and an entity owned by the 
Indonesian government concerning the running of a hotel and office block. The 
agreement presupposed that the investor would provide capital whereas the 
investment would enjoy various tax concessions. After the relationship between the 
investor and the government-owned entity turned sour, the management of the hotel 
was taken over with the assistance of the Indonesian army and police officers. 
Subsequently, the investor’s license to engage in business in Indonesia was revoked 
by the president of Indonesia. The investor instigated arbitral proceedings and 
claimed denial of justice by asserting, firstly, that the army and police had acted in 
breach of international law and, secondly, that its license had been wrongly revoked. 
The arbitral tribunal sided with the investor and awarded damages.571 
It is important to emphasize that while the concept has narrowed in scope by 
differentiating between the obligation to protect and an alien’s right to justice, its 
scope has also widened in another sense, as it is no longer the prevalent view to limit 
the concept to courts alone. Instead, the concept has been considered to include 
whatever state system administers justice regardless of whether it is a part of the 
executive, legislative or judicial branch of the state. Two cases illustrate the different 
approaches taken by tribunals in the first half and second half of the 20th century. In 
the Chattin case the US-Mexican Claims Commission dealt with a case concerning the 
arrest and detention of an American who was suspected of a defrauding his 
employer, a railway company operating in Mexico, and was later sentenced to serve 
time in prison. However, civil unrest in Mexico made it possible for him to escape 
and return to the United States. The commission concluded that the legal 
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proceedings instigated by the Mexican authorities had been faulty. During its 
argumentation the commission emphasized a narrow understanding of denial of 
justice stating “state responsibility should be limited to judicial acts showing outrage, 
bad faith, wilful neglect of duty or manifestly insufficient governmental action.”572 In 
contrast, the tribunal in the Amco II case came to the conclusion that even though the 
arbitral awards cited in the Chattin case did concern at some phase judicial decisions, 
the tribunal saw “no provision of international law that makes impossible a denial of 
justice by an administrative body.”573 
It might seem illogical to make a state responsible for the adjudication of cases 
by the judiciary taking into account that the latter acts independently as prescribed by 
a state’s constitution. However, that proposition is not sustainable in international 
law where the state is and must be considered a single entity. This was acknowledged 
in the ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: 
 
“The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international 
law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, 
whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an 
organ of the central government or of a territorial unit of the State.”574 
 
This is relevant because, as we have seen before, the full protection and security 
standard, in particular its concept of due diligence, has been considered to entail an 
obligation by a state to protect aliens within its border. That protection has been 
considered to include, first, an obligation to prevent that attacks be made on a 
foreigner’s person or property, second, an obligation to restore (if possible) the 
situation as if the violation had not occurred and, third, an obligation to investigate, 
prosecute and punish those who are responsible. The third part of this obligation 
falls under the rubric of “administration of justice”. Any violation of this obligation 
regardless of whether the violation stems from actions of the legislature, executive or 
judiciary comes close to the concept of denial of justice but could also be considered 
a violation of the full protection and security standard. 
The relationship between the concept of denial of justice and full protection and 
security is also interesting in terms of how treaty law might influence the customary 
standard of the denial of justice. As has been discussed, treaty law has led to a 
structural change to the standard of full protection and security strengthening its 
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foundation.575 In contrast, that seems not have been the case in terms of the denial of 
justice – treaty-based standards, including the fair and equitable treatment, which 
have expanded treaty protection for investors due to their vague and unclear 
substance, have negatively affected the customary international law standard of the 
denial of justice. This is the case in one BIT in particular, the 2004 US Model Treaty. 
After having prescribed in its Article 5(1) that each contracting party should accord 
to investments treatment in accordance with customary international law, including 
fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security, Article 5(2) then defines 
further the meaning of fair and equitable treatment as: 
 
“Fair and equitable treatment” includes the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or 
administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process 
embodied in the principal legal systems of the world.”576 
 
Here, denial of justice is included under the concept of fair and equitable treatment. 
Such a treaty-based reference cannot but influence the customary principle of denial 
of justice. This development of increased influence of treaty law has led 
commentators to conclude that the concept of denial of justice, as perceived through 
treaty law, will contribute to the modern understanding of the customary principle of 
denial of justice: 
 
“[T]he application of treaty provisions will contribute to a modern understanding of the old 
doctrine. The reason for this inevitable cross-pollination is that the elements of the delict of 
denial of justice tend to reappear as treaty provisions, for example when they proscribe 
“discrimination” or when they require “fair and equitable treatment”. Thus, a complainant 
before an international tribunal may allege that a treaty has been breached by reference to its 
terms without invoking the doctrine of denial of justice by name. When the alleged breach 
has seen committed by a judicial body, however, an assessment of discrimination, or unfairness, 
or protection immediately invites reference to the way such general notions have been 
understood in the context of denial of justice.”577 
 
The interaction between treaty law and the “old doctrine” – here the relationship 
between the denial of justice and the full protection and security standard – is 
documented in the Mondev case. The dispute, which was subjected to Article 1105 and 
does not mention denial of justice as such, dealt with an agreement between the 
investor and a public authority which enjoyed statutory immunity. The project failed 
because planning consent was not secured. The investor filed suit where he claimed 
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inter alia that the statutory immunity violated the standard of full protection and 
security in Article 1105 of NAFTA and that there had been denial of justice. The 
tribunal noted with regard to the immunity issue that a general immunity from suit 
granted to a public authority could be considered a violation of Article 1105. 
However, due to the fact that the immunity relevant to the case was a limited one 
and served a rational purpose that corresponded to the authority’s purpose, the full 
protection and security standard was not violated. The tribunal took a restrictive 
approach to whether denial of justice had been violated. The main reason for its 
restrictive approach was related to the particularities of the case, namely that the 
investor pursued to have the national judgments reviewed substantively. However, as 
the tribunal observed, if the investor’s approach would be adopted, “NAFTA 
tribunals would turn into courts of appeal, which is not their role.”578 Therefore, no 
violation of Article 1105 could be found. 
 
5.7.4 National treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment 
Even though there seems to be overlap in certain areas with regard to absolute 
standards, the full protection and security standard enjoys a close relationship with 
the national treatment standard and the most-favoured-nation standard. However, 
generally there can be no overlap due to the relative nature of these standards. They 
do, in contrast to the substantive standards of fair and equitable treatment and full 
protection and security, not include defined substantive elements, but rather refer to 
other additional protections provided in BITs for nationals of the host state or 
nationals of third states. 
Almost all treaties that have provisions providing for protection and security, 
both FCN treaties and modern investment treaties, also include provisions 
prescribing the national treatment standard and the most favoured nation standard. 
These standards are often formulated with the full protection and security standard. 
The US-Italy FCN stated in Article V(3): 
 
“The nationals, corporations and associations of either High Contracting Party shall within 
the territories of the other High Contracting Party receive protection and security with 
respect to the matters enumerated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, upon compliance 
with the applicable laws and regulations, no less than the protection and security which is or may 
hereafter be accorded to the nationals, corporations and associations of such other High Contracting Party 
and no less than that which is or may hereafter be accorded to the nationals, corporations and associations of 
any third country.”579 (emphasis added) 
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The UK Model BIT mentions both standards, but in a different way. This 
formulation includes the standards as stand alone standards. Article 3 states: 
 
“(1) Neither Contracting Party shall in its territory subject investments or returns of nationals 
or companies of the other Contracting Party to treatment less favourable than that which it accords 
to investments or returns of its own national or companies or to investments or returns of nationals or 
companies of any third State. 
(2) Neither Contracting Party shall in its territory subject nationals or companies of the other 
Contracting Party, as regards their management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of 
their investments, to treatment less favourable that that which it accords to its own nationals or companies 
or to nationals or companies of any third State. 
(3) For the avoidance of doubt it is confirmed that the treatment provided for in paragraphs 
(1) and (2) above shall apply to the provisions of Articles 1 to 11 of this Agreement.”580 
(emphasis added) 
 
Here, the contracting parties incorporate principles that provide a tertium comparationis 
as a relative footing. As a result, parties to these BITs will grant freedom to invest, 
but only that which is equal with third states (most-favoured-nation standard) or 
equal to its own nationals (national treatment). However, these different anti-
discrimination standards enjoy a distinct relationship with the full protection and 
security standard due to their different approach of comparison.  
 
National treatment and full protection and security 
The national treatment standard prescribes that a state – the host state – shall extend 
to foreign investors and their investments treatment that is at least as favourable as 
the treatment accorded to its own nationals. The standard has a long history – it has 
been traced to trade treaties of the Hanseatic League dating from the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries.581  
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In addition, the standard has a long history in FCN treaties,582 intellectual 
property rights treaties583 and multilateral584 and regional trade agreements.585 The 
standard has been described as one of the most important standards of treatment, 
but yet problematic in implementation: 
 
“The national treatment standard is perhaps the single most important standard of treatment 
enshrined in international agreements […] at the same time, it is perhaps the most difficult 
standard to achieve, as it touches upon economically (and politically) sensitive issues.”586 
 
The fact that the standard is considered to ensure that an investor should be treated 
in the same way as the host country’s nationals does not always result in favourable 
treatment. Investors often base their decisions on a certain level of treatment – a 
presupposition often distorted by their background. The reason for this situation is 
that there can be considerable difference between the treatment which an investor 
enjoys compared to the treatment which the investor is accustomed to in his home 
country, in particular if that country is a developed country. That fact cannot but 
influence the level of protection that the investor can expect to enjoy. An investor, 
needless to say, invests in a developing country to enjoy the comparative advantage 
which that country enjoys inter alia in terms of being available to offer a work force 
enjoying lower wages than in a developed country. However, the reason for its 
comparative advantage is lower development which can permeate the entire legal 
environment in which the investment is scheduled to operate. That often results in 
different forms of development, e.g. bad governance, economic uncertainty, etc. 
These factors are known to the investor and must affect his presuppositions as to the 
level of protection he expects.587 
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The implications of this situation is that the national treatment standard does 
not guarantee that an investor is satisfied with the treatment provided or is in fact 
treated well by the host country. However, the minimum standard of customary 
international law will provide a floor for the investor which the host state will not be 
able to violate. Earlier tribunals recognised this scenario as can be seen in the Hopkins 
case by the US-Mexican Claims Commission: 
 
“It not infrequently happens that under the rules of international law applied to 
controversies of an international aspect a nation is required to accord to aliens broader and 
more liberal treatment than it accords to its own citizens under its municipal laws [...] The 
citizens of a nation may enjoy many rights which are withheld from aliens, and conversely, 
under international law, aliens may enjoy rights and remedies which the nation does not 
accord to its own citizens.”588 
 
Thus, in many developing countries a minimum standard of customary international 
law will raise the national treatment standard whereas in many developed countries 
the national treatment standard will do the opposite. This interrelationship must be 
taken into account when interpreting the two standards.589 
This interrelationship was recognized by the ICJ in the ELSI case when the court 
commented on Article V(1) of the US-Italy FCN treaty. While referring to the full 
protection and security standard as the primary standard, it also noted that this 
standard was “supplemented by the criteria of national treatment and most-favoured-
nation treatment.”590 In contrast, NAFTA tribunals have not considered the 
relationship supplementary. Their approach has held different opinions as to the 
relationship’s nature – one group of tribunals has argued that a violation of the 
national treatment standard in Article 1102 of NAFTA automatically includes a 
violation of the full protection and security standard in Article 1105, whereas other 
groups have viewed the two obligations as independent.591 The Free Trade 
Commission’s interpretative note influenced this discussion as cited by the tribunal in 
the Loewen case:  
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“The effect of the Commission’s interpretation is that “fair and equitable treatment” and 
“full protection and security” are not free-standing obligations. They constitute obligations 
only to the extent that they are recognised by customary international law. Likewise, a breach 
of Article 1105(1) is not established by a breach of another provision of NAFTA. To the 
extent, if at all, that NAFTA Tribunals in Metalclad, S.D. Myers and Pope & Talbot, may 
have expressed contrary views, those views must be disregarded.”592 
 
However, it must be considered somewhat special, as a matter of policy, that two 
obligations, which are stipulated in two different parts of an investment treaty, be 
considered so overlapping that a breach of one obligation automatically entails a 
violation of the other. As discussed earlier, this has also been topical concerning the 
relationship between the standards of fair and equitable treatment and full protection 
and security. Such automatic reasoning within the context of national treatment 
could lead, as in the case of other standards, to a dangerous situation of oversimplifi-
cation in important investment disputes.  
 
Most-favoured-nation treatment and full protection and security 
The most-favoured-nation standard has been considered to be a “core provision of 
international investment agreements”.593 Its origin can be traced back to the treaty 
practice of King Henry V of England which ensured that English vessels were 
granted the right to use harbours of Flanders “in the same way as French, Dutch, 
Sealanders and Scots.”594 This standard later evolved into a standard whereby vessels 
were ensured a right to a particular activity without naming certain countries, but 
with reference to any third state. It was included early on in provisions dealing with 
protection of foreign merchants. Article XVII of the Treaty of Commerce between 
Great Britain and Russia of 1766 prescribed that Russian merchants were to enjoy 
protection and justice and should be treated as the subject “of the most favoured 
nation.”595 
The standard entails that a host country is obliged to extend to foreign investors 
of a particular country treatment no less favourable than it accords to investors from 
another foreign country. Its application is far from being simple in practice as well 
documented in various cases. In the Anglo-Iranian Oil case, the United Kingdom 
sought to use a most-favoured-nation provision in its treaty with Iran in order to 
                                                     
592 Loewen Group et al v United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award of 26 June 
2003, para 137. 
593 UNCTAD, Most-Favoured Nation Treatment, Series on Issues on International Investment 
Agreement Series, Vol. III, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/10 (1999), p. 3. 
594 UNCTAD, Most-Favoured Nation Treatment, Series on Issues on International Investment 
Agreement Series, Vol. III, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/10 (1999), p. 13. 
595 See A Collection of All the Treaties of Peace, Alliance and Commerce between Great-Britain and Other Powers 
from the Revolution in 1688 to the Present Time, Vol. II (1771), p. 318-327. 
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benefit from more preferential treatment accorded to Danish nationals – or in other 
words, Iran’s conduct toward the Anglo-Iranian Oil company constituted a breach of 
“the principles and practice of international law which, by her treaty with Denmark, 
Iran promised to observe towards Danish nationals.” The International Court of 
Justice did not agree with the United Kingdom’s position on jurisdictional grounds,596 
but emphasized the importance of the “basic treaty” within the context of the most-
favoured-nation standard: 
 
“…in order [to] enjoy the benefit of any treaty concluded by Iran with a third party by virtue 
of a most-favoured-nation clause contained in a treaty concluded by the United Kingdom 
and Iran, the United Kingdom must be in a position to invoke the latter treaty. The treaty 
containing the most-favoured nation clause is the basic treaty upon which the United 
Kingdom must rely. It is this treaty which establishes the juridical link between the United 
Kingdom and a third-party treaty and confers upon that State the rights enjoyed by the third 
party. A third-party treaty, independent of and isolated from the basic treaty, cannot produce 
any legal effect as between the United Kingdom and Iran: it is res inter alios acta.”597 
 
With regard to the scope of the most-favoured-nation standard, the principles to 
which the standard is applied, including their substantive elements, are of 
considerable importance. In the Ambatielos case, a case that dealt with a dispute 
between Greece and the United Kingdom, a legal dispute arose about whether a 
Greek ship-owner should enjoy certain guarantees relating to the administration of 
justice. Here, Greece argued, with reference to a most-favoured-nation clause in 
Article X of the United Kingdom-Greece Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 
1886, that its national should enjoy certain treatment that had been accorded to other 
nationals in treaties made after 1886. The claims commission that adjudicated the 
dispute emphasized that the most-favoured-nation clause in Article X was limited to 
matters of “commerce and navigation” and could as such only apply to matters 
belonging to the same category of subject as that to which the clause itself relates. 




                                                     
596 The treaties, to which the United Kingdom referred in the proceedings, were the Treaty 
between the United Kingdom and Persia on 4 March 1857 and the Commercial Convention between 
the United Kingdom and Persia on 9 February 1903. However, Iran had limited its acceptance of the 
Court’s compulsory jurisdiction to disputes arising after the ratification of its declaration. The 
declaration was signed on 2 October 1930 and ratified on 19 September 1932. See Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company Case (United Kingdom v Iran), Preliminary Objection, Judgment 22 July 1952, ICJ Reports 
(1952), p. 103 and 108. 
597 See Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case (United Kingdom v Iran), Preliminary Objection, Judgment 22 
July 1952, ICJ Reports (1952), p. 109.  
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It is true that the ‘administration of justice,’ when viewed in isolation, is a subject-matter 
other than ‘commerce and navigation,’ but this is not necessarily so when it is viewed in 
connection with the protection of the rights of traders. Protection of the rights of traders 
naturally finds place among the matters dealt with by treaties of commerce and navigation. 
Therefore it cannot be said that the administration of justice, in so far as it is concerned with 
the protection of these rights, must necessarily be excluded form the field of application of 
the most favoured nation clause, when the latter includes ‘all matters relating to commerce 
and navigation.’ The question can only be determined in accordance with the intention of the 
Contracting Parties as deduced from a reasonable interpretation of the Treaty.”598 
 
This arbitral award shows that when a state has agreed to a most-favoured-nation 
clause the clause’s subject-matter determines to what extent the standard is applicable 
– or, in other words, the standard should only be applicable to beneficiaries in similar 
situations.599 
The standard’s application has not only been topical in general international law, 
but also in international investment law. Here, two aspects have been particularly 
relevant for this discussion, namely whether the most-favoured-nation standard can 
be used to expand the level of investment protection or whether it can be used to 
expand the investor’s access to more favourable dispute resolution regimes.  
The first issue can be described in the following way: can an investor refer to a 
most-favoured-nation clause to enjoy a higher level of protection, e.g. if another BIT 
omits provisions that curtail the full protection and security standard in the basic 
treaty? This issue was addressed in AAPL v Sri Lanka where the tribunal sought to 
interpret two provisions of the UK-Sri Lanka BIT that applied to the protection of 
the investment. The former clause was conventional in the sense that it prescribed 
that an investor should enjoy full protection and security. The latter clause prescribed 
two principles, namely that if the investor would suffer losses (i) owing to inter alia 
war or other armed conflict, the investor should be accorded treatment no less 
favourable than that accorded to a contracting party’s own nationals or nationals of 
any third state; (ii) resulting from requisition or destruction of property perpetrated 
by forces or authorities, the investor should be adequately compensated, if the 
destruction was not required by the necessity of the situation.600 Due to this latter 
                                                     
598 The Ambatielos Claim (Greece v United Kingdom), Judgment 6 March 1956, XII RIAA (1956), p. 107.  
599 This principle is usually referred to as the ejusdem generis principle. See further ‘The Most-
Favoured Nation Clause’, Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of its 
Thirteenth Session, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1978, Vol. II, Part 2, p. 27 et seq. 
600 Article 4 of the UK-Sri Lanka BIT reads: 
(1) Nationals or companies of one Contracting Party whose investments in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party suffer losses owing to war or other armed conflict, revolution, a state of national 
emergency, revolt, insurrection or riot in the territory of the latter Contracting Party shall be accorded 
by the latter Contracting Party treatment, as regards restitution, indemnification, compensation or 
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provision, which was curtailed by a national treatment and most-favoured-nation 
clause, the investor sought to invoke the Swiss-Sri Lanka BIT as that BIT did not 
contain a similar clause. The tribunal did not agree and refused such attempts, as it 
could not be proven that the Swiss-Sri Lanka BIT contained rules that were more 
favourable than the rules of the UK-Sri Lanka BIT.601  
In another case, ADF v United States, the claimant argued that measures 
implemented by the US Government violated Article 1105(1) NAFTA. Here, the 
claimant was faced with the FTC Interpretative Note, which narrowed the scope of 
application of Article 1105 NAFTA to customary international law, published 
following arbitral awards that had widened the scope of the Article to such an extent 
that the contracting parties decided to intervene. The claimant sought to counter this 
strict interpretation of Article 1105 by referring to similar provisions in the US-
Albania and US-Estonia BITs. Needless to say, the claimant pointed out that these 
BITs were not subjected to the FTC Interpretative Note and argued that these 
treaties “establish broad, normative standards of treatment distinct and separate from 
the specific requirements of the customary international law minimum standard of 
treatment.”602 However, the tribunal rejected this, as it had not been proven that 
these treaties had more favourable standards than the standards contained in Article 
1105 NAFTA.603 
The second issue can be described in the following way: Can an investor on the 
basis of a most-favoured-nation clause enjoy preferential treatment accorded to 
nationals of third states in scenarios dealing with whether he is obliged to seek 
redress before municipal courts prior to resorting to arbitration? In addition, can an 
investor expand the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal so that it can address legal 
                                                                                                                                                 
other settlement, no less favourable than that which the latter Contracting Party accords to its own 
nationals or companies or to nationals or companies of any third state. 
(2) Without prejudice to paragraph (1) of this Article, nationals and companies of one Contracting 
Party who in any of the situations referred to in that paragraph suffer losses in the territory of the 
other Contracting Party resulting from (a) requisitioning of their property by its forces or authorities, 
or (b) destruction of their property by its forces or authorities which was not caused in combat action 
or was not required by the necessity of the situation, shall be accorded restitution or adequate 
compensation.  
601 AAPL v Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award of 21 June 1990, 30 ILM 577 (1991) 
para 54.  
602 ADF Group Inc. v United States of America, ICSID Case (Additional Facility) No. ARB(AF)/00/1, 
Award of 9 January 2003, 6 ICSID Reports 470, 527, para 194. 
603 ADF Group Inc. v United States of America, ICSID Case (Additional Facility) No. ARB(AF)/00/1, 
Award of 9 January 2003, 6 ICSID Reports 470, 527, paras 195-198. 
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disputes not included in a BIT’s arbitration clause?604 Claimants have made attempts 
to this effect, but with different results.605  
As to the former scenario, i.e. whether an investor needs to seek redress before 
municipal courts before resorting to arbitration, the majority of tribunals adhere to 
the opinion that an investor should not be obliged to, even if there is a treaty 
provision that establishes a “cooling off period”. The main reason for enabling an 
investor to use the most-favoured-nation clause to circumvent such jurisdictional 
requirements was described as follows in the Maffezini case: 
 
“Notwithstanding the fact that the basic treaty containing the clause does not refer expressly 
to dispute settlement as covered by the most favored nation clause, the Tribunal considers 
that there are good reasons to conclude that today dispute settlement arrangements are inextricably 
related to the protection of foreign investors, as they are also related to the protection of rights of 
traders under treaties of commerce.”606 (emphasis added) 
 
Tribunals have followed this approach to a large extent.607 In a similar fashion, the 
tribunal in Siemens v Argentina argued the following with regard to the dispute 
settlement arrangements in the Germany-Argentina BIT: 
 
 “[T]he Treaty itself, together with so may other treaties of investment protection, has as a 
distinctive feature special dispute settlement mechanisms not normally open to investors. 
Access to these mechanisms is part of the protection offered under the Treaty. It is part of the treatment 
of foreign investors and investments and of the advantages accessible through a MFN 
clause.”608 (emphasis added) 
                                                     
604 Other cases could also be mentioned. In TECMED v Mexico, the claimant sought, with reference 
to a most-favoured-nation clause, to apply the Spain-Mexico BIT retroactively – or in other words to 
circumvent the BIT’s provision that prescribed that the treaty only applied to investments after its 
entry into force by referring to a more preferential provision in the Austria-Mexico BIT. The tribunal 
did not concur with the claimant’s claim by stating that provisions dealing with the treaty’s application 
over time “go to the core of matters that must be deemed to be specifically negotiated by the 
Contracting Parties.” See Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/02, Award of 29 May 2003, para 69. 
605 This has also been extensively debated in academia. See e.g. G.S. Tawil, ‘Most Favoured Nation 
Clauses and Jurisdictional Clauses in Investment Treaty Arbitration’, in C. Binder, U. Kriebaum, A. 
Reinisch and S. Wittich (eds.), International Investment Law for the 21st Century – Essays in Honour of 
Christoph Schreuer, OUP (2009), p. 9, and K. Hobér, ‘MFN Clauses and Dispute Resolution in 
Investment Treaties: Have We Reached the End of the Road?’, also in C. Binder, U. Kriebaum, A. 
Reinisch and S. Wittich (eds.), International Investment Law for the 21st Century – Essays in Honour of 
Christoph Schreuer, OUP (2009), p. 31.  
606 Emilio Augustín Maffezini v Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision of Jurisdiction 25 
January 2000, para 54.  
607 See e.g. Gas Natural S.A. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, Decision on 
Jurisdiction of 17 June 2005, paras 24-49, Suez and InterAgua v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/17, Decision on Jurisdiction of 20 May 2006, paras 52-66, and National Grid Plc. v Argentine 
Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Decision on Jurisdiction of 20 June 2006, paras 80-93.  
608 Siemens v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction of 3 August 
2004, para 102.  
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As to the latter scenario, i.e. whether an investor is able through a most-favoured-
nation clause to expand the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals, tribunals have remained 
consistently opposed to such attempts – at least until recently. The issue here is 
particularly difficult due to the fact that it affects directly the host states’ consent to 
arbitration. In some cases states have limited the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals to 
determine the amount of compensation only in the event that a violation has 
occurred. However, the issue of whether there has been a violation falls outside the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal. Needless to say, investors have sought to circumvent this 
limitation through the most-favoured-nation standard by referring to more open 
clauses in BITs made with third states. In Plama v Bulgaria, the investor submitted the 
legal dispute to arbitration before an ICSID tribunal with reference inter alia to the 
Cyprus-Bulgaria BIT. As that BIT only provided for arbitration “in cases of dispute 
with regard to the amount of the compensation”, the investor argued through a 
most-favoured-clause that the tribunal should employ a wider clause to be found in 
the Finland-Bulgaria BIT. The tribunal rejected this contention in the following way:   
 
“The “context” may support the Claimant’s interpretation since the MFN provision is set 
forth amongst the Treaty’s provisions relating to substantive investment protection. 
However, the context alone, in light of the other elements of interpretation considered 
herein, does not persuade the Tribunal that the parties intended such an interpretation. And 
the Tribunal has no evidence before it of the negotiating history of the BIT to convince it 
otherwise.”609 
 
“The present Tribunal agrees with that observation, albeit that the principle with multiple 
exceptions as stated by the tribunal in the Maffezini case should instead be a different 
principle with one, single exception: an MFN provision in a basic treaty does not incorporate 
by reference dispute settlement provisions in whole or in part set forth in another treaty, 
unless the MFN provision in the basic treaty leaves no doubt that the Contracting Parties 
intended to incorporate them.”610 (emphasis added) 
 
This line of argument was followed rather consistently until recently.611 In RosInvest v 
Russia, the investor was faced with a consent that was limited to disputes “concerning 
the amount or payment of compensation […], or concerning any other matter 
consequential upon an act of expropriation.”612 The tribunal argued that whilst a 
most-favoured-nation clause could be used to expand substantive protection, i.e. fair 
                                                     
609 Plama Consortium Ltd. v Repulic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision of Jurisdiction 
of 8 February 2005, para 192. 
610 Plama Consortium Ltd. v Repulic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision of Jurisdiction 
of 8 February 2005, para 223.  
611 See e.g. Vladimir Berschader and Moïse Berschader v Russia, SCC, Award of 21 April 2006 and Telenor 
Mobile Communications AS v Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15, Award of 13 September 2006. 
612 See Article 8 of the UK-USSR BIT as reprinted in RosInvestCo v Russia, SCC, Award on 
Jurisdiction of 3 August 2004, para 23. 
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and equitable treatment and full protection and security, the investor should be able 
to expand the jurisdiction of the tribunal through a most-favoured-nation clause: 
 
“While indeed the application of the MFN clause of Article 3 widens the scope of Article 8 
and thus is in conflict to its limitation, this is a normal result of the application of MFN 
clauses, the very character and intention of which is that protection not accepted in one treaty 
is widened by transferring the protection accorded in another treaty. […] If this effect is 
generally accepted in the context of substantive protection, the Tribunal sees no reason not 
to accept it in the context of procedural clauses such as arbitration clauses. Quite the 
contrary, it could be argued that, if it applies to substantive protection, then it should apply 
even more to ‘only’ procedural protection. However the Tribunal feels that this latter 
argument cannot be considered as decisive, but that rather […] an arbitration clause, at least 
in the context of expropriation, is of the same protective value as any substantive protection afforded by 
applicable provisions […] of the BIT.”613 (emphasis added) 
 
As these cases show, tribunals remain open to the argument that an investor be able 
to circumvent procedural requirements that hinder his direct access to international 
investment arbitration. In contrast, tribunals seem not as sympathetic to the 
argument that an investor use the most-favoured-nation standard to circumvent 
substantive requirements that determine what legal disputes a tribunal can adjudicate. 
This last principle, however, includes an exception, namely that tribunals are at times 
willing to agree with an investor that seeks to increase the jurisdictional scope of an 
arbitral tribunal if such an exercise is to increase investment protection, which is not 
included in the basic treaty, but accorded in another treaty. 
With regard to investment protection within the context of the full protection 
and security standard, in particular, tribunals have not had an opportunity to address 
the matter in great detail. In one case – AMT v Zaire – the respondent attempted to 
employ arguments related to the most-favoured-nation standard. It is important to 
stress from the outset that the most-favoured-nation standard was not included in 
the treaty-based full protection and security standard applicable to the dispute. 
However, the tribunal addressed an argument submitted by the respondent that 
touched upon national treatment. The case concerned looting that had taken place 
on two occasions, but it was disputed whether the perpetrators had been government 
entities or third parties. The respondent argued that it had not violated its obligation 
to provide protection and security because the claimant had not adduced evidence to 
show that the state had “accorded in like circumstances a treatment less favourable 
[…] than that accorded to its own nationals or companies.” The tribunal rejected this 
argument in the following way: 
 
                                                     
613 RosInvestCo v Russia, SCC, Award on Jurisdiction of 3 August 2004, para 132.  
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“If the argument advanced by Zaire does not seem altogether unfounded, the fact remains 
that Zaire has manifestly failed to respect the minimum standard required of it by 
international law. It should be added that Zaire has equally failed to perform a similar 
obligation with regard to a third state or all other third States. In effect, the argument 
advanced by Zaire that it has not accorded to nationals and companies of these States any 
protection or reparation, is not pertinent to the Tribunal. Since the repetition of breaches 
and failures to perform similar obligations it owes to third States will not in any way 
exonerate the objective responsibility of the State of Zaire for the breach of its obligation of 
the treatment of protection and security it owes to AMT by virtue of Article II paragraph 4 
of the BIT.”614 
 
However, while the tribunal was not susceptible to this line of argument, it did take 
into account the respondent’s position within the context of its level of development.  
 
5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter focused on the content of the full protection and security standard. It is 
important to address from the very beginning what effect the concept of a standard 
has on full protection and security. The study revealed that the concept is an old one 
in international law and was discussed in some detail in the early 1920s, but its 
influence later decreased during the interwar period and following the Second World 
War. It became also clear that some aspects of the standard, as a concept, including 
the part that emphasized the experience and intuition of an umpire, are difficult to 
align with the current state of affairs of international law. An umpire cannot but be 
bound by the sources of international investment law and cannot adopt its own 
idiosyncratic standard of “full protection and security”.  
Despite the expanding scope of treaty law in international investment law, 
arbitral tribunals have not shied away from applying customary international law 
when addressing issues concerned with full protection and security – an approach 
heavily influenced by the applicable law clause in the relevant treaty instrument or 
arbitration agreement. This is particularly true with regard to the concept of due 
diligence. That concept poses a different set of positive and negative obligations to 
the host state. In addition, the due diligence principle entails a three-pronged 
obligation that consists of (i) a duty to prevent that damage be inflicted upon the 
investor, (ii) a duty to restore the investor to his previous position, and (iii) a duty to 
investigate, charge and punish the parties responsible for a violation against the 
investor and his investment. In that context a state must apply its sovereign power 
with a certain level of intensity – or, in other words, diligence will not suffice when 
providing for protection and security to an investor, only due diligence. In that regard 
                                                     
614 AMT v Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award 21 February 1997, 36 ILM 1531 (1997), para 
6.10. 
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the knowledge of the state entities responsible for providing protection plays a 
considerable role. Moreover, the foreseeability of a particular risk within a certain 
time span affects the legal assessment that is necessary to determine whether the host 
state has discharged its duty to provide protection and security.  
The standard’s application is one of the most topical parts of the standard. As 
with rules in any legal system – municipal or international – the full protection and 
security standard depends on procedural and substantive requirements that must be 
fulfilled prior to the standard’s application. It is here that the legal issues on which 
the investor and the host state differ often have a level of individuality which is 
difficult to address with application of general rules. Procedural principles dealing 
with the burden of proof and other rules of evidence have affected the way in which 
the standard is applied in individual cases.  
One of the most controversial aspects of the standard is whether it is limited to 
physical security or whether it also provides for protection beyond physical security. 
As discussed, arbitral tribunals have remained divided on the issue. It is, however, 
clear that there is authority to conclude that the standard must provide for physical 
security as an absolute minimum. However, if treaty law is formulated in a way to 
increase the level of protection, the host state has an obligation to provide for legal 
security for the investor and the investment.  
In exceptional cases the host state’s level of development can play a role in a 
tribunal’s application of the standard – however, the balancing of interests between 
the host state and the investor is particularly challenging as such an approach could 
lead to a scenario where the standard could become too casuistic in practice. If the 
level of development is to play a role in an investment tribunal’s application, it will 
either affect its assessment pertaining to the state’s obligation to provide full 
protection and security or the assessment that deals with determining the damage of 
the investor.  
The full protection and security standard has a close relationship with other 
international investment standards, absolute and relative standards alike, including 
expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, national treatment and most-favoured-
nation. It is, however, clear that the relationship differs considerably depending on 
the standard in question. In addition, treaty law has lead to cross-pollination between 
standards due to the fact that various treaty standards often incorporate different 
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6. VIOLATIONS OF THE STANDARD AND THEIR MANIFESTATIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
So far, this dissertation has focused primarily on issues describing the history of the 
full protection and security standard, identifying its sources, describing its content, 
including outlining the way in which it is applied and how it overlaps with other 
standards. Having described these parts of the standard, it seems appropriate to 
focus on what consequences a state might face after having violated the various 
obligations inherent in the standard and that are owed to the investor. 
This chapter will describe violations of the standard and their manifestations. 
Any discussion about the standard and its concepts through the prism of its sources 
can only give a partial picture of the standard because its application is first and 
foremost influenced by certain types of facts or fact-based scenarios as revealed in 
judgments and arbitral awards. After having discussed these judgments and awards, it 
is possible to identify certain fact situations where arbitral tribunals have applied the 
full protection and security standard. Further examination of these situations and 
scenarios will provide a clearer picture of the standard’s content and as a result 
justifies further discussion.615 
According to the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States a state is 
responsible if it is found having violated its obligations according to international 
law. After having violated its obligations, a state is required to make full reparation 
for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act. This chapter will not, 
however, deal with consequences of violations of international law according to 
general international law, but focus on the subject within the context of violations of 
the full protection and security standard.616 That will first and foremost include an 
examination of the fact-based situations where the standard has been applied and 
what kind of acts or omissions will lead to a violation of the standard. Therefore, the 
chapter will deal with which claims are most relevant within the context of investor-
                                                     
615 See comments made by Professor Christoph Schreuer at the conference held by the Investment 
Treaty Forum on 9 September 2005, printed in F. Ortino et al (eds.), Investment Treaty Law – Current 
Issues II; Nationality and Investment Treaty Claims and Fair and Equitable Treatment in Investment Treaty Law, 
British Institute of International and Comparative Law (2007), p. 93, regarding the importance of 
identifying certain fact based scenarios when dealing with investment standards that contain broad 
legal concepts.  
616 As of late, scholarly writings have addressed damages in international investment law in great 
detail. See e.g. S. Ripinsky and K. Williams, Damages in International Investment Law, British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law (2009) and I. Marboe, Calculation of Compensation and Damages in 
International Investment Law, OUP (2010).  
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state arbitration, the effect of different formulations, such as “war clauses” within the 
context of compensation.  
During the time period from June 1990 to June 2012, the full protection and 
security standard became a contentious issue in 51 investor-state cases.617 Investors 
claiming violations of the standard were successful in 13 cases, but unsuccessful in 34 
cases. In four cases, the issue of full protection and security was not addressed by the 
arbitral tribunal despite being claimed by the claimant. The reason why the standard 
was not addressed in this last category of cases was mainly because of procedural 
reasons618 or because the standard was addressed under the prism of fair and 
equitable treatment.619 
 
6.2 Disparate behaviour constituting a violation of the standard 
Violations of the full protection and security standard come in many different forms 
and can be perpetrated by action and inaction – or in other words violations of full 
protection and security occur as a result of state action or state inaction, action by 
third parties or a combination of these factors. The broad legal concepts included in 
various investment standards, including the full protection and security standard, 
cannot be applied in the abstract, but rely heavily on facts of individual cases – a 
scenario that influences the interpretation and application of the standard.620 
The fact-based scenarios in arbitral awards evidence that the state can be the 
main perpetrator of the damage caused to the investment621 or a private party 
(parties).622 In addition, the state can, by using its legislative action, create a scenario 
that enables a private entity to cause damage to the investment.623 However, these 
fact-based scenarios are often complicated as they usually evolve over a certain 
period of time. Due to this complexity, a state’s obligation is a mixture of obligations 
different in nature. On one hand a state’s obligation is negative which entails the 
absence of action. Thus, a state is to refrain from taking action which could have 
                                                     
617 See Annex IV; Analytical table of investor-state cases during June 1990 – June 2012.  
618 See Mondev International Ltd. v United States of America, ICSID Case (Additional Facility) No. 
ARB(AF)/99/2, Award of 11 October 2002, 42 ILM 85 (2003), p. 58. 
619 See e.g. Eastern Sugar B.V. v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Partial Award of 27 March 
2007, SCC, para 207 and MCI Power Group LC and New Turbine Inc. v Ecuador, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/6, 31 July 2007, paras 361-371. 
620 Mondev International Ltd. v United States, ICSID Additional Facility Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, 
Award 11 October 2002, 42, ILM 85 (2003), paras 95 and 118. 
621 See Wena Hotels Ltd. v Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award of 8 December 
2000, 46 ILM 896 (2002). 
622 Case concerning Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI), (United States of America v Italy) ICJ, Decision rendered 
on 20 July 1989, ICJ Reports (1989) and Parkerings-Compagniet A.S. v Lithuania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/8, Award of 11 September 2007. 
623 CME v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Partial Award of 13 September 2001. 
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adverse effects on the investor and his investment. On the other hand the state’s 
obligation is positive, i.e. the state is obliged to take action in the event that the 
investor and his investment suffer adverse effects stemming from the action or 
inaction of a third party or the agencies of the state itself. As discussed in Chapter 
5.4.2, this latter obligation becomes partly relevant after the fact and establishes an 
obligation which the state has to fulfil, namely to (1) prevent the damage which is 
being caused, (2) to restore the investor to his previous situation or to (3) investigate 
the authors of the infringement of the investor’s rights, charge them accordingly and 
punish them, if found guilty.  
It is important to emphasize that “the state”, as a concept, applies here to the 
state and its agencies. This adds further to the complexity of the legal disputes that 
arise between states and investors. The perpetrator could possibly be the central 
authority in a particular state, namely legislature, executive or judiciary.624 In some 
cases that deal with federal states, the perpetrator is a part of a state that is only one 
of the many states that form the federal state.625 Moreover, specialized state organs or 
entities at either level could be the “state” in this context, e.g. agencies that deal with 
foreign investors or armed forces.626 These issues are at times dealt with in arbitral 
practice with reference to the ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility. According 
to Article 4, the conduct of any state organ, regardless of whether it is a part of the 
central government or of a territorial unit of the state, is considered an act of the 
state under international law. Even though the article only includes the concept of 
“conduct”, it is safe to say that the provision covers both acts and omissions of the 
state within the context of the full protection and security standard.  
Here, it is particularly important to differentiate between the state and a private 
party within the context of the way in which the investment is affected or damaged. 
It is obvious that both parties are capable of causing damage to the investment, e.g. 
by taking or harassment, but only the state can cause damage to the investment by 
making changes to the regulatory framework to which the investment is subjected or 
by failing to provide for a legal system capable of ensuring protection and security.  It 
is important to note that the following chapters are based on a categorization where 
                                                     
624 For examples of violations perpetrated by the legislature, executive or judiciary see CME v Czech 
Republic (legislative amendment made it possible for a private entity to destroy the investment), Waguih 
Elie George Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award 1 June 2009 (failure to 
enforce judicial rulings of state courts) and Loewen Group et al v United States, Additional Facility Case 
No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award of 26 June 2003 (trial judge failed to ensure a fair trial). 
625 An example of a violation perpetrated by a state court (as opposed to a federal court), see Loewen 
Group et al v United States, Additional Facility Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award of 26 June 2003.  
626 See e.g. Wena Hotels Ltd. v Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award of 8 December 
2000, 46 ILM 896 (2002) and Amco Asia Corporation and Others v Indonesia, Award 20 November 1984, 1 
ICSID Reports 413 (1993).  
237
this distinction is made. The first two subchapters will deal with violations that both 
parties are capable of perpetrating whereas the last two subchapters include factual 
scenarios where the state is the only entity able to cause harm to the investment.  
 
6.3 Violations of the standard 
6.3.1 Taking of investment or destruction of investment 
An investment can be taken over by either the state or a third party. However, a 
distinction has to be made between these two types of cases because taking by a 
private party is always unlawful while taking by the state is not always unlawful. The 
majority of BITs include provisions which prescribe that the state can expropriate 
the investment if the measure is (i) done for a public purpose, (ii) carried out under 
due process of law, (iii) non-discriminatory and (iv) followed by prompt, adequate 
and effective compensation to the investor.627 Regardless of whether the taking of the 
investment is lawful or unlawful, the state will either keep control of the investment 
or it will hand the investment over to another private entity. However, such a 
distinction does not have any practical importance to the investor in most cases – he 
has lost the investment. 
 
6.3.1.1 Taking or destruction caused by state organs 
In the ELSI case, the investor decided to withdraw his investment, a factory, due to 
heavy financial losses. The investor decided upon a structural approach that entailed 
“orderly liquidation” of various parts of the investment and laying off its personnel 
that would finally lead to the closing of the factory. The factory was later requisited 
by the Mayor of Palermo and temporarily taken over by its employees. The United 
States Government argued that the requisition violated constant protection and 
security as prescribed in the US-Italy FCN treaty of 1948. While it was not denied 
that the requisition had taken place, the International Court of Justice entered into a 
discussion as to whether the investor had had control of the investment when the 
government measure was executed. The Court discussed the company’s 
(investment’s) financial position when the Mayor of Palermo decided to seize the 
investment. The Court emphasized the fact that when the investment was taken 
over, it was so under-capitalized that it had become questionable whether the 
investor’s decision to “orderly liquidate” the investment would succeed and whether 
                                                     
627 For the legal requirements see S. Ripinsky and K. Williams, Damages in International Investment 
Law, British Institute of International and Comparative Law (2009), p. 66, but for interpretation of 
these requirements in investment treaties, see A. Reinisch, ‘Legality of Expropriations’, in A. Reinisch 
(ed.), Standards of Investment Protection, OUP (2008) p. 176-199. 
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the company had entered into a state of insolvency according to Italian bankruptcy 
law. The Court stated the following: 
 
“If, therefore, the management of ELSI, at the material time, had no practical possibility of 
carrying out successfully a scheme of orderly liquidation under its own management, and 
may indeed already have forfeited any right to do so under Italian law, it cannot be said that 
it was the requisition that deprived it of this faculty of control and management.”628  
 
Does the fact that an investor has limited control over an investment due to its loss 
lead to the conclusion that the host state has the right to take over the investment? It 
is difficult to see that an arbitral tribunal would reach the same conclusion on a 
government measure that circumvented the pre-determined legal regime (Italian 
bankruptcy laws) in order to interfere with a particular investment.629 One of the 
main arguments in support of that contention is that the reason for the government 
interference was not to deal with whether the management of the ELSI was obliged 
to declare the company bankrupt according to Italian bankruptcy laws, but to address 
the fact that about 800 employees of the company were to lose their jobs. 
If a state follows the pre-determined legal regime, a tribunal will most likely deny 
most claims, not unless some discrepancies can be found that deviate from that 
regime. In Emanuel Too v United States, an Iranian national living in the United States 
sought compensation for damage caused by the revocation of his liquor license by 
the IRS and the lack of protection and security from attacks and acts of plunder. The 
Iran-US Claims Tribunal noted that the reason for why the government revoked his 
liquor license was based on his unwillingness to pay lawfully levied withholding 
taxes.630 With regards to the claim pertaining to lack of protection, the Iran-US 
Claims Tribunal argued that the responsibility was incurred only when police 
protection fell below a minimum standard of reasonableness. As the claimant had 
not shown that local authorities failed to exercise due diligence, the tribunal could 
not find a violation.631 The investor in SAUR v Argentina argued that the brutality 
                                                     
628 Case concerning Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI), (United States of America v Italy) ICJ, Decision rendered 
on 20 July 1989, ICJ Reports (1989), para 101. 
629 See separate opinion of Judge Schwebel which criticized numerous points in the Court’s 
judgment. While Judge Schwebel agreed with the judgment on various points, he criticized the 
legitimacy of the presupposition that the investors’ had little control of the company (the creditors of 
the company had not decided to force the company into bankrupcty) when it was requisitioned and 
addressed points that supported the notion that the management of the company had control of the 
company. See Case concerning Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI), (United States of America v Italy) ICJ, Decision 
rendered on 20 July 1989, ICJ Reports (1989), p. 89 et seq. 
630 Emanuel Too v United States of America, Award No. 460-880-2 rendered on 29 December 1989, 
reprinted in 23 Iran-US Claims Tribunal Reports 378, p. 387-388. 
631 Emanuel Too v United States of America, Award No. 460-880-2 rendered on 29 December 1989, 
reprinted in 23 Iran-US Claims Tribunal Reports 378, p. 385-386. 
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shown by the host state during an “administrative intervention”, namely by using the 
police force and acts of physical violence entailed a violation of the standard of full 
protection and security. Here, the tribunal considered the use of the host state’s 
police force during the take over of the investment not a violation by itself, as the use 
of the police was based on statutory or regulatory authority:  
 
“Sauri’s argument is based on the fact that “the decree of the notification procedure was 
performed with a large police presence and deployment of police vehicles, police officers and 
about thirty people who literally landed in the company.” Faced with this argument, the 
Republic has shown, convincingly, that the decree of intervention itself authorized the notary 
office to “ask for the help of the police, until the appointed receiver had taken possession of 
the post, “which justifies the presence of the police force in accordance with the 
regulations.” […] The Tribunal considers that the mere presence of police at the intervention 
of a company is part of measures that public officials can legitimately take to ensure a 
smooth takeover.”632  
 
In contrast, in Middle Eastern Cement v Egypt, a ship owned by the investor was seized 
by the host state port authorities and auctioned off in accordance with its laws and 
regulations. However, the investor was not been sufficiently informed about the 
proceedings that led to its auction. The tribunal concluded that the fair and equitable 
treatment standard and the full protection and security standard had been violated.633  
In some cases, the state in question sets in motion a set of events that concern 
the investment directly and these events ultimately lead to the taking or destruction 
of the investment. Under such circumstances, the state should take any precautionary 
measure, if possible, that would minimize the loss of human life and property 
damage. In AAPL v Sri Lanka, the government decided to execute a counter-
insurgency operation that lead to fighting between its armed forces and revolutionary 
groups. The investment was destroyed during the fighting. The tribunal argued that 
the government “should have undertaken important precautionary measures to get 
peacefully all suspected persons out of [the] farm before launching the attack, either 
through voluntary cooperation with the Management of the company or by ordering 
the Company to expel the suspected persons.”634 In Wena v Egypt, a company 
responsible for dealing with foreign investors in the host state’s tourism industry 
requisited the investment and controlled it for one year before returning it to the 
                                                     
632 SAUR International S.A. v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/4, Award 6 June 2012, para 510. 
It must be noted that the tribunal found that the host state had expropriated the investment and 
violated the fair and equitable treatment standard.  
633 Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co. C.A. v Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6, Award 12 
April 2002, para 143. 
634 AAPL v Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award 21 June 1990, 30 ILM 577 (1991) para 
85. 
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investor. The tribunal concluded, despite assurances from the respondent that the 
operation was not undertaken with consent from the Ministry of Tourism, that the 
respondent had violated the full protection and security standard by not preventing 
the requisition, returning the investment to the investor in operating condition, 
punish those responsible or paying compensation for the damage caused.635  
 
6.3.1.2 Taking or destruction caused by private parties 
In the ELSI case, the investor’s decision to “orderly liquidate” the investment caused 
considerable unrest in the local community that eventually lead to a takeover of the 
factory by its employees.636 The International Court of Justice stated with regard to 
this scenario: 
 
“The reference […] to […] “constant protection and security” cannot be construed as the 
giving of a warranty that property shall never in any circumstances be occupied or disturbed. 
The dismissal of some 800 workers could not reasonably be expected to pass without some 
protest. Indeed, the management of ELSI seems to have been very much aware that the 
closure of the plant and dismissal of the workforce could not be expected to pass without 
disturbance […] In any event, considering that it is not established that any deterioration in 
the plant and machinery was due to the presence of the workers, and that the authorities 
were able not merely to protect the plant but even in some measure to continue production, 
the protection provided by the authorities could not be regarded as falling below “the full 
protection and security required by international law” […].637  
 
This approach  has been followed in cases where private parties have obstructed 
construction of the investment temporarily.638 In other cases, private parties might 
damage the investment during a period of civil unrest, riots and other scenarios of 
lawlessness. In AMT v Zaire, the investor suffered during two occasions of civil 
unrest and looting by the general public. It was claimed that soldiers participated in 
the latter occurrence that lead to the investment eventual collapse and as a result the 
host state was obliged to compensate for the damage caused. The arbitral tribunal 
argued that the nature of the looting showed “clearly that it was not “the army” or 
                                                     
635 Wena Hotels Ltd. v Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award of 8 December 2000, 41 
ILM 896 (2002), paras 88-93. 
636 The factory and related assets were also requisitioned by the Mayor of Palermo for six months. 
See Case concerning Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI), (United States of America v Italy) ICJ, Decision rendered 
on 20 July 1989, ICJ Reports (1989), para 30. 
637 Case concerning Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI), (United States of America v Italy) ICJ, Decision rendered 
on 20 July 1989, ICJ Reports (1989), para 108. 
638 Toto Costruzioni Generali S.P.A. v Republic of Lebanon, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, Award 7 June 
2012, para 228. 
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“the armed forces” that acted as such in the circumstance.”639 It also did not accept 
the host state’s argument that it was unable to prevent the occurrence and noted that 
the treatment of protection and security required by the BIT in question was not to 
be “any less than those recognized by international law”640 and that this last 
obligation was not to be less than the minimum standard of vigilance according to 
international law. Thus, the state is to provide protection and security for private 
entities (including soldiers not operating in their official capacity) by exercising due 
diligence in protecting the investment.  
If the state can show that it has executed due diligence by referring to its 
preventive measures, it has fulfilled its obligation, including scenarios that have 
reached revolutionary proportions.641 In LESI et al v Algeria, an investor succeeded in 
a tender for the construction of a dam for the purpose of providing the City of 
Algiers with drinking water. The project eventually failed and the investor 
subsequently claimed that the host state had not exercised enough diligence in 
protecting the investment, especially taking into account that the dam was to be 
constructed in an area that suffered from repeated assaults of Islamist extremists. 
The host state submitted evidence to the tribunal that showed numerous security 
measures undertaken in order to protect the investment from attacks. The tribunal 
concluded that the host state had taken “several security measures” to provide 
protection and as a result fulfilled its obligation. So, if the state can show that it has 
exercised due diligence by referring to its preventive measures, it has fulfilled its 
obligation.642 
When the host state is unable to prevent an occurrence that inflicts damage on 
the investor and his investment, the state is under the obligation to investigate the 
occurrence. In Parkering v Lithuania, the investor argued that the host state had not 
prevented damage caused by random vandalism. The tribunal noted that the 
authorities had conducted an investigation, but no culprits had been found. It noted 
that the case file did not show “in which way the process of investigation amounted 
to a violation” and concluded that the full protection and security standard had not 
                                                     
639 See AMT v Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award, 21 February 1997, 36 ILM 1531 (1997), 
para 7.09.  
640 See AMT v Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award, 21 February 1997, 36 ILM 1531 (1997), 
para 6.06. 
641 Parkerings-Compagniet A.S. v Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award of 11 September 
2007, para 356.  
642 See LESI et al v Algeria, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/3, Award of 12 November 2008, para 182. It 
should be noted that Islamist extremists did not destroy the investment. The parties decided to change 
the way in which the dam was to be constructed, but the earlier method posed particular security 
threats. As the parties were unable to agree on a new approach for its construction, the project was 
discontinued. See further same award, para 14 et seq. 
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been violated. In GEA v Ukraine, the investor complained about a shooting incident 
that was directed at one of its officials. It further argued that the host state had not 
investigated the matter. The host state submitted evidence that showed that an 
investigation had been instigated which did not support the allegation that the 
shooting was directed at the investment. The tribunal concluded that “…even if the 
shooting could be considered as related to an investment, Ukraine’s treatment of the 
shooting […] does not amount to a violation of its obligations…”.643 
It must be noted that one case falls not only in this category, but also in the 
former category described above. In CME v Czech Republic, the main reason for the 
damage caused to the investment was a statutory amendment that made it possible 
for the business partner of the investor to terminate the investment relationship.644  
 
6.3.2 Coercion and harassment of the investor and his personnel 
Coercion and harassment of the investor has at times been addressed theoretically in 
individual cases. The lack of proof has played a role as the tribunal is faced with two 
different accounts of the various measures taken by the state agencies or private 
entities. With regard to private parties in particular, the issue of conflicting rights has 
at times played a role, e.g. the public’s right to protest against a particular cause or 
occurrence.645 
 
6.3.2.1 Coercion and harassment caused by state organs 
While claims of harassment by state organs are frequently submitted by investors, 
they often face considerable challenges in substantiating claims of this nature.  
The first challenge concerns the burden of proof. In Alex Genin v Estonia, the 
investor argued that he had been harassed following his purchase of an Estonian 
bank that had been privatized by the state. The tribunal was troubled by the claim 
due to lack of proof. It later found that “…Claimants have failed to prove that such 
contacts between Respondent’s agents and Messrs. Genin and Dashkovsky as did 
take place amount to harassment.”646 In another case, Eureko v Poland, the claimant 
argued that the organs of the state had harassed its personnel. The tribunal did not 
                                                     
643 GEA Group Aktiengesellschaft v Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/16, Award of 31 March 2011, 
paras 254-255. 
644 CME v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Partial Award of 13 September 2001. This 
award is discussed in Chapter 5.5.4. 
645 Case concerning Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI), (United States of America v Italy) ICJ, Decision rendered 
on 20 July 1989, ICJ Reports (1989), para 108. 
646 Alex Genin v Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award of 25 June 2001, para 374. 
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dismiss the claimant’s contention but noted that there was “…no clear evidence 
before the Tribunal…”.647  
The second challenge consists of legitimacy of the measures claimed to 
constitute the coercion or harassment in question. If the state acts upon general 
statutory authority or if the government measures can be challenged before a court, a 
tribunal will generally be reluctant to conclude that the investor is being targeted for 
the purpose of negatively influencing the investment. In Saluka Investments v Czech 
Republic, the investor was subjected to a search conducted by the police as a part of 
an investigation. The investor argued that the police searches, which had removed 
documents, had been illegal and violated his right to privacy and home. The tribunal 
denied the investor’s claims as he had “lodged appeals or petition to the competent 
authorities or courts” after which documents were returned.648 In Spyridon Roussalis v 
Romania, the claimant’s investment consisted of an initial investment that was to be 
complemented by further investment (“post-purchase” investment obligations). A 
disagreement arose as to whether the investor had fulfilled his post-purchase 
obligations and whether the investor had honoured his fiscal duties according to 
Romanian law. The police decided to investigate the investor’s business operations 
and the state prosecutor later instigated criminal proceedings against the investor. A 
part of these proceedings was an interdiction order that temporarily limited the 
investor’s freedom of movement. The arbitral tribunal rejected the investor’s 
contention that he had been harassed by government agencies. It argued concerning 
the interdiction order: 
 
“…such policies are commonplace in many countries and promote the rational public policy 
of preventing the accused of fleeing the country in avoidance of criminal prosecution. […] 
The record shows that the orders were communicated to Claimant and he had an 
opportunity to contest them. Indeed, the orders were challenged and were ultimately lifted. 
And Claimant finally left the country.”649  
 
The tribunal concluded that the full protection and security standard had not been 
violated, as there had been no allegation that it compromised the physical integrity of 
the investment. 
One case, in particular, is of interest with regard to cohercion and harassment by 
the host state. In Desert Line Projects v Republic of Yemen, the investor entered into an 
                                                     
647 Eureko B.V. v Poland, Ad hoc arbitration, Award rendered on 19 August 2005, para 237. 
648 Saluka Investments B.V. v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Partial Award of 17 March 
2006, paras 494-496 and 505. 
649 Spyridon Roussalis v Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Award 7 December 2011, paras 607-
609. 
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agreement with the host state to build roads. The host state later delayed payments to 
the investor that lead to the investor’s inability to pay local subcontractors 
responsible for road construction – one of which threatened the investor’s 
personnel. In addition, the investor was threatened and attacked by local authorities 
and state agencies. Even though, the relevant BIT did not include a full protection 
and security clause, the tribunal concluded by referring inter alia to these occurences 
that a settlement entered into by the investor and the host state was null and void as 
it was signed under duress. That decision of the tribunal reinstated an earlier arbitral 
award, which was concluded by an arbitral tribunal constituted in the municipal 
jurisdiction, that awarded the investor compensation.650 
 
6.3.2.2 Coercion and harassment caused by private parties 
Investment projects are often undertaken in areas that are susceptible to public 
pressure that can take various forms. Tribunals have not addressed such scenarios in 
a strict way, but argued that demonstrations or public protests are not, as such, to be 
prevented by the host state. 
In TECMED v Mexico, the investor took part successfully in an auction that 
included the selling of property, buildings and other assets related to a controlled 
landfill of hazardous waste. In addition to purchasing the real property and facilities 
built there, the investor was to run the landfill for a certain period of time. The 
project became a contentious issue amongst the general public. The investor 
complained about (i) that the municipal and state authorities had encouraged the 
community to take action against the “…Landfill and its operation […] as well as the 
transport [of] waste…” and (ii) that the “…Mexican authorities, including the police 
and the judicial authorities, did not act as quickly, efficiently and thoroughly as they 
should have to avoid, prevent or put an end to the adverse social demonstrations 
expressed through disturbances…”.651 The tribunal did not agree. With regard to the 
latter argument in particular, the tribunal held that:  
 
 “…there is not sufficient evidence supporting the allegation that the Mexican authorities, 
whether municipal, state, or federal, have not reacted reasonably, in accordance with the 
parameters inherent in a democratic state, to the direct action movements conducted by those 
who were against the landfill.”652 [emphasis added]  
                                                     
650 See Desert Line Projects v Republic of Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17, Award of 6 February 
2008, paras 166-167, 184-185 and 194-195. 
651 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v United Mexican States, Additional Facility Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award of 29 May 2003, para 175. 
652 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v United Mexican States, Additional Facility Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award of 29 May 2003, para 177. 
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In another case, Noble Ventures v Romania, an investor took part in a privatization 
project of a steel mill in Romania. The investor was successful and entered into a 
privatization agreement with a government agency. Shortly thereafter, a change in 
government took place that altered the state’s position to the investment project. A 
number of problems arose, including social demonstrations following the mill’s 
structural reorganization. The investor argued that the host country had violated the 
full protection and security standard by not providing “…reasonable measures of 
protection which a well-administered government would be expected to exercise 
under similar circumstances…”.653 The respondent denied such claims by submitting 
that the two attacks, which were reported by the claimant, had been investigated and 
there was no attempt to prove that those incidences and others (unreported by the 
claimant but referred to during arbitral proceedings) had caused any damage to the 
investment. The tribunal concluded that the investor had failed to prove that the 
respondent had not acted with due diligence or that he had suffered damage due to 
the unrest. It also stated: 
 
And even if one concluded that there was a certain failure on the side of the Respondent 
sufficiently grave to regard it as a violation, it has not been established that non-compliance 
with the obligation prejudiced the Claimant, to a material degree.654 
 
It is important to note that investment tribunals that deal with cases of social unrest 
have not had the opportunity to address the right of protesters of free speech and 
their freedom of assembly.655 However, one jurisdiction includes regional free trade 
and/or investment obligations and a high level of human rights protection, namely 
the European Union. Two cases before the European Court of Justice provide an 
interesting look at how such cases are dealt with in a jurisdiction that involves 
fundamental economic and human rights.656 In Commission v France, the ECJ was faced 
                                                     
653 Noble Ventures v Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award 11 October 2005, para 162. 
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with violent incidents perpetrated by various groups of French farmers. The groups 
undertook a systematic campaign to restrict the supply of agricultural products from 
other EU countries, most notably strawberries from Spain and tomatoes from 
Belgium. These attacks were at times lodged in the presence of police that took no 
action to provide effective protection. The ECJ acknowledged that while France had 
the obligation to guarantee the free movement of goods, it had wide discretion in 
choosing the appropriate measures in fulfilling that objective. However, it fell under 
the jurisdiction of the Court to determine whether France had adopted adequate and 
appropriate measures to deal with actions of private entities that created obstacles to 
the free movement of goods. After having assessed the action undertaken by French 
authorities in responding to attacks that had taken place for over ten years, the Court 
concluded that they had been “manifestly inadequate to ensure the freedom of intra-
Community trade”.657  
In contrast, in Eugen Schmidberger, the ECJ dealt differently with a demonstration 
in Austria that resulted in the complete closure of the Brenner motorway, a major 
transit route, for 30 hours. One of the transit companies affected instigated legal 
proceedings against Austria, arguing that the demonstration should not have been 
authorized and claimed for compensation due to damage suffered. Here, the ECJ 
noted that the issue was how to reconcile, firstly, the right to the free movement of 
goods and, secondly, the freedom of expression and assembly – the former being 
based on treaty law whereas the latter formed part of EU’s general principles at the 
time. The Court made several distinctions from its earlier ruling in Commission v 
France, including that the demonstration was notified to the relevant authorities 
before it took place, that the relevant authorities had contemplated what the effects 
of not authorizing the demonstration would have and that authorities in Austria and 
other countries took action to warn motorists of the demonstration. It concluded 
that even though the demonstration constituted measures having equivalent effect to 
a quantitative restriction, it was objectively justified in this particular case.658  
Despite not dealing with investment arbitration, these cases could indicate how 
international human rights obligations of states, such as the freedom of expression 
and the freedom of assembly, could affect a tribunal’s assessment in cases dealing 
with human rights which they are obliged to honour.659  
 
                                                     
657 Case C-265/95, Commission v France [1997] ECR I-6959, paras 33-35, 40-52 and 65.  
658 Case C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge [2003] ECR I-5694, paras 
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659 See Article 19(2) [freedom of expression] and Article 21 [freedom of assembly] of the United 
Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. UNTS, Vol. 999, p. 171. 
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6.3.3 Changes to the regulatory framework after an investment is made 
It is not uncommon that a state that either welcomes or is indifferent towards 
foreign investment becomes hostile towards it after it has been made. Usually such a 
development is the result of the adoption of a different government policy.  
Two arbitral awards – one of the oldest and one of the more recent ones – give 
examples of how changes to government policy can lead to different scenarios which 
an investor needs to address after having made an investment. The former example is 
the Lena Goldfields case, a case adjudicated long before the establishment of the current 
BIT regime. After having entered into a concession agreement with the investor that 
was in line with its economic policy, the Soviet government later adopted the “Five-
Year Plan” that was hostile towards foreign investment and capitalistic enterprises in 
general. That manifested itself in lack of police protection and attacks from unions 
and government agencies alike and resulted in various violations against the investor 
and his employees, such as theft of gold, loss of the employees’ political rights and 
prosecution of government officials for “counter-revolutionary activity and 
espionage”. The investor instigated arbitral proceedings against the host state and 
was awarded compensation.660  
The latter example is the AES Summit Generation v Hungary case. In 1995, the host 
state privatized its energy sector. The following year, the investor acquired 
government entities that supervised power stations. In 2004, when the host state 
joined the European Union, all administrative pricing was abolished. Only two years 
later the host state approved an amendment to its Electricity Act where 
administrative pricing was reintroduced. This amendment allegedly seriously affected 
the investment. The investor instigated arbitral proceedings and claimed that the 
reintroduction of the administrative pricing through statutory amendments and 
pricing decrees had violated the most constant protection and security standard. The 
tribunal did not agree and noted: 
 
“While it [the standard] can, in appropriate circumstances, extend beyond a protection of 
physical security, it certainly does not protect against a state’s right (as was the case here) to 
legislate or regulate in a manner which may negatively affect a claimant’s investment, 
provided that the state acts reasonably in the circumstances and with a view to achieving 
objectively rational public policy goals.”661 
 
                                                     
660 See A. Nussbaum, The Arbitration Between the Lena Goldfields Ltd. and the Soviet Government, 36 
Cornell Law Quarterly (1950-1951), p. 31. This award is discussed in Chapter 3.3.5. 
661 AES Summit Generation v Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Award 23 September 2010, 
para 13.3.2. 
248
As discussed earlier, the full protection and security standard has been thought 
historically to focus on the physical protection of investments. Such an approach 
would entail considerable discretion for host states to legislate or implement 
regulatory amendments that could have detrimental effects on investments in their 
jurisdiction. Still, arbitral awards that have argued for a more expansive approach, at 
the expense of a state’s discretion to regulate the framework to which the investment 
is subjected, have grown in number in recent years. If the host state implements 
amendments to the regulatory framework that are “aimed at, [or] suited to, 
destroying [the] investment” or “targeted to remove the security and legal 
protection” of the investment, it has violated the full protection and security 
standard.662 In addition, there are authorities that argue that the full protection and 
security standard should extend beyond physical protection and include legal 
protection for investors and their investments.663 The late Thomas Wälde noted the 
following when discussing the standard in the Energy Charter Treaty:664 
 
“This obligation would not only be breached by active and abusive exercise of state powers 
but also by the omission of the state to intervene where it had the power and duty to do so 
to protect the normal ability of the investor’s business to function in a level playing field. If 
one links the […] duty of the state […] to supervise effectively its subordinated entities […] 
with the […] a duty to provide ‘constant security and protection’, one would arrive at reading 
this discipline as providing a duty, enforceable by investment arbitration, to use the powers 
of government to ensure the foreign investment can function properly on a level playing 
field, unhindered and not harassed by […] political and economic domestic powers […].”665 
 
When a state exercises its political and economic power to implement changes to the 
regulatory framework, it will either employ legislative power or executive power – or 
a combination of both. Needless to say, the risk of overlap with the fair and equitable 
treatment standard is considerable as the difference between arguments in favour of 
a violation of full protection and security and fair and equitable treatment is minimal. 
Examples of such an overlap are regulatory amendments implemented by the host 
state. In such cases, casuistic regulatory amendments targeting the investment violate 
full protection and security. Similarly, particular regulatory amendments that go 
against legitimate expectations or a stable legal and regulatory framework violate fair 
                                                     
662 Lauder v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Award 3 September 2001, para 311, and CME 
v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Partial Award of 13 September 2001, para 613.  
663 See C. Schreuer, Full Protection and Security, Journal of International Dispute Settlement, OUP 
(2010), p. 10. 
664 See Article 10(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty in Chapter 3.3.2.3.2 and in Annex II.  
665 T.W. Wälde, ‘Investment Arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty: An Overview of Selected 
Keys Issues’, in N. Horn (ed.), Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes – Procedural and Substantive Legal 
Aspects, Kluwer Law International (2004), p. 213. 
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and equitable treatment. In such a scenario, arguments that do not necessarily 
succeed under the rubric of full protection and security might be employed to find a 
violation of fair and equitable treatment.666   
 
6.3.3.1 Post-investment obligations of the host state not implemented 
Legislative and regulatory amendments can in some circumstances increase the 
likelihood that a host state will violate the full protection and security standard. In 
some cases, the host state has a role to play after the investment has been made. This 
obligation of the state manifests itself in the responsibility to amend tariffs in 
infrastructure projects that were previously run by the host state or in a pledge not to 
alter its laws and regulations that might seriously damage the investment. 
In some cases, where the investment is implemented in a single transaction, the 
state has a role to play with regards to how the investor is able to charge for its 
services. Here, it can happen that a state is not able or willing to follow through on 
its earlier statements as that might lead to public opposition. In Azurix v Argentina, 
the investor invested in a utility that distributed drinking water and disposed of 
sewage. The investment was not only handed over to the investor in poor condition, 
but the host state did not implement a new tariff regime due to political instability. 
The claimant argued that this failure to apply the regulatory framework of the 
concession agreement had destroyed the security provided therein.667 The tribunal 
held that this constituted a violation of fair and equitable treatment and full 
protection and security.668 In National Grid v Argentina, the investor purchased an 
electricity company privatized by the state. The decision to invest was made after the 
government had forwarded various statements to the investor in which a particular 
structure was to be provided. The host state later reneged on the promises made and 
amended the regulatory framework. The tribunal held: 
 
“In applying this standard of protection to the facts of the instant case, the Tribunal finds 
that the changes introduced in the Regulatory Framework by the Measures, which effectively 
dismantled it, and the uncertainty reigning during the two years preceding the sale of its 
shares in […], with respect to any possible compensation on account of the impact of the 
Measures on Claimant’s investment, are contrary to the protection and constant security 
which the Respondent agreed to provide for investments under the Treaty.”669  
                                                     
666 PSEG Global Inc. and Konya Ilgin Elektrik Üretim ve Tícaret Limited Sirketi v Republic of Turkey, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/02/5, Award of 19 January 2007, paras 246-254 and 257-259, Total S.A. v Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Award of 27 December 2010, para 127 and Impregilo v Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Award of 21 June 2011, para 334.  
667 Azurix Corp. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award 14 July 2006, para 396. 
668 Azurix Corp. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award 14 July 2006, para 408. 
669 National Grid Plc. v Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL Award, 3 November 2008, para 269 et seq.  
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With regards to legislative amendments in general, which cannot be construed as 
being obligations related to the investment, the state has wider discretion to legislate. 
Legislation is, needless to say, not beyond the reach of the investment instruments to 
which the host state is a party. However, a democratically elected legislature has the 
sovereign power to pass legislation despite that it is amongst some considered to be 
ill-conceived and burdensome. That alone does not suffice to constitute a breach of a 
BIT or other instrument.  In Paushok v Mongolia, the investor owned gold mining, oil 
and gas companies in Mongolia. Due to considerable increase in gold prices, the 
Mongolian parliament introduced a tax law that introduced a 68% tax on any gold 
sales at prices in excess of USD 500 pr ounce. Following this amendment, the 
investor sought to have it repealed before various courts without any success. The 
investor received notices to pay taxes that had fallen due and were based on the new 
legislation. The investor’s bank accounts were later seized as his relationship with 
Mongolian authorities deteriorated. The investor instigated arbitral proceedings. As 
the BIT provided for “full legal protection to investments”, the tribunal thought that 
there was no reason to limit the protection to physical protection. However, the 
tribunal did not consider that the tax law violated the investor’s “legal protection”: 
 
“Further, the Tribunal has not found, in relation to the [tax law], any reason to conclude that 
there has been a breach of such a clause or of the fair and equitable treatment through 
actions of the State or its agents. As a result, whether it would refer to “an objective 
requirement of stability, certainty and foreseeability” as argued by Claimants or to “a 
subjective standard reduced to the protection of Claimants’ specific expectations” as argued 
by Respondent, the Tribunal cannot conclude that there has been a violation of the “full 
legal protection” guaranteed by Article 2 of the Treaty.”670 
 
It must be noted that the reason for the implementation of the tax amendment 
seems not to have been to target the investment as such, but to tax gold due to the 
exceptionally high price of gold on the world market.671 If, however, the state has 
committed itself to not amend its laws and regulations, but implements statutory or 
regulatory changes, it could be held in violation of the full protection and security 
standard. A case in point is Bogdanov v Moldova, where the state went too far in 
subjecting the investor to excessive administrative charges. According to Article 2.2 
of the Russia-Moldova BIT, capital investments were to be “guaranteed complete 
and unconditional legal protection”. The investor had established a company that 
enjoyed rights in a defined Free Economic Zone, one of which was a stability clause 
                                                     
670 Paushok et al v Mongolia, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Award of 28 April 2011, para 327. 
671 Paushok et al v Mongolia, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Award of 28 April 2011, para 319. 
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which limited the host state’s ability to levy customs duties during a 10 year period. 
The government, however, decided to introduce administrative charges that added 
considerable cost to the importation and exportation from the host state. The 
investor instigated arbitral proceedings and argued that administrative charges 
entailed a violation of his rights according to Article 2.2 of the Russia-Moldova BIT. 
The umpire agreed with the investor and concluded: 
 
 
“The Sole Arbitrator does not exclude that there may be some room for administrative 
charges which conceptually are to be distinguished from customs duties. In the present case, 
however, the charges were of such size and construed so that the cost to [investor] exceeded 
a total of 440 000 lei for the three years […]. Charges of such magnitude are quite obviously 
designed to fulfil the purposes typical for customs duties […]. The Sole Arbitrator 
accordingly must find that the application of law […] to [investor] as regards the fees 
complained about by Mr Bogdanov was in contravention of the stabilistation clauses […] 
and that consequently such application entailed a violation […].”672 
 
Further political developments, e.g. regime change following an election, might 
seriously affect the host state’s commitment to its post-investment obligations, in 
particular when an investor intends to increase its investment over time.673 In Eureko 
v Poland, the investor acquired in cooperation with another company 30% of shares 
in an insurance company privatized by the state. The privatization became a 
contested political issue and the host state reneged on its promise to privatize more 
of the insurance company. In addition, the investor experienced hostility from 
government agencies. The investor instigated arbitral proceedings and complained 
that the full protection and security standard had been violated. The tribunal 
disagreed: 
 
“The Tribunal is not convinced that the harassment by Polish authorities of senior 
representatives of Eureko’s management breached the standard of full security and 
protection of the Treaty. Certain of the acts of harassment described […] are disturbing and 
appear to come close to the line of Treaty breach […] However, in any event, there is not 
clear evidence before the Tribunal that [Poland] was the author or instigator of the actions in 
question. If such actions were to be repeated and sustained, it may be that the responsibility 
of [Poland] would be incurred by a failure to prevent them.”674 
 
                                                     
672 Bogdanov v Republic of Moldova, SCC, Award of 30 March 2010, paras 83-85. 
673 See e.g. Lauder v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Award 3 September 2001, CME v Czech 
Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Partial Award of 13 September 2001, Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed 
SA v United Mexican States, Additional Facility Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award of 29 May 2003, Noble 
Ventures v Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award 11 October 2005 and Vivendi Universal S.A. v 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award of 22 May 2007. 
674 Eureko B.V. v Poland, Ad hoc arbitration, Award rendered on 19 August 2005, paras 236-237.  
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The investor also argued that the fair and equitable treatment standard had been 
violated. The tribunal agreed with the investor that the host state had violated that 
obligation.675  
 
6.3.3.2 Operating licenses revoked or restrictions imposed on the investment  
The investor is at times dependent upon the host state in terms of operating licenses. 
It, therefore, becomes extremely important for the investor to be able to renew his 
operating license, if needed, or ensure that the license is not taken away by the host 
state. In TECMED v Mexico, the investor was unable to renew his license to operate a 
landfill of industrial waste. The claimant argued that the decision to deny his request 
for renewal constituted a change in administrative practice that was different from 
when the investment was made. In addition, the investor argued that the judicial 
system had not functioned adequately when the investor attempted to reverse the 
decision to reject the renewal of the operating permit. The tribunal disagreed and 
noted that there was not sufficient evidence to conclude that municipal, state and 
federal authorities had acted unreasonably. Moreover, the tribunal emphasized that 
the judicial system had not, in relation to efforts made by the investor to reverse 
administrative measures affecting the landfill, been inconsistent with legal rules 
applicable to the landfill.676 
Similarly, some sectors of the economy come under more scrutiny than others, 
such as financial institutions. In Saluka v Czech Republic, the investor acquired a bank 
privatized by the host state. The investor sought to reorganize the bank’s operation 
but without result. The bank faced serious liquidity problems, in particular after a run 
on the bank had occurred on two occasions. The bank was one of the largest banks 
in its field and was as a result closely supervised by the host state’s financial 
authorities. As the bank’s position deteriorated and because of the risk of systemic 
failure of the Czech financial sector, if the bank would become bankrupt, the host 
state suspended the trading of shares in the bank and prohibited the investor to 
transfer its shares to a third entity. The bank was later taken over by the state and 
sold to a third party. The investor instigated arbitral proceedings and argued that his 
rights had been violated. While the tribunal concluded that the host state had not 
violated the full protection and security standard by suspending the trading of shares 
                                                     
675 Eureko B.V. v Poland, Ad hoc arbitration, Award rendered on 19 August 2005, paras 233-234. 
676 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v United Mexican States, Additional Facility Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award of 29 May 2003, para 177. 
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and prohibiting the investor to transfer its shares, it concluded that the fair and 
equitable treatment standard had been violated.677  
 
6.3.3.3 Demands for the renegotiations of concession agreements 
Economic difficulties have forced a number of host states to demand that 
concession agreements be renegotiated, as the states are unable to sustain the 
regulatory structure upon which the agreements rest.678 In general terms this request 
of host states could not, as such, be considered a violation of the full protection and 
security standard. It is rather what host states do or do not do, e.g. the non-
implementation of tariff regimes critical to the investor and the structure underlying 
the investment, which has been thought to be a violation of the full protection and 
security standard.679 However, in cases where the treaty-based standard is formulated 
in a way to increase the level of protection, a tribunal would be more inclined to 
conclude that the demand for renegotiation entailed a violation. In Siemens v 
Argentina, the investor was awarded the project to design and maintain a personal 
identification and electoral system. The host state later requested that the investor 
postpone production and sought to renegotiate the terms of the concession contract. 
The investor claimed that the standard, which provided for “vollen rechtlichen 
Schutz und volle rechtliche Sicherheit”, had been violated. The tribunal held that the 
initiation of renegotiation with the sole purpose of reducing cost and without a 
declaration of public interest affected the legal security of the investment.680 In 
Vivendi v Argentina, the investor also was awarded a concession for a water and 
sewage system in an Argentine province. The government made public statements 
that raised public opposition and demanded renegotiation, while the BIT to which 
the dispute was subjected prescribed that the investment should enjoy protection and 
security in accordance with fair and equiteable treatment. The tribunal noted: 
 
“On the facts before us, it is only possible to conclude that the Bussi government, 
improperly and without justification, mounted an illegitimate “campaign” against the 
concession, the Concession Agreement, and the “foreign” concessionaire from the moment 
it took office, aimed either at reversing the privatisation or forcing the concessionaire to 
renegotiate (and lower) CAA’s tariffs.”681 
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678 At times, the investor requests that the concession agreement be renegotiated. See Impregilo v 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Award of 21 June 2011, para 32. 
679 See National Grid Plc. v Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL Award of 3 November 2008, para 269.  
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The tribunal concluded that the standard could not be limited to physical protection 
alone and had been violated, as had the fair and equitable treatment standard. In 
contrast, the tribunals in Suez and Vivendi v Argentina and Suez and InterAgua v 
Argentina reached the opposite conclusion when arguing that protection according to 
the full protection and security standard should be limited to protection from 
“physical injury” despite dealing with a treaty-based standard that prescribed that the 
investments made were to be “fully and completely protected and safeguarded in the 
territory […] in accordance with the principle of just and equitable treatment […]”.682 
 
6.3.4 Failure to provide for legal system 
It is a principle of customary international law that a state is obliged to provide for a 
legal system. However, while the state has considerable discretion as to the way in 
which that system serves its nationals, the state is under the obligation to provide a 
system that protects aliens within its territory in accordance with the minimum 
standard of international law. This basic obligation is fulfilled when the state in 
question shows that it has a legal system – or in other words, this obligation is 
relative in the sense that it is a “best efforts” obligation with the caveat that certain 
elements must be inherent in the system that do not fall beneath the floor provided 
by the international minimum standard. 
What is the influence of international investment standards which are based on 
the BIT-regime that have evolved over the past fifty years on this structure of 
customary international law? As discussed earlier, BITs usually only include a simple 
formulation of the full protection and security standard whereby the parties to the 
instruments are obliged to provide for “most constant protection and security” and 
“full protection and security”. In some cases, treaty law goes further and prescribes 
that investors are to be accorded “full legal protection and legal security” or “full 
legal protection and security”. Arbitral awards have dealt with cases involving the 
conventional formulation of the standard, but not the more expansive articulation of 
the standard. 
While arbitral tribunals have emphasized the importance of having access to the 
host state’s court system, they have not gone as far as to conclude that the investor is 
entitled to a court decision in its favour. The tribunal in Parkerings v Lithuania argued 
the following:  
 
                                                     
682 Suez and Vivendi et al v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/19, Award of 30 July 2010, 
para 173, and Suez and InterAgua v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17, Award of 30 July 
2010, para 167.  
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“The Respondent’s duty under the Treaty was, first, to keep its judicial system available for 
the Claimant to bring its contractual claims and, second, that the claims would be properly 
examined in accordance with domestic and international law by an impartial and fair court. 
There is no evidence – not even an allegation – that the Respondent has violated this 
obligation.”683 
 
In addition to the investor’s access to the host state’s legal system, tribunals have not 
considered government measures and police investigations to violate the standard, in 
particular if the investor has been able to challenge these measures before the host 
state’s courts. In Saluka v Czech Republic, the investor argued that a search undertaken 
by the police had violated the investor’s fundamental rights of privacy and protection 
of property. The tribunal noted that the investor had successfully lodged a petition 
before the Czech Constitutional Court and the seized documents had been returned 
to the investor. The tribunal failed to see a violation of the full protection and 
security standard.684 In TECMED v Mexico, the investor argued that “the judicial 
authorities, did not act as quickly, efficiently and thoroughly as they should have to 
avoid, prevent or put an end to the adverse social demonstrations” that affected the 
investor’s operation. The tribunal disagreed and noted that there was not sufficient 
proof supporting that municipal, state or federal authorities had not reacted 
reasonably. The tribunal stated: 
 
“This conclusion is also applicable to the judicial system, in relation to the efforts made to 
take action against the community’s opposing demonstrations or to the attempt to reverse 
administrative measures which were deemed inconsistent with the legal rules applicable to 
the Landfill…”685 
 
In a recent award, Frontier Petroleum Services v Czech Republic, the claimant invested in 
the aviation industry in the Czech Republic. The claimant acquired a bankrupt state-
owned aircraft manufacturing company and transferred the assets of that company to 
a joint venture, which the claimant established with a Czech business partner. After 
various difficulties arose with the claimant’s business partner, the claimant sought 
assistance from the Czech government. In addition, the claimant instigated civil 
proceedings in the Czech Republic against his Czech counter-party and arbitral 
proceedings in Stockholm against the same counter-party and the joint venture itself. 
After having obtained interim and final arbitral awards, the claimant sought to 
                                                     
683 Parkerings-Compagniet A.S. v Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award 11 September 2007, 
para 360. 
684 Saluka Investments B.V. v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Partial Award of 17 March 
2006, paras 495-496. 
685 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v United Mexican States, Additional Facility Case No. 
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enforce the awards. His attempts were not only unsuccessful before Czech courts, 
but assets, which the claimant had acquired for his investment, were eventually sold 
off in bankruptcy proceedings. The claimant instigated arbitral proceedings and 
argued that he had been “mistreated as a result of inaction of the Czech courts and 
officials, malfeasance by Czech bankruptcy trustees, and through the manifest 
inadequacy of the legal system of the Czech Republic with respect to the recognition 
of arbitral awards.”686 The tribunal disagreed with the investor that the full protection 
and security standard had been violated. It noted that a state’s obligation with regard 
to its legal system was to provide for a functioning system of courts that was 
available to the investor: 
 
“Even a decision that in the eyes of an outside observer, such as an international tribunal, is 
wrong, would automatically lead to state responsibility as long as the courts have acted in 
good faith and have reached decisions that are reasonably tenable. In particular, the fact that 
protection could have been more effective, procedurally or substantively, does not 
automatically mean that the full protection and security standard has been violated.”687 
 
One of the fundamental aspects of any legal system is that its judgments and rulings 
are acknowledged as binding and enforced by the executive branch of government. If 
a state fails to do so, it has violated the full protection and security standard. Here, 
Vecchi v Egypt provides guidance in a scenario of this nature. An investor acquired 
real estate from the Egyptian state for the purpose of developing a hotel resort. The 
relationship between the investor and the host state turned sour after the investor 
started doing business with an Israeli company. After having been threatened that the 
investment would be requisited by the state if he did not end his business with the 
Israeli company, the investor terminated the business relationship. Shortly thereafter, 
the host state took over the investment by a Ministerial Resolution. The investor 
filed suit in the Egyptian courts that deemed the government seizure illegal. After 
having repeatedly won his case before the Egyptian courts, including the Supreme 
Administrate Court, whose decisions were not enforced by the state, the investor 
instigated arbitral proceedings. The tribunal noted that the host state had not 
respected the rulings of its own courts: 
 
“The Tribunal is of the view that the conduct of Egypt fell well below the standard of 
protection that the Claimants could reasonably have expected, both in allowing the 
expropriation to occur and in subsequently failing to take steps to return the investment to 
Claimants following repeated rulings of Egypt’s own courts that the expropriation was illegal.  
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This is indeed the most egregious element in the whole affair. Accordingly the Tribunal finds 
that Egypt has contravened Article 4(1) of the Italy-Egypt BIT.”688 
 
Therefore, a failure by the government to execute final judgments is a violation of 
full protection and security.689 Needless to say, such a violation removes the legal 
security that a state is obliged to guarantee to the investor according to customary 
international law and the most common formulations of the standard in treaty law.690 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
Applying the full protection and security standard requires appreciating the factual 
elements of each case. As discussed, certain fact-based scenarios appear more 
frequently in cases dealing with the standard. Outright takings or destruction of the 
investment make up for the clearest forms of violations of the standard regardless of 
whether these violations are perpetrated by the state itself or private entities. Other 
forms of violations of the standard consist of coercions and harassments. However, 
these types of violations can be more challenging to determine – not least because of 
the fact that what an investor might experience as coercion or harassment, e.g. 
investigation undertaken by state agencies, might only be an example of when the 
state exercises its police powers or supervisory authority. Even more challenging are 
instances in which the state either makes changes to the regulatory framework to 
which the investment is subjected or does not fulfil its obligations necessary for the 
investment to succeed. Finally, cases involving claims purporting that the state has 
failed to provide for a legal system necessary for the investor to protect and secure 
the investment in question are particularly demanding. It must, however, be 
emphasized that the factual elements dealt with here are by no means exhaustive. 
Recognizing these elements will not enable an arbitrator to reach his conclusion in 
                                                     
688 Waguih Elie George Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, 
Award 1 June 2009, para 448. 
689 A state’s aggressive conduct towards an investor is not limited to the domestic sphere alone. In 
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690 The failure to execute final judgments also constitutes denial of justice. See J. Paulsson, Denial of 
Justice in International Law, CUP (2005), p. 168. There are other similarities between the full protection 
and security standard and denial of justice. See Chapter 5.7.3.  
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the abstract – the arbitrator is still bound by the proven facts when applying them to 
the standard in the legal dispute before him.  
The result must be, after having assessed the factual circumstances that appear 
most frequently, that the application of the full protection and security standard 
depends considerably on comprehensive judicial balancing between the investors’ 
and the host states’ protected legal interests. As arbitral practice shows, the  
balancing of those interests is far from being a simple task and depends on all the 














7. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONARY REMARKS 
 
 
This dissertation has sought to discuss the full protection and security standard 
through the prism of its sources of international investment law; sources that are 
structurally the same as the sources of international law described in Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice. A number of conclusions can be drawn 
from the research undertaken – some of which confirm statements that are 
considered “conventional wisdom”, while others contradict what has previously been 
thought about the standard. 
 
(1) Historical development of the standard 
While the standard has previously been thought to stem from the treaty practice of 
the United States, it is clear that it rests upon an older principle recognized by states 
for centuries: a state is to some extent responsible for the protection and security of 
aliens travelling or residing within its borders. This principle was originally limited to 
certain professions but later developed into a general principle of law applicable to all 
foreigners. It became particularly important during the de-colonization of the regions 
in South America and Africa where nationals of the colonial powers experienced 
discrimination that negatively affected their person and property. Later, it became 
even more important during the ever-expanding interference of government 
authority into economical affairs.  
While the FCN treaties provided for protection and security clauses, aliens, or in 
other words, investors, only began to enjoy a higher level of protection with the 
conclusion of the ICSID Convention of 1965 and the emergence of BITs since 1959. 
This accelerated development of treatymaking, coupled with various concepts that 
have expanded in scope over time, has increased protection for investors. Not only 
did investors start to enjoy protection according to treaty-based standards, but they 
were also able to instigate arbitral proceedings against the host state of the 
investment and by doing so circumvent national court systems.  The application of 
additional concepts, which rest upon other sources of law, has further developed the 
full protection and security standard. Still, it is important to note that while some 
concepts have a long history in international law, they are not to be applied in a non-
critical way.  
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(2) The standard and sources of international law 
One of the concepts enjoying a long history in international law is the concept of the 
standard. A standard is not a source of international law – it is an abstraction of rules 
and principles that are based on sources of international law. So, when the full 
protection and security standard is interpreted or applied to a particular legal dispute, 
it is not the standard as such that is applied but the sources of law from which the 
standard is abstracted.  
Here, the sources most important are, needless to say, treaty law and customary 
international law. The conclusion must be that the full protection and security 
standard is by its very nature a two-part standard founded on a treaty based standard 
with defined elements and a standard of due diligence which rests upon customary 
international law. These two foundations of the standard are different in nature – 
one entails an obligation to abstain from action whereas the other entails an 
obligation to take action. This makes the full protection and security standard a 
standard of general application with considerable flexibility to take into account the 
facts of each case that might render different conclusions in similar situations. This is 
particularly clear in cases concerned with whether the standard provides only for 
physical protection or whether it also provides for protection going beyond physical 
protection and security. It must also be noted with regard to the two main 
foundations of the full protection and security standard, that other sources also can 
play a considerable role due to the very minimalistic formulations of treaty law and 
the wide scope of due diligence according to customary international law. 
 
(3) Interpretation and application  
The great influence of the two main foundations of the standard is also reflected in 
the way in which it is interpreted in arbitral practice. Here, tribunals seek through the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to apply treaty law and customary 
international law. It is here at the intersection of the treaty based standard and the 
customary international law standard where the application of the standard through 
the prism of the concept due diligence becomes particularly challenging. The three 
part concept entails an obligation to which the host state is subjected, namely (i) the 
obligation to prevent an occurrence, (ii) the obligation to restore the investor to his 
previous position and (iii) the obligation to investigate, charge and punish the parties 
responsible. These elements of the concept of due diligence make issues dealing with 
full protection more complicated than otherwise due to the relative nature of these 
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substantive elements and other issues (e.g. the level of diligence and the legal effects 
of time) that need to be taken into account when determing whether the level of 
protection owed to the investor. It seems, in addition, that tribunals are at times 
susceptible to arguments that take into account the development of the host state. In 
such cases a tribunal might under exceptional circumstances conclude that a state 
was unable to take “reasonable measures” in order to provide the investor with 
protection and security. If a tribunal is unable to come to such a conclusion with 
regard to what “reasonable measures” might be necessary, it is able to address the 
issue when determining quantum.  
 
(4) Violations – judicial balancing between different legal interests 
It appears from the arbitral practice reviewed that the full protection and security 
standard is violated more often in certain scenarios that others. The “traditional 
methods” of violating the standard consist of when the state requisites the 
investment or does not provide protection and security prior to or during an attack 
from third parties. This field has, however, also been evolving rapidly in recent years 
not least because of the different approaches taken by tribunals to determine the 
judicial balancing between, on one hand, the legal interest of the investor, and, on the 
other hand, the legal interest of the host state. With the widening formulation of the 
standard, including provisions that expand the definition of the concept of 
“investment” and that provide for “legal security”, investors have sought 
compensation in cases where the host state has sought to amend its laws and 
regulations – an act that has had negative effect on the investor’s business in the host 
state. Arbitral practice reveals that while tribunals are generally conservative with 
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Annex IV. Analytical table of Investor-State cases during 1990-2012 
 
No. Parties to dispute, 
















1. Asian Agricultural 
Products v Republic of 
Sri Lanka, ICSID 















Violation The words 
“full protection 
and security” 
do not entail 

















       
2. American 
Manufacturing & 
Trading Inc. v 
Republic of Zaire, 
ICSID Award, 21 
February 1997 
US-Zaire BIT Investment 
destroyed during 














security – it is 
an objective 
obligation that 
must not be 







       
3. Wena Hotels Ltd. v 
Arab Republic of 
Egypt, ICSID Award, 








investor one year 
later – revocation 
of license to 
operate 
investment 




Violation The state did 
not (i) prevent 
the seizure of 
the investment 
or return it to 
the investor 
after it had 
been seized  
(ii) punish the 
officials that 
orchestrated 




       
No. Parties to dispute, 
















4. Alex Genin v Estonia, 





purchased a bank 
but banking 
license later 
revoked – claims 




treaty law and 
ICSID 
Convention 
No violation Investor 
claimed 






due to lack of 
proof 
       
5. Ronald S. Lauder v 
Czech Republic, 














Treaty law and 
international 
law 










to law and the 
use of 
regulatory 
powers did not 
violate the 
standard  
       
6. CME v Czech 
Republic, UNCITRAL 



























investor and a 
Czech business 












       
350
 265 
No. Parties to dispute, 
















7. Middle Eastern 
Cement v Egypt, 




A ship owned by 
the investor was 
seized and sold at 
auction without 
notification being 
sent to the 
investor 













provided for in 







be a violation 
8. Mondev International 
Ltd. v United States of 
America, ICSID 
Award, 11 October 
2002 
NAFTA Investor won a 
trial case against a 
public entity that 
was thought to 
have violated a 





on the entity’s 
immunity from 
jurisdiction 
Treaty law and 
international 
law 
No violation as 




to lack of 
jurisdiction 
Article 1105(1) 



















decision in the 
1920s 
 
A tribunal may 







sources of law 
351
 266 
       
No. Parties to dispute, 
















9. ADF Group Inc. v 
United States of 
America, ICSID 
Award (Additional 
Facility), 9 January 
2003 
NAFTA The claimant, a 
contractor in a 
construction 
project, was only 
able to provide 
for material at a 
higher cost due 
to a Buy 
American 
requirement  










not sustain its 
claim that 
actions taken 





       
10. Tecnicas 
Medioambienta les 
Tecmed S.A. v 
Mexico, ICSID Award 
(Additional Facility), 





successfully in an 
auction relating 
to a landfill of 
hazardous 
industrial waste – 
authorization to 
run the landfill 





Treaty law No violation The investor 
did not furnish 
evidence to 












       
11. The Loewen Group 
Inc. and Raymond L. 
Loewen v United 
States of America, 
ICSID Award 
(Additional Facility), 
26 June 2003 
NAFTA The claimant was 




used against him 
– claimant lost 
and was ordered 
to pay a vast 
amount in 
damages  
Treaty law and 
international 
law 
No violation By not 
pursuing an 




unable to show 





       
       
       
       
       
       
352
 267 
No. Parties to dispute, 



















v Republic of Ecuador, 





entered into an 
agreement 
relating to oil 
exploration in 
host state – the 
investor paid 
VAT on all 
purchases in host 
state and applied 
for 
reimbursement – 
host state denied 
all 
reimbursements  




















Obchodni Banka A.S. 
v Slovak Republic, 





which was a 
public company 




failed to cover 
losses incurred 
by a collection 
company 
according to an 
agreement made 
between the 





Treaty law and 
international 
law and Czech 
law 







its loans and 
breach the host 
state’s 
commitments 




14. Eureko B.V. v 







company as a 





ation became a 
political issue and 
the host state 
reneged on its 
prior 
commitments – 
officials of the 
investor harassed 
by authorities 
Treaty law and 
international 
law 
No violation The tribunal 
could not find 
clear evidence 








and came close 
to a violation – 
if acts had been 
repeated the 
country would 





       
No. Parties to dispute, 
















15. Bogdanov v Moldova, 





changes made to 
regulatory 
framework after 
investment made  
Treaty law No violation Standard 
formulated in 
such a way that 





       
16. Noble Ventures v 











place – civil 
unrest ensued 
after workers 
were not paid 




ments made by 
politicians – 
police refused to 
exercise powers  
Treaty law and 
international 
law 
No violation It is doubtful 
whether treaty 







law – the 







not proven that 
alleged injuries 
could have 
been prevented  
       
17. Saluka Investments 
BV v Czech Republic, 
UNCITRAL Award, 





privatized one of 
its banks, the 




difficulties – in 
addition, the host 
state (i) 
suspended the 
trading of the 
bank’s shares, (ii) 
prohibited the 
investor to 
transfer its shares 
in the bank and 
(iii) searched the 
premises of the 
investor a part of 
an investigation 
Treaty law and 
international 
law 
No violation The decisions 
















premises of the 
investor was  
successfully 
challenged in 
state courts  
354
 269 
       
No. Parties to dispute, 
















18. Azurix Corp. v 
Argentina, ICSID 








and disposed of 
sewerage water – 
government 
measures 




ation of revisions 
to tariff regime to 
address years of 
disinvestment  
Treaty law and 
international 
law 
Violation Full protection 
and security 














       
19. PSEG Global Inc v 
Turkey, ICSID Award, 











Treaty law and 
international 
law 
No violation Violations of 
protection and 
security could 
not be found – 






of the case did 
not justify such 
an interpret-
ation 
       
20. Siemens A.G. v 
Argentina, ICSID 























Treaty law and 
international 
law 
Violation The obligation 
to provide 
protection and 










the state for 








       
No. Parties to dispute, 
















21. Eastern Sugar B.V. v 
Czech Republic, SCC 







after the downfall 
of the iron 
curtain – a 
number of years 




that affected the 
investment  






















actions of the 
host state, not 
third parties – 
actions of host 
state dealt with 
in fair and 
equitable 
treatment  
       
22. Enron Corp. v 
Argentina, ICSID 





in a gas 
transportation 
company 









made due to 
economic 
instability 




No violation The standard 
has historically 
been developed 
in the context 
of physical 
protection and 
security – there 












       
23. MCI Power Group 
L.C. and New Turbine 
Inc. v Ecuador, ICSID 













the investor  













and court cases 
that were filed 
against investor 
addressed in 






No. Parties to dispute, 
















24. Compañía de Aguas 
del Aconquija S.A. and 
Vivendi Universal S.A. 




The investor was 
granted a 
concession 
agreement for the 
water and sewage 















Treaty law and 
international 
law 
Violation The BIT’s text 





– scope of 
protection 
interpreted to 





full security – 
the standard 
can apply to 
more than 
physical 
security of an 
investor or the 
investment  
because both 
can be harassed 
without 
physical harm  
25. Parkerings 
Compagniet A.S. v 
Lithuania, ICSID 








Treaty law No violation The state 
fulfilled the 
obligation 





authors of the 
vandalism 
26. Sempra Energy Int. v 
Argentina, ICSID 











Treaty law and 
International 
law 
No violation Historically the 
standard has 




tribunal did not 





about lack of 
protection and 





       
No. Parties to dispute, 
















27. BG Group Plc. v 
Argentina, 
UNCITRAL Award, 







dealt with gas 
transportation 













Treaty law and 
international 
law 






security – as 











       
28. Biwater Gauff Ltd. v 
United Republic of 
Tanzania, ICSID 




took part in a 
tender and was 
awarded a project 
to repair and 
expand the Dar 
es Salaam Water 
and Sewerage 
infrastructure – 








took over the 
investor’s 
business 
Treaty law and 
international 
law 
Violation The inclusion 








security – it 
implies that 
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No. Parties to dispute, 
















29. Rumeli Telekom A.S. 
and Telekomikasyon 
Hizmetleri A.S. v 
Republic of 
Kazakhstan, ICSID 










partner in a state 
auction – after 
the investment 








the investor lost 
control of the 
investment 
Treaty law and 
international 
law 




obliges a state 
to provide a 
certain level of 
protection 
from physical 
damage – the 




orders given by 
state officials 
but by orders 







       
30. Plama Consortium 
Ltd. v Bulgaria, ICSID 










difficulties due to 
poor economic 
times – claimant 









the investment - 
judicial 
authorities 
thought to have 
created problems 





Treaty law and 
international 
law 
No violation The obligation 
to provide 
protection and 
security is an 
obligation of 














acted in a way 
that violated 
the standard 
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No. Parties to dispute, 


















31. National Grid Plc. v 
Argentina, 







that was sold as a 
part of a 
privatization 







currency with the 
US dollar – due 













Violation The obligation 







– if the 
standard is (i) 
not formulated 






with fair and 
equitable 
treatment and 






is no reason to 
limit the 
application of 




       
32. Jan de Nul N.V. and 
Dredging International 
N.V. v Arab Republic 
of Egypt, ICSID 








were rewarded a 








higher costs – 
their claims for 
higher fee was 
denied 
Treaty law and 
international 
law 












       
       
       
       
       
360
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No. Parties to dispute, 
















33. LESI SpA et al v 
Algeria, ICSID Award, 




participated in a 
tender in order to 
cooperate in the 
construction of a 
dam that was to 
supply the City of 
Algiers with 









civil war within 
the host country 
 
Treaty law  No violation The BIT 
included two 
versions of the 




security and (ii) 
a specific one 
dealing with 
protection 
during inter alia 
armed conflict 
and revolution 
that was not 
less than MFN 
treatment or 
national 
treatment – the 
tribunal found 
that security 
issues were so 
severe that they 
were revol-
utionary – no 
violation found 
as the host 
state had taken 
active measures 
to address the 
security 
problems 
34. Waguih Elie George 
Siag and Clorinda 
Vecchi v Egypt, 






estate from the 
government for 
the purposes of 
developing a 






that the host 







Treaty law and 
international 
law  
Violation The standard is 
not absolute, 
the state must 
exercise due 
diligence to 




to be taken by 
the state, he 
requested 
protection – 
the state failed 
to prevent its 
taking and to 
return it after 
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No. Parties to dispute, 
















35. Pantechniki S.A. 
Contr. & Engineers v 
Albania, ICSID 






the collapse of a 
pyramid scheme 
Treaty law and 
international 
law 










available to the 
state 
       
36. Mohammad Ammar 
Al-Bahloul v 
Tajikistan, SCC 


















Treaty law  No violation The investor 
could not 
prove action or 
inaction of 
security forces 
– matters of 
justice not 
subjected to a 
strict standard  
       
37. Yury Bogdanov v 
Moldova, SCC Award, 
30 March 2010 
Russia-
Moldova BIT 
The host state 
levied high 
administrative 
charges on the 
investor’s 
company  
















the standard  
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
362
 277 
No. Parties to dispute, 
















38. GEMPLUS and 
TALSUD v Mexico, 
ICSID Award, 16 June 
2010 
France-




entered into a 
concession 
agreement with 
investor, the host 
state requisited 
the investment  
Treaty law and 
international 
law 




not entail a 
strict obligation 




by third parties, 




       
39. Suez and Vivendi et al 
v Argentina, ICSID 





The host state 
privatized Santa 
Fe’s water and 
sewage services – 










addition to later 
taking over the 
investment  
Treaty law and 
international 
law 
No violation After having 
considered 
each BIT, the 
historical 
development 













an obligation to 
maintain a 
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No. Parties to dispute, 
















40. Suez and InterAgua v 
Argentina, ICSID 







The host state 
privatized the 
water and sewage 
services in 
Buenos Aires – 










addition to later 
taking over the 
investment  
Treaty law and 
international 
law 
No violation After having 
considered 
each BIT, the 
historical 
development 
of the standard 
according to 
international 













an obligation to 
maintain a 
stable legal and 
commercial 
environment  
       
41. AES Summit 
Generation Limited 
AES-Tisza Erömü Kft. 
v Hungary, ICSID 




In 1995, the host 
state privatized 
its energy sector 




















Treaty law and 
international 
law 





not imply that 
no change in 
law can occur 
that affects the 
investor’s 
rights 
       
364
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No. Parties to dispute, 
















42. Frontier Petroleum 
Services v Czech 
Republic, UNCITRAL 









in order to use its 
assets in a joint 
venture, which 
was established 
with a Czech 
business partner 




against his Czech 
business partner 
– investor sought 
to enforce in the 
host state but 
failed – the 
investor claimed 
that Czech courts 
and officials had 
failed to protect 
and secure his 
investment  
Treaty law and 
international 
law 










courts and legal 
remedies 
available to 
investors – eve 
if a court 
decision is 




lead to state 
responsibility if 
courts act in 




43. Total SA v Argentina, 






provided by the 
host state, the 
claimant invested 
power generation 
industries – the 










Treaty law and 
international 
law 
No violation Full protection 
and security 
standard a part 













found that the 
host state had 
not violated the 
standard – a 
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No. Parties to dispute, 
















44. GEA Group 
Aktiengesellschaft v 
Ukraine, ICSID 




claimed that the 
host state had (i) 
not punished 





failed to respond 
to an attack on 
one of the 
investor’s 
employees and 
(iii) not punished 
its business party 
in the Ukraine 
for 
misrepresentation 
Treaty law and 
international 
law 










theft of its 
products, (ii) an 
investigation to 




and (iii) the 
host state could 
not be held 
responsible for 




45. Paushok et al v 
Mongolia, 
UNCITRAL Award, 





invested in the 
gold industry in 
the host state, 
became subject 





actions in the 
form of tax 
audits, etc.   
Treaty law and 
international 
law 
No violation While 
acknowledging 















could not find 
anything to 
conclude that 
there had been 
a violation of 
the standard 
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No. Parties to dispute, 
















46. Impregilo S.p.A v 
Argentina, ICSID 




invested in the 
host country’s 







to maintain his 
services as his 
non-collection 
rates for services 
rendered had 
reached 60% - 
the investor 
requested of the 
host state that 
the concession be 
renegotiated but 




















been violated – 








had also been a 




47. El Paso v Argentina, 





invested in the 
host country’s 
energy sector – as 
a result of the 
2001-2002 
economic crisis, 










Treaty law No violation The standard is 





law – the host 





of third parties 
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No. Parties to dispute, 
















48. Spyridon Roussalis v 
Romania, ICSID 





invested in the 
host country, but 
disagreement 
arose inter alia as 
to the claimant’s 
further additional 
obligations in 













of fiscal duties 
Treaty law No violation Criminal 
proceedings 










fiscal duties – 
an interdiction 
order was not 
unusual, 
commonly 
used in order 










by use of force 
49. Oostergetel v Slovak 
Republic, UNCITRAL 







privatized by the 
host country – 
the company 
owed taxed when 
sold but tax 
liabilities 
increased – the 
state demanded 
that the company 
be declared 
bankrupt – the 
investor argued 
that the host 
country had in 
cooperation with 
a business group 
brought about 
the company’s 




Treaty law No violation The same facts 
that gave rise 







rubric of fair 
and equitable 
treatment – the 
allegation of a 
breach of full 
protection and 
security lacked 
a factual basis 
taking into 
account that 
the same facts 
had been 
referred to 





       
No. Parties to dispute, 
















50. SAUR International 
S.A. v Argentina, 




The investor was 










the investor was 
refused to 
increase service 
charges – the 
investment was 
taken over by the 
government – the 
investor’s offices 
were overtaken 






Treaty law No violation The presence 

















not proven – 





serious to be a 
violation  
51. Toto v Lebanon, 





entered into an 
agreement with 
the host state to 
construct a part 
of the Arab 
Highway linking 
inter alia Beirut to 
Damascus – the 
investor argued 
that the host 
state had failed to 
expropriate 
private property, 
failed to protect 
its possessions 
and protect it 
from disgruntled 





Treaty law No violation Even though 




security, it does 






amounts to an 
impairment 
that affects the 
investment’s 
physical 
integrity – the 
investor failed 




taken or that 








"ABSTRACT" der Dissertation: 
FULL PROTECTION AND SECURITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 
Die vorliegende Dissertation behandelt einen Investitionsschutzstandard des 
Internationalen Investitionsrechts, das Gebot des vollen Schutzes und der Sicherheit 
("full protection and security standard"). Die Dissertation gliedert sich in drei Abschnitte 
und sieben Kapitel. 
Abschnitt I stellt die Untersuchung hinsichtlich Gliederung und Inhalt vor. Kapitel 1 
enthält die Beschreibung des Umfangs des Untersuchungsgegenstandes sowie eine 
Definition der Begriffe und der strukturellen Merkmale. Kapitel 2 behandelt die 
geschichtliche Entwicklung des Standards des vollen Schutzes und der Sicherheit ("full 
protection and security"). Die Darstellung führt Gründe für den schrittweisen Verlust 
des diesbezüglichen Einvernehmens, welches durch die westlichen Staaten während der 
kolonialen Expansion erzielt worden war, an; behandelt die Kodifikation der 
Freundschafts-, Handels- und Schifffahrtsabkommen, das Aufkommen bilateraler 
Investitionsschutzabkommen und den Misserfolg des Versuchs der Kodifikation eines 
multilateralen Instruments des Investitionsschutzes. Die besondere Bedeutung dieser 
historischen Perspektive liegt darin, dass der maßgebliche Unterschied zwischen dem 
Standard des vollen Schutzes und der Sicherheit ("full protection and security") und 
anderen Schutzstandards wie beispielsweise jenem der fairen und gerechten Behandlung 
der Anleger ("fair and equitable treatment") aus der unterschiedlichen geschichtlichen 
Entstehung erklärt werden kann. Dieser Umstand ist bedeutsam, da hiervon die 
Anwendung des Schutzstandards des vollen Schutzes und der Sicherheit ("full protection 
and security") betroffen sein könnte.   
Abschnitt II behandelt mit der Darstellung der Quellen, der Interpretation und des 
Umfangs drei grundlegende Aspekte des gegenständlichen Schutzstandards. Kapitel 3 
enthält die Abhandlung der unterschiedlichen Quellen des Standards, wie insbesondere 
völkerrechtliche Investitionsabkommen, Völkergewohnheitsrecht und Schiedssprüche. 
Jede der Quellen wird einer eigenständigen Analyse unterzogen. Verschiedene Beispiele 
unterschiedlicher Formulierungen des Standards in Investitionsschutzabkommen, 
regionalen und bilateralen Abkommen und Verträgen werden dargestellt und 
besprochen. Zudem umfasst die Untersuchung bedeutsame Staatenpraxis im Bereich des 
Völkergewohnheitsrechts sowie Schiedssprüche. Besondere Fragestellungen in Bezug auf 
die Merkmale der jeweiligen Quelle werden herausgearbeitet. Problemstellungen 
hinsichtlich der wechselseitigen Beziehung der Quellen sowie deren Einfluss auf den 
Inhalt des Standards werden aufgeworfen und einer Lösung zugeführt. Das vierte Kapitel  
befasst sich mit grundlegenden Fragen der Auslegung, insbesondere der Bedeutung der 
Wiener Vertragsrechtskonvention im Rahmen des Interpretationsvorgangs. Dieses 
Kapitel unterzieht die Begriffe "Schutz" ("protection") und Sicherheit ("security") einer 
Analyse hinsichtlich ihrer inhaltlichen Bedeutung, da dieser Auslegung im Licht der 
Allgemeinen Auslegungsregeln gemäß der "gewöhnlichen, seinen Bestimmungen in 
ihrem Zusammenhang zukommenden Bedeutung" (Artikel 31(1) der Wiener 
Vertragsrechtskonvention) große Wichtigkeit zukommt. Überdies werden in diesem 
Kapitel die bedeutsamsten Mittel des Auslegungsvorgangs, insbesondere die 
Wortinterpretation, die Auslegung nach Ziel und Zweck, die systematische Interpretation 
und die Auslegung nach dem Willen der Parteien dargestellt. Abschließend werden 
Fragen betreffend der Rolle und Auswirkung des Völkergewohnheitsrechts im Rahmen 
des Auslegungsvorgangs besprochen sowie die Problempunkte der bedeutenden Stellung 
des Völkergewohnheitsrechts trotz der ständig steigenden Zahl an bilateralen 
Investitionsschutzabkommen (BITs) und anderer Instrumente des Investitionsrechts 
problematisiert. Kapitel 5 behandelt den Inhalt des Standards des vollen Schutzes und 
der Sicherheit ("standard of full protection and security"), sowie insbesondere 
konzeptuelle Fragen der diesen Standard bedingenden materiellen Elemente. In diesem 
Kapitel werden außerdem jene grundlegenden Aspekte thematisiert, die sich stellen, 
wenn ein Staat einer "due diligence" Prüfung hinsichtlich der Frage unterzogen wird, ob 
er seiner Verpflichtung zur Einhaltung des vollen Schutzes und Sicherheit ("full 
protection and security") nachgekommen ist. Weiters wird die Anwendung des Standards 
dahingehend untersucht, ob und in welchem Umfang der Standard über physische 
Sicherheit hinausgehenden Schutz und Sicherheit ("protection and security") 
gewährleistet. Die Untersuchung behandelt überdies die Frage, ob und in welchem 
Umfang der Entwicklungsgrad im Empfangsstaat die Anwendung des Standards in 
Einzelfällen beeinflussen kann. Untersucht werden mögliche Überschneidungen dieses 
Standards mit anderen Grundsätzen des Investitionsrechts wie beispielsweise jenem der 
fairen und gerechten Behandlung der Anleger ("standard of fair and equitable 
treatment"), der Enteignung oder der Rechtsverweigerung.  
Abschnitt III behandelt Fragen der Verletzung des Standards. Kapitel 6 befasst 
sich mit der Darstellung und Analyse der Verletzungen des Standards und deren 
unterschiedlichen Ausformungen. Dieses Kapitel untersucht die Frage, ob bestimmte, 
auf Fakten basierende Szenarien darstellbar sind, in denen regelmäßige Verstöße zu 
erwarten sind. Dieses Vorgehen ist bedingt durch die unterschiedlichen Ausprägungen 
der Verletzungen. Die Identifikation dieser Formen und unter welchen Umständen diese 
auftreten können hilft bei der besseren Darstellung der Gefahren für einen Investor nach 
erfolgter Investition. Das abschließende Kapitel 7 enthält die Zusammenfassung der 
Forschungsergebnisse sowie die Schlussbemerkungen.  
 
 
ABSTRACT OF DOCTORAL THESIS: 
FULL PROTECTION AND SECURITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 
The thesis covers one of the investment standards of international investment law, 
namely the full protection and security standard. The thesis can be divided into three 
parts and seven chapters. 
In Part I, the study is introduced in terms of structure and substance. Chapter 1 
provides a description of the scope of the research topic and a definition of its terms and 
structure. Chapter 2 covers the historical development of the full protection and security 
standard. A discussion about the reasons why the consensus, which had been reached 
amongst nations during the colonial expansion of Western Powers, came to an end; the 
codification of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaties; the emergence of bilateral 
investment treaties and the failure of multilateral attempts to codify an instrument 
providing for investment protection will be undertaken. The historical perspective is of 
considerable importance due to the fact that one of the defining differences between the 
standard of full protection and security vis-à-vis other standards, e.g. the standard of fair 
and equitable treatment, is their different historical origin. This issue is important as it 
could affect the application of the full protection and security standard.  
Part II deals with three fundamental issues concerning the standard: sources, 
interpretation and content. Chapter 3 contains a discussion dealing with the various 
sources of the standard, such as international investment treaties, customary international 
law, general international law and arbitral awards. Each source will be studied 
independently. Various examples of different formulations of the standard in bilateral 
investment treaties, regional and multilateral treaties will be examined and discussed. In 
addition, state practice relevant within the context of customary international law and 
various arbitral awards will be discussed and issues concerning the nature of each source 
addressed. Questions relating to the relationship between these sources of law and to 
what extent these sources have on the substantive content of the standard will be asked 
and answered. Chapter 4 will discuss general issues with regard to interpretation, such as 
to what extent the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties influences the process of 
interpretation. The chapter will address the substantive meaning of “protection” and 
“security”, not least because of the important role which the objective meaning of these 
concepts play when interpreted through the prism of “ordinary meaning” as prescribed 
by Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention. In addition, the chapter will address the most 
relevant tools of interpretation, most notably textual interpretation, object and purpose, 
contextual interpretation and whether the intention of the parties can be ascertained. 
Finally, questions concerning the ever-present role and influence of customary 
international law during the process of interpretation will be discussed and issues dealing 
with the important role of customary international law despite the ever-growing number 
of BIT and other instruments addressed. Chapter 5 deals with the content of the 
standard of full protection and security, including conceptual issues relating to the 
substantive elements of which the standard consists. Moreover, the chapter will ask 
questions as to which underlying issues are needed to explore when a due diligence 
assessment is made in order to determine whether a state has fulfilled its obligations to 
provide protection and security. Furthermore, a discussion about the standard’s 
application will address whether and to what extent the standard provides for protection 
and security that goes beyond physical security. In addition, the study will focus on 
whether and to what extent a host state’s level of development can affect the application 
of the standard in individual cases. The possible overlap between the standard and other 
investment principles, e.g. the standard of fair and equitable treatment, expropriation and 
denial of justice, is addressed.  
Part III deals with issues relating to the violations of the standard. In Chapter 6, the 
violations of the standard and their many manifestations will be addressed and analyzed. 
The chapter will address whether certain fact-based scenarios can be established in which 
the standard is most commonly violated. This is necessary due to the fact that a violation 
can take many forms. The identification of these forms and under what circumstances 
they might arise will provide for a clearer picture about the dangers which an investor is 
faced with after having made the investment. Finally, Chapter 7 contains a summary of 
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